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Abstract
This thesis develops and defends a Peircean conception of the task of metaphysics
and critically compares it with recent anti-metaphysical forms of pragmatism.
Peirce characterises metaphysics in terms of its place within his hierarchical
classification of the sciences. According to the classification, metaphysics depends
on logic for principles and provides principles to the natural and social sciences.
This arrangement of the sciences is defended by appeal to Peirce’s account of
philosophy as ‘cenoscopy’. The dependence of the natural and social sciences on
cenoscopy is then argued for on the basis of Peirce’s rejection of psychologism and
in terms of the necessity of abductive inference. Peirce’s position is then compared
with recent forms of pragmatism. While it is less naturalistic, Peirce’s position is
defended on pragmatist grounds.
An account of Peirce on truth is then developed. Peirce’s account of truth in
terms of an ideal limit of inquiry is defended as consistent with recent, more de-
flationary, approaches. The truth of ‘abstract propositions’ is a matter of local in-
defeasibility. These abstract propositions are related to the ‘absolute truth’, un-
derstood as a single non-abstract proposition. The truth of this proposition is then
understood in terms of an identity theory.
Two conceptions of Peircean metaphysics are presented. Both are ‘abductive’.
Their task is to explain the possibility of success in inquiry. However, only one
proposal accepts the notion of an absolute truth. The ‘absolutist’ proposal is de-
fended as an interpretation of Peirce and as a contemporary option for pragmatist
philosophers.
The thesis concludes by comparing recent anti-metaphysical arguments due to
HuwPrice with the Peircean position. Room for the absolutist proposal is defended
by means of an account of recent exchanges between Price and Robert Brandom
on dispositional modality.
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Introduction
Pragmatism has a difficult relationship with metaphysics. On one hand, the prag-
matists direct their attention towards the concrete details of our practices, often
at the expense of traditional philosophical concerns. Some even take the primary
aim of pragmatism to be the end of metaphysics (e.g. Seigfried 2001; Rorty 1979).
Attention to ourselves and our practices can encourage the thought that there
is no story to be told about the world as it is independently of us. On the other
hand, many classical and contemporary pragmatists have tried to produce meta-
physical work consistent with their pragmatist scruples.1 This thesis offers an ac-
count of Peirce’s conception of metaphysics and critically compares it with some
recent, anti-metaphysical, pragmatist positions. It is hoped that focusing on the
basic strategy that Peirce attempts to carry out in his metaphysics, rather than on
his detailed first-order metaphysical proposals, will enable us to come to a better
understanding of its contemporary viability.
This study, since it is concerned with Peirce’s understanding of the role and
function of metaphysics, will focus primarily on Peirce’s later work. Peirce’s creat-
ive work on first-order metaphysical issues largely occurs in his Monist Metaphys-
ical Series (1891–1893), and in some earlier material, including A Guess at the
Riddle (1887–1888). This work will sometimes be referred to in order to illustrate
Peirce’s conception of the task of metaphysics.2 After the Monist series, Peirce
turns his attention to other issues. One set of issues concerns the systematic re-
lationships between philosophy, its various subdisciplines, and the other domains
1One tendency is to endorse some form of process metaphysics (e.g. Rockwell 2008; Hausman
2002; Seibt 1990; Rosenthal 1986). For a more classical example, consider William James’s at-
tempts to decide between metaphysical hypotheses (in part) by considering their implications for
our practical life (e.g. ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’ in James 1948). A contemporary Jamesian,
‘ethically grounded’, version of pragmatist metaphysics is developed in Pihlström 2009.
2There are many worthwhile studies of this work in its own right already available (e.g. Reyn-
olds 2002; Parker 1998; Sheriff 1994; Esposito 1980). There are also important studies of the form
of ‘scholastic realism’ that Peirce adopted (e.g. Mayorga 2007; Boler 1963).
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of theoretical inquiry. One important product of this work is a detailed hierarch-
ical classification of the various domains of theoretical inquiry. We thus find many
resources for understanding the nature of metaphysics, and the nature of philo-
sophy in general, in Peirce’s work from the mid-1890’s onward. Moreover, much
of this work, especially from 1898 onward, was carried with a defence of Peirce’s
form of pragmatism in mind. If we want clarity about the role of metaphysics for
a pragmatist, then Peirce’s work from the mid-1890’s onward is the place to look.
The recent anti-metaphysical arguments of Huw Price can be compared with
Peirce’s conception of metaphysics. For Price, pragmatism is both naturalistic and
anti-metaphysical. Price’s pragmatism aims to ‘makemincemeat’ out of metaphys-
ics (Price 2008, p. 95). Like other analytic pragmatists, Price develops the pragmat-
ism’s anti-metaphysical tendency by deploying deflationary semantics. The locus
classicus for this kind of move is Richard Rorty’s rejection of representationalism
(e.g. Rorty 1982, p. xxv; Rorty 1979, pp. 3–7).3 Price’s anti-representationalism is
a result of his particular form of naturalism: ‘subject naturalism’. Price takes it
that the pragmatist naturalist should start with what the natural sciences tell us
about ourselves, rather than with what the natural sciences tell us about reality in
general. If we start from this perspective, then we will see that the thought that we
could either deny or affirm claims about the way the world is independently of our
contingent situation (i.e. metaphysics) is hopeless. There is no ‘representational
notion’ that could, consistently with subject naturalist scruples, do the work of
metaphysics. On Price’s view, then, we should be quietists regarding metaphysical
claims.
Price provides a useful contrast with Peirce because they strikingly disagree
on almost every issue that this thesis will consider. We will see that they diverge
over the way in which a pragmatist should be a naturalist. Whereas Price begins
with a natural-scientific story about ourselves, developed from a third-person per-
spective, Peirce thinks we start from the first-personal and second-personal per-
spectives of the participant in theoretical inquiry. While Price develops an account
of the function of various vocabularies ‘from the outside’, Peirce’s pragmatism at-
tempts to articulate appropriate ideals for inquiry ‘from the inside’. Peirce, in ad-
dition, takes this first-person and second-person work to be foundational for the
natural (and social) sciences. By taking philosophy to have a foundational role for
3This thesis does not deal in any detail with the relationship between Peirce’s and Rorty’s forms
of pragmatism. These issues have been dealt with by previous scholarship (e.g. Bacon 2007; Cooke
2006, pp. 144–152; Hildebrand 2003; Mounce 2002; Haack 1995; Hausman 1993, pp. 194–225).
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the other sciences, Peirce rejects both Price’s naturalism, and ‘liberal naturalism’
more broadly. Moreover, Peirce thinks that we can move from claims about the
truth of various propositions to claims about metaphysical reality.
However, there remains a sufficient kernel of commonality for the comparison
to remain interesting. Both are pragmatists in so far as they take philosophical
theorising to include, and be constrained by, some account of ‘practice’. We are to
understand ourselves as creatures interacting with an environment before we at-
tempt to provide an account of, say, reality or thought in general. They differ in
so far a Price’s story about practice is taken from the natural sciences, whereas
Peirce’s is an attempt to produce, from within, an account of any possible inquirer.
This account of the possible inquirer is then read onto reality by means of ab-
ductive inference. Interestingly, the room for something like Peirce’s view within
contemporary pragmatist is suggested by Robert Brandom’s recent defence of a
combination of a characteristically pragmatist form of ‘modal expressivism’ with
a more full-throated modal realism. That is, there is a move from a claim about
what is necessary for any possible user of a certain kind of language, to a claim
about the modal structure of reality.
Chapter One introduces Peirce’s hierarchical classification of the sciences. The
classification clearly displays Peirce’s conception of the task of metaphysics, but
also his account of the relationship between philosophy and the other sciences. The
chapter begins by setting out, on the basis of work by Beverley Kent, Peirce’s post-
1902 version of the classification. This final version of the classification includes
both ethics and esthetics as amongst the disciplines that logic and metaphysics
depend on. This chapter considers what Peirce means by calling something a sci-
ence. What the sciences share is not any particular method or collection of results,
but rather, a ‘spirit’. The theoretical sciences are those social practices which have
truth as their ultimate aim. The classification is hierarchical in so far as it presents
a one-way relation of ‘principle-provision’ between the sciences. In addition to this,
‘data’ and ‘suggestions’ can be passed from subordinate sciences to superordinate
sciences. The two important things to note for our purposes, are that the hierarchy
depicts the natural and social sciences as dependent on philosophy for principles,
and depicts metaphysics as dependent on the rest of philosophy. The chapter con-
cludes by considering two possible pragmatist objections to Peirce’s scheme: that
it is foundationalist and that it is reductionist. I suggest that Peirce’s scheme does
indeed have those features, but in a way that should not worry the pragmatist.
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In Chapter Two, Peirce’s claim that philosophy is superordinate to the natural
and social sciences is defended. This requires, first, an account of what Peirce
thinks distinguishes philosophy from those other sciences. I introduce Peirce’s
claim that philosophy should be thought of as ‘cenoscopy’: the observational sci-
ence of the commonly available. The natural and social sciences are, on the other
hand, forms of ‘idioscopy’, or observational sciences that depend on observations
that are not available to all inquirers. I argue that cenoscopy must be understood
to be the study on the basis of observations that must be available to any inquirer
simply by virtue of being an inquirer. This feature of Peirce’s account of philosophy
enables it to produce (fallible) necessity claims. That is, it can make claims about
what must be the case for any possible inquirer. I then offer a series of arguments
for the claim that cenoscopy should be thought of as superordinate to idioscopy.
I offer a ‘positive’ argument on the basis of the need for abductive inferences in
any form of inquiry. This leads us to want an account of what the inquirer brings
to bear in any investigation. If the hope for convergence in the limit between in-
quirers is to be maintained, then we must likewise hope that there is an account
not just of what this or that kind of inquirer brings to an investigation, but of any
possible inquirer. I then offer a ‘negative’ argument on the basis of Peirce’s rejec-
tion of psychologism in logic. Peirce’s arguments can be generalised to apply to
any proposal that puts an idioscopic science in a foundational role for cenoscopy.
In such cases we risk forms of circularity that could undermine our attempts to
attain ‘rational self-control’.
Chapter Two concludes by drawing out the distinctions between Peirce’s ac-
count of the science-philosophy relation with the work of Huw Price and David
Macarthur. I distinguish Peirce’s position from Price’s ‘subject naturalism’ in the
way outlined previously in this introduction. I also compare it with David Macar-
thur, as a representative of the broader ‘liberal naturalist’ tradition. Unlike Price,
Macarthur insists that philosophy should involve first-person and third-person in-
formation. That is, we should not adopt scientism within philosophy. However, on
Macarthur’s view, philosophy should relinquish any pretensions to a foundational
role for the other disciplines or human practices. I argue that Peirce’s position,
while in some respects less naturalistic, is preferable to both.
In Chapter Three, the resources for the transition from logic to metaphysics
are developed. This turns on an account of truth. I begin with an account of the
relationship between well-functioning inquiry and true propositions. I then con-
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sider the distinct but compatible interpretations of Peirce on truth developed by
Christopher Hookway and Cheryl Misak. I argue that these interpretations offer
a contextualist account of truth in the sense that they focus on propositions as
answers to particular questions in particular contexts. Such views downplay the
idea that truth is an ‘ideal limit’ of inquiry. I offer an interpretation of Peirce which
increases the role for the ‘ideal limit’, understood as a notion of absolute truth. I
align the notion of the absolute truth with the idea of the ‘ultimate interpretant’
developed within Peirce’s semeiotic theory. On this understanding, there is only
one proposition that is absolutely true, and that proposition is identical with real-
ity in so far as reality is intelligible. This understanding, while idiosyncratic in
comparison with many contemporary accounts of truth, avoids many of the objec-
tions that have previously been deployed against Peirce’s account of truth. On this
view, something like the contextualist story applies to any ‘abstract’ proposition,
where by contrast the absolute truth is not abstract. The latter notion is motiv-
ated by ideals that Peirce takes to be internal to the practice of theoretical inquiry.
Chapter Three concludes by comparing the resultant account of truth with Huw
Price’s subject naturalist account of truth.
Chapter Four develops a Peircean account of the methodology of metaphys-
ics on the basis of the account of truth developed in Chapter Three. It begins by
considering Peirce’s own characterisations of the functional role of metaphysics.
On Peirce’s view, metaphysics ‘completes’ cenoscopy and ‘welds’ in to idioscopy. I
consider some of Peirce’s methods for making the shift from logic to metaphysics.
These are characterised by reading our story about any possible inquirer on to
reality. The aim is to end up with an account of any reality which could be intelli-
gibly inquired into. I consider, in addition, Peirce account of what it is to ascribe
reality to something. Peirce distinguishes between a nominalist and a realist ac-
count of reality ascriptions, and argues for the latter. On this latter account, we
cannot ascribe reality to the absolutely incognisable. I argue that this is an im-
portant methodological principle for Peirce’s transition from logic to metaphysics.
Chapter Four also attends to the connection between abduction and metaphysics.
Metaphysics is abductive in so far as it is more dependent on the use of abductive
inference than other forms of theoretical inquiry. It is also abductive in so far as
it is concerned with the conditions for successful explanation. That is, Peircean
metaphysics attempts to offer abductive hypotheses which explain either how suc-
cessful explanation in the sciences has been possible, or which offer some account
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of what any world in which successful explanation is possible would have to look
like. Finally, I consider how much of this pattern can be maintained if we adopt
only the contextualist account of truth. The merely-contextualist proposal closely
matches the account of Peirce’s metaphysics developed by Hookway. I argue that
the adoption of the idea of the absolute truth is a necessary feature of any version
of Peirce’s metaphysics that attempts to make the logic-metaphysics transition
just outlined.
In Chapter Five, I critically compare Peircean metaphysics with Price’s anti-
metaphysical arguments. I begin by presenting the basic form of Price’s argu-
ments, which turn on a rejection of representationalism. I then argue that the
merely-contextualist approach to Peirce’s metaphysics can make some headway
against Price’s position. It does this by focusing first on explanatory questions,
rather than on questions of representation. That is, for Peirce to say that some-
thing is true, even in the contextualist sense, does not automatically require us to
adopt any particular metaphysical attitude with respect to it. This contrasts with
the kind of strategy that beginswith a metaphysically loaded notion of representa-
tion. However, the contextualist approach leaves some responses open to Price. We
can derive an argument from Price according to which none of the explanations for
our success in inquiry require us to either affirm or deny judgements about mind-
independent reality. In order to make this argument, we need to consider Price’s
recent distinction between ‘e-representation’ and ‘i-representation’. Price’s claim
is that no explanation of our success in inquiry licenses the claim that judgements
can be made about reality absent some contingent ‘practical stance’ that must be
taken up in order to engage in the explanatory project at all. On Price’s view, meta-
physics would require us to be able to, per impossible, make judgements about real-
ity absent any such stance. In order to challenge this argument, I turn to the ab-
solutist version of Peircean metaphysics. I argue from this perspective that Price’s
position requires him to adopt the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions. In
addition to being inconsistent with Price’s claim that he is not doing metaphysics,
there is reason to think that a pragmatist should adopt the realist conception of
reality ascriptions instead. I conclude by arguing that something like this Peircean
move can be discerned in Brandom’s recent exchanges with Price over the status
of dispositional modality. Brandom’s arguments for a kind of modal realism track
key features of the Peircean approach.
Chapter 1
The Hierarchical Classification of
the Sciences
Introduction
Throughout this thesis we will have reason to make reference to Peirce’s hierarch-
ical classification of the sciences. Two of the core questions of the thesis concern the
relations between various aspects of theoretical inquiry. First, we need to consider
the relationship between philosophy and the other sciences. This is important for
understanding the distinct senses in which Peirce and more recent pragmatists
count as ‘naturalists’. That is, we ask in what sense philosophy is to be influenced
by developments in the sciences. Secondly, we want to know what Peirce means
by metaphysics. One aspect of this meaning which is particularly important for a
pragmatist is the way in which metaphysics influences and is influenced by work
in the other sciences. Peirce’s own account of these relations is presented in his
hierarchical classification of the sciences.1
Peirce’s readers have taken various approaches to the classification. These have
ranged from dismissal as anachronistic curiosity to endorsement as the key to the
completion of Peirce’s ‘philosophical system’. This chapter begins by suggesting
some of the issues at play in discussions of the classification. It then presents the
classification in what Beverley Kent has called its ‘perennial’ (post-1902) form. I
also follow Kent in presenting the classification as a diagram of the possible effects
1Throughout the thesis I will use ‘classification’ and ‘hierarchy’ interchangeably when referring
to Peirce’s hierarchical classification.
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of the various sciences on one another. That is, the classification’s main purpose
is to provide ‘pragmatic clarifications’ of the various forms of science.
In order to understand the classification, it will be necessary to consider first
what it is that Peirce thinks he is classifying. The chapter thus continues with
an account of what Peirce means by ‘science’. Peirce points to the ‘spirit’ of the
practitioners of science. I focus in this section on two divisions that are displayed
in the hierarchy. The first is the threefold division between theoretical, practical,
and retrospective sciences. This distinction helps to reveal what Peirce means by
the spirit of science. The second division is the distinction between three variet-
ies of theoretical science, of which two are particularly important for this thesis.
‘Cenoscopy’, Peirce’s form of first philosophy, is the science carried out on the basis
of commonly available observations. Cenoscopy is distinguished from ‘idioscopy’,
which requires special observations. Consideration of this distinction sets up the
next chapter and helps to reveal why theory and observation are so tightly linked
for Peirce.
I then turn to the core relationships that Peirce depicts in the hierarchy. For
one science to be subordinate to another in the hierarchy is for the former to be
able to receive principles from the latter, while the reverse is not true. It is also
for the former to be able to provide data and suggestions to the latter on the basis
of which it can make further inferences or adjust its methods. I provide examples
of these relationships from the history of science and from philosophy. I highlight
the claim that the sciences are dependent on philosophy for principles. This claim
will be taken up in more detail in Chapter Two.
The chapter concludes by heading off some objections and misinterpretations
of the classification. These concern the extent to which Peirce’s proposal should
be thought of as either foundationalist or reductionist. I argue that there is an
ineliminably foundationalist aspect to the classification, but that this should not
worry the pragmatist. I also argue that there is a reading of the classification that
is reductionist and that Peirce entertains it in some places. However, it is not a
reading that we need to adopt nor is it necessarily incompatible with pragmatism.
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1 Motives and Outcomes of Peirce’s
Classificatory Project
Peirce was not alone in being concerned with the classification of, and relations
between, the sciences. The 19th century saw a great deal of interest in this task.
There were many motivations for this kind of work. These ranged from interest
in the classification as the basis for a ‘science of science’, which might reveal deep
truths about the universe, all the way to the more immediately practical task of
organising libraries and encyclopedias.2 Moreover, issues concerning the nature,
purpose, and value of the classification highlight some important dividing lines
in later Peirce scholarship. As a result, it will be worth considering what Peirce
hopes to achieve by classifying sciences. Having considered Peirce’s purposes, we
then turn to the final form of the classification.
1.1 Why Classify Sciences?
That Peirce was particularly interested in classifying sciences would not have
raised eyebrows during his lifetime, or those of previous generations. His classi-
fication has many historical antecedents and Peirce shares some motivations with
his philosophical ancestors and contemporaries.3
Modern approaches to classification start with Francis Bacon, who provided a
classification on the basis of an understanding of the ‘faculties of the soul’ (Kent
1987, p. 23). That is, on the basis of some philosophical first principles about the
nature of mind, he determined the forms that science might take. Elements of
this are maintained in Peirce’s classification, which, for instance, distinguishes
between ‘physical’ and ‘psychical’ sciences.
The mechanical philosophy, accelerated by the success of Newton in the 17th
century, endeavoured to understand all phenomena on the basis of physical prin-
ciples. As a result, it was important to understand how the other sciences might
2This knowledge-organising motivation is still alive today. Some have looked to Peirce’s classi-
fication, and his work in logic more broadly, in the context of current attempts to enable computers
to gain a semantic, rather thanmerely syntactic, understanding of their data (e.g. Sowa 2000; Legg
2013).
3Peirce was also interested in the task of classification in general. For instance, he spent a
great amount of effort attempting to classify ‘great men’ (e.g. W5:26–106, 1884–1886), German
philosophers (R1139, 1904), and ‘amusements’ (R1135, c. 1903). As Pietarinen notes, this last clas-
sification is supposed to be grafted on to the classification of practical sciences (Pietarinen 2006a,
135 n.9).
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eventually reduce to physics. This motivation led to classifications which ‘arrange
the sciences into a sequence reflecting this reduction’ (Kent 1987, p. 23). For in-
stance, by showing that the objects of biology can be reduced to the objects of chem-
istry, which can in turn be reduced to the objects of physics.
One motivation that carries across these attempted classifications is the hope
that we might discover some common features amongst the sciences or some kind
of unity amongst their variety. In Baconian terms this unity could be made sense
of in terms of the structure of the intellect which engages in science. This is what
motivates the ‘faculties’ approach. The post-Newtonian proposals, on the other
hand, worked out the unity of the sciences in terms of an underlying unity of nature
as a physical system.
As Kent notes, Peirce attempted to base his study on close observation of the
sciences as they were in his day and on the basis of his detailed ‘firsthand know-
ledge of mathematics and several sciences’ (Kent 1987, p. 16). This more empir-
ical approach was pioneered by the French positivist Auguste Comte (Kent 1987,
pp. 24–25). One motivation for this is to avoid setting up a philosophical story in
advance, based either on the assumptions of a Newtonianmetaphysic or some kind
of faculty psychology. The sciences themselves would show their relations to one
another. We will see later in this chapter that Peirce includes both an empirical
study of scientific activity at his time and a study of first principles in the method
he eventually employs for classifying the sciences.4
While Peirce’s classification answers to motivations shared with his contem-
poraries, there are also some uniquely Peircean issues in play. That Peirce thinks
the classification is important for his version of pragmatism is made clear in his
late attempts to provide a proof of his pragmatic maxim.5 The maxim, in its first-
published and most well-known form, holds that in order to achieve the ‘third
grade of clarity’ about a term of concept one should:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object. (W3:266/EP1:132, 1878)
4A fuller examination of the specifically 19th century context of Peirce’s work on the classifica-
tion can be found in Ambrosio 2016.
5For a detailed account of Peirce’s attempts to prove the maxim see Hookway 2000a and Hook-
way 2012b. A further account, focusing in particular on the mathematical aspects of the proof can
be found in Pietarinen 2011.
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It was not until 1898 that thismaximwas connected in the public imaginationwith
something called ‘pragmatism’. This was the result of William James using the
term, and crediting it to Peirce, in a public address at the University of California
delivered in that year (Castell 1948, p. xiii).6
The new attention granted to Peirce and his maxim spurred him to further
develop his own version of pragmatism and to distinguish it from others. In a
letter to William James, having expressed his agreement that pragmatism is not
merely important for philosophy, he sets out his conception of the key difference:
But I seem to myself to be the sole depositary at present of the completely developed
system, which all hangs together and cannot receive any proper presentation in frag-
ments. My own view in 1877 was crude. Even when I gave my Cambridge lectures I
had not really got to the bottom of it or seen the unity of the whole thing. It was not
until after that that I obtained the proof that logic must be founded on ethics, of which
it is a higher development. Even then, I was for some time so stupid as not to see that
ethics rests in the same manner on a foundation of esthetics [. . . ] (CP8.254, 1902)
Here Peirce refers to his defence of the maxim in the Popular Science Monthly in
the late 1870’s and his lectures delivered as part of the Cambridge Conferences
series in 1898.7 Peirce suggests that the key to his understanding the ‘unity’ of his
form of pragmatism is his realisation of the hierarchical relationship between the
three normative sciences: esthetics, ethics, and logic. That is, his late understand-
ing of pragmatism depends on developments in his classification of the sciences.8
Peirce’s letter to James also touches on one of the core areas of contention in the
reception of Peirce’s ideas. Peirce refers, with some exaggeration, to a ‘completely
developed system’. Elsewhere, we see him hoping to
make a philosophy, like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so compre-
hensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy
of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in his-
tory, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as
the filling up of its details. (EP1:247, 1887–1888)
6An account of the status of the maxim in the span between 1878 and 1898 is given in: Leary
2009.
7The former are widely available, including in the Essential Peirce and Writings (W3:242–
374/EP1:109–99, 1877–1888). They have recently been published as a single volume with supple-
mentary material (ILS). The Cambridge Conferences lectures have been published as Reasoning
and the Logic of Things (RLT). Two lectures from the series, ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’
and ‘The First Rule of Logic’, are available at EP2:27–56.
8What Peirce has in mind here can be seen in his 1903 Harvard Pragmatism lectures, where
he proceeds on the basis that ‘if, as pragmatism teaches us, what we think is to be interpreted
in terms of what we are prepared to do, then surely logic; or the doctrine of what we ought to
think, must be an application of the doctrine of what we deliberately choose to do, which is Ethics’
(EP2:142, 1903).
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Peirce’s pragmatism comes in the form of a ‘system’, or at least, in Anderson’s
phrase, a collection of ‘strands of system’ (Anderson 1995). Further, this system
is closely associated with the classification. The importance of Peirce’s systematic
ambitions is a controversial issue amongst his readers.
Thomas Goudge’s claim that Peirce’s thought is divided into two distinct and
conflicting strains, the ‘transcendentalist’ system builder and the ‘naturalist’, has
been widely rejected as an interpretation of Peirce’s project (c.f. Goudge 1950,
pp. 5–7). However, some contemporary readers of Peirce attempt to derive insight
from Peirce in a piecemeal fashion without concern for the more systematic ar-
ticulation of his position. This is a perfectly acceptable way of proceeding if the
aim is to cast light from Peirce on a single issue. Work in this vein includes Isaac
Levi’s account of inquiry as self-correcting (e.g. Levi 2012) or Cheryl Misak’s more
detailed exegesis and development of Peirce’s account of truth (e.g. Misak 1991).9
For this kind of work the classification is of secondary importance.10
Others, especially those more concerned with understanding Peirce’s thought
in its own terms, havemademore of the classification. Douglas Anderson’sStrands
of System provides a good example of this variety of work (Anderson 1995).11 It is
also worth noting that it has been used as the organising principle of both the
Collected Papers and the Robin Catalogue. Those interpreters particularly inter-
ested in understanding what Peirce means by his attempt to ‘prove’ pragmatism
are similarly interested in the classification, for reasons that should already be
evident.
The questions considered in this thesis are systematic ones. We are interested
in the relationship between philosophy and the other sciences and in the status of
metaphysics with respect to both the rest of philosophy and the other sciences. If
we are to learn anything from Peirce about these issues, we will be learning from
his attempts to put these various disciplines into systematic order.
9In this, these philosophers resemble the American novelist Walker Percy, who described him-
self as a ‘thief of Peirce’ (Ketner and Percy 1995). By this he meant that he picked out particular
ideas from Peirce without worrying too much about fitting them in with Peirce’s other views. In
Percy’s case, the idea that he was attracted to was the three category ontology.
10It may be possible to take up the classification as an idea removed from the rest of Peirce’s
work. However, we will see as this thesis progresses that a number of Peircean philosophical claims
are embedded in the classification. Consequently, it is hard to imagine a detailed understanding
of the classification being developed without also developing a reasonably detailed understanding
of Peirce’s first-order philosophical work.
11An important early study in this vein, which presents a succession of ‘systems’ developed by
Peirce can be found in Murphey 1993.
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According to Kent, the motivating purpose of Peirce’s classifications of the sci-
ences was to generate a diagram of the ‘conceivable effects’ of the various theor-
etical disciplines, and especially logic, on one another. That is, the hierarchy is
designed to reveal logic and the other sciences in their ‘third grade of clearness’
(Kent 1987, p. 54).12 If Kent is right, then we should look to the hierarchy to clarify
the role of any of the sciences which appear on it. As she puts it, one can ‘[p]ick a
science, and Peirce’s scheme should reveal it in its “third grade of clearness,” its
pragmatic meaning’ (Kent 1987, p. 47).
Kent’s interpretation of Peirce’s approach to the hierarchy is evidenced by a
close reading of all of the manuscripts related to his classification and its histor-
ical development. Without going into full detail, we can already see how this con-
ception of the function of the classification connects with the specifically Peircean
motivations and the wider 19th century background. Kent presents the hierarchy
as not only motivated by an attempt to understand the grounds of the pragmatic
maxim, but also as an expression of the maxim. It allows us to attain pragmatic
clarity about the various disciplines. Kent’s account also presents Peirce’s clas-
sification as directed to the more widely shared concern with gaining a unified
conception of the nature of science in general. The classification thus presents, in
a characteristically pragmatist way, a general picture of the sciences.
Before turning to the classification itself, there is a further motivation to be
considered. Murray Murphey notes that Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology starts
with the claim that any such metaphysical work should:
first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge, should take note of all the
valuable ideas in each branch of science, should observe in just what respect each
has been successful and where it has failed, in order that in the light of the thorough
acquaintance so attained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of
the nature and strength of each, he may proceed to the study of what the problem of
philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of solving it. (W8:99/EP1:286, 189113)
Murphey suggests that this reveals the impetus for Peirce’s work on the classi-
fication (Murphey 1993, pp. 229-330).14 On this view, the classification helps us
12The third grade of clarity is the gradewhich is attained by application of the pragmaticmaxim.
We achieve the third grade of clarity when we go beyond mere familiarity with a concept and the
possession of an abstract definition, to an understanding of the possible practical effects of the
application of the concept (W3:271/EP1:136, 1878).
13The date given here and in EP is the publication date. The date given in W is the date of
composition. I will prioritise publication dates whenever possible.
14This interpretation seems particularly apt for the ‘retrospective sciences’ or ‘sciences of review’,
which we will consider later in this chapter (§2.2).
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to understand where to find the materials for our philosophical inquiries, and in
what manner these materials should influence philosophy.
The task that Murphey sets out for the classification is compatible with the
approach I am taking from Kent. Kent holds that the classification provides an
important part of the pragmatic clarification of the meaning of the classified sci-
ences. This does not conflict with the idea that it also helps to showwhat one needs
to know in order to produce good philosophical hypotheses.15 The kind of project
Murphey points to may be aided by pragmatic clarity about the discipline in which
one is attempting to work. Kent suggests as much herself. She suggests that, with
the classification and hierarchy in hand, ‘[s]cientists would have at their disposal
clear indications of where to seek solutions to their problems’ (Kent 1987, p. 47).
This seems especially true of areas of inquiry whose nature remains contested.
Philosophy, and especially metaphysics, is an example of this if anything is.
1.2 The ‘Perennial’ Form
According to Kent, Peirce’s classification achieves its ‘perennial’ form by 1903. This
final form of the classification is presented in the pamphlet A Syllabus of Certain
Topics of Logic, which was produced to accompany his Lowell lectures (Kent 1987,
p. 121).16
The post-1902 classification divides the sciences in three branches: theoretical,
practical, and retrospective. The theoretical branch of the sciences is presented
below (Figure 1).17
According to Peirce, the sciences depicted in the classification are to be under-
stood as domains of activity of communities of inquiry motivated by the desire for
15Kent andMurphey do differ over some important issues concerning the role of Peirce’s categor-
ies in the hierarchy. In particular, Murphy highlights the role of Peirce’s categories and presents
the inclusion of ‘phenomenology’ as a somewhat ad hoc response to the fact that his division of
the normative sciences depends on the categories. The basic idea is that if some division of the
hierarchy relies on the categories then the discipline which establishes the categories must be su-
perordinate to it (Murphey 1993, pp. 366-7). For Kent’s arguments against Murphey and Elizabeth
Flower see Kent 1987, pp. 41–42, 120. Relatedly, some take the final form of Peirce’s classification
to be the result of a ‘systematic application’ of the categories (Atkins 2006).
16The first of Peirce’s attempts at classification that Kent considers was developed in the 1860’s
(Kent 1987, pp. 90–91). The step which brings the hierarchy into its final form is Peirce’s recog-
nition of all three normative sciences: esthetics, ethics, and logic. After 1903 there are only minor
changes in content and terminology.
17For the version of the hierarchy given below see: CP1.180-202, 1903; EP2:258–262, 1903; and
Kent 1987, pp. 134–135. This could be givenwithmore or less detail. I have included a few examples
of each variety of ‘idioscopy’, since a few of these will come up in the following discussion.
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Figure 1: The Perennial Classification
1. Mathematics (‘Schematoscopy’)
2. Philosophy (‘Cenoscopy’)
a) Phenomenology
b) Normative Science
i. Esthetics
ii. Ethics
iii. Logic
c) Metaphysics
3. Special Sciences (‘Idioscopy’)
(a) Nomological Physics (a) Nomological Psychics
(i) Molar Physics
(ii) Molecular Physics
(iii) Ethereal Physics
(i) Introspective Psychology
(ii) Experimental Psychology
(iii) Physiological Psychology
(iv) Child Psychology
(b) Classificatory Physics (b) Classificatory Psychics
(i) Crystallography
(ii) Chemistry
(iii) Biology
(i) Special Psychology
(ii) Linguistics
(iii) Ethnology
(c) Descriptive Physics (c) Descriptive Psychics
(i) Geognosy
(ii) Astronomy
(i) History
(ii) Biography
(iii) Criticism
truth (EP2:131, 1902). The sciences, at least when healthy, can be picked out by
looking at the output of such groups. In one place, Peirce suggests one need only
look at a list of the titles of scientific journals in order to see the natural divi-
sions into which the sciences fall (EP2:131–2, 1902). So, for instance, if we were
to display the hierarchy in more detail we would see, for instance, various forms
of chemistry under the heading ‘classificatory physics’. In the next section I will
consider Peirce’s conception of science at more length.
The central relationship depicted by the hierarchy is the provision of principles.
A superordinate science provides (or can rightly provide) principles to subordinate
sciences.18 So, within philosophywe find esthetics giving principles to ethics, which
in turn gives principles to logic. Or, between philosophy and the special sciences
18The hierarchy is thus set out in terms of a kind of methodological relationship between sci-
ences. This methodological relationship might later be explained in metaphysical terms (e.g. in
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we see metaphysics providing principles to the ‘nomological’ forms of physics or
psychics.19
While the hierarchy is designed to present relationships of principle depend-
ence and provision, it collaterally depicts the further relations of data and sugges-
tion provision. So, for instance, results in physics might form the basis for a gen-
eralisation in metaphysics. This would be a form of ‘data provision’. Physics might
also provide metaphysics with suggestions as to methods to apply or problems to
solve. In Peirce’s work this happens when he applies the methods of statistical
mechanics to attempt a metaphysical account of the development of the laws of
nature. All three forms of relationship depicted in the hierarchy will be presented
in more detail in Section Three.
2 Peirce’s Conception of the Sciences
2.1 The Spirit of Science
According to Peirce, science cannot be characterised in terms of any particular
method or any established collection of results. Rather, Peirce characterises sci-
ence in terms of the ‘spirit’ of its practitioners and of the communities that share
that spirit. According to Peirce, ‘[s]cience consists in actually drawing the bow
upon truth, with intentness in the eye, with energy in the arm’ (EP2:131, 1902).20
Detailed discussion of the notion of ‘truth’ that is involved here will be deferred
to Chapter Three. For our present purposes, it is enough to appeal to Peirce’s
earlier characterisation of science in ‘Fixation of Belief’, according to which the
scientific conception of truth is the view that we can develop stable beliefs that are
not merely the result of personal tenacity, appeals to authority, or the vagaries
terms of the generality of the objects of the given science). But the hierarchy starts with methodo-
logical relationships.
19I will follow Peirce in using ‘special sciences’ to refer to all of the natural and social sciences.
This diverges slightly from contemporary usage, which distinguishes, e.g. ‘fundamental physics’
from the special sciences (e.g. Fodor 1974). On Peirce’s usage, fundamental physics is a special
science too (although it may in places ‘merge with’ metaphysics, which is part of philosophy (e.g.
EP2:39, 1898)).
20This quote, and much of the discussion that follows, is derived from a text from 1902 on clas-
sification in general and the classification of the sciences in particular. Even though the hierarchy
was not in its final form in this text, Peirce had mostly settled on his methodology for classifying
and ordering the sciences. Consequently, introducing this earlier text will not lead us astray (c.f.
Kent 1987, p. 114). The text is entitled ‘A Detailed Classification of the Sciences’ in Collected Pa-
pers (CP1.203–283), and the early sections are published as ‘On Science and Natural Classes’ in
Essential Peirce (W3:253/EP2:115–132).
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of fashion, but rather, are attributable to ‘some external permanency’ (EP1:120,
1877).21
Peirce’s appeal to the spirit of science comes after he rejects a characterisation
of science in terms of some particular method or some collection of established res-
ults. Science cannot be characterised in terms of its method, because ‘the method
of science is itself a scientific result’ (CP6.428, 1893). Elsewhere, he says that the
‘one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods [is] the sincere de-
sire to find out the truth, whatever it may be’ (CP5.84, 1903). That is, the spirit of
science is more important for science than the methods themselves. Whatever the
scientific method is, Peirce does not take it to be something that is necessary for
science to get off the ground. In fact, Peirce entertains the thought that our meth-
ods may become continually ‘more scientific’ (e.g. CP5.565, 1901). Peirce thus re-
jects the view that there is one trans-historical scientific method which one either
possesses or doesn’t and which is a definitive mark of whether a given cultural
practice is a science.22
Peirce rejects the idea that a method is the essence of science by arguing that
it is itself a product of science. Peirce’s use of the example of chemistry in ‘The
Fixation of Belief’ provides a sense of what he means here. Peirce claims that
‘each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic’ (W3:243–244/EP1:111, 1877).
In the history of chemistry such a step was taken by Lavoisier:
The old chemist’s maxim had been, ‘Lege, lege, lege, labora, ora, et relege’.23 Lavois-
ier’s method was not to read and pray, not to dream that some long and complicated
chemical process would have a certain effect, to put it into practice with dull patience,
after its inevitable failure to dream that with some modification it would have an-
other result, and to end by publishing the last dream as a fact: his way was to carry
his mind into his laboratory, and to make of his alembics and cucurbits instruments of
thought, giving a new conception of reasoning, as somethingwhichwas to be donewith
one’s eyes open, by manipulating real things instead of words and fancies. (W3:243–
244/EP1:111, 1877)
21The process by which one comes to think that such a fixation is both possible and worthy of
being attempted is described by Peirce in quite religious language. We find him offering a diagnosis
of those without a sense of ‘Truth’ as an idea with ‘infinite vitality’. Such people are like those who
‘have not a sense of sin’, and must, consequently ‘be born again and become as a little child’. If
you are in such a position, then ‘you have to look upon the world with new eyes’ (EP2:123, 1902).
This conversion is also described in terms of being ‘seized’ (EP2:130, 1902) with the desire to ‘look
Truth in the face’ (EP2:375, 1906; see also EP2:61, 1901).
22Peirce attributes such a view to Francis Bacon who, Peirce claims, thought that ‘in a few years
physical science would be finished up’ if we just applied the right rules (W3:243/EP1:110, 1877).
23‘Read, read, read, work, pray, and read again’.
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There are a few developments that could be highlighted in this passage. One of the
more interesting is a blurring between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of
justification’. Chemists (and scientists in general) are presented in this passage as
having abandoned the method that separates the theory building phase from the
testing phase. Lavoisier’s method attaches the development of hypotheses more
intimately to his equipment for testing them.24 The imagination is here tethered
more closely to the ‘external permanencies’ which the scientist is confronted with
in the laboratory.
The relation between the spirit and the methods of science is clearly set out in
the following passage:
That which constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it is a cor-
rect method. But the method of science is itself a scientific result. It did not spring out
of the brain of a beginner: it was a historic attainment and a scientific achievement.
So that not even this method ought to be regarded as essential to the beginnings of
science. That which is essential, however, is the scientific spirit, which is determined
not to rest satisfied with existing opinions, but to press on to the real truth of nature.
To science once enthroned in this sense, among any people, science in every other
sense is heir apparent. (CP6.428, 1893)
Peirce also rejects the view that science can be characterised by any collection
of systematised knowledge. He attributes the view that science is systematised
knowledge to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, especially in Coleridge’s introduction to
the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (EP2:372, 1906). The problem with this proposal
is that we can easily imagine situations in which some collection of true proposi-
tions is assented to, and perhaps even often consulted, but where there is no con-
nection between these propositions and the practices by which they can be tested
and developed. Such a collection of systematised knowledge would be simply ‘dead
memory’ (CP6.428, 1893).
Peirce notes that one can be a ‘man of science’ even if one has completely in-
adequate methods and entirely false results. He offers Ptolemaic astronomy as
such a case (CP6.428, 1893). In so far as Ptolemy and his followers were proceed-
ing by what they took to be the best methods available, and were deploying them
sincerely, then they posses the ‘spirit of science’ (c.f. W4:378–379/EP1:211, 1882).
However, their status as scientists would be much harder to make sense of if sci-
ence is characterised in terms of methods or results.
24Peirce does not use this term, but he can be understood as advocating the use of ‘exploratory
experimentation’ (c.f. Waters 2007). This kind of experimentation proceeds without any clear idea
concerning what will be found, and hopes to come out at the other end with a better idea about
what kind of hypothesis to test.
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While methods or results are not the essence of science, possession of the spirit
of science has important consequences for themethods you adopt and your attitude
to the results of previous scientific inquiry. For instance, an important knock on
effect of the ‘spirit of science’ is the careful consideration of the work of others
in your area and of the adoption and development of the best available methods
(EP2:130, 1902). As we saw above, Peirce takes scientific methods to be the ‘heir
apparent’ of the spirit of science. To neglect to select the best methods available
is a sign that you do not have the true spirit of science. On this view ‘if a man
pursues a futile method through neglect to inform himself of effective methods, he
is no scientific man; he has not beenmoved by an intelligently sincere and effective
desire to learn’ (EP2:130, 1902).
An important dimension of this story is that the ‘scientific spirit’ realizes early
on that its aim, truth, is not achievable by any finite individual. In a famous early
passage, Peirce says that ‘the very origin of the conception of reality shows that
this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite
limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge’ (W2:239/EP1.52, 1868).
Combining this with the notion of an ‘external permanency’ from ‘Fixation of Be-
lief’, the claim is that the attempt to fix our beliefs in terms of something external
is a project which is essentially social.
Kent summarises Peirce’s conception of science as follows: ‘Peirce proceeded to
use the word “science” in the sense of the collective and co-operative activity of all
persons and any group of persons whose lives are animated by the desire to find
out the truth’ (Kent 1987, p. 81). This closely echoes Peirce’s own characterisation
of (theoretical) science as
the total activity of a social group whose members devote their whole being to finding
out and to helping one another to find out the truth in a certain department into
which they are peculiarly equipped to search; and are doing this for no ulterior object
whatsoever beyond that of making the holy truth known; and who are in substantial
accord as to the general method proper for prosecuting such inquiries, and as to what
has, in fact, already been discovered in their field. (EP2:459, 1911)
We are now in a position to see that to take philosophy to be a science does not
require us to take philosophy to deploy the methods or results of any particular
special science. Nor does it require us to subordinate philosophy to physics in our
metaphysics, or to psychology in our logic and epistemology. All it requires is the
adoption of the spirit of science: active directedness to truth.25
25As Susan Haack puts it, ‘it would be a misunderstanding to think of Peirce’s aspiration to
make philosophy scientific as in any way scientistic; Peirce expressly denies that philosophical
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2.2 Theoretical/Retrospective/Practical
The version of the classification presented above covered only the theoretical sci-
ences. But Peirce takes there to be two other varieties of science: practical and
retrospective. While we have already seen that all sciences are characterised by
their orientation to the truth, the theoretical sciences are those sciences which
have truth as their ultimate aim. A theoretical scientist seeks the truth for its
own sake. A practical scientist on the other hand seeks truths in order that they
might be used to achieve some ulterior, practical, motive (e.g. NM4:191, 1904). In a
similar formulation, the theoretical sciences concern the attempt to discover ‘such
truth as seems to [the scientist to be] highly worthy of life-long devotion’, while the
‘science[s] which [differ] from this in all the important respects which result from
investigation being pursued, not because of the august nature of the truth sought,
but for the sake of some anticipated utility of it to some man or men’ are practical
sciences (EP2:372, 1906). We will turn to the retrospective sciences in a moment.
Peirce produced a few lists of the ‘motley crowd’ of practical sciences, but they
never achieved the level of clarity or systematicity obtained in his classification of
the theoretical sciences. One list is as follows: ‘pedagogics, gold-beating, etiquette,
pigeon-fancying, vulgar arithmetic, horology, surveying, navigation, telegraphy,
printing, bookbinding, paper-making, deciphering, ink-making, librarian’s work,
engraving, etc’ (CP1.243, 1902). Peirce elsewhere claims that he has made a list of
‘upwards of three hundred different sciences ranging from such general psychical
sciences as ethics, religion, law, to gold beating, cooking, charcoal burning, and so
forth’ (EP2:37, 1898).26
Some interpreters have taken these lists to be evidence that Peirce is dismissive
of the practical sciences. For instance, the inclusion of ‘pigeon-fancying’ alongside
the theory of education (‘pedagogics’) suggests to some that important studies are
being lumped in with the obviously ridiculous.27 This is unfair. Rather than taking
the inclusion of pigeon-fancying to be a mark of disrespect, we should instead be
impressed by the breadth of Peirce’s own interests. Many of the items on his lists
of practical sciences are endeavours that he participated in. For instance, he put a
great deal of work in to questions of education. This work included mathematical
issues could be resolved within, and certainly never suggests that philosophy ought to be replaced
by, the natural sciences’ (Haack 2003, p. 776).
26Peirce’s manuscripts include a few examples of this kind of work (e.g. R1135, c. 1903).
27For instance, Hickman complains that the inclusion of pigeon-fancying makes technology a
‘comic inferior’ to theoretical science (Hickman 1986, pp. 183–184).
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lessons for children (e.g. NM1:1–120, various dates) and even, briefly, the planning
of elocution lessons for seminarians (Johnson 2006). He also worked, for many
years, on issues of surveying with the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
We need not think of ‘motley’ as having negative connotations here. It is cer-
tainly the case that Peirce thinks of theoretical science as a particularly noble
vocation. He says, for instance, that ‘man’s proper function’ is to ‘embody general
ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition’ (EP2:443,
1908). Many pragmatists will baulk at this normative claim. However, returning
to the list just given, the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences
can still be made without it. Consider, for instance, surveying. In this case the
end towards which any truths are discovered is typically some advance in map-
making. The success of our surveying will ultimately be measured in so far as the
maps made on the basis of our surveying live up to their purposes. To determine
whether a science is theoretical or practical, we need to consider the ‘ultimate aim’
of the research.
This account of the practical sciences does not sit entirely comfortably with
what we have just seen of the spirit of science. We might think that only those
disciplines for which truth is the ultimate aim really possess the spirit of science.
It should not be surprising that this worry comes up. Peirce’s discussions of the
spirit of science are primarily concerned with articulating the attitude of the the-
oretical inquirer, rather than the practical inquirer. The quasi-religious language
used above for those who wish to ‘look Truth in the face’, or to ‘draw the bow upon
truth with intentness in the eye, with energy in the arm’, all suggests an orienta-
tion towards truth for its own sake. But even if Peirce’s articulations of the spirit
of science tend towards the theoretical sciences, the notion is not thereby inapplic-
able to the practical sciences. Scientific inquiry is activity directed towards truth.
That someone engages in inquiry with some further purpose in mind does not
mean that they cease to be directed towards truth. The most we could be entitled
to here is that their directedness towards truth is imperfect.28
28It is important to note in passing that earlier work by Peirce is much more damning of the
practical inquirer. For instance, in 1898 he suggests that the orientation towards truth and the
orientation towards practical ends are ultimately incompatible: ‘[I]t is notoriously true that into
whatever you do not put your whole heart and soul, in that you will not have much success. Now
the two masters, theory and practice, you cannot serve’ (EP2:34, 1898). He goes on to set out the
problem with practical science in strikingly moralistic terms:
Do you think that the physiologist who cuts up a dog reflects, while doing so, that he may be saving a human
life? Nonsense. If he did, it would spoil him for a scientific man; and then the vivisection would become a
crime. However, in physiology and in chemistry, the man whose brain is occupied with utilities, though he
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An example may help to make these distinctions out. Let’s say there are two
researchers working on yeast biology in the same laboratory. Now suppose they
manage to engineer some particularly fast-acting yeast which has important con-
sequences for the baking industry. One of our researchers now leaves the lab, pat-
ents this new yeast variety, and starts a lucrative baking business. This researcher
ceases to inquire, their beliefs about yeast biology are good enough for their pur-
poses. The other, however, stays in the lab and continues to ask further questions
about yeast, perhaps looking into the causes of the faster action in more detail. In
the course of this, they might end up investigating completely commercially use-
less strains. In this case both researches can be credited, at least initially, with the
spirit of science. They both aimed to discover some truth. The second researcher is
a theoretical scientist, since this researcher aims at the truth for its own sake. The
former was a practical scientist, but, upon achieving the practical aim which they
were working towards they ceased to be any kind of scientist. They may, of course,
become a practical scientist again in the future. Perhaps some further problem
will come up in their bakery which requires the discovery of some new truth.29
The precise function of the retrospective sciences, or ‘sciences of review’, is less
clear. According to the 1903 classification these sciences are ‘the business of those
who occupy themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with
digests and going on to endeavor to form a philosophy of science’ (EP2:258–259,
1903). According to Peirce, the classification of the sciences itself belongs to this
kind of science (EP2:258–259, 1903). Later, Peirce characterises these sciences as
‘systematized knowledge’ (EP2:372, 1906). He then suggests that one sense of the
will not do much for science, may do a great deal for human life. But in philosophy, touching as it does upon
matters which are, and ought to be, sacred to us, the investigator who does not stand aloof from all intent
to make practical applications will not only obstruct the advance of the pure science, but, what is infinitely
worse, he will endanger his own moral integrity and that of his readers. (EP2:29, 1898)
This anti-practical aspect of Peirce’s thought continues into the work we are considering in this
chapter, albeit in a more tempered form.
29My interpretation of Peirce’s distinction between theoretical and practical inquiry differs from
Cooke’s. Cooke takes the distinction to be one of the degree to which we allow the results of theoret-
ical and practical inquiry to affect our conduct. The less directly action guiding, themore theoretical
(Cooke 2006, pp. 67–69). While this is usually true, it is a difference which stems from the more
fundamental distinction between the ultimate purpose of the two kinds of science. Theoretical sci-
ence does not inquire into truth in order to achieve ulterior ends. Cooke entertains the thought
that the distinction could be drawn on the basis of distinct ‘goals’, where theory aims at truth and
practice aims at something else (Cooke 2006, p. 69). However, on this account both theory and prac-
tice aim at truth. The difference is whether truth is their ultimate aim or not. This distinction is
important, since practical ends can distort theoretical inquiry, and the results of inquiry dedicated
exclusively to discovering the truth may not be appropriately applied in practice (c.f. Atkins 2016).
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term ‘philosophy’ is ‘philosophia ultima’, which ‘[embraces] all that truth which is
derivable by collating the results of the different special sciences, but which is too
broad to be established by any one of them’ (EP2:372, 1906).30
According to Kent, both the sciences of review and theoretical logic have a role
to play in the task of classifying the sciences (Kent 1987, p. 18). The sciences of
review provide an account of what is actual, and discern any patterns that can
be found in the relationships between the sciences as practices and any patterns
in the results which they produce. This is the more directly ‘empirical’ phase of
building the classification. The role of theoretical logic is to determine the under-
lying principles which govern a ‘natural classification’ of the sciences (Kent 1987,
pp. 48–50). In Peirce’s view, the underlying principle here is the provision of prin-
ciples from one science to another.
Aside from their role in the classification of the sciences, Kent also notes that
the sciences of review can ‘generalize and criticize’ the ‘fragmented discoveries’ of
the various theoretical sciences, and ‘collect, arrange, and digest them into hand-
books’ (Kent 1987, p. 188). Peirce’s examples of such work include: Comte’s Cours
de philosopie positive, Spencer’s System of Synthetic Philosophy, and the work of
Whewell (Kent 1987, pp. 145, 188; EP2:373, 1906; EP2:458, 1911).31 Aside from
generalising and criticising the work of the theoretical scientist, such digests en-
able the results of the theoretical sciences to be applied in the practical sciences
and in other theoretical sciences.32 That is, they enable the provision of sugges-
tions between sciences. Perhaps, this is the kind of work that Peirce has in mind
when he suggests that in order for a result of a theoretical science to be made use
of in practice we have to make the ‘extra-scientific’33 judgement that ‘this ground
has held a long time without showing signs of yielding’ (EP2:55, 1898). In so far
as they play this kind of role, the sciences of review are also directed to the truth,
and thus share in the spirit which Peirce takes to be definitive of science.
30Philosophia ultima is then said to be ‘at the head of the Retrospective Sciences’, which is
another term Peirce uses for the sciences of review (EP2:373, 1906).
31Note the similarity of this list with the list of the predecessors to Peirce’s classification. This,
additionally, suggests that the sciences of review have a lot to do with the task of classifying the
sciences.
32The idea that the sciences of review mediate between the theoretical and practical sciences is
due to Maryann Ayim (Ayim 1981, p. 46).
33In this text, Peirce uses the term ‘science’ to refer to those practices which have truth as their
ultimate aim. That is, he uses ‘science’ to refer to what he later specifies as the ‘theoretical sciences’.
So here we could replace ‘extra-scientific’ with ‘extra-theoretical’.
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2.3 Schematoscopic/Cenoscopic/Idioscopic
In the depiction of the classification offered above, the first three divisions of the
theoretical sciences are labelled ‘schematoscopy’, ‘cenoscopy’, and ‘idioscopy’. The
suffix ‘-scopy’ indicates that the commonality between all four varieties of theoret-
ical science is that they observe. In the case of schematoscopy, a term that Peirce
occasionally uses to refer to mathematics, what is observed are ‘schemata’, or ‘skel-
eton diagrams’ (CP2.148, 1902).34 Cenoscopy observes the ‘ceno-’, which comes via
the Greek koine, and means the ‘common’. That is, cenoscopy is the theoretical sci-
ence that observes that which is commonly available. Finally, idioscopy observes
the ‘idio-’, from the Greek for special or unique. It is the theoretical science which
makes special observations. It is worth getting a little more clear about this dis-
tinction, especially as it pertains to cenoscopy and idioscopy, before turning to why
Peirce thinks all theoretical sciences should be thought of as observational.
Peirce endorses the scholastic maxim ‘nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit
in sensu’,35 which he glosses as the claim that ‘there are no conceptions which
are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all ideas
are perceptual ideas’ (EP2:223; 226, 1903). This applies equally to mathematical,
philosophical, and special-scientific conceptions, so all earn the right to their Peir-
cean neologisms with the suffix ‘-scopy’. Peirce’s own defence of the maxim runs
through his account of perception as a limiting case of abduction and as able to
provide access to general ideas as well as particular objects (c.f. EP2:229–233,
1903).36
Following this path would take us far from the aim of this chapter. However,
a suggestion in Peirce’s favour can be made using the resources we already have
at hand. We have seen that the ‘spirit of science’ requires inquiry to be directed
towards truth and that, in the theoretical sciences, truth is the ultimate aim. We
have also seen that the notion of truth that goes along with scientific inquiry is
one in which all our beliefs are to be fixed by some ‘external permanency’. The
34Peirce almost never uses the term ‘schematoscopy’, I’ve taken it up for the sake of symmetry
(Kent 1987, p. 205). This is not to say that he only briefly thought of mathematics as observational.
This aspect of Peirce has been widely discussed (e.g. Carter 2014; Campos 2007; Shin 2002; Hull
1994).
35‘Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses’.
36For accounts of Peirce on perception see: Legg 2014b;Wilson 2012; Rosenthal 2004; and
Almeder 1970.
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processes by which this fixation is achieved will all require some relation to this
‘external permanency’ which may as well be labelled ‘observation’.37
The observations made by these three divisions of the theoretical sciences are
arranged in order of generality. The observations that idioscopy draws on are only
available to observers in peculiar or special circumstances. We can easily ima-
gine, for instance, observers who have no access to the results of experiments in
the LargeHadron Collider or similar experimental apparatuses. Cenoscopy, on the
other hand, derives its results from observations available to any possible inquirer.
We might think, for instance, that no possible inquirer could observe the world to
be irregular in all respects. That is, a purely chaotic world could not sustain any
possible inquirer. This rules out the possibility of any inquirer having observations
of a certain character. Finally, schematoscopy makes observations of pure possib-
ility via experimentation with diagrams. Mathematics can consider what would
happen in situations in which no possible observer was present.
The three varieties of ‘-scopy’ here are kinds of theoretical science. The question
arises whether the suffix ‘-scopy’ could also be used to label varieties of practical
and retrospective sciences. Peirce’s defence of the maxim that all conceptions are
given the senses suggests that any science could be labelled in this way. However,
there are some reasons to doubt this. For the practical sciences, where the ability to
achieve some ulterior end is pre-eminent, the achievement of that end is the mark
of success. This enables a greater role in practical inquiry for instinct, or ‘practical
wisdom’, of the sort which need not be justified by anything other than our success
at achieving the relevant end. In the theoretical sciences, on the other hand, there
is a greater need to be aware of how and why our activity works. That is, while all
conceptions are given in the senses, the theoretical sciences have a greater need
to be able to point to specific observational phenomena in order to back up their
ideas. At the ‘results’ end, rather than the observation end, of inquiry we can also
draw a distinction. Theoretical science has no ultimate aim beyond discovery and
is only practical insofar as experimental intervention is necessary for discovery.
Theoretical seeks to observe the world, rather than to change it. Practical science
on the other hand observes the world only in order to change it (c.f. EP2:304, 1904).
The suffix ‘-scopy’ is thus more appropriate for labelling theoretical sciences than
practical sciences.
37Making sense of the idea of an external permanacy will be an important task in later chapters.
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3 Relations Between Sciences
Peirce credits Comte with the recognition that the sciences can be organised in
terms of principle-dependence, where ‘one science depends upon another for fun-
damental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other’ (EP2:258,
1903).38 Peirce organises his hierarchy according to principle-provision. But this
does not prevent other relations from being displayed by it. For instance, subor-
dinate sciences can provide ‘suggestions’ and ‘data’ to superordinate sciences.39
Both sets of relations are important for the hierarchy. Taking as an example
the topic of the next chapter, the relationship between philosophy and the special
sciences, we can see that both directions in the hierarchical relationship must
be accounted for. In this case, the fact that philosophy provides principles to the
special sciences does not mean that it has no use for, or recourse to, the results of
the special sciences. In fact, philosophy carried out entirely independently of the
results of the special sciences will, Peirce thinks, fail to advance as successfully as
it might. I will consider each set of relations in turn.
3.1 Dependence for Principles
The laws of physics are supposed to apply to all physical objects. Biological laws,
if there are any, should apply to any living thing. Metaphysical laws, if there are
any, should apply to any possible reality. The laws of physics need not apply in
other possible worlds, and the laws of biology do not apply to inanimate objects
like rocks or abstract objects like the natural numbers. These simple observations
provide the motivation for the idea of arranging sciences in terms of principle
38Comte’s principle is set out in Cours de Philosophie Positive as derived from the phenomena
studied by the respective sciences. Where one science studies phenomena that are more general,
or more abstract, than another it appears higher in the hierarchy (Comte 1896, pp. 26–27). Kent
shows how Peirce derived his conception of ‘principle dependence’ from this Comtean foundation
(e.g. Kent 1987, p. 90). One way that he moves from the Comtean claim about the abstractness or
generality of the objects of the respective sciences to the provision of principles is to note that ‘if
anything is true of a whole genus of objects, this truth may be adopted as a principle in studying
every species of that genus’ (CP3.427, 1896; cited in Kent 1987, p. 93). In a late paper he sets out
the principle dependence relationships of the special sciences as deriving from the fact that the
nomological sciences study laws, the classificatory sciences, kinds, and the descriptive sciences
individual objects (EP2:458, 1911).
39One can slightly complicate this arrangement by following Kent in thinking that the practical
sciences and the sciences of review are ‘parallel’ to the theoretical sciences. On this picture, sug-
gestions can also pass ‘horizontally’ in the hierarchy (c.f. Kent 1987, p. 47). For instance, practical
ethics might ‘take suggestions’ from theoretical ethics, or the practical science of engineering may
do the same from chemistry or geology.
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dependence. The biologist can take for granted that the laws of physics hold good.
The biologist and the physicist, whether they like it or not, must assume that some
metaphysical laws hold good. However, the physicist ought not take the laws of
biology for granted when studying quarks. On this picture, metaphysics provides
principles to both biology and physics and physics provides principles to biology.
We need not assume that ‘principles’ are always ‘laws’. A principle is just a result
that can be taken for granted as applying to whatever objects we are studying.
Some examples from the hierarchy will help to make the principle-dependence
relationship clear. Idioscopy is divided horizontally into physical and psychical
branches and vertically into nomological, classificatory, and descriptive branches.
Peirce provides a compact summary of the latter division as it occurs on the phys-
ical branch of idioscopy:
Nomological Physics discovers the ubiquitous phenomena of the physical universe,
formulates their laws, and measures their constants. It draws upon metaphysics and
upon mathematics for principles. Classificatory Physics describes and classifies phys-
ical forms and seeks to explain them by the laws discovered by nomological physics
with which it ultimately tends to coalesce. Descriptive Physics describes individual
objects,—the Earth and the Heavens,—endeavors to explain their phenomena by the
principles of nomological and classificatory physics, and tends ultimately itself to be-
come classificatory. (EP2:259, 1903)
As well as presenting the basic structure of the physical sciences, this passage also
reveals some of the dynamics of the hierarchy. Sciences, Peirce suggests, have a
tendency to move ‘up the hierarchy’. Descriptive sciences may become classificat-
ory, and classificatory sciences may become nomological.40
For example, Peirce suggests that the work of William Herschel has made sig-
nificant progress in transforming astronomy from a descriptive into a classific-
atory science (EP2:39, 1898). In a review of a biography of Herschel, Peirce says
that ‘[b]efore Herschel the Great, astronomy had consisted almost exclusively in
measuring the positions of stars at different times relative to one another and to
the earth, and in searching out and testing hypotheses to explain their motions’
(PW:P00783.72, 1901). The ‘new astronomy’, on the other hand, ‘applies photo-
metry, photography, spectroscopy, bolometry, polariscopy, and physics generally,
to the study of the physical universe’ (PW:P00783.72, 1901). Technologies of this
sort enabled astronomers to apply the principles of chemistry and physics and gain
classificatory insight into the various possible kinds of astronomical body. To be
40These dynamics will be considered in more detail in Section 4.2, where we consider the extent
to which Peirce’s proposal is reductionist.
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able to move from reporting the features of actual planets and stars to being able
to see that a certain kind of astronomical body must be in a certain place requires
a wider understanding of the space of possibilities than that possible in a merely
descriptive science.
A more straightforward example of principle provision can be found in the re-
lationship between chemistry and geology. Peirce takes the former to be one of
the classificatory sciences and the latter to be a descriptive science (e.g. EP2:36–
37, 1898). Chemistry, as one of the classificatory physical sciences, is supposed
to deploy the results of nomological physics and mathematics to attempt to clas-
sify features of the physical world. Peirce presents Mendeleev’s development of the
periodic table as an example of this kind of work (e.g. CP1.259–260, 1902; CP5.469,
c. 1907).41
Mendeleev’s work deploys both mathematics and the laws of physics to attempt
to classify all possible elements (including some that were not yet encountered).
Thismove beyond describing those elements whichwe have acquaintancewith into
amore systematic study of the possible kinds of element is a characteristically clas-
sificatory move.42 Compared to the universal laws discovered by the nomological
sciences, the regularities of the classificatory sciences tend to require a great deal
more byway of observations, and less byway of antecedent theory. The regularities
may be subject to unsystematic exceptions, and not be, like the Peircean ideal for
a law of nature, consonant with the ‘natural light of reason’ (CP7.84, 1902). That
is, they might be quite unintuitive.43 The periodic table is paradigmatically classi-
ficatory in so far an it enabled predictions of the behaviour of as-yet-undiscovered
elements on the basis of their position in the classification.
Geology, on the other hand, concerns a particular object: the earth and its pro-
cesses. This places it nicely within the descriptive sciences. The discovery of some
of these processes, for instance continental drift, will depend largely on having a
41The date for CP5.469 is given in the editorial note at EP2:398.
42An interesting, critical, discussion of the limitations of Mendeleev’s arrangement of the occurs
at EP2:110-111 (1901).
43Mendeleev’s work in chemistry discovered a periodic law in the behaviour of chemical ele-
ments. That is, a law according to which behaviours reappear with a certain frequency when the
objects in question are ordered. Peirce notes that this kind of law is very hard to establish, and
suggests that it is almost pure induction (PW:P00641.424, 1897). Our abductive capacities do not
naturally come up with laws of this sort. That is, they aren’t in tune with the ‘natural light of
reason’.
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good understanding of the underlying basic physics (CP7.85, 1902).44 Some geo-
logical work will also depend on chemistry. For instance, when explaining how
various kinds of rock and mineral are produced in the earth the geologist will
make use of chemical classifications. A direct application of the periodic table to
geology can be found in the Goldschmidt classification, which sets out the elements
according to whether they tend to be found in rock, ore, iron, gas, or liquid (Gold-
schmidt 1937).45 The geologist, when engaged in this research, takes for granted
the results of the chemist.
The same principle-dependence structure applies within philosophy. For in-
stance, Peirce takes logic to be principle-dependent on ethics. We’ve seen that this
relationship is an important feature of the systematic articulation of his own form
of pragmatism. Since thought, according to Peirce’s pragmatism, is to be under-
stood as a kind of action, then any principles which apply to action in general will
equally apply to thought. One principle from ethics, which is applied in Peirce’s
logic, is that any action which cannot be controlled is beyond criticism (Kent 1987,
p. 172). This principle is deployed in Peirce’s late Monist articles, where he ar-
gues for the logical thesis that uncontrollable beliefs and inferences are ‘acritical’
(EP2:347, 1905).46 The next chapter will show that this dependence is also import-
ant for understanding truth as the ultimate aim of inferential action.
Finally, principles cannot be shared ‘laterally’. That is, two sciences on the same
level of the hierarchy cannot provide principles to one another. For instance, a
family of nomological physics and one of nomological psychics cannot provide prin-
ciples to one another. Peirce notes that such a situation would be unstable, since,
having constant need to consult one another, the scientists involved would become
part of a single research project. That is, on the social account of the sciences
outlined in the previous section, they would become one and the same science. Ad-
ditionally, according to Peirce, the objects that a science studies are just the objects
that its conclusions hold good for (R693a.58–60 1904; cited in Kent 1987, p. 123).
So, a superordinate sciencemust include the objects of a subordinate science. How-
ever, if this relationship goes both ways, then the objects of the two sciences are
44Here, Peirce suggests that the geologist requires an understanding of the laws of physics in
order to understand the ‘cycles through which continents commonly pass’.
45These developments occurred after Peirce’s death in 1914. I suspect he would take it to be
evidence for his claim that the descriptive sciences tend to become classificatory.
46The ‘late Monist articles’ are a further attempt to present his form of pragmatism, there re-
christened ‘pragmaticism’, in systematic form (c.f. EP2:334–335, 1905). These articles are distinct
from the more well known ‘Monist Metaphysics Series’ (W8:84–207/EP1:285–371, 1891–1893).
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exactly the same. Assuming that each science has its own set of objects, then the
two sciences must, again, become the same science (R693a, 1904; cited in Kent
1987, p. 123).
3.2 Provision of Data and Suggestions
‘Data’ and ‘suggestions’ can move from a subordinate science to superordinate sci-
ence (R693b.374–376, 1904, cited in Kent 1987, p. 124).47 For example, according
to Peirce:
Metaphysics makes constant appeal to the special sciences for data, but it derives
no principles from that source. Yet not one of the special sciences can proceed prop-
erly without the air of metaphysical principles. (R1336.12, 1892;48 cited in Kent 1987,
p. 184)
Sometimes, the ‘data’ provided by subordinate sciences is used as the basis for
generalisations, inductions and abductive inferences. Peirce takes metaphysics to
use the results of the special sciences in this way:
Here and there, however, metaphysics avails itself of one of the grander generalisa-
tions of physics, or more often of psychics, not as a governing principle, but as a mere
datum for a still more sweeping generalisation. (CP3.428, 1896)
One place that this is visible in Peirce’smetaphysics is in his attempts to generalise
the approach deployed in statistical mechanics to explaining irreversible processes
(e.g. gas diffusion), to the explanation of the possibility of growth in general (e.g.
the development of the laws of nature) (e.g. W8:100/EP1:287–288, 1891).49
In addition to suggestions of method, a subordinate science can ‘suggest’ new
problems to a superordinate science. This is most obvious in cases where an anom-
aly in a subordinate science requires new developments in a superordinate science.
In the case of astronomy (a descriptive science) and physics (a nomological science),
changes in the orbit of Mercury detected by Urbain Le Verrier by 1859 were known
to contradict Newtonian mechanics. It took General Relativity for these observa-
tions to be explained. In this case an anomalous result in a subordinate science
47Kent notes that the hierarchy is not supposed to display every important relation that might
hold between the various sciences (Kent 1987, pp. 54–55).
48This date was attributed to the MS by Kent.
49Peirce’s metaphysical proposal, which we will have reason to look into in more detail later,
proposes that the introduction of ‘real chance’ is necessary for a fully adequate metaphysics. The
connection between Peirce’s metaphysics and the science of thermodynamics is explored in detail
in Reynolds 2002.
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suggests that the superordinate science, physics, needs to be changed. It does not,
by itself, reveal how the science must be changed. In the case of the precession
of the perihelion of Mercury, it took 56 years.50 Note that the issue here is not
one that can be solved by an astronomer qua astronomer, it requires a much more
general change at the level of physics.
Returning to the history of chemistry and geology, we can find an interesting
example of a geological result which had the potential to have a major influence on
chemistry. This can be found in the work of the French geologist Alexandre-Émile
Béguyer de Chancourtois. De Chancourtois produced an early version of the peri-
odic table that, for largely non-scientific reasons, was not widely influential. De
Chancoutois’ scheme was set out in a cylindrical diagram such that elements that
behave similarly are found along vertical lines (much as elements with similar
chemical structures appear along the vertical lines of the modern periodic table).
This work was largely ignored because it was set out in the language of geology
rather than chemistry. The point of note for our purposes is that De Chancoutois
was initially motivated by the similarity of behaviour between pyroxenes and feld-
spars, two groups of minerals whose similar behaviour is explained by the under-
lying similarity in behaviour between aluminium and silicone (Scerri 2007, p. 72).
In this case, then, a phenomenon discovered in a subordinate science suggested a
generalisation that could only be properly developed in a superordinate science.
It is more difficult to find similar dynamics in the case of ethics and logic. The
right kind of example would be a result discovered in logic andwhich would require
a modification in our theoretical ethics.51 For example, Peirce would be in such a
situation if he were to become convinced that we can be culpable for beliefs and
inferences over which we do not even have the conceivable ability to control. In
this case he would need to re-evaluate the ethical principle that we are not to
criticise habits of action that are not subject to self-control. Another possibility
is that in studying the concept of truth the Peircean might come to believe that,
as some contemporary deflationists and pragmatists argue, there is no need to
postulate an ideal for thought beyond present conversational norms. This would
50An account of these developments in physics and astronomy is given in Ni 2016.
51I’m here attempting to avoid the difficulties involved in spelling out exactly what Peirce wants
to include within the realm of theoretical ethics (as opposed to practical ethics). The rough idea is
that theoretical ethics does not directly affect our actual conduct (whereas practical ethics does)
and that theoretical ethics concerns what we can say about purpose-directed action, abstracting
away from the details of particular ethical decisions that affect some particular kind of agent (c.f.
EP2:377, 1906).
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affect whether Peirce’s conception of the summum bonum, the ongoing growth of
concrete reasonableness, is really the only possible ultimate aim for action.52
4 Two Pragmatist Worries
One of the central appeals of pragmatism for those interested in the philosophical
implications of the sciences is its anti-reductionism and anti-foundationalism.53
These aims may seem to be threatened by any attempt to order the sciences hier-
archically. That is, we may worry that a superordinate science is ‘foundational’
for its subordinate sciences in a way which falls afoul of pragmatist scruples. We
may also worry that a subordinate science ultimately ‘reduces to’ a superordinate
one in a way which undermines the autonomy of the subordinate science. We will
consider each issue in turn.
4.1 The Foundationalist Worry
Foundationalism is often taken to be the epistemological position which takes epi-
stemic justification to require a suitable inferential link between the belief justified
and some set of basic, or ‘foundational’, beliefs. When those foundational beliefs
are taken to be certain, and the inferential links are deductive, then we have cer-
tain knowledge of the truth of the belief in question.54 I’ll call this view ‘epistemic
foundationalism’ to distinguish it from the sense that I will eventually attribute
to Peirce. Epistemic foundationalism is often challenged by pragmatists on fallib-
ilist grounds. Loosely speaking, pragmatists take certainty to be an undesirable,
infeasible, or unnecessary aim for philosophy.
The status of foundationalism in Peirce’s account of the sciences can be brought
out by considering two distinct metaphors that he offers for the project of theoret-
ical inquiry in general and philosophy specifically. The latter is an architectural
metaphor, which emphasises the importance of careful planning before going to
work on the ‘building’ of theoretical inquiry. The former, the ‘bog metaphor’, em-
52The connection between this conception of the summum bonum and the Peircean conception
of truth will become more clear in the next two chapters.
53The chapter ‘Privileged Representations’ in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature provides a
good example (Rorty 1979).
54Modern statements of this view can be found in Fumerton et al. 2000. The most obvious his-
torical example is the Cartesian strategy of finding a stable and certain ‘archimedian point’ from
which to rebuild after having doubted everything (c.f. Descartes 1984, p. 16).
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phasises the fallibility of any scientific result. Holding the two together allows for
a kind of methodological foundationalism without the epistemological foundation-
alism which often accompanies it and which is a frequent target of pragmatist
attack. That is, Peirce’s classification offers a form of fallibilist foundationalism.
Peirce derives his architectural metaphor from his reading of Kant. According
to Peirce, Kant holds that the construction of a philosophical system should be
approached like the construction of a building.55 This metaphor has, Peirce thinks,
‘excellencies which the beginner in philosophy might easily overlook’ (CP1.176, c.
1896). The first feature of the metaphor that Peirce endorses has nothing to do
with foundationalism. He suggests that, unlike the visual arts, music, or poetry,
public architecture must have a ‘secular’ character; it must express the spirit of
the age as a whole. The achievement of this task would be undermined by ‘thought
characteristic of an individual—the piquant, the nice, the clever’ which he takes
to be ‘too little to play any but the most subordinate rôle in architecture’ (CP1.176,
c. 1896).56
However, Peirce does take the metaphor to have aspects which can be described
as foundationalist. We are to avoid systems which have been insufficiently planned
out, for instance ‘the new Schelling-Hegel mansion, lately run up in the German
taste, but with such oversights in its construction that, although brand new, it is
already pronounced uninhabitable’ (EP1:247, 1887–1888). Philosophy requires de-
tailed and sustained planning (W8:98–99/EP1:285–286, 1891). The architectural
metaphor directs our attention to our own responsibility for the justification of
our various beliefs. We are to plan out the system, and an important part of that
planning is to ensure a strong foundation. As we will see in the next chapter, this
is provided, in part, by cenoscopy.
The classification of the sciences has been taken by many to be the core state-
ment of Peirce’s ‘system’. We have made reference already to Peirce’s aspiration to
‘a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human
reason [. . . ] shall appear as the filling up of its details’ (EP1:247, 1887–1888). This
aspiration lines up with the architectural metaphor, and especially with the em-
phasis that Peirce puts on the importance of planning such a project. The hierarchy
55Peirce refers in this passage to ‘the architectonic of pure reason’ (Kant 1998, A832/B860).
56Parker takes up something like this metaphor when he suggests that the hierarchy is related
to the actual process of scientific inquiry in something like the way a blueprint plan of a house is
related to the actual house. On this view, ‘[t]he classification of the sciences no more restricts the
inquirer to moving through the classification one time in a straight line, than the blueprint of a
house restricts the inhabitant to moving through it in two dimensional space.’ (Parker 1998, p. 58).
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draws our attention to foundations in this sense. It points out that, for example,
if we are to be secure in our chemistry, then we ought to be secure in our physics.
In order to attain stable and successful beliefs, we ought to attend to the ways in
which the various disciplines and sub-disciplines of the sciences depend on each
other. The hierarchy is foundationalist in so far as it draws our attention to this
feature of inquiry. We can thus call Peirce a ‘methodological foundationalist’.
That Peirce does not endorse epistemological foundationalism is made partic-
ularly clear by his metaphor of the bog. Having presented science as relying on a
‘guessing instinct’ and presented induction as a kind of passive openness to facts,
Peirce goes on to say that as a result science:
feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must find confirmations
or else shift its footing. Even if it does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is
still not standing on the bedrock of fact. It is walking on a bog, and can only say, this
ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP2:55,
1898)
The bog metaphor emphasises the fact that, in theoretical science, we can never
be certain that any given belief will hold indefinitely. The most we are entitled
to is the reflection that the current ground has held out for a long time, and even
this is, strictly speaking an extra-theoretical reflection. That is, the judgement that
some theoretical result should be applied in some practical case is itself a practical
judgement and rightly incorporates many more considerations than those which
are relevant in the theoretical sphere.57
The classification is not foundationalist in a sense which denies the insights
of the bog metaphor. The provision of principles is not tied to any particular de-
gree of certainty. For instance, the ‘foundations’ provided for chemistry from fun-
damental physics need not be more certain than the results of chemistry itself.
Rather, Peirce is attempting to bring to light the dependency relationships that
any given science has, whether it wants them or not. If, for example, we want to
study the composition of the stars, then our conclusions will depend on the beha-
viour of the underlying chemicals and the laws of physics. If we know such laws,
then we are justified in applying them in our astronomical research. Moreover,
we will implicitly assume some such laws if we do not take them from other re-
searchers. The risk of taking principles implicitly is that we will be unaware of a
potential source of error in our work. If the ‘foundations’, either implicitly assumed
57We saw this earlier when we looked at the relationship between the theoretical and the prac-
tical sciences (with the sciences of review mediating between them).
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or explicitly taken from the foundational science, are false, then the subordinate
science may be compromised. Consequently, we ought to make these relationships
clear. Peirce attempts to do this by means of the classification.
We can summarise the relationship between the two metaphors by saying that
the bog metaphor and the architectural metaphor direct our attention to two fea-
tures of inquiry that are really present. On one side we have the fact that our
beliefs are answerable to reality. As a result, there is always a chance that our
best beliefs might fail, and that we end up being dragged under the bog. On the
other side, we have the responsibility that wemust take for the strength of our own
beliefs and of the process of inquiry. While we are always in a precarious position,
‘on the bog’, this does not prevent us from exploring the ground underneath us or
from carefully planning our next step.
4.2 The Reductionist Worry
There are many meanings attached to the term ‘reductionism’. For our purposes
we can take reductionism to mean the idea that the objects and phenomena of
one science can be re-articulated without remainder in terms of the objects and
phenomena of some other science.58 An example of such a view would be the pic-
ture invoked by Laplace’s Demon, an entity which knows the position of the fun-
damental constituents of nature at a given time and the physical laws govern-
ing them. Within a deterministic cosmos, Laplace’s Demon has enough to know
everything that has ever happened or will happen. In such a world one would only
do, say, biology or even history, as a result of contingent limitations on ones own
knowledge and cognitive capacities. That biology or history are engaged in at all
would be the result of some lack on our part that prevents us from just doing the
physics in which the objects of our investigation would be ideally understood.
The reduction charge against the classification is the thought that providing
principles to a subordinate science suggests that the subordinate science is redu-
cible to the superordinate science. It will turn out that a simple version of this
charge can be easily dismissed, but that a more sophisticated reductionism is still
open to Peirce and consistent with the classification.
58As Brandom might put it, a reduction is when some target vocabulary is related to a base
vocabulary in such a way that everything that can be said in the target vocabulary can be said
without loss or remainder in the base vocabulary (c.f. Brandom 2008a, p. 2).
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The simple version suggests that to order sciences according to principle de-
pendence is to say that the subordinate science is reducible to the superordinate
science. But this is not so. The hierarchy is consistent with each science supply-
ing itself with its own principles on top of those it receives. It is also consistent
with the possibility that the special observations made by a science are not able
to be cashed out in terms of the observations of some superordinate science. For
instance, philosophy can take for granted the results and patterns of reasoning of
mathematics without thereby becoming a branch of mathematics.
For Peirce, mathematics is the science which frames and draws out the deduct-
ive consequences of various arbitrary hypotheses. Philosophy, on the other hand,
requires appeal to actual experience. Philosophy is a ‘positive science’, while math-
ematics is a ‘hypothetical’ one. This is made out quite clearly in the following pas-
sage:
The science of phenomenology59 is in my view the most primal of all the positive
sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any other positive science.
By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for positive knowledge, that is, for
such knowledge as may conveniently be expressed in a categorical proposition. Logic
and the other normative sciences, although they ask, not what is but what ought to be,
nevertheless are positive sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth,
that they are able to show that what they call good really is so; and the right reason,
right effort, and right being of which they treat derive that character from positive
categorical fact.
Perhaps youwill askmewhether it is possible to conceive of a sciencewhich should
not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I reply that it is
not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such a science exists and flour-
ishes, and phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other positive science,
nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon the Con-
ditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover
not how things actually are, but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our uni-
verse, then in some other. (EP2:144, 1903)
This is sufficient to show that phenomenology, while subordinate to mathematics,
is not exhausted by the principles it derives frommathematics. It and all subordin-
ate sciences in the hierarchy must appeal to what actually appears in experience.
The hierarchy does not guarantee, or even suggest, that this difference can ever be
overcome. Similarly, biology is not merely a branch of physics even though it can
take the results of physics for granted in its reasoning. Likewise, a historianmight
take for granted the law of non-contradiction from logic and the law of gravity from
physics while also developing their own principles for interpreting the testimony
of historical texts.
59Recall that phenomenology is the first division of philosophy in the hierarchy.
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However, the hierarchy is consistent with a somewhat reductionistic proposal.
We have already seen that Peirce thinks descriptive sciences tend to become clas-
sificatory and classificatory sciences tend to become nomological. Peirce expands
on this in a speculative passage from the Cambridge Conferences lectures of 1898.
First he continues the thought that sciences can ‘move up’ the hierarchy, then
suggests that they may all converge on mathematics. On this view nomological
sciences tend towards metaphysics, metaphysics towards logic, and logic ‘seems
destined to become more and more converted into mathematics’ (EP2:39, 1898).
Having said that, he characterises the aim of mathematics in the following terms:
The host of men who achieve the bulk of each year’s new discoveries are mostly con-
fined to narrow ranges. For that reason you would expect the arbitrary hypotheses of
the different mathematicians to shoot out in every direction into the boundless void
of arbitrariness. But you do not find any such thing. On the contrary, what you find
is that men working in fields as remote from one another as the African diamond
fields are from the Klondike reproduce the same forms of novel hypothesis. Riemann
had apparently never heard of his contemporary Listing. The latter was a naturalistic
geometer, occupied with the shapes of leaves and birds’ nests, while the former was
working upon analytical functions. And yet that which seems the most arbitrary in
the ideas created by the two men are one and the same form. This phenomenon is
not an isolated one; it characterizes the mathematics of our times, as is, indeed, well
known. All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world affords no parallel,
each man arbitrarily following his own sweet will, are, as we now begin to discern,
gradually uncovering one great cosmos of forms, a world of potential being. The pure
mathematician himself feels that this is so. He is not indeed in the habit of publish-
ing any of his sentiments nor even his generalizations. The fashion in mathematics is
to print nothing but demonstrations, and the reader is left to divine the workings of
the man’s mind from the sequence of those demonstrations. But if you enjoy the good
fortune of talking with a number of mathematicians of a high order, you will find that
the typical pure mathematician is a sort of Platonist. Only, he is [a] Platonist who
corrects the Heraclitean error that the eternal is not continuous. The eternal is for
him a world, a cosmos, in which the universe of actual existence is nothing but an
arbitrary locus. The end that pure mathematics is pursuing is to discover that real
potential world. (EP2:40, 1898)
On the view defended in this passage, all of the theoretical sciences might be con-
tained within a sufficiently developed mathematics. This proposal, whatever it is,
is not traditional reductionism. Before we consider this proposal, it is worth noting
that the hierarchy doesn’t require us to follow Peirce in this direction. However, we
need not think that the proposal, even in its extreme form, is reductionistic in a
sense which undermines the autonomy of particular sciences or demands a reduc-
tion of the objects of all sciences to some privileged set of mathematical objects.
Firstly, we need to be careful what we are imagining when we imagine ‘com-
pleted mathematics’. One way of understanding what Peirce has in mind here is to
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consider his examples of sciences ‘moving up’ the hierarchy. We have already intro-
duced Peirce’s claim that the work of Herschel represented a move in astronomy
towards becoming a classificatory science. The mark of this was that astronomy
began to have a grip on the question of possible kinds of stars and galaxies over
and above knowledge of particular actual objects. Astronomy thus gained a cer-
tain amount of modal strength in this transition. One might say something sim-
ilar about the move from a classificatory to a nomological science. Here the move
is from an understanding of the behaviour of all possible kinds that are relevant
for a given science to an understanding of some law-like principle underlying those
kinds. If this move can be taken, we gain an understanding not only of the vari-
ous possible individuals that could fall under a given kind, but also of the ways
in which the possible kinds are determined by some law. Perhaps this also gives
us further knowledge of what kinds there would be were the laws in play slightly
different.
The important point to note is that ‘moving up the hierarchy’ does not entail
losing the uniqueness of your objects and phenomena or your autonomy in study-
ing them. Rather, one gains a more modally strong handle on what is going on
in your domain and why. Peirce’s proposal, when describing the movement of as-
tronomy up the hierarchy is not that astronomy thereby becomes a mere part of
fundamental physics, rather astronomy itself changes in character from a merely
descriptive science into a classificatory one. There is thus no reason to think that
Peirce’s imagined future mathematics would undermine this feature of movement
up the hierarchy. In fact, it might be best to think of Peirce’s proposal as holding
that the various sciences in the hierarchy might all become entirely ‘mathemat-
ical’, rather than that they all might become part of mathematics.
We have also noted the ontological aspect of reductionist proposals. Laplace’s
Demon can only do its magic if the objects of the various sciences can all be under-
stood as entirely made up of the objects studied in fundamental physics. Peirce’s
imagined future mathematics does not have this feature since, on his understand-
ing, mathematics does not have an ontology of its own. For instance, mathematics
is not to be understood as the study of sets, or any other fundamental object out
of which all others are to be made up. The ‘positive sciences’ (cenoscopy and idio-
scopy) do have to take some set of actual objects as their domain. To make some
positive science entirely mathematical, one would have to re-articulate the ob-
jects and phenomena of that science in such a way that they appear as deductive
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consequences of some hypothetical state of things. Peirce also imagines that the
relations between this state of things and others would be also known (and that
the actual world would thereby become an ‘arbitrary locus’ in the world of pos-
sibility). In so far as this procedure captures the unique features of the objects of
whatever discipline we are studying, we need not think of this as a ‘reduction’ in
any negative sense. We have not, for instance, reduced the world to sets and their
axiom-governed combinations.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a detailed account of Peirce’s classification and hier-
archy of the sciences as it stood after 1902. We have considered the motivations
for the classification and its historical antecedents and philosophical motivations.
Having seen the systematic motivations from within Peirce’s own thought and the
connection of the classification to to the central issues of this thesis, we turned to
the interpretation of the classification itself.
We considered Peirce’s characterisation of science in terms of the ‘spirit’ of its
practitioners. This was distinguished from approaches that highlight either the
methods or results of the sciences. We then turned to two important distinctions
that Peirce makes, the first between theoretical, practical, and retrospective sci-
ences, and the second, a division of the theoretical sciences into schematoscopic,
cenoscopic, and idioscopic sciences.
We then turned to the relations between sciences depicted by the classification.
On one hand, subordinate sciences receive principles from superordinate sciences.
On the other, subordinate sciences can provide data and suggestions to superordin-
ate ones. These relationships were illustrated with examples from both philosophy
and the special sciences.
Finally, we considered two characteristically pragmatist worries about the hier-
archy. The first, that it is a ‘foundationalist’ proposal, was avoided by distinguish-
ing between epistemological foundationalism, which Peirce rejects on fallibilist
grounds, and methodological foundationalism which Peirce endorses. The second,
that the hierarchy represents a form of reductionism, was approached from two
directions. The first was to simply note that no reduction of one science to the
other is required by the hierarchy. The second was to consider Peirce’s proposal
that all sciences are ‘moving up’ the hierarchy towards mathematics. I suggested
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that Peirce’s conception of the nature of mathematics prevents this proposal from
collapsing into a form of reductionism that damages the autonomy of the reduced
science.
We nowhave a clear idea of what Peirce’s position is with respect to the relation-
ship between philosophy, understood as cenoscopy, and the other sciences. In the
next chapter we turn to the arguments that Peirce deploys for this arrangement
and critically compare them to some more contemporary proposals. We have also
set up the background against which the function of metaphysics, as the ‘bridge’
between cenoscopy and the other sciences, can be understood. This will be taken
up in detail in Chapter Four.
Chapter 2
Cenoscopy, Idioscopy, and First
Philosophy
Introduction
Pragmatism is often taken to be a form of naturalism.1 Naturalism is understood
in many ways. One important aspect of any form of naturalism is the relationship
it posits between science and philosophy. At a bare minimum, a naturalist thinks
philosophy should be responsive to the natural (and perhaps social) sciences. We
have already seen that Peirce thinks of philosophy as a kind of theoretical science,
engaged in a project that is continuous with what he calls, following Bentham,
‘idioscopy’. However, we have also seen that Peirce maintains that philosophy is
a distinct kind of science, cenoscopy, and that this kind of science has a founda-
tional role for the other sciences (excluding mathematics). In this he differs from
many contemporary forms of pragmatist naturalism. These contemporary forms
foreground the rejection of ‘first philosophy’ as a core naturalist commitment. On
such views Peirce does not come out as a naturalist at all.2 In this chapter, I de-
fend Peirce’s conception of the relationship between science and philosophy against
two recent defenders of the pragmatist rejection of first philosophy: Huw Price and
David Macarthur.
1For instance, consider recent debates over the relative strengths of the American pragmatist
and German idealist traditions. In these debates pragmatism is often taken to be a naturalisation
of German idealism (e.g. Margolis 2012, p. 122; Gardner 2007). Dewey explicitly understands him-
self to be doing something like this (e.g. in ‘From Absolutism to Experimentalism’, LW5:147–161).
2Of course, there are other senses in which Peirce can be understood to be a naturalist, but
they are not the central issue in this chapter.
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While the previous chapter set out Peirce’s account of the relationship between
philosophy and the other sciences, it did not provide any arguments for his posi-
tion. In addition, since it had to cover the entire hierarchy of the sciences, it did
not spend sufficient time setting out what Peirce means by the terms ‘cenoscopy’
and ‘idioscopy’. Both gaps will need to be filled before we can proceed to the critical
comparison of Peirce’s views with those of Price and Macarthur.
We have already seen that cenoscopy is the observational science of the ‘com-
monly available’. However, we have not yet got a good idea of what Peirce means by
this notion. In fact, one of Peirce’smain characterisations, in terms of what is avail-
able to the ‘adult and sane’, is likely to mislead. I consider two objections to this
proposal and abandon it. I then turn to Peirce’s suggestion that the conclusions of
cenoscopy should be able to be reached by any possible ‘scientific intelligence’. On
this view, the ‘common’ of cenoscopy is common to anything that can learn from
experience. Cenoscopy, then, is the activity by which we attempt to abstract away
from contingent features of our present situation to arrive at (fallible) conclusions
about what should be admitted by any possible scientific intelligence. I conclude
this section by discussing the relation between this conception of cenoscopy and
the traditional a priori.
We have also seen that the relationship between cenoscopy and idioscopy is
one of principle dependence. Cenoscopy provides, but does not receive, ‘principles’
from idioscopy. That is, the results of cenoscopy, if true, apply in all idioscopic
investigations. The converse does not hold. We also saw that this relationship does
not preclude philosophy from taking ‘data’ or ‘suggestions’ from the other sciences.
In fact, on Peirce’s view it had better do this if it is to develop in the most efficient
manner.
The arguments for this position considered in this chapter will be divided into
‘negative’ and ‘positive’. The positive case turns on the role of abduction in Peirce’s
account of scientific inquiry. On Peirce’s view, the inquirer always needs to provide
some kind of hypothesis and science cannot be achieved by mere induction. This
points in the direction of an account of the inquirer that might underlie all par-
ticular idioscopic investigations. I argue that only cenoscopy, with its appeal to all
possible scientific intelligences, can do the job while maintaining the conception of
science as truth-directed. On the negative side, Peirce challenges various propos-
als that would base philosophy in some idioscopic science or other. In this connec-
tion I consider Peirce’s rejection of Sigwart’s psychologism and Dewey’s ‘natural
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history of thought’. In both cases, Peirce diagnoses a potential failure of rational
self-control. I conclude this section by considering whether Peirce’s rejection of
such views, which I will group under the heading ‘idioscopism’, constitutes a ‘block
on inquiry’ and thus a violation of his ‘first rule of logic’.3
With Peircean arguments in hand, we can turn to the position of some more
contemporary pragmatists with respect to the relationship between philosophy
and the special sciences. One prominent contemporary pragmatist, Huw Price,
rejects metaphysics as a discipline on the basis of his own brand of naturalism.
Price agrees with other pragmatists that our philosophical work ought to be con-
strained by some account of ourselves and our practices. Unlike Peirce, and many
other pragmatists, Price thinks that this account should be taken from, variously,
biology or anthropology. After introducing Price’s view, I connect it with Peirce’s ar-
guments against idioscopism. I argue that, from the Peircean perspective, Price’s
view is a threat to the possibility of rational self-control and that Price does not
say enough to require us to abandon Peircean hopes for its achievement.
Macarthur’s form of ‘liberal naturalism’ provides an alternative to both Price
and Peirce. Macarthur holds, with the Peircean, that Price’s account of philosophy
is unacceptably scientistic. Macarthur thinks, for instance, that Price’s scientism
elides the first and second person perspectives of the participant in a given lin-
guistic/conceptual practice. In so far as the Peircean approach starts from the
perspective of the inquirer, rather than from a third-person perspective on the
inquirer, it aligns with Macarthur’s. However, the two approaches diverge on the
question of ‘first philosophy’. From Macarthur’s position, there are reasons to be
sceptical of the feasibility or desirability of abstracting away from contingent fea-
tures of our own situation towards the perspective of any possible scientific in-
telligence. I argue that, like Price, Macarthur does not say enough to undermine
the hope for rational self-control that underlies Peirce’s conception of cenoscopy as
first philosophy.
3Strictly speaking, the first rule of logic is that ‘in order to learn you must desire to learn and
in so desiring not be satisfied which what you already incline to think’, with ‘do not block the way
of inquiry’ presented as a corollary (EP2:48, 1898). But to violate a corollary of a rule is also to
violate the rule.
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1 Characterising Cenoscopy
Peirce summarises the distinction between cenoscopy and idioscopy in the follow-
ing passage from his 1903 Harvard Pragmatism lectures:
Philosophy, as I shall use this word, and use it without any serious rupture with gen-
eral usage, is distinguished from all the special theoretical sciences, whether they be-
long to the great Physical wing or to the great Psychical wing of special science, that
is, whether they be inquiries into dynamics, physics, chemistry, physiology, anatomy,
astronomy, geology, etc., or whether they be inquiries into psychology, anthropology,
linguistics, history, etc.—Philosophy, I say, is distinguished from all of these by the
circumstance that it does not undertake to make any special observations or to ob-
tain any perceptions of a novel description. Microscopes and telescopes, voyages and
exhumations, clairvoyants and witnesses of exceptional experience are substantially
superfluous for the purposes of philosophy. It contents itself with a more attentive
scrutiny and comparison of the facts of everyday life, such as present themselves to
every adult and sane person, and for the most part in every day and hour of his wak-
ing life. The reason why a natural classification so draws a line between Philosophy,
as cenóscopy (κοινοσκοpiία) and Special Sciences, as idioscopy (ἰδιοσκοpiία) ,—to follow
Jeremy Bentham’s terminology,—is that a very widely different bent of genius is re-
quired for the analytical work of philosophy and for the observational work of the
special science. (EP2:146, 1903)
Cenoscopy, unlike idioscopy, does not require appeal to ‘microscopes and tele-
scopes, voyages and exhumations’ and so on. Rather, the observational science of
the common is characterised in terms of what is almost always available to any
‘adult and sane person’. It takes this material and, as a result of ‘more attent-
ive scrutiny and comparison’, produces philosophy. This gives us a test that can
exclude a discipline from cenoscopy: if there’s someone amongst the collection of
adult and sane people who doesn’t have access to the observations in question,
then the inquiry is not cenoscopic. We can easily point to, say, Hypatia as someone
who did not have access to the observations enabled by the use of microscopes. This
shows that microbiology is not a cenoscopic science. On the other hand, we might
struggle to imagine anyone adult and sane as being unable to ‘see’ the validity of
modus ponens. Arguments of this sort could be used to establish the cenoscopic
nature of logic.
Since the idea has been brought up in the passage just cited, now is as good a
place as any to point out that we need not think of cenoscopy as the only meaning
we can give the term ‘philosophy’. In this text, Peirce suggests that thinking of
philosophy as cenoscopy does not involve ‘any serious rupture with general usage’.
As it stands this does not exclude other meanings. However, we saw in the last
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chapter that Peirce also considers there to be a brand of philosophy, philosophia
ultima, associated with the sciences of review. He goes on to say:
Widely different as the two sciences are, [they are] frequently confounded and inter-
tangled; and when they are distinguished the question is often asked, “Which of these
is the true philosophy?” as if an appreciation of one necessarily involved a depreciation
of the other. In the writer’s opinion each is an important study. (EP2:373, 1906)
There is no reason to think that other sensible meanings for ‘philosophy’ are not
possible.4
1.1 The Adult and Sane
In the passage we have just considered from 1903, Peirce aligns the common with
that which is available to the ‘adult and sane’. At best, this proposal is liable to
be misinterpreted. In this section I briefly point towards a broad cluster of eth-
ical/political issues with the notion, before turning to an objection centred around
the possibility of ‘armchair idioscopy’. The aim of this latter objection is to high-
light the tendency of a notion like the ‘adult and sane’ to attach to a specific group
of actual, spatio-temporally located, entities. As such, there will be observations
available to all members of this group which are, strictly speaking, idioscopic. In
both cases, the objection is that Peirce’s formulation is misleading with respect to
his actual view.
Peirce frequently appeals to a notion of sanity in his arguments. For instance,
we find Peirce appealing to what ‘any sane man’ would believe in attempts to de-
fend the reality of generals (e.g. EP2:183, 1903; 343, 1905). We see Peirce deploy-
ing the logical maxim that if any ‘sane’ person disagrees with a position it should
be doubted (e.g. W2:195/EP1:13, 1868; W5:221/EP1:229, 1885). We also see judge-
ments about features of the experience of ‘any sane person’. For instance, that their
experience is divided into an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ world (CP5.487, c. 1907), and that
they have no experience from which can be inferred anything concrete about the
life after death (CP6.451, 1895). Often these arguments can be rephrased in terms
of the account of the commonly-available that will be developed in a moment.
One set of problems with appealing to notions of sanity and adulthood is that
they are incredibly culturally variable, not to mention politically charged. As a
4We should expect even within Peirce’s own scheme that there is room for a ‘practical philo-
sophy’ alongside theoretical philosophy and the philosophia ultima that appears within the sci-
ences of review.
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result such notions have exclusionary potential that should at least give us pause.
The conception of philosophy on the table is one according to which it is an obser-
vational science. A result of this is that one can only participate in philosophy if
one has access to the observations on which it depends. Consequently, excluding
someone from the adult and sane is excluding them from the ability to engage in
philosophy. Given the foundational role of philosophy in Peirce’s conception, such
people would also be excluded from fully engaging in the practice of theoretical
inquiry.
We need not restrict ourselves to hypothetical examples here. History is well
populated with examples of various groups of people being excluded from inquiry
(and other social practices) on grounds of something like ‘insanity’. Women have
often been excluded from education on the basis of a perceived lack of rationality
or of excessive sentimentality. Similar issues are in play in terms of both race and
class. As is well known, homosexuality was listed in the Diagnostic and Statist-
ical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association until 1973 (Drescher 2015).
A characterisation of cenoscopy which thereby excluded homosexuals would be,
of course, unacceptable. It is not hard to see why notions of ‘sanity’ might slide
towards various forms of racism, sexism, homophobia, etc.5
Moreover, a notion of sanity can unduly restrict the kind of hypotheses enter-
tained within a discipline. It is not for nothing that the heliocentric hypothesis was
initially thought to be insane. Attitudes about the obvious consequences of such a
hypothesis for the observations wemake on earth meant that it was taken to imply
that we should see the effects of the rapid movement of the earth in our everyday
experience. Why, for instance, don’t I have to hold on tight to the earth to prevent
being flung off it.6 In such circumstances, those with heliocentric inclinations can
easily be classified as ‘insane’.7 It is not impossible that the same kind of rejection
could prevent us from properly attending to true hypotheses today.
The discussion above has focused on sanity, which has more obviously perni-
cious potential than does the notion of adulthood. However, it is not hard to ima-
5In this connection it’s also worth noting that Peirce typically refers to ‘any sane man’ and
similar, rather than to the ‘adult and sane person’.
6Consider for example, Jean Bodin’s claim, in 1597, that ‘[n]o one in his senses, or inbued with
the slightest knowledge of physics, will ever think that the earth, heavy and unwieldy from its
own weight and mass, staggers up and down around its own center and that of the sun; for at the
slightest jar of the earth, we would see cities and fortresses, towns and mountains thrown down’
(Kuhn 1957, p. 190).
7According to Kuhn, heliocentrism was able to overcome this conservatism by virtue of making
itself mathematically indispensable (Kuhn 1957, p. 185).
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gine such a notion being deployed to backup a kind of conservatism within the
sciences.
A further issue with the notions of both adulthood and sanity is that they can
suggest the proper functioning of some particular species in some particular place.
It is perhaps possible to specify a notion of adulthood and sanity that applies to,
say, the human species in general. If so, we could attempt to clarify what is com-
monly available by picking out some particular group at a time that constitute the
adult and sane or the group that constitutes the adult and sane at all times. How-
ever, there are problems with any proposal that ties the commonly available to
any group of actual entities. One of these is brought out by considering ‘armchair
idioscopy’.
Let’s suppose that we have agreed on a criterion for picking out the adult and
sane and that the world is set up such that the whole collection picked out is loc-
ated on Earth and has some mode of experiential access to the regular cycles of
the Moon and Sun. They know, for instance, that the Sun rises and sets once a
day, and that the Moon runs through a cycle from being entirely dark through to
fully illuminated, and back again. On this basis, we can get the following piece
of reasoning, which roughly follows the ancient astronomer Aristarchus, off the
ground:
1. When the Moon is half-illuminated, the Sun, Earth, and Moon form a right
triangle where the right angle is between the Sun and the Earth.
2. When the Moon is half-illuminated, the angle between the Sun and Moon is
very close to, but just less than 90 degrees.
3. Therefore, the distance from Earth to the Moon must be significantly less
than the distance between Earth and the Sun.8
Here, a diagram may help (Figure 2).
The conclusion of this piece of reasoning is an astronomical claim which is de-
rivable from the armchair by any of the entities in our group of the adult and sane.
8We can go further without needing to engage in any particularly special observations. We
can follow Aristarchus’s rough estimate of the angular distance between the Moon and the Sun,
which was around 87 degrees. Applying some basic trigonometry, we can derive that the Sun must
be around 19 times further from the Earth than the Moon is. As it happens, this value is much
too small. More accurate measurements of the angular distance between the sun and the moon
are able to give us a much better value. However, at that point we would be within the realm of
idioscopy.
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Figure 2: Earth, Moon, and Sun
It is, in other words, an idioscopic conclusion that risks coming out as cenoscopic
according to the present proposal.
This may not seem like much of a worry, given that we’ve imagined a very
specific set of circumstances and a very specific group. We could imagine a slightly
different set of the ‘adult and sane’ for whom this reasoning would not be available.
Add, for instance, a population of people living underground to the previous scen-
ario and the reasoning becomes idioscopic. More speculatively, we could imagine
some alien species entirely outside of the light-cone of our solar system, who are
thus unable to come to any conclusions regarding the relative distances between
the Sun, Moon, and Earth.
The underlying point is that it seems plausible that any collection of the sort
that we have been considering will be able to derive some conclusions that are,
properly understood, idioscopic, on the basis of experience common to all in the
collection. For instance, any collection of actual entities, regardless of their adult-
hood or sanity, will be spatio-temporally located in such a way that conclusions
can be derived about that neighbourhood that are not available to other possible-
but-not-actual observers. What we want then is a notion that includes all possible
inquirers, rather than some particular group of inquirers.
In fact, we can think of ‘adulthood’, ‘sanity’, and even of the particular spatio-
temporal location occupied by any collection of people as a set of special appar-
atuses in the same way that we think of those listed by Peirce in his 1903 char-
acterisation of idioscopy. The claim then, is that the idea of collecting the adult
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and sane, or any other collection of actual people, will result in a group which,
strictly speaking, all possess some kind of special observational apparatus. Two
desiderata thus emerge from our consideration of the ‘adult and sane’: we want a
characterisation of the commonly available that avoids:
1. the exclusionary potential of picking out properties like adulthood and sanity,
and
2. we want a proposal that does not pick out some particular set of entities
whose contingent features enable them to derive properly idioscopic conclu-
sions from experience common to each.
1.2 The Scientific Intelligence
Thankfully, Peirce offers an alternative account of the commonly available that
answers to the two needs just set out. Some time around 1897 Peirce offered the
following as a characterisation of logic:
Logic in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic
(σημειωτική) the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doc-
trine as ‘quasi-necessary,’ or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such
signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to
naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one
sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a
‘scientific’ intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experi-
ence. [. . .By abstraction] we can reach conclusions as to what would be true of signs in
all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. The modes of thought
of a God, who should possess an intuitive omniscience superseding reason, are put
out of the question. Now the whole process of development among the community of
students of those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths
which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an observational
science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its strong contrast to all the
special sciences which arises from its aiming to find out whatmust be and not merely
what is in the actual world. (CP2.227, c. 1897)
As this passage presents it, logic proceeds from our familiarity with the use of
signs, and attempts, by a process which will be discussed in a moment, to reach
conclusions that would apply to all possible ‘scientific intelligences’. This latter
notion is cashed out by Peirce in terms of anything that can learn from experience.
Excluded from such a conception are ordinary physical objects, sticks and stones
for instance. Also explicitly excluded, is the notion of God as intuitive intelligence.
This notion, which Peirce derives from Leibniz, is of a being whose act of thinking
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automatically creates the thing thought.9 That is, if such a God were to think
‘There are birds wandering about on the roof’ it would immediately be the case
that there are birds wandering about on the roof. Such a being could never learn
from experience, since learning is a process by which we come to align our thought
with what actually is the case. The need to align ones thought with reality would
never arise.
We can take this characterisation of logic and apply it to cenoscopy in general
by simply removing the reference to ‘signs’.10 On this view, we are to think of ceno-
scopy as abstracting away from the contingent features of our experience to gain
a (fallible) conception of what must be present to anything that can learn from ex-
perience. Vitally, this conception concerns what must be available to any possible
scientific intelligences, rather than any collection of actual entities of whatever
sort.
Peirce provides short account of the abstractive process to be used in reasoning
about what must be present to any scientific intelligence:11
As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation. The faculty which I
call abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for
which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar ex-
perience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means,
and to follow that wish by the question, ‘Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I
had ample means to gratify it?’ To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in
doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination
a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications
the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then
examines it, that is, observes what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent
desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like
mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what would be true of signs
in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. (CP2.227, c. 1897)
Again, Peirce is discussing logic here, but we can draw out some broader con-
sequences. The abstractive process that Peirce describes deploys both actual exper-
ience and imagination. In his example, we experience some presently-unachievable
9Leibniz holds that ‘[o]nly God has the privilege of having nothing but intuitive knowledge’
(Leibniz 1996, p. 490). In an interesting discussion of Leibniz’s account of God, we find Peirce
challenging the idea of a God that does not have the power of improvement (CP7.380, 1902). Other
relevant passages include: CP1.35, 1885; 4.67, 1893; 6.508, c. 1906.
10Another angle from which we could approach the characterisation of ‘cenoscopy’ would be to
focus our attention on Peirce’s variety of phenomenology. Phenomenology is, for Peirce, the first
division of philosophy and gives principles to all the other branches of philosophy. Peirce holds that
there must be sufficient commonality in the form of experience between any inquirers to enable
phenomenology to proceed. It seems that Peirce thinks of this as a kind of regulative assumption
of philosophy (e.g. EP2:362, 1905).
11This passage was hidden by an ellipsis in the previous block quote.
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desire, we imagine conditions such that it could be satisfied and ask how we would
feel on those occasions. In so doing, we rise above at least some of the contingent
features of our situation. By something like this process we get closer to a concep-
tion of ‘what must be and not merely what is’.12
A more substantive example that gives a sense of Peirce’s method can be found
in the Harvard Pragmatism Lectures. In the course of the second lecture of the
series, Peirce attempts to show that we must take experience to include more than
just a play of feelings. It must also include direct experience of external resist-
ance.13 In order to make this argument, which aims at a ‘quasi-necessary’ con-
clusion about what experience must include for any scientific intelligence, Peirce
begins with the familiar experience of being surprised. Any reader following will
be able to come up with an example from their own history where they have been
surprised. He asks us, also, to imagine a few scenarios. For instance, sailing along
in a boat and suddenly, without warning, striking a rock (EP2:154, 1903). These
examples develop our ability to discriminate between the mere play of feeling and
the experience of resistance. We are also to note that such experiences are ne-
cessary in any process of learning we can conceive of. The basic thought is that
without the world ‘pushing back’ in the way these example bring to the fore, then
there would be no constraint on our beliefs and, consequently, no learning. In so
far as we fail to be able to imagine learning from experience without resistance,
we conclude, by means of a fallible abstraction, that surprise (and thus resistance)
is a necessary feature of the experience of any possible scientific intelligence.14
Cenoscopy, then, is the theoretical science which is based on those observations
which we take to be available to any scientific intelligence. Cenoscopy is distin-
guished from the special sciences (or ‘idioscopy’), the forms of theoretical science
which require ‘special observations’. Special observations are such that they need
12Peirce’s account of mathematical reasoning as experimentation on ‘skeleton diagrams’ has
beenmuch discussed in recent years (e.g. Champagne 2016; Legg 2012; Shin 2002; Stjernfelt 2000).
I will not attempt to add to that discussion here. The example Peirce gives of hypothetical practical
reasoning, and the example from the pragmatism lectures that will be deployed soon, should be
enough for our purposes. It is important to note, though, that this is part of the story about how
philosophy can target modally strong conclusions about what must be the case for any possible
scientific intelligence.
13In the language of Peirce’s categories, he is attempting to show that experience must include
‘secondness’ as well as ‘thirdness’.
14Another aspect of this argument is to note the necessary connection between having beliefs
and having expectations. In order to learn, it is probably necessary to already have at least some
beliefs. That expectations can be violated suggests some ‘non-ego’ against which the ‘ego’ interacts
(EP2:154, 1903). A further variant of this argument will be considered in Chapter Four.
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not be available to any possible inquirer. As Peirce characterises it, idioscopy is
the kind of science ‘depending upon special observation, which travel or other ex-
ploration, or some assistance to the senses, either instrumental or given by train-
ing, together with unusual diligence, has put within the power of its students’
(CP1.527, 1902). Or, to recall the previous passage, ‘[m]icroscopes and telescopes,
voyages and exhumations, clairvoyants and witnesses of exceptional experience’
(EP2:146, 1903). The special sciences we have considered so far all involved spe-
cial instruments. The advances in geology and chemistry we considered in the
previous chapter required the ability to ascertain the weights of various elements.
Since individual atoms are too small to be directly weighed, all sorts of techniques
had to be developed. Even simple geology requires special observations in so far
as it depends on observations of this rock or that rock rather than any others. For
instance, we can imagine that there is currently an intelligent species on another
planet, who by virtue of its particular geology have no access to gabbro rocks.
Returning, now, to the two charges against characterising cenoscopy in terms of
what is available to the adult and sane, we see that they do not apply to the notion
of the scientific intelligence. First, it is not perniciously exclusionary to exclude
things which can not possibly learn from experience from the practice of learning
from experience.15 Second, the ‘armchair idioscopy’ objection relied on there being
some perspective we could imagine fromwhich the inferences in question could not
be made. This cannot be the case with anything derivable from the perspective
of any possible scientific intelligence. We have thus moved from a conception of
cenoscopywhich tends towards picking out some particular group of actual entities
to one that applies to all possible entities.16
It is also worth noting, in connection with the worries about exclusion that arise
from the ‘adult and sane’ proposal, that the notion of universality that attaches
to the possible scientific intelligence is not the kind which can be claimed to pos-
sessed by any particular group of humans, ‘sane’ or not. In so far as critical studies
reveal the influence of various forms of prejudice on the results of philosophical
inquiry, they also reveal that the philosophy in question is failing to be properly
cenoscopic. Such results should be welcomed by anyone engaged in cenoscopic in-
15Recall that the problem set out above was that exclusion from those who can engage in ceno-
scopy would be also an exclusion from the practice of inquiry writ large. The characterisation of the
common in terms of the possible scientific intelligence only excludes things that couldn’t possibly
engage in inquiry.
16Those already familiar with Peirce will see that I am, in effect, charging the ‘adult and sane’
proposal with tending towards a kind of nominalism (c.f. Forster 2011, p. 17).
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quiry. Moreover, much like Peirce’s fallibilism, this notion of the universal puts in
question any claim to its possession by any particular person or group.
Finally, it is important to note that the idea of the scientific intelligence is prob-
ably in the background whenever Peirce uses the language of ‘adulthood’ and ‘san-
ity’. This is made clear in the Regenerated Logic of 1896, where Peirce says that
‘[philosophy] confines itself [. . . ] to the universal phenomena of experience; and
these are, generally speaking, sufficiently revealed in the ordinary observations
of every-day life’. This is the kind of thought that motivates the appeal to what is
available to the adult and sane (here with ‘ordinary’ substituted). However, Peirce
continues, adding that ‘in the strictest sense’ hemeans those ‘observations asmust
be open to every intelligence which can learn from experience’ (CP3.428, 1896).
While such features are available from the everyday perspective, they need not be
immediately familiar to us and they may well surprise us.
1.3 Cenoscopy and the A Priori
The distinction between cenoscopy and idioscopy allows Peirce to capture the mo-
tivations for thinking that philosophy is an a priori discipline. The distinction
between the a priori and the a posteriori concerns the relationship between a claim,
or a form of reasoning, and experience. If the claim or inference does not require
an experiential basis then it is a priori, if not it is a posteriori. Cenoscopy is a priori
in some senses.
The a priori is sometimes aligned with what can be discovered ‘from the arm-
chair’.17 That is, what can be discovered without going out and looking for some
special experience. On this conception the a priori can appeal to common exper-
ience, however ‘common’ is cashed out. This is conception obviously aligns with
Peirce’s notion of cenoscopy. It also aligns with the idea that cenoscopy is not to
be turned into idioscopy. For instance, Fumerton, defending the armchair, claims
that ‘one doesn’t need to engage in highly specialised investigations into the struc-
ture of the brain, the causal origin of language, the fundamental laws governing
the physical universe, or complex sociological/psychological facts about people in
order to get an answer to the questions that preoccupy [the armchair philosopher]’
(Fumerton 1999, p. 23).
17For instance, Fumerton uses the term ‘armchair philosophy’ to capture what he takes to have
been typically meant by saying that philosophy is a priori. However, he acknowledges that this can
be misleading if one has a stricter notion of the a priori in mind (Fumerton 1999, p. 22).
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However, the notion of the a priori can also be read as requiring a more radical
independence from experience than this. One way of cashing this out is in terms
of necessity and contingency. The a priori can be aligned with the necessary if
we take experience to be only capable of providing information about mere local
matters of fact. Such experience could not tell us that something must be true
in all worlds or for all possible inquirers.18 We have already seen that Peirce’s
conception of logic as ‘quasi-necessary’ stems from the conception of cenoscopy as
abstracting away from contingent features of human experience in order to gain
a conception of what is necessary for any possible inquirer. Cenoscopy is thus a
priori if this means that it aims at modally strong conclusions. However, in so far
as its methodology for deriving necessity claims depends on observation there may
still be a problem.
If the a priori is taken to exclude anything that is observational in any sense
then Peirce does not think that any discipline is a priori. We saw in the last chapter
that Peirce holds that all theoretical sciences are observational. In this connection,
Peirce famously rejects what he calls the ‘a priori method’ in ‘Fixation of Belief’.
The ‘a priori method’ is characterised, rhetorically, as the method whereby one
accepts a conclusion because it strikes one as rational (W3:252/EP1:119, 1877). In
a later text, Peirce suggests that metaphysicians who adopt this method, at the
expense of mastering exact logic, ‘had better put up [their] shutters and go out
of the trade’ (EP2:31, 1898). Our sense of what is rational is not to be considered
a source of knowledge when used by itself.19 Peirce does, however, think we do
have something like a rational insight or ‘natural light of reason’ (CP2.25, 1902).
However, this faculty is only able to aid in the hypothesis generation process—it
cannot be the basis of an autonomous science. We will consider this in more detail
in a moment.
Peirce himself uses the term ‘a priori’ in various ways. In one place we find him
holding that logic is not ‘purely a priori’, but has a ‘degree of apriority’ (CP292,
18Fumerton denies that the traditional conception of philosophy as an armchair discipline
makes it a priori, if one understands the a priori to be, strictly speaking, the necessary.
19Some recent work on philosophical methodology aligns the traditional a prioriwith something
like ‘rational intuition’. Nolan, for instance, argues against the equation of the armchair and the a
priori on the basis that armchair work does not require any special form of rational intuition. He
defends, instead, the ‘a posteriori armchair (Nolan 2015).Williamson, while acknowledging, ‘loosely
speaking’, an alignment between the a priori and the armchair, rejects the view that armchair
methodology is radically different from the methodology of the natural sciences on the basis of a
lack of a special faculty of a priori intuition (Williamson 2005, p. 1, p. 15).
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1908).20 On the other hand, Peirce holds that ‘when we come to study logic, we
shall find that all such a priori arguments, whether pro or con, about positive fact
are rubbish’ (CP2.137, 1902). Here, Peirce is concerned with a priori arguments
concerning whether there is any truth or not. Peirce takes the ‘positive fact’ that
there is some truth or other to be forced on us by experience.21
Cenoscopy is then a priori if by that we mean independent of any observations
not available to any possible inquirer. Of course, Cenoscopy may, of course, ‘take
suggestions’ on the from idioscopic sciences in the sense presented in the previous
chapter. It is also a priori if by that we mean something that aims at necessity
claims, or that aims to explore non-actual possibilities. It is not a priori is by that
we mean entirely independent of observation in toto.
2 Cenoscopy as First Philosophy
Having filled the gaps in our understanding of cenoscopy and idioscopy, we can now
turn to the foundational status of the former for the latter. The claim to be defended
is that this turns cenoscopy into a kind of ‘first philosophy’. This claim is quite
vague, and consequently not particularly hard to establish. Rather, real progress
in our understanding of Peirce will be achieved by seeing the particular mode of
first philosophy that he defends. In later chapters, we will turn our attention to
the specific role of metaphysics within this framework.
A good working conception of ‘first philosophy’ can be derived from De Caro and
Macarthur. They present ‘First Philosophy’ as having two characteristics: author-
ity over, and foundational status for, the other sciences. In the following passage
they refer specifically to ‘scientific naturalism’, but their ‘liberal naturalism’ shares
this rejection of first philosophy:22
Scientific naturalism is, as Quine elegantly puts it, the ‘abandonment of the goal of a
First Philosophy prior to natural science.’ Abandoning First Philosophy involves two
related ideas: 1) the denial of philosophy’s traditional authority—philosophy can no
longer claim to be the master discipline that sits in judgment of the claims of the
20Logic has this degree of apriority in so far as at least some of its conclusions must be true on
the basis of ‘necessary deduction[s] from the fact that there are signs’. This is, of course, something
like the account of logic as the ‘quasi-necessary’ doctrine of signs, set out above.
21Elsewhere we find Peirce preferring the word ‘innate’ to ‘a priori’ (CP4.92, 1893), and aligning
the ‘primitive’ with the ‘a priori (W5:236, 1885).
22They take this rejection to be the ‘minimal sense’ of the term ‘naturalism’ (De Caro and Ma-
carthur 2004, p. 14).
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natural sciences; and 2) the denial that the results of philosophy play a foundational
role with respect to the sciences. (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, p. 6)
The one-way relationship of principle-dependence between philosophy and the
other sciences seems to set it up as a kind of first philosophy.23 I argued in the pre-
vious chapter that principle-dependence gives philosophy a kind of foundational
status for the other sciences. This foundational status also gives authority to philo-
sophy insofar as it has the authority to criticise the philosophical assumptions of
various other sciences.24 To establish that Peirce adopts a kind of first philosophy
is not, then, very difficult. The aim of this section is rather to provide arguments
for the hierarchical relationship between cenoscopy and idioscopy. I offer two such
arguments from Peirce, one ‘positive’ the other ‘negative’.
The positive argument is derived by considering Peirce’s motivations for think-
ing there must be a science concerned with any possible scientific intelligence.
That such a ‘quasi-necessary’ science is needed is defended on the basis of an ac-
count of scientific inquiry as requiring abductive, in addition to inductive and de-
ductive, reasoning. It is also motivated on the basis of the regulative hopes that
Peirce takes to guide practice of scientific inquiry. The need for abductive reas-
oning leads us to need an account of the inquirer, while the regulative hopes of
inquiry motivate us to think there must be an account of all possible scientific
inquirers.25
The negative argument challenges any proposal which seeks to either ground
philosophy in, or replace it with, some special science or other. I will use the gen-
eric term ‘idioscopism’ to refer to this class of views. Peirce himself challenged two
variants of this proposal: Sigwart’s psychologism and Dewey’s conception of logic
as a ‘natural history of thought’. I will draw on his arguments against both. Ac-
cording to Peirce, such proposals threaten the achievement rational self-control.
Idioscopism threatens rational self-control by undermining the hopes which reg-
ulate scientific inquiry. The Peircean will not think the gains presented by these
proposals are worth the cost.
23Peirce himself uses the term ‘philosophia prima’ to refer to cenoscopy (EP2:372, 1906).
24Here we can take up Haack’s metaphor in which Peirce makes metaphysics the ‘Queen of the
Sciences’, but as a constitutional monarch rather than an autocratic rules (Haack 2008, pp. 108–9).
25Hopes, like beliefs, determine our actions. They are distinguished in so far as hopes can outrun
our expectations. If I believe that there is a black pen in the drawer I will expect to see it when I
open the drawer. If I merely hope that there is a pen in the drawer, then I will not necessarily expect
to see it there. Belief and hope are also related in so far as I cannot rationally hope for something
that I believe to be impossible (Cooke 2006, pp. 139–141).
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Before turning to these arguments, it is worth heading off a potential source of
puzzlement. This section offers a series of arguments for the hierarchical relations
that Peirce suggests hold between various theoretical sciences. However, in the
previous chapter it was suggested, in passing, that Peirce adopts an empirical
method for generating the hierarchy. That is, Peirce presents himself as merely
showing the reader how the sciences in his day are in fact related by looking at the
way those sciences are practised (e.g. EP2:131–132, 1902).26 He even suggests that
the relations between the sciences could change as science develops. For instance,
we might imagine that some kind of neo-vitalism might switch the relationship
between biology and physics. In this imagined future, the objects of physics would
be considered special cases of the objects of biology. Biologywould, in this situation,
provide principles to physics.
While the use of the empirical method may be true of the classification of the
idioscopic sciences that Peirce provides, it is hard to believe that he follows it when
classifying the sub-disciplines of philosophy. For one thing, Peirce seems to be
proposing that we organise philosophy in a certain way, and proposing it for philo-
sophical reasons.27 It may be that, since Peirce conceives of philosophy as ‘quasi-
necessary’, its appropriate structure can be derived by this kind of reasoning. In
any case, we should move on into the following sections with the thought that
Peirce is proposing that philosophy should be structured in a certain way, rather
than reporting his views about the divisions of philosophy as they appeared to him
in his day.28
2.1 Abduction and the Need for Cenoscopy
2.1.1 Abduction as ‘Internal Observation’
The previous chapter introduced Peirce’s metaphor in which scientific inquiry is
depicted as the attempt to navigate a bog. In the lead up to that metaphor, Peirce
introduces the need for abduction in scientific research:
26The hierarchy is ‘concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so many branches of know-
ledge, but with sciences in their present condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men’
(EP2:258, 1903).
27Other Peirce interpreters have made similar distinctions. Hookway, for instance distinguishes
between the pre-logical and post-logical sciences on the hierarchy (Hookway 1985, pp. 77–79).
28That this is the best way to approach this material should be made clear by the fact that
‘phaneroscopy’, a science recognised as such by one person (Peirce), is an important part of his
hierarchy. Unless Peirce thought of himself as the entire social practice of philosophy, then he
cannot have taken himself to be merely reporting how philosophy is practised.
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The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach
it. In induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. But it finds at once,—I
am partially inverting the historical order to state the process in its logical order,—it
finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call upon its inward
sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn of mod-
ern science making his appeal to il lume naturale. But insofar as it does this, the solid
ground of facts fails it. It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional.
(EP2:55, 1898)
Induction is presented here as a kind of passive opening up to facts. Finding this
is insufficient, science turns to something internal rather than external. This in-
ternal thing, ‘instinct’ or ‘inward sympathy with nature’, is aligned, earlier in the
same text, with what he calls ‘retroduction’:
As for retroduction, it is itself an experiment. [. . . ] It begins always with a colligation,
of course, of a variety of separately observed facts about the subject of the hypothesis.
[. . . ]29 And then comes an observation. Not, however, an external observation of the
objects as in induction, nor yet an observation made upon the parts of a diagram, as
in deduction; but for all that just as truly an observation. For what is observation?
What is experience? It is the enforced element in the history of our lives. It is that
which we are constrained to be conscious of by an occult force residing in an object
which we contemplate. The act of observation is the deliberate yielding of ourselves
to that force majeure,—an early surrender at discretion, due to our foreseeing that we
must, whatever we do, be borne down by that power, at last. Now the surrender which
we make in retroduction is a surrender to the insistence of an idea. The hypothesis,
as the Frenchman says, c’est plus fort que moi.30 It is irresistible; it is imperative.
(EP2:46–47, 1898)
On this view, observation is involved in all kinds of reasoning. This should not be
too surprising given Peirce’s view, set out in the previous chapter, that all of the
theoretical sciences are observational. The kind of observation involved in retro-
duction is ‘internal’. In retroduction, we gather the facts to be explained together.
Having performed this ‘colligation’, various ideas thatmight explain the facts force
themselves upon us. Combining this idea with the previous passage, we see that
the ‘occult force’ behind the compulsion involved in retroductive inferences is the
force of ‘instinct’ or the ‘inward sympathy with nature’.31
29The term colligation is due to William Whewell. It means something like collecting the facts
and considering them together. The ellipsis here covers a short passage where Peirce praises
Whewell as a logician and scientist, and as providing a much better account of the inductive sci-
ences than Mill did. I will very briefly discuss the Mill-Whewell debate in a moment.
30A literal rendition of this expression is ‘it is stronger than me’. The phrase carries the con-
notation of being compelled by something stronger than reason.
31In an earlier lecture from the same series, Peirce provides a compact statement of the distinc-
tion between retroduction, induction, and deduction:
Reasoning is of three kinds. The first is necessary, but it only professes to give us information concerning
the matter of our own hypotheses, and distinctly declares that if we want to know anything else, we must
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In later texts, Peirce uses the term ‘abduction’ for what he called ‘retroduction’
in the previous passages:
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical
operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a
value and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.
Deduction proves that something must be, Induction shows that something actu-
ally is operative, Abduction merely suggests that something may be.
Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction
which can be tested by induction and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to under-
stand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that it is brought about. (EP2:216,
1903)
Peirce goes on to suggest that our success in abduction can best be made sense
of if it is based in an ‘Insight. . . into the Thirdnessess, the general elements, of
Nature’, and that this insight ‘is at the same time of the general nature of In-
stinct, resembling the instincts of the animals’ (EP2:217–218, 1903). ‘Abduction’
and ‘retroduction’ are, then, two terms for the same process. In both cases, some-
thing internal to the inquirer is appealed to rather than simply opening ourselves
up to external experience.
That induction, by itself, is insufficient for scientific inquiry should not be par-
ticularly controversial. In the previous generation this was an important aspect of
the debate between Whewell and Mill that Peirce references in ‘The First Rule of
Logic’. Mill thought that the chief difficulty in Kepler’s research consisted in get-
ting himself into to a position where he could just see that, e.g., the orbit of Mars
around the Sun is elliptical. Whewell, on the other hand, emphasised the need
to bring the right idea to the observations. On Whewell’s view, observations can
never, by themselves, be sufficient. In the case of Kepler, the necessary abductive
moves included rejecting the previously held idea that planetary orbits must be
understood in terms of either regular polygons or platonic solids.32
Like Whewell, Peirce’s picture of the development of science introduces, as an
essential feature, the inquirer. For both, the activity of hypothesis-making on the
part of inquirers is an irreducible feature of scientific activity. For Peirce, the suc-
cess of science depends on the ‘instinct’, or ‘inward sympathy with nature’ of the in-
quirer. This inward sympathy explains our tendency to guess rightmore often than
go elsewhere. The second depends upon probabilities. [. . . ] The third kind of reasoning tries what il lume
naturale, which lit the footsteps of Galileo, can do. It is really an appeal to instinct. (EP2:32, 1898)
The first kind of reasoning is deduction, the second induction, and the third retroduction/abduction.
32For an account of the dispute between Mill and Whewell which highlights the example of
Kepler see, e.g., Snyder 2010 or Lugg 1989.
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chance would suggest (c.f. EP2:216–218, 1903). We might hope, then, to provide
some kind of philosophical account of the nature of the inquirer and of what the in-
quirer brings to the task of inquiry. This is, I argue, a core function of cenoscopy.33
Peirce thinks that some of the hypotheses brought to inquiry by the inquirer
are too general to be tested by any special science. Peirce offers a few examples in
the course of making an argument for the unavoidability of metaphysics, where
he argues as follows:
the special sciences are obliged to take for granted a number ofmost important propos-
itions, because their ways of working afford no means of bringing these propositions
to the test. In short, they always rest upon metaphysics. At one time, for example, we
find physicists, Kelvin, Maxwell and others, assuming that a body cannot act where
it is not, meaning by ‘where it is not’ where its lines of force do not centre. At another
time, we find them assuming that the laws of mechanics (including the principles of
metric geometry) hold good for the smallest corpuscles. Now it is one thing to infer
from the laws of little things how great things, that consist of little things, will act;
but it is quite a different thing to infer from the phenomena presented by great things
how single things billions of times smaller will act. It is like inferring that because
in any country one man in so many will commit suicide, therefore every individual,
once in such a period of time, will make an attempt at suicide. The psychical sciences,
especially psychology, are, if possible, even more necessitated to assume general prin-
ciples that cannot be proved or disproved by their ordinary methods of work. The
philosopher alone is equipped with the facilities for examining such ‘axioms’ and for
determining the degree to which confidence may safely be reposed in them. Find a
scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics—not by any means
every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of metaphysicians in scorn—and you
have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized
metaphysics with which they are packed. (CP1.129, c. 1905)
The importance of this passage for the motivation of metaphysics will be taken up
in further detail in later chapters. For now, we need only note that the hierarchy
presents metaphysics as depending on the rest of philosophy as well. Philosophy
is the only discipline that can test the assumptions upon which the various spe-
cial sciences depend.34 In this passage, Peirce offers us some examples of the as-
sumptions that he has in mind. One is a general assumption about causation: that
bodies cannot act where they are not. The other is a mereological assumption con-
cerning the relationship between parts and wholes. Peirce does not here provide
33Oneway of thinking about the three kinds of theoretical science is to think of them as primarily
associated with one of the three kinds of reasoning. Idioscopy is closely associated with inductive
reasoning, mathematics (schematoscopy) is closely associated with deductive reasoning, and, if the
arguments of this thesis are correct, cenoscopy is closely associated with abductive reasoning. One
reason in favour of this last claim, which we are already in a position to see, is that cenoscopy is
the study of the necessary features of the inquirer and proceeds by a kind of internal observation.
34This is not because philosophers have access to any additional kind of experience than other
scientists. Rather, they are better at reasoning on the basis of common experience.
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an example of a philosophical assumption made by psychology. He suggests else-
where that psychology depends more on logic than metaphysics (CP1.250, 1902).35
Peirce’s claim is that these assumptions are not able to be tested by the special
sciences themselves, and so some more general science is needed. It will be worth
considering some examples in a bit more detail.
General accounts of causation, mereology, and inferential validity are tradi-
tional parts of philosophy. On top of these, and as a result of the common-sensism
outlined above, Peirce also thinks that there are a series of indubitable, but es-
sentially vague, assumptions made by the special sciences. Moreover, he takes the
articulation of these assumptions to be one of the jobs of cenoscopy. For instance,
we assume that, at least in some respect, ‘there is an element of order in the uni-
verse’ (CP6.496, c. 1906). Peirce tends to criticise any formulation of this assump-
tion that is more precise than this. On Peirce’s view ‘when anybody undertakes to
say precisely what that order consists in, he will quickly find he outruns all logical
warrant’ (CP6.496, c. 1906). One such unwarranted characterisation of the order
that obtains in the universe is hard determinism.36
If the ‘ways of working’ of idioscopy provide nomeans of putting the propositions
they depend on to the test, then there is good reason to think that idioscopy is
principle-dependent on cenoscopy. The examples we have been considering suggest
that this dependence is the result of the nature of experimentation in the special
sciences. If Peirce is right, then all scientific experimentation requires abduction
before any induction is attempted. This is easiest to see in the case of the vague
assumption that the behaviour of the world is regular ‘in some respect’. As Peirce
says, attempting to confirm this belief by means of experiment ‘would vie with
adding a teaspoonful of saccharine to the ocean in order to sweeten it’ (CP5.522,
c. 1905). Note, also, that the act of engaging in an experiment assumes that that
the results of a series of particular events are telling about some more general
phenomena. The belief that there is some order or regularity in the universe is an
35One place in which this dependence manifests is in the classification of the actual cognitive
processes studied by empirical psychology. Hookway has argued that Peirce thinks any attempt to
understand the psychology of inferential processes will require the psychologist to already have a
conception of when an inferential process is valid or invalid. That is, the psychologist will assume
a logical principle (Hookway 2012d, pp. 94–95).
36Peirce criticises this view under the name ‘necessitarianism’. Necessitarianism is, Peirce
says, ‘the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law’
(W8:111/EP1:298, 1892). By using the word ‘common’ here, Peirce does not mean to align the be-
lief with ‘common sense’.
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example of the kind of common-sense belief that Peirce thinks cannot be abstracted
away when we consider the possible scientific intelligence.37
In the passage quoted above, Peirce offered metaphysical assumptions about
causation and mereology as examples of the kind of principles that the natural
sciences take from philosophy. However, unlike in the case of the belief that the
world is regular in some respect, it is less clear that either the affirmation or denial
of the proposition that a body cannot act where it is not would involve a kind of
performative contradiction. That is, we don’t assume either the truth or falsity of
this belief simply by virtue of inquiring. It is also less clear that this assumption
cannot be tested by special-scientificmeans. However, in any idioscopic experiment
will have to assume some general principle or other of this sort. So, for instance,
to test whether a body can act where it is not might be managed by finding some
particular phenomenon which we fail to explain in any other way. However, the
assumptions that condition our conception of the space of possible explanations
will themselves be metaphysical, and not themselves testable in the experiment
in question. Rather, they call for a more general reflection on the space of pos-
sibilities. This is the kind of reflection that is only available from the cenoscopic
perspective.38
The examples we have considered so far have all been metaphysical. Peirce
takes idioscopy to also depend on logical principles. For instance, they are needed
in the design and implementation of experiments.39 As in the case of metaphysical
principles, this dependence relationship is often easiest to see when it is going
wrong. We can look at historical examples of scientific practice and see that if the
investigators at the time had adopted differentmethods then they would have been
able to advancemuchmore rapidly. Two examples that Peirce uses to illustrate this
have come up already. We have looked at the famous passage on Lavoisier from
‘The Fixation of Belief’, in which Peirce notes the new recognition of the role of
hands-on experimentation, and Lavoisier’s ability to let his experimentation feed
37We could go further, by offering some arguments to the conclusion that anything that could
learn from experience must take the world to be regular in some respect. Some arguments of this
sort will be developed in later chapters.
38A further point which might be added here is that the assumptions which we might bring
from cenoscopy to idioscopy can unduly constrain idioscopy. This will be considered in more detail
in Chapter Four.
39According to Peirce logic is the ‘method of methods’ and that ‘Logic will not undertake to inform
you what kind of experiments you ought to make in order best to determine the acceleration of
gravity, or the value of theOhm; but it will tell you how to proceed to form a plan of experimentation’
(W4:378/CP7.59, 1882).
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back into the task of hypothesis generation. On Peirce’s view this development
had been blocked by bad logical principles. Knowledge, for the alchemists that
the new science of chemistry challenged, required a sudden burst of insight with
a testing phase which could only answer questions in the negative. We can see
the effects of logic in this kind of proto-science. This suggests that early alchemy-
chemistry was indeed dependent on logic. The appropriate solution to problem of
bad logic affecting our idioscopic investigations is not to attempt to avoid logical
principles. This would be impossible, since even methodological anarchism is a
logical principle. Instead, we should attempt to improve our logic.
Peirce also presents the Ptolemaic astronomers as revealing the effects of a
flawed logic:
It is impossible tomaintain that the superiority of the science of themoderns over that
of the ancients is due to anything but a better logic. No one can think that the Greeks
were inferior to any modern people whatever in natural aptitude for science. We may
grant that their opportunities for research were less; and it may be said that ancient
astronomy could make no progress beyond the Ptolemaic system until sufficient time
had elapsed to prove the insufficiency of Ptolemy’s tables. The ancients could have
no dynamics so long as no important dynamical problem had presented itself; they
could have no theory of heat without the steam-engine, etc. Of course, these causes
had their influence, and of course they were not the main reason of the defects of the
ancient civilisation. Ten years’ astronomical observations with instruments such as
the ancients could have constructed would have sufficed to overthrow the old astro-
nomy. The great mechanical discoveries of Galileo were made with no apparatus to
speak of. If, in any direction whatever, the ancients had once commenced research
by right methods, opportunities for new advances would have been brought along in
the train of those that went before. But read the logical treatise of Philodemus; see
how he strenuously argues that inductive reasoning is not utterly without value, and
you see where the fault lay. When such an elementary point as that needed serious
argumentation it is clear that the conception of scientific method was almost entirely
wanting. (W4:378–379/CP7.60, 1882)
The issue that this passage is directed to is how to explain the relative success of
heliocentric astronomy and the geocentric system of the Ptolemaic astronomers.
Peirce suggests that it is not that they lacked the spirit of science.40 Nor were
they simply less clever than us or lacking in necessary experimental equipment.
Rather, theywere held back by their faulty logic. Peirce’s example in this case is the
disdain for inductive inference evidenced by extent to which it needed defending
in the work of Philodemus and others. Here, as in the chemical case, faulty logical
40Although they may have had the ‘spirit’ in diminished form. According to Peirce ‘[t]he diffi-
culty [with including ancient authors amongst scientists] is that one of the things that coheres
to that undeveloped state of intelligence is precisely a very imperfect and impure thirst for truth.
Paracelsus and the alchemists were rank charlatans seeking for goldmore than for truth’ (EP2:131,
1902).
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principles prevented inquirers from engaging in well-conducted experimentation.
Again, the solution is not to abandon logic, but to do it better.
In each case considered in this section, the kind of experimental activity that
the special sciences are engaged in is found to depend on a set of assumptions
that cannot themselves to put to the test by the same methods. We have seen
the role of metaphysical assumptions about causation and mereology, the role
of a normative understanding of reasoning in the psychological sciences, and lo-
gical/epistemological principles about what counts as knowledge and what meth-
ods might be used to attain it.41
2.1.2 From The Inquirer to Any Possible Inquirer
If the claim is accepted that the inquirer always brings something to inquiry by
way of abductive assumptions that are unable to be tested in idioscopic inquiry,
then we have good reason to think that some kind of account of the inquirer is
wanted to account for this dimension of inquiry. We do not, however, have motiva-
tion for thinking that cenoscopy, a science which attempts to take stock of the kind
of abductive assumptions brought to bear by any possible inquirer, is the answer
to this need. It could be ‘idioscopy all the way down’. When the need arises, for
instance, we could engage in some psychology to consider the ways in which our
various instincts and biases influence inquiry. Sociology and other critical social
sciences would have a role to play in here. Peirce’s cenoscopy is not supposed to
undermine this critical work. Rather, cenoscopy is a critical discipline that is being
proposed in addition to it, and as foundational for it.
41Onemight object to the arguments so far presented on the grounds that they deploy the follow-
ing pattern: any idioscopic experiment depends on some assumption which is not itself susceptible
to idioscopic research, if not susceptible to idioscopic research then it must be susceptible to ceno-
scopic research, therefore idioscopy depends on cenoscopy. This excludes a few options. For one, it
could be that the assumptions in question are just unable to be properly criticised from any per-
spective. Against this possibility, the Peircean will offer arguments couched in terms of regulative
hopes of inquiry. I will deploy an argument of this sort in the next section.
One might also note that mathematics is an option that could play a foundational role with
respect to the special sciences. That is, idioscopy could depend merely on ‘schematoscopy’ rather
than cenoscopy. It is indeed true that Peirce thinks mathematics plays a foundational role for
the other theoretical sciences (see Chapter One). All sciences have their mathematical element
(CP1.247, 1902). But the assumptions that we have highlighted in this section cannot be simply
reduced to mathematics. They concern the real world, rather than, as Peirce takes mathematics
to study, the space of possibilities in general (e.g. EP2:39–40, 1898). The assumption that, say, an
entity can act where it is not, is not excluded or adopted for merely mathematical reasons, it must
find some rationale in actual experience. This is a consequence of the claim, referenced earlier,
that mathematics is a hypothetical rather than a positive science.
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The proposal that wemight just, when the need arises, engage in idioscopy with
respect to some particular abductive assumption that some particular species or
culture bring to bear in inquiry is not entirely un-Peircean. For instance, with
respect to habits in general, within which category Peirce includes beliefs, we find
him saying:
Among the things that the reader, as a rational person, does not doubt is that he
not merely has habits, but also can exert a measure of self-control over his future ac-
tions; whichmeans however, not that he can impart to them any arbitrarily assignable
character, but, on the contrary, that a process of self-preparation will tend to impart
to action (when the occasion for it shall arise) one fixed character [. . . ] (EP2:337, 1905)
The power of habit development, and a fortiori, belief development does not enable
us to change our entire collection of beliefs in one go. Rather, we are to think of
ourselves in line with Peirce’s story of science as traversing a bog. We shift our
footing when the need arises or can be clearly foreseen. Given that Peirce allows
for this kind of adjustment of our beliefs in medias res, why engage in the specific
kind of foundational work that Peirce encourages?
To see why an account of any possible inquirer is relevant, we need to return
to Peirce’s conception of truth as the aim of inquiry.42 In the last chapter we in-
troduced the idea that truth includes a notion of ‘externality’: we aim to fix our
beliefs to something not determined by us.43 The concept of ‘externality’, and the
very closely related concept of ‘reality’, is set out by Peirce in his review of Fraser’s
Berkeley collection:
But observing that ‘the external’ means simply that which is independent of what
phenomenon is immediately present, that is of how we may think or feel; just as ‘the
real’ means that which is independent of how we may think or feel about it; it must be
granted that there are many objects of true science which are external, because there
are many objects of thought which, if they are independent of that thinking whereby
they are thought (that is, if they are real), are indisputably independent of all other
thoughts and feelings. (W2:470/EP1:90, 1871)
This characterisation of ‘reality’ introduces the idea that what some particular
group of people think about the object in question is important, whereas externality
concerns what people think in general. If the object in question changes as a result
ofmy deciding to think of it in a different way (excluding cases inwhich that change
42A full discussion of the notion of truth that Peirce deploys will wait until Chapter Three.
43In the previous chapter we saw that internal or impermanent things by which be might fix
belief include tenacity, authority, and fashion.
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in thought causes someone to physically intervene with the object), then it isn’t
external.44
The upshot here is that whatever the ‘external permanency’ associated with
truth, it cannot be determined by contingent features of some group of inquirers.
It can’t be, for instance, that this group of inquirers reach such and such con-
clusions, while this other group of inquirers, more or less different from the first,
reach some other conclusion regarding the same question. If we hold on to the hope
that belief can be fixed by an ‘external permanency’ alongside the recognition that
the inquirer always brings something to bear in inquiry, then we must also hope
that there is some, however abstract, commonality between inquirers such that
consensus in the limit is possible.
On Peirce’s account, ‘external’ and ‘real’ come to mean something not determ-
ined by a particular entity or particular collection of entities, but which may be
determined by the nature of thought in general. We find Peirce expressing this
view nicely slightly earlier in the Berkeley review:
The arbitrary will or other individual peculiarities of a sufficiently large number of
minds may postpone the general agreement in that opinion indefinitely; but it cannot
affect what the character of that opinion shall be when it is reached. This final opinion,
then, is independent, not indeed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary and
individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I, or any number of men
think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real,
and nothing else. (W2:469/EP1:89, 1871)
We will return to the ‘final opinion’, and the role of ‘hope’, in subsequent chapters.
The positive case for cenoscopy as first philosophy that we have just considered
starts with the recognition of the ineliminable role of abduction, and thus of the
creative contribution of the inquirer in the project of inquiry. Having acknowledged
this, we turned to the general assumptions that condition our hypothesis making
in idioscopic inquiry. These are adopted on the basis of a kind of abduction, rather
than being simply given in experience. One of the roles of cenoscopy is to articulate
and criticise these abduction-conditioning assumptions. This gives cenoscopy au-
thority over the assumptions brought to bear in theoretical inquiry. Moreover, we
saw that bad cenoscopy can have negative downstream effects in idioscopy. Work
in cenoscopy is foundational at least in so far as it helps idioscopy to avoid these
44A closely related definition, of ‘real’, runs as follows:
‘Real’ is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or
group of men or not. (EP2:434, 1908)
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pitfalls. To get to this point, however, we needed to adopt some substantive views
about the hopes that motivate theoretical inquiry. These, touching on the issues
of truth and reality in Peirce, are loose threads which will need to be tied up in
following chapters.
2.2 The Threat of Idioscopism
Some progress in tying these threads can be made already, as we consider the case
against ‘idioscopism’. In diagnosing what is wrong with this series of proposals
we will need to consider Peirce’s account of rational self-control. Our subsequent
consideration of truth and reality will in large part turn on how best to achieve
rational self-control.
Recall that ‘idioscopism’ is defined as any proposal which either replaces philo-
sophywith some special science (that is, any variety of idioscopy) or ‘grounds’ philo-
sophy in idioscopy. In Peircean hierarchical terms, idioscopism presents some idio-
scopic sciences as providing principles to cenoscopy. Recall also, that a principle
is some proposition which applies to all of the objects in the domain of the science
which receives the principle.
2.2.1 Rational Self-Control
On Peirce’s understanding, logic aims at giving us deliberate control over our
thought. I follow Hookway in using the phrase ‘rational self-control’ to capture
this aim.45 Peirce thinks that making the general assumptions that idioscopic in-
quiry depends on explicit and criticisable is an important part of the attempt to
gain self-control. We are not maximally in control of our reasoning and beliefs if
they rest on arbitrary and uncontrolled premises or inference patterns. Peirce’s
conception of self-control in general, and of rational self-control in particular, is
developed by the central division of cenoscopy: the normative sciences. One of the
reasons Peirce refuses to allow philosophy to be based on the results of the nat-
ural or social sciences is that such an arrangement would undermine rational
self-control.
45As far as I am aware, Peirce does not use the phrase himself. He does use the similar phrase
‘logical self-control’ (e.g. EP2:347, 1905). Hookway’s term helps to indicate that Peirce is interested
in our control over our beliefs and inferences in general, rather than with our merely following the
rules of formal logic.
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The normative sciences consider the conformity of feeling, action, and thought
to an ideal. Peirce summarises his conception of the normative sciences as follows:
Normative Science has three widely separated divisions (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii)
Logic.
Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without
any ulterior reasons. I am not well acquainted with this science, but it ought to repose
on phenomenology. Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to esthet-
ics for aid in determining the summum bonum. It is the theory of self-controlled, or
deliberate, conduct. Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and
as such must appeal to ethics for its principles. (EP2:260, 1903)
According to Peirce, deliberate conduct (including thought), is conduct that is car-
ried out for some end. We act deliberately when we have some purpose. The norm-
ative sciences, then, provide a general account of the kinds of ends to which feeling,
thought, and action might be directed. They also attempt to articulate an ultimate
ideal (or summum bonum). This ultimate end is ultimate in so far as it is an ideal
which could be endorsed in any circumstance (EP2:202, 1903).
Peirce eventually articulates each of these disciplines in terms of habits and
their development.46 Logic becomes the study of habits of belief and inference,
ethics the study of habits of conduct in general, and esthetics the study of habits of
feeling (EP2:377–378, 1906). Whatever the ideal habit of feeling is, to play the role
that Peirce assigns for it, we must have some control over it (otherwise esthetics
would not be a normative science), and it must enable us to criticise our ideals for
conduct.
A core feature of Peirce’s pragmatism is its alignment of the content of beliefs
with habitual conduct. To believe something is to have certain habits of deliberate
conduct. Here we mean ‘deliberately’ in a way that makes sense of Peirce’s claim
that ‘[i]f a man really believes that alcohol is injurious to him, and does not choose
to injure himself, but still drinks for the sake of the momentary satisfaction, then
he is not acting deliberately’ (EP2:12, 1895). To act deliberately is, again, to act in
order to achieve your ends. Developing beliefs is then a certain way of developing
habits of deliberate conduct. Peirce summarises this kind of habit-development as
follows:
logical criticism is limited to what we can control. In the future we may be able to
control more but we must consider what we can now control. Some elements we can
46We have already made reference to Peirce’s struggles to include ethics and esthetics within
the normative sciences. Peirce also struggled to figure out how each related to the idea of self-
controlled habit development. This was particularly true of esthetics. Vincent Potter traces out
this development in detail (Potter 1967, pp. 25–51).
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control in some limited measure. But the content of the perceptual judgment cannot
be sensibly controlled now, nor is there any rational hope that it ever can be. Con-
cerning that quite uncontrolled part of the mind, logical maxims have as little to do
as with the growth of hair and nails. We may be dimly able to see that, in part, it
depends on the accidents of the moment, in part on what is personal or racial, in part
[on what] is common to all nicely adjusted organisms whose equilibrium has narrow
ranges of stability, in part on whatever is composed of vast collections of independ-
ently variable elements, in part on whatever reacts, and in part on whatever has any
mode of being. But the sum of it all is that our logically controlled thoughts compose a
small part of the mind, the mere blossom of a vast complexus, which we may call the
instinctive mind, in which this man will not say that he has faith, because that implies
the conceivability of distrust, but upon which he builds as the very fact to which it is
the whole business of his logic to be true. (EP2:240–241, 1903)
On Peirce’s account, self-control is not complete self-creation. That is, we can’t just
take on and throw off habits at will (EP2:337, 1905). Rather, it starts with the idea
that we have some control over our habits which, while we can be convinced that it
has limits, does not have any definite limits that can be assigned in advance.47 In
the passage just quoted, Peirce holds that we cannot just believe at will.48 However,
by reflection and experimentation we can take responsibility for our beliefs to an
ever greater degree. This is rational self-control of belief.49
Logic is the study of reasoning and reasoning ismerely a special case of conduct.
The core of normative logic is, then, habits of reasoning. These habits must be
developed if one is to achieve rational self-control. This conception of logic includes,
but is not limited to, the study of deductive logic and formal systems. It includes
a theory of signs that captures some of what is presently studied in philosophy of
language and speech act theory,50 an account of the various forms of argument and
their strengths and weaknesses, and finally a general study of the methodology of
inquiry. The latter two parts of logic include much which is now considered part of
the philosophy of science and epistemology. Logic, as a normative science, is also
dependent upon ethics and aesthetics. We have already seen one example of Peirce
making logic depend on ethics: he takes from ethics the principle that that which
cannot be controlled cannot be criticised, and then applies it to the special case of
47This is a theme which Peirce returns to regularly in his late attempts to set out his version of
pragmatism (e.g. EP2:339, 1905; and 347, 1905).
48Peirce took this to be an important difference between his version of pragmatism and the kind
which endorses a Jamesian ‘will to believe’ (c.f. James 1896).
49There is an irony here that in order to gain self-control of our beliefs, we must more and more
submit them to the test of external experience. That is, we fail to gain rational self-control in so far
as we deploy the more ‘internal’ methods of tenacity, authority, or fashion (c.f. EP1:117-120, 1877).
50For recent attempts to connect Peirce’s semeiotic theories with contemporary philosophy of
language see Atkin 2008.
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inferences and belief. There are beliefs and inferences which are, in Peirce’s terms
‘acritical’, they cannot be criticised because they cannot be controlled (EP2:357,
1905).
If logic is the study of the development of habits of reasoning, and ethics is the
study of the development of habits of conduct, then esthetics is best understood as
the development of habits of feeling. This progression can be seen in the following
passage:
To return to self-control, which I can but slightly sketch, at this time, of course there
are inhibitions and coördinations that entirely escape consciousness. There are, in the
next place, modes of self-control which seem quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of
self-control which results from training. Next, a man can be his own training-master
and thus control his self-control. When this point is reached much or all the training
may be conducted in imagination. When a man trains himself, thus controlling con-
trol, he must have some moral rule in view, however special and irrational it may be.
But next he may undertake to improve this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his
control of control. To do this he must have in view something higher than an irrational
rule. He must have some sort of moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by
reference to an esthetic ideal of what is fine. There are certainly more grades than I
have enumerated. Perhaps their number is indefinite. The brutes are certainly cap-
able of more than one grade of control; but it seems to me that our superiority to them
is more due to our greater number of grades of self-control than it is to our versatility.
(CP5.533, c. 1905)
Here we see that, as we go ‘up the ladder’ of self-criticism, the principles we de-
ploy become more and more general. Without going into too much detail, we can
see that as self-control increases we gain the ability to take ownership of more
and more general principles of conduct. So, for instance, one might have a series
of practical skills all of which one is cultivating at once. One might, to return to
Peirce’s list of practical sciences, be spending a few hours pigeon fancying and do-
ing some gold-beating here and there, while also attempting to engage in theoret-
ical inquiry andmaintain a series of personal relationships. Each of these portions
of conduct might be subject to development on their own terms. But one could also
seek to attain a higher degree of self-control by applying a moral principle con-
cerning the coherence of these various activities. This is the level of self-control at
which, say, reflections about ‘work-life balance’ on the one hand, or commitment to
a single vocation, on the other, might appear. One might then criticise those eth-
ical principles on the grounds of some higher ‘esthetic ideal’. Such an ideal would
not just apply to human conduct, or even conduct in general, but perhaps to things
in general. Perhaps, for instance, one attempts to decide between a commitment
to work-life balance or to a single-minded devotion to some one goal on the basis
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of what you think would make an admirable life in general, and which applies
equally to other kinds of object. In this case, perhaps reflections on how the parts
of various objects can be in harmony with one another.51
So far, I have not said anything about the end towards which the development
of habits tends. However, we have already seen how Peirce will attempt to discover
it. Peirce takes the appropriate method for uncovering the summum bonum to be
the abstractive method of cenoscopy. For instance, in criticising the view, defended
by the statistician Karl Pearson, that the ultimate aim of scientific inquiry is the
stability of society, he directs us to imagine possible situations in which such an
aim could not be coherently adopted:
Professor Pearson’s aim, ‘the stability of society,’ which is nothing but a narrowBritish
patriotism, prompts the cui bono at once. I am willing to grant that England has been
for two or three centuries a most precious factor of human development. But there
were and are reasons for this. To demand that man should aim at the stability of
British society, or of society at large, or the perpetuation of the race, as an ultimate
end, is too much. The human species will be extirpated sometime; and when that time
comes the universe will, no doubt, be well rid of it. (EP2:60, 1901)
Here, we may start by being directed towards the stability of some society or other,
but we find that there are situations we can imagine in which we would have to
give up that aim. Leaving Peirce’s imagined end of the human race aside, wemight
instead appeal to the scenario, perhaps actual, in which some much wider social
solidarity is needed. Or perhaps, we imagine a scenario in which the continuation
of British society is in fact a hindrance to what we realise are higher aims.
Peirce’s conception of the aim that we reach when attempting to abstract away
from all non-ultimate aims is revealed in the following:
The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in
the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very develop-
ment of Reason. I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable
than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness
is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far
as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute
our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering
51Peirce’s own attempts at articulating the esthetic good are similarly abstract. For instance, in
the Harvard Pragmatism Lectures we get the following:
In light of the doctrine of the categories I should say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have
a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their
totality; and whatever does this is, in so far, esthetically good, no matter what the particular quality of the
total may be. (EP2:201, 1903)
Note that this kind of reflection is quite similar to the perfectionist tradition exemplified in Leib-
niz’s rationalist ethics (c.f. Youpa 2016).
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the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is‘up to us’ to do so. (CP1.615,
1903)
Immediately before this passage Peirce characterises ‘reason’ as something which
by nature tends to become embodied, but never can be fully embodied. For in-
stance, to call a rock hard commits you to ‘an innumerable series of conditional
predictions’ so that whatever happens to the rock will not ‘exhaust the meaning’
of calling it hard (CP1.615, 1903).52 To truly say of a rock that it is hard is then, in
a small degree, to participate in the growth of reason. Peirce, it is fair to imagine,
takes us to have more to offer in terms of ‘rendering the world more reasonable’.53
If the summum bonum is the growth of concrete reasonableness, by which we
‘embody general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical
cognition’ (EP2:442, 1908), then it is worth asking how this plays out in the intel-
lectual sphere. This will be part of the story in the next chapter. For our purposes
here, we need only keep in mind that the drive to greater self-control involves com-
ing to be cognisant of, and to criticise and endorse, general normative principles.
Some of the principles, namely the esthetic ones, will apply to things in general,
while others will only apply to conduct.
2.2.2 Two Idioscopisms
Peirce criticises many varieties of ‘idioscopism’. In this section I consider two of
the most prominent: Sigwart’s psychologism and Dewey’s conception of logic as
a natural history of thought. In both cases a circularity worry arises. This is a
problem if we aim, like Peirce, to achieve rational self-control.
Peirce frequently criticises ‘German logicians’, and holds the work of Christof
von Sigwart up as particularly worthy of rejection.54 Peirce presents Sigwart as
holding that logical validity is ultimately a matter of the experience of a certain
kind of ‘logical feeling’, or ‘logical Gefühl’ (EP2:166, 1903). On this view, what dis-
tinguishes good frombad reasoning is a kind of feelingwhich is accessible via intro-
spective psychology. Sigwart’s proposal would make logic depend on psychological
(and thus idioscopic) observations. Peirce offers a series of arguments against this
52Here, Peirce means ‘innumerable’ literally. This is necessary for the claim that ‘the meaning’
of calling a rock hard will never be exhausted.
53The ideal of ‘rendering the world more reasonable’ is elsewhere called the ‘growth of concrete
reasonableness’ (e.g. CP5.3, 1902).
54Characteristic passages include: CP8.62–63, 1890; 2.428, 1893; 4.37, 1893; 2.346, c. 1895;
2.18–20, 1902; 2.154–174, 1902; EP2:211-2, 1903; CP8.189, 1904; 8.377, 1908; and 4.353, 1911.
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position. Two can be mentioned here. Peirce argues that the logical feeling can-
not be recognised without a prior conception of the validity of inferences (EP1:169,
1903).55 Peirce also, playfully, notes that his own objections to Sigwart highly stim-
ulate his own logical Gefühl. There is thus a sense in which Sigwart’s view is
self-refuting. Peirce presents this challenge as follows: ‘[w]ere the Holy Father in
Rome to take it into his head to use his Infallibility to command the Faithful, un-
der pain of excommunication, to believe everything that any Protestant ever had
said or ever should say, he would put himself into a position very much like that
[which] Sigwart assumes in reducing logicality to a Quality of Feeling’ (EP1:169,
1903).
Moving to Peirce’s more general complaints about the influence of psychology
in philosophy, we find him saying that:
Psychology must depend in its beginnings upon logic, in order to be psychology and
to avoid being largely logical analysis. If then logic is to depend upon psychology in
its turn, the two sciences, left without any support whatever, are liable to roll in one
slough of error and confusion. (CP2.51, 1902)
Elsewhere Peirce characterises those who adopt this kind of circularity as adopt-
ing the ‘mutual support’ view, according to which ‘the philosophical sciences will
support each other, like two drunken sailors’ (CP8.167, c. 1903).56
By claiming that ‘psychology must depend in its beginnings upon logic, in order
to be psychology’, Peirce is arguing that psychology depends on normative logic in
order to make the distinctions it needs to make in order to pick out its objects.
That is, without applying some logical principles we can’t distinguish between the
subject matter of logic and the subject matter of psychology. For one thing, matters
of brain physiology and of introspective analysis are, Peirce thinks, confused in
psychology. According to Peirce, ‘there must be an application of scientific logic in
order to separate the precipitate of physiology from the filtrate of logic’ (CP2.43,
1902).
Peirce argues that the confusion of psychology and logic is, in part, the res-
ult of the historical development of the discipline. He holds that ‘[t]he logicians
55As Hookway constructs the argument, we need the logical concept of validity to understand
the psychological feelings associated with reasoning (Hookway 2012d, pp. 94–95).
56While the mutual support theory might work with the metaphor of Neurath’s ship, in which
inquiry is presented as a ship which has to be repaired at sea rather than in dry-dock (Cat 2014,
§3). It does not work as well with the metaphor of the bog. The bog that Peirce depicts inquiry as
walking along is one where we have some responsibility for the security of our footing. To leave
the kind of circularity involved in the mutual support theory uncriticised would be like walking
around in the bog without bothering to check our next steps.
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of the period from Descartes to Kant cannot be much blamed for seeing little dis-
tinction between psychology and logic, inasmuch as the psychology of their days,
whether rational or empirical, consisted in little else than a logical analysis of the
products of thought, as every psychologist of our day will admit’ (CP2.41, 1902).
Here, Peirce has in mind the shift, which Peirce himself was involved in, from a
kind of armchair psychology to a full laboratory science that attempted to integ-
rate both observation reports and physiological data.57
Armchair psychology, from Descartes to Kant, is characterised by Peirce as
either ‘rational’ or ‘empirical’. Two examples will suffice to make Peirce’s point
about the difficulty of dividing logic from philosophy in this work. Descartes is,
of course, well known for producing a ‘rational psychology’.58 Cartesian rational
psychology aims to derive knowledge of the mind by means of pure reflection. In
the second of his Meditations, Descartes wonders what ‘certain and unshakeable’
conclusions he can derive about himself starting from the mere certainty of his
own existence (Descartes 1984, pp. 16–17). He moves on to conclude that he is ‘in
the strict sense only a thing that thinks’ (Descartes 1984, p. 18). Having drawn
this conclusion, one of his next moves is to produce a logical analysis of thought.
For instance, he moves on in the third of the Meditations to ask what kind of
thought is able to be true or false (Descartes 1984, pp. 25-6). This ‘psychology’ is
not idioscopic, nor is it removed from what Peirce calls logical analysis.
Examples of empirical psychology can, unsurprisingly, be found in the work of
the early modern empiricists. Locke, for instance, takes our knowledge of mind
to be derived from the experience of reflection. Locke understands experience in
terms of the reception of ‘ideas’. Sensation is the receipt of ideas from external
objects via the senses, whereas reflection is the receipt of ideas of the internal
operation of our own minds (Locke 1998, Bk. 2, Ch.1, §2). A characteristically em-
piricist feature of Locke’s psychology is that it thinks of all of our ideas as built
up from the ‘simple’ ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection. Locke
attempts to analyse all of our concepts, including empirical descriptive concepts
57William James and Peirce both engaged in pioneeringwork in experimental psychology. James
is, of course, famous for his Principles of Psychology (James 1890). Peirce, with his student Jastrow,
published ‘On Small Differences of Sensation’ (W5:122–135, 1884). They argued, against Fechner,
that there is no smallest perceptible difference in sensationW5:123, 1884). This may have been the
first fully blinded and randomised psychological experiment (c.f. Hacking 1988, pp. 431–432). For
a general account of the history of experimental philosophy, including the contributions of James,
see Mandler 2011.
58The term ‘rational psychology’ is due to Christian Wolff, and makes up one of the divisions of
‘special metaphysics’ (Hettche 2016, §8.3).
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like ‘dog’ or ‘table’, metaphysical concepts like ‘substance’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, as
complexes of simple ideas. Locke’s psychology, then, is a kind of logical analysis of
concepts which divides them into their component parts.
The work that was newly being done in psychological laboratories in Peirce’s
day was not work of this sort. However, to draw the distinction between this work
and modern psychological research we must be able to demarcate psychology from
logic. This is only possible, Peirce thinks, from the side of logic. There is no way of
siphoning off the ‘logical’ aspects of the empirical data without the use of logical
principles. So here we have a route to the conclusion that psychology requires logic
in order for it to even understand what its objects are.59
If we grant that psychology depends on logic in the way outlined above, then a
circularity worry arises for any view that makes logic in turn depend on psycho-
logy. If this dependence holds, then we could end up with a faulty psychology on
the basis of faulty logic, and that faulty psychology could in turn back up the faulty
logic. There is no easy way out of this circle, since the falsity of the logic need not
turn up in the experiments of the psychologist. As a result, psychology and logic
might end up, as Peirce suggests, ‘roll[ing] in one slough of error and confusion’.
Peirce also criticises Dewey for introducing the use of idioscopic conclusions
into logic. The Deweyan proposal was to base logic in a ‘natural history’ of thought.
Dewey presents his perspective, and the contrary approach, in the following pas-
sage:
Thus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To take the distinctions of thought
and fact, etc., as ontological, as inherently fixed in the make-up of the structure of
being, is to treat the actual development of scientific inquiry and scientific control
as a mere subsidiary topic ultimately of only utilitarian worth. It is also to state the
terms upon which thought and being transact business in a way so alien to the use
made of these distinctions in concrete experience as to create a problem which can
be discussed only in terms of itself—not in terms of the conduct of life—metaphysics
again in the bad sense of that term. As against this, the problem of a logic which aligns
itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday life and in critical
science, is to follow the natural history of thinking as a life-process having its own
generating antecedents and stimuli, its own states and career, and its own specific
objective or limit. (Dewey 1903, p. 13, emphasis mine)
Dewey’s recommendation seems to be that the logician should engage in a close
description of actual thinking processes, in their particular concrete situations.
When engaged in Deweyan logic we might, for instance, consider the rules of
59The previous path to this conclusion that we considered concerned inference exclusively. This
was the argument against Sigwart’s appeal to ‘logical feeling’. The more general route to this con-
clusion concerns signs and sign-activity in general rather than just inferential validity.
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thumb deployed in particular practical sciences in some detail. For instance, we
might ask how a cook solves the particular problems that arise in their practice. Or,
we might consider particular laboratory practices in detail. Here we would focus
on, say, how myrmecologists study some particular kind of ant. This is contrasted
with the kind of logic that sets up a once-and-for-all picture of what thought is,
in general, and comes along with a ‘metaphysical’ conception of the world as also
being divided up into corresponding categories (object, substance, property, etc.).
Peirce’s worries about Dewey’s proposal are not a direct defence of the kind of
‘bad metaphysics’ that Dewey criticises. Rather, Peirce is concerned with the in-
ability of a ‘natural history’ to provide the kind of normative direction that Peirce
wants from logic. This turns, in part on the inability of natural history to consider
the gamut of not-currently-actual possibilities for thought (c.f. Hookway 2012d,
pp. 107–108). Without this, we lose the necessary stand-point from which to criti-
cise current practice. This charge is set out in a letter from Peirce to Dewey:
You propose to substitute for the Normative Science which in my judgment is the
greatest need of our age a ‘Natural History’ of thought or of experience. Far be it from
me to do anything to hinder a man’s finding out whatever kind of truth he is on the
way to finding out. But I do not think anything like a natural history can answer the
terrible need that I see of checking the awful waste of thought, of time, of energy,
going on, in consequence of men’s not understanding the theory of inference. Though
you use the expression ‘Natural History,’ yet of the two branches of Natural History,
physiology and anatomy, which are as sharply sundered today as ever they were, you
seem to be alluding only to the latter, since you speak of its being revolutionized by
conceptions of evolution. Now the doctrine of evolution has not affected physiology
either much or little, unless by lending a competing interest to anatomy and thus
weakening physiology. It has certainly neither directly, nor indirectly, strengthened
it. So, using the word anatomy without reference to its etymological suggestions, but
simply as a designation of the sort of business that Comparative Anatomists are en-
gaged in, you seem to conceive your occupation to be the studying out of the Anatomy
of Thought. Thereupon, I remark that the ‘thought’ of which you speak cannot be the
‘thought’ of normative logic. For it is one of the characteristics of all normative science
that it does not concern itself in the least with what actually takes place in the uni-
verse, barring always its assumption that what is before the mind always has those
characteristics that are found there and which Phänomenologie is assumed to have
made out. But as to particular and variable facts, no normative science has any con-
cern with them, further than to remark that they form a constant constituent of the
phenomenon. [. . . ]60 If then you have a ‘Natural History’ (i.e. a comparative anatomy)
of thought,—it is not the merely possible thought that Normative Science studies, but
thought as it presents itself in an apparently inexplicable and irrational experience.
(CP8.239, 1904)
The moral that Peirce wants us to draw from this is that the kind of control over
thought that we want is only available to us if we go beyond descriptions of ac-
60Peirce offers a series of examples here.
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tual processes of inquiry. We will have to adopt, instead, the cenoscopic viewpoint.
Cenoscopy, since it considers all possible inquirers, enables us to move beyond
present practices by considering not-currently-actual practice which may be su-
perior.61
In Dewey’s defence, there are places in his Studies in Logical Theory in which
he attempts to capture the normative dimension of logic. Dewey holds that logic
has three tasks:
Generalization of the nature of the reflective process certainly involves elimination of
much of the specific material and contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of
critical science. Quite compatible with this, however, is the notion that it seizes upon
certain specific conditions and factors, and aims to bring them to clear consciousness—
not to abolish them. While eliminating the particular material of particular practical
and scientific pursuits, (1) it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in the
various situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which evoke it;
(2) it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific antecedents of thought
call out to diverse typical modes of thought-reaction; (3) it may attempt to state the
nature of the specific consequences in which thought fulfils its career. (Dewey 1903,
p. 7)
The first and second points are merely descriptive. The third, however, has some
normative bite. Dewey asks us consider how thought, perhaps in a particular situ-
ation,might achieve its aims.We can then criticise ways of thinking on the grounds
that they are more or less well adapted to achieving the given aim. Dewey thus
promises that his logic will provide us with some normative guidance.
Like Dewey, Peirce allows for information from the sciences to influence our
logic. We spent some time in the last chapter going over places in which Peirce
thinks that our logic has developed along with developments in the natural or
social sciences. A close focus on the details of the sciences and their problems is
not a difference between Peirce and Dewey.62
61In a passage in the Minute Logic, Peirce notes the seeming paradox that in order to provide a
normative theory that will aid inquiry we need to move further away from the concrete details of
our practices and engage in pure theory:
‘The notion that a normative science is necessarily of the nature of a practical art, in having no independent
value as a pure theory, is one which, no doubt, arises naturally enough from a superficial survey. [. . . but] we
shall then find that, so far is it from being true that the normative character must necessarily be exclusively
due to the branch of knowledge that possesses it being a mere concrete application to a practical need of a
theory which, in its pure development, never considered that need [. . .Rather,] this character may equally
have its origin in the circumstance that the science which presents it is so very abstract, so alien to any
experiential lineage, that ideals alone, in place of positive facts of experience, can be its proper objects.’
(CP2.46, 1902)
62In fact, we find Peirce complaining to Dewey in these terms in another letter (probably never
sent). He thinks of Dewey as setting up road blocks against his own formal investigations and
claims that, despite Dewey’s rhetoric focusing attention on particular scientific practices, Peirce
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We can grant that Peirce may be overemphasising his differences with Dewey,
while holding on to his central point.63 That is, we can endorse the view that ra-
tional self-control, if possible at all, can be attained by articulating and criticising
our deepest abductive assumptions, assumptions which are deployed in any invest-
igation we attempt. The way to do this, Peirce thinks, is by taking up cenoscopy—
and thus a perspective on possible, and not merely actual, forms of inquiry. More
specifically, we are to take up the normative wing of cenoscopy: aesthetics, ethics,
and logic.
2.3 Anti-Idioscopism as Block on Inquiry
In the same lecture in which Peirce presents the metaphor of the bog and the
necessity of abduction, he articulates the ‘first rule’ of logic. From this rule he
derives an more famous corollary:
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you
must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline
to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every
wall of the city of philosophy,
Do not block the way of inquiry.
(EP2:48, 1898, emphasis in original)
This slogan has a good claim to be the party motto of the early pragmatists. We
will see in later chapters that one of Peirce’s main reasons for rejecting metaphys-
ical nominalism is that it blocks inquiry by preventing the exploration of certain
important scientific hypotheses. Peirce uses this slogan to challenge a maxim of
scientific practice that he claims was particularly prominent in his youth. As he
states it the maxim was ‘that no science must borrow the methods of another; the
geologist must not use a microscope, nor the astronomer a spectroscope’ (EP2:437,
1908). Such maxims unduly restrict inquiry by preventing the transferal of meth-
ods from one science to another. They thereby ‘block the path’ of inquiry.
According to the account of Peirce classification that I have offered, Peirce
denies the possibility of using a psychological principle to back up a logical one. It
is fair to ask how this is compatible with the claim that we should not block the
himself has had much more to do with first-order scientific research in his logic than Dewey has
(CP8.243–244, 1905).
63Peirce himself claims that he is exaggerating. He says that he is ‘simply projecting upon the
horizon, where distance gets magnified indefinitely, the direction of [Dewey’s] standpoint as viewed
from mine’ (CP8.241 1904).
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path of inquiry. Peirce is proposing an end to psychologistic approaches to logic.
It is not much of a stretch to imagine that, if he had the power, he would reject
funding for any such research project. However, the bare fact that some inquiry
is stopped does not mean that Peirce’s rule has been violated. The rule does not
endorse a complete free-for-all a la Feyrabend’s ‘epistemological anarchism’ (Fey-
erabend 1975). In fact, the path of inquiry can be blocked by a failure to impose
sufficient restraints. In so far as psychologism in logic opens up the possibility of
a vicious circularity that could undermine the prospects for rational self-control,
then engaging in psychologistic research risks blocking the path of inquiry. To
block the path of inquiry is to prevent it from being able to attain its end.
3 Contemporary Alternatives
So far in this chapter, we have considered what cenoscopy is and why we should
think of it as foundational for the various forms of idioscopy. We’ve considered
some of the motivations for thinking that there should be some story that can be
told on the basis of observations common to any possible scientific intelligence.
We want to hold together the fact that inquiry requires some active contribution
from the inquirer and the hope that this dependency will not distort the eventual
results of inquiry. This aim can be met, on Peirce’s view, if there is some com-
monality between all possible inquirers that we can investigate by means of the
abstractive method of cenoscopy. We also considered Peirce’s arguments against
basing logic in psychology or natural history. Basing philosophy in any kind of
idioscopy (‘idioscopism’), opens up the possibility of vicious circularity and may
thereby undermine our ability to attain rational self-control.
Cenoscopy is, if the arguments just given are correct, a form of first philosophy.
However, recent pragmatists have typically rejected any form of first philosophy.
In this section I introduce two recent pragmatist arguments for this rejection due
to HuwPrice and DavidMacarthur respectively. I then argue that Peirce’s position
is not inconsistent with pragmatism or undermined by Price and Macarthur.
According to Price, philosophy should be thought of as a kind of biology or
anthropology. On this view, philosophy is a kind of third-personal theorising in
which we attempt to explain, in biological or anthropological terms, why we en-
gage in certain linguistic behaviours. Price’s position is pragmatist in so far as he
begins with an account of human beings and their practices, rather than with, say,
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fundamental physics. Price calls this kind of naturalism ‘subject naturalism’, and
distinguishes it from ‘object naturalism’. Price’s position is, in the terms we have
just developed, a form of idioscopism.
David Macarthur’s position is closely related to Price’s. However, unlike Price,
he does not think that philosophy should be understood as a third-person dis-
cipline. Macarthur offers a series of arguments against Price’s position that the
Peircean can agree with. The Peircean splits with Macarthur over the question of
whether philosophy can have a foundational role for the sciences. Moreover, Ma-
carthur rejects the idea that philosophy should aim at providing, as cenoscopy
does, an account of any possible inquirer.
Both Price and Macarthur are motivated by the attempt to produce a natur-
alistic philosophy. Both also take pragmatism to be committed to naturalism. I
argue that neither form of naturalism is required by pragmatism. In fact, if the
Peircean arguments developed in the previous section are successful, then we can
adopt a kind of ‘first philosophy’ on pragmatist grounds.
3.1 Price’s Subject Naturalism
Price introduces his form of pragmatism by presenting it as a variety of natural-
ism. According to Price, ‘naturalism’ means ‘at least’ that:
1. the ‘concerns’ of science and philosophy are not ‘simply disjointed’, and
2. where they ‘overlap’ philosophy must ‘defer to science’ (Price 2013, p. 3).
As stated here, Price’s position starts with distinction between science and philo-
sophy.Wewill see in amoment that, in fact, this distinction is collapsed. On Price’s
view, there is at least some commonality in the ‘concerns’ of science and philosophy.
One way in which the concerns of science and philosophy can overlap is by sharing
some object of interest. The philosopher and the psychologist might both be inter-
ested in, say, human decision making. On Price’s view, the philosopher must defer
to the results of the psychologist in their theorising.
Having set out this basic conception of naturalism, Price goes on to distinguish
between ‘object’ and ‘subject’ naturalism. He draws this distinction according to
whether we start with what the sciences say about the world in general or with
what they say about us. The former orientation is familiar from various contem-
porary forms of physicalism, materialism, and naturalism. A popular variant of
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object naturalism starts with, say, an ontology derived from modern physics and
then attempts to make sense of all of our various commitments in those terms. We
might wonder, for instance, whether there is room for morality in a world entirely
constituted by the kind of objects studied in this privileged version of physics.64
‘Subject naturalism’, on the other hand, insists that ‘philosophy needs to begin
with what science tells us about ourselves’ (Price 2013, p. 5). We don’t start by,
say, taking physics as our story about the world and building up from the objects of
physics to a story about ourselves. Rather, we start with what biology and a certain
kind of anthropology tell us about ourselves. The shift from object naturalism to
subject naturalism is a characteristically pragmatist move. Pragmatists start with
a story about us and our practices.
Price characterises the task of philosophy as the provision of a kind of ‘lin-
guistic anthropology’ (Price 2011, p. 11). On this view, the philosopher provides an
explanation of our use of certain philosophically interesting concepts in functional
terms. This functional story can only appeal to the results of biology or anthropo-
logy, or both (e.g. Price 2011, pp. 110–111, 320). Price sketches an example of how
we might explain probabilistic concepts in these terms:
Crudely put, the view is that creatures who are decision-makers under uncertainty
find it useful to tie their credences to a topic suitable for debate and consensus,
and that’s what the notion of probability provides. By discussing propositions about
probability—by coordinating beliefs about that—speakers can coordinate their cre-
dences. That’s what talk of probability is ‘good for’, on this view. The distinctive ‘ob-
jects’ of such talk—the probabilities themselves—inherit their properties from the
functional task, from the credences, or dispositions to betting behaviour, to which
talk of probability gives voice. (Price 2013, p. 47)
We understand the concept of probability, by understanding the function that it
plays for creatures who have to make decisions in a condition of uncertainty. This
is the condition that we find ourselves in if we adopt a conception of ourselves as
a certain kind of natural creature.
It is important to note that the sketch of an explanation of our use of probab-
ilistic concepts does not invoke a notion of representation. We do not explain our
use of probabilistic concepts by saying that they ‘represent’ some probabilistic fact
in the world. The rejection of ‘representationalism’ is a core feature of Price’s lin-
guistic anthropology. As Price characterises it, the representationalist assumption
is the view that the function of linguistic items (words, concepts) is to ‘stand for’
64Price refers to these problems as ‘placement problems’. They will be an important subject in
Chapter Five
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or ‘represent’ some non-linguistic object (Price 2013, p. 9). On Price’s view, this as-
sumption about language cannot be sustained once we adopt the subject naturalist
orientation (Price 2013, pp. 11–15).65
Price’s argument for the rejection of representationalism is a direct upshot of
his particular form of pragmatist naturalism. When we take up the perspective
of the linguistic anthropologist, we find that representationalism is a bad ‘proto-
theory’ of the function of language (Price 2013, p. 25). Representational discourse
is then judged in so far as it provides a good account of human linguistic practices
from a third-person scientific perspective. The Peircean, on the other hand, can
take certain kinds of representational language to name, from within, ideals for
theoretical inquiry. We cannot do this if philosophy is understood as third-person
linguistic anthropology.
The Peircean arguments against various forms of idioscopism are aimed at
showing why we should take philosophy to be not only different from the other
sciences, but also as foundational for them. These arguments include descriptive
accounts of various episodes in the history of inquiry along with theoretical dia-
gnoses of what those episodes revealed. Peirce also offers more prescriptive claims,
which tell us what we should do in order to avoid the risks of circularity (anti-
Sigwart) and what we should do in order to gain the right kind of vantage point
from which to criticise current epistemic practices (anti-Dewey).
Peirce’s arguments are excluded by Price’s naturalism. However, what we have
seen so far of Price’s position does not constitute an argument against Peirce on
these matters. Price starts from a characterisation of naturalism that already ex-
cludes Peirce’s position from consideration. On the other hand, Peirce’s arguments
can challenge Price. Price’s position relies on the health of theoretical inquiry.
Consequently, if Peirce can demonstrate that Price’s naturalism undermines the
health of inquiry, then Price’s position is in trouble. He would be in the somewhat
contradictory position of implicitly relying on something while explicitly under-
mining it.
3.2 Macarthur’s Liberal Naturalism
DavidMacarthur andHuwPrice agree on a great deal with respect to pragmatism,
metaphysics, and first philosophy. In fact, the paper which first set out the ‘subject’
65These arguments will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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vs. ‘object’ naturalism division, and the resultant metaphysical quietism, was co-
written by Macarthur and Price (Macarthur and Price 2007). However, there are
some important differences between the two regarding the relationship between
science and philosophy. Macarthur charges Price with a kind of ‘scientism’. One
aspect of this scientism that Macarthur focuses particular attention on is Price’s
endorsement of third-person theorising at the expense of the perspective of the
participant in linguistic practices. However, unlike in the case of Peirce, this does
not motivate any kind of first philosophy.
Against Price’s subject naturalism, Macarthur defends a form of ‘liberal’ nat-
uralism. This kind of naturalism refuses to equate the natural with the scientific.
Instead, the liberal naturalist focuses their attention on the contrast between the
‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural’ (Macarthur 2014a, p. 74). That Price is not this
kind of liberal naturalist is made clear by his shift from the claim that we must
study the function of various concepts in our lives as ‘natural creatures’, to the
claim that, within philosophy at least, we must exclusively deploy the explanat-
ory resources of biology and/or anthropology (Macarthur 2014a, p. 76).66 Here the
natural is aligned with that which is revealed by a certain kind of science.
Macarthur argues that Price’s conception of the relationship between science
and philosophy makes it hard to understand how philosophy might ‘defer’ to sci-
ence. Price seems to think that philosophy just is a kind of biology or anthropology.
If so, then philosophy does not defer to science, rather it is identical with (some)
science.67
More seriously, the authoritative role Price grants biology and anthropology
pulls against his desired pluralism. Price’s pluralism consists in the claim that
there is no privileged language which accurately ‘represents’ the world. Rather,
we use descriptive language for all sorts of purposes. On this view probabilistic
language, or ethical language, are just as ‘descriptive’ as scientific language. This
is a result of his particular brand on anti-representationalism, which he takes to
be the upshot of deploying science in philosophy.68 Price’s claim is that, ‘[i]f we do
science better in philosophy, we’ll be less inclined to think that science is all there
is to do’ (Price 2013, p. 21). However,
66Paul Redding makes a similar point (Redding 2010, pp. 272–273).
67Note that Peirce’s claim that philosophy is a form of theoretical science is not susceptible to
this kind of worry. For Peirce, philosophy is a science with its own subject matter.
68Price’s anti-representational arguments will be considered in more detail in Chapter Five.
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while Price recognizes a plurality of linguistic frameworks of which the scientific is
only one, the scientific framework does have a special kind of priority because it is from
this framework that one practices philosophy! The scientific framework has philosoph-
ical primacy: it is the position from which one articulates one’s worldview. Subject
naturalism explains the functions of all linguistic frameworks and in so doing gives
us a picture of the world. It, therefore, bears an asymmetrical explanatory relation to
other frameworks. Whatever theoretical reflection non-scientific frameworks involve
is subject to functional re-description by way of the explanations propounded by sub-
ject naturalist inquiry. The subject naturalist sits in judgment of the function of all
other discourses, including their theoretical aspects. This is enough to convict Price
of scientism contre lui. (Macarthur 2014a, pp. 80–81)
Macarthur notes, further, that the only theoretical explanations that Price coun-
tenances are causal ones. He excludes, for instance, the kind of ‘rational sensit-
ivity’ to, say, moral values appealed to by liberal naturalists like McDowell. For
such thinkers reasons are natural in so far as they are not supernatural (Macar-
thur 2014a, p. 83).
One of the pressures that Macarthur highlights in Price’s form of scientism is
that, by adopting a third-person orientation on linguistic practice, Price is blind to
distinctions that are only available from the second-person perspective of the lin-
guistic practitioner (Macarthur 2014b, p. 84). One such distinction is that between
correct and incorrect uses of language:
A presupposition of Price’s approach that goes unnoticed is that it is has the resources
to detect the meaningful uses of language as opposed to the meaningless. That is, if
we are studying the function of sentences of the form ‘x means F’ we must first ex-
clude such uses as ‘Cat means number’, ‘Rain means green’, ‘Tuesday means ought’
etc. And it is important to see that this requirement holds generally for all the uses
of language of interest to the subject naturalist. Subject naturalism must be cap-
able of distinguishing, as a preliminary to theorizing about linguistic functions, the
appropriate data, namely, meaningful or normatively appropriate uses of language:
whether these take the form of speech-acts such as assertion or the use of semantic
or intentional concepts (e.g. meaning, belief). Assertions and concepts are essentially
normative items the genuine cases of which can only be picked out by attending to the
normative significance of candidate assertions or candidate conceptual employments.
(Macarthur 2014b, p. 90)
If this is right, then our theoretical focus must then include, on top of third-person
scientific information, the first-person and second-person perspectives of the par-
ticipant in a linguistic community. By widening his theoretical focus to include
second-person and first-person data, Macarthur allows philosophical reflection to
incorporate various other sources of non-supernatural insight. This might include
appeals to literature and the arts, introspection, or conceptual analysis (c.f. Ma-
carthur 2010).
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Like Macarthur, Peirce does not set up philosophy in entirely third-personal
terms. In this, they both differ from Price. However, both Macarthur and Price
are committed to the rejection of both metaphysics and first philosophy. Macar-
thur does not think that there is any prospect for telling a story about any possible
inquirer. Nor does he think that such a project could be foundational for the sci-
ences. Price and Macarthur this differ over what the ideals for theoretical inquiry
are and, perhaps, over what they should be.
Like Price, Macarthur takes pragmatism to be a kind of naturalism. While
Macarthur does not endorse Price’s alignment of the natural with the natural-
scientific, he does take naturalism to exclude the invocation of the supernatural.
Peirce does not explicitly make any such restriction on the kinds of explanation
that we might find ourselves giving in philosophy. This, however, raises the ques-
tion of the relationship between pragmatism and naturalism.
3.3 Pragmatism and Naturalism
We’ve just seen that, although there is some dispute between Price andMacarthur,
both take pragmatism to be a naturalist orientation. We’ve also seen that Peirce
is not a naturalist if by naturalism we mean the replacement of philosophy with
Price’s linguistic anthropology. Nor is Peirce a naturalist if by naturalismwemean
the rejection of first philosophy. Macarthur also proposes the idea that naturalism
is characterised by a rejection of the ‘supernatural’. But even this claim is not
shared amongst either the classical pragmatists or all contemporary pragmatists.
It is worth considering some examples of pragmatists adopting, for pragmatist
reasons, supernatural hypotheses. We will then turn to a sense in which most
pragmatists are naturalists. The aim of this discussion is to defuse the idea that
showing something to be not ‘naturalistically respectable’ automatically implies
that it should be unacceptable for any pragmatist.
F. C. S. Schiller is one early pragmatist who did not use ‘naturalism’ with pos-
itive connotations. We find him, for instance, railing against ‘the naturalistic view
of life’ (Schiller 1903, p. 440). Moreover, he held that pragmatism is what allows
us to reject naturalism because it proves that ‘Nature cannot be indifferent to us
and to our doings’ (Schiller 1903, pp. 440–441). There is, of course, a reading of
these claims that would be consistent with the views of either Price or Macar-
thur. However, Schiller’s account of pragmatism prioritises ethics over the other
sciences. According to Schiller pragmatism shows that the ‘purposive character of
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mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive
activities’ (Schiller 1903, p. 437). That is, there is not thought without practically
engaged thinkers who are acting in order to attain certain ends or ideals. This
story, thinks Schiller, takes priority over any result of cognition, and especially of
natural scientific theorising, that might try to undermine it.
In attempting to carry out this pragmatist programme, Schiller endorses phe-
nomena that would be taken by the liberal naturalist to be ‘supernatural’. Ma-
carthur characterises the kind of entities that naturalism rejects in terms of ‘im-
mortal souls or magical powers and suchlike’ (Macarthur 2014a, p. 74). However,
these were exactly the kinds things that Schiller took to be worthy of experiment.
He held, for instance, that belief in life after death could be justified on pragmat-
ist, ethical, grounds (Schiller 1897). Both Schiller and William James engaged in
parapsychological research (Ford 1998; Schiller 1930).
In addition, the pragmatists endorsed various forms of theism, and other reli-
gious beliefs, on pragmatist grounds. Peirce seemed to think his theism took him
beyond nature in some way. For instance, when setting out his form of pragmat-
ism in a letter to Calderoni he leaves open whether the universe is governed by a
divine purpose or rather the ‘virtual purposes of nature’ (CP8.211, 1905). Both op-
tions, it seems, are acceptable to Peirce. William James’s ‘Will to Believe’, is also,
of course, a defence of taking on various religious beliefs on pragmatist grounds
(James 1896).69 There is thus no particular inclination amongst the early pragmat-
ists to exclude supernatural beliefs at the outset, or to think of them as having any
particular tension with pragmatism.70
Dewey, on the other hand, does think of his pragmatism as a kind of natural-
ism. In Nature and Experience he offers ‘naturalistic empiricism’ and ‘empirical
naturalism’ as possible labels for his view (LW1:10, 1925). However, Dewey’s use
of the term was considered by some with more hard-nosed scientific leanings as
being too vague. In order to distinguish themselves from the pragmatists, other
terms like ‘physicalist’ or ‘materialist’ would be used. Wilfrid Sellars reports that
his father took this attitude:
As for Naturalism. That, too, had negative overtones at home. It was as wishy-washy
and ambiguous as Pragmatism. One could believe almost anything about the world
and even some things about God, and yet be a Naturalist. What was needed was a
69James’s form of theism is discussed in Hall 2009.
70Some supernatural beliefs are in tension with pragmatism, of course, but they are not in
tension with it simply by virtue of being supernatural.
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new, nonreductive materialism. My father could call himself a Materialist in all good
conscience, for at that time he was about the only one in sight. (Sellars 1979, p. 1)
Reflecting on the attitude of Roy Wood Sellars, McKenna and Pratt distinguish
between two broad streams of naturalism in American philosophy:
As naturalism became a key way of describing (and polarizing) American academic
philosophy, two strands developed: those like Sellars who began with some form of
physicalism and a strong reliance on physical sciences, and those who began with the
recognition of continuity. Emerging from the first strand were the logical positivists
and their successors, includingW. V. O. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and Donald Davidson.
Emerging from the other was a broad range of naturalists including Randall, Hook,
and Justus Buchler. (McKenna and Pratt 2015, p. 101)
The ‘scientific’ approach here can be seen both in Price and in the object naturalists
that he criticises. By emphasising the deference of philosophy to the sciences, Price
can only mean by ‘naturalism’ something like the scientific ‘strain’ of naturalism.
The other strain is characterised by Dewey in terms of its endorsement of the
‘continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities
and forms’ (LW12:30, 1938; cited in McKenna and Pratt 2015, p. 100). That is, the
continuity approach holds that there is no major ‘rupture’ between human activity
and the rest of reality. This approach rejects a kind of dualism between, say, mind
and world. On this view there is one kind of stuff, but it is not demanded that it
only be understood in terms of the methods and results of the natural sciences.
The liberal naturalist a la Macarthur adopts a continuity view rather than
aligning the natural with the natural-scientific. The distinction between the nat-
ural and the supernatural can also be drawn consistently with the continuity view.
We could say that the ‘spooky’ entities listed above would represent a rupture in
the continuity of the natural world. However, this ‘contrastive’ sense of natural is
only one form of continuity naturalism. One can also be a continuity naturalist by
dropping the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. This would
leave us with a form of ‘non contrastive’ or ‘absolute’ naturalism. This view is de-
fended by Hans Fink (Fink 2006). As Fink puts it: ‘[on the absolute] conception of
nature to say that something is natural is not to say something specific about it
but merely to deny claims from others that a certain domain could be in discon-
tinuity with or be sui generis in relation to nature’ (Fink 2006, p. 218). This sense
of naturalism does not automatically exclude research into strange phenomena. It
merely holds that whatever the phenomena in question are, they are in some re-
spect continuous with the rest of nature. We will see, in later chapters, that Peirce
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is a continuity naturalist of this sort.71 Moreover, continuity naturalism does not
demand that we abandon the ambition to produce first philosophy. That nature is
continuous does not mean that the structure of inquiry is ‘flat’. Some disciplines
can be more fundamental than others.
Finally, it is worth noting how continuity naturalism, whether contrastive or
non-contrastive, is motivated by pragmatism. Dewey’s position provides a nice ex-
ample of this. We find Dewey arguing for the continuity view by asserting that
both philosophy and the sciences are ‘refinements’ of ‘primary experience’:
[The] consideration of method may suitably begin with the contrast between gross,
macroscopic, crude subject-matters in primary experience and the refined, derived
objects of reflection [. . . ] The objects of both science and philosophy obviously belong
chiefly to the secondary and refined system. (LW1:15, 1925)
For Dewey, thought begins and ends in everyday, or ‘primary’ experience. Philo-
sophy, art, and the natural sciences are ‘refinements’ of this experience. By virtue
of beginning in, and returning to, the same domain, they are continuous with one
another. The return of all concepts from reflection to everyday experience is char-
acteristically pragmatist. Experience is, for Dewey, an active exchange between an
organism and its environment rather thanmere passive receipt. By virtue of start-
ing from the perspective of our practical interaction with the world (experience),
Dewey is led to his form of continuity naturalism.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I began with an attempt to clarify what Peirce means by ‘ceno-
scopy’ and one of its contrasts, ‘idioscopy’. Cenoscopy is the observational science
of the commonly available. I introduced Peirce’s conception of the ‘commonly avail-
able’ in terms of what is available to any ‘adult and sane person’. I suggested that
two problems arise for this proposal: exclusionary worries and the ‘armchair astro-
nomy’ objection. We then moved towards Peirce’s conception of the ‘scientific intel-
ligence’. Cenoscopy is the science developed on the basis of that which is available
to any possible inquirer. I argued that this latter proposal is superior and helps
us to understand how philosophical claims come to claim the modal strength that
71Still more exotic options are available. For instance, Peirce is picked by Robert Corrington
as a pioneer of ‘ecstatic naturalism’, a metaphysics of nature articulated in semiotic terms and
emphasising the creation of new signs (Corrington 1994, p. 19). Corrington goes on to understand
this process in psychoanalytic terms, extending a notion of the unconscious to nature.
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they do. In cenoscopy, we abstract from our present situation, and attempt to come
to conclusions about all possible scientific intelligences.
I then moved on to a consideration of why cenoscopy is superordinate to idio-
scopy. Since the principle-provision relationship that is set out in the hierarchy
is uni-directional, it grants both a kind of authority and foundational status to
cenoscopy. On this basis, I presented cenoscopy as a kind of first philosophy. I con-
sidered a ‘positive argument’ for this status, in terms of the necessity for abduction
in any kind of idioscopic inquiry. On this view, cenoscopy is closely associated with
the role of abduction in inquiry. I then turned to ‘negative arguments’ against any
proposal to base cenoscopy on idioscopy. These arguments included charges of both
circularity and a failure of ‘rational self-control’.
Finally, I introduced two alternative conceptions within contemporary prag-
matism of the relationship between science and philosophy. In the case of Huw
Price, science is presented as ‘above’ philosophy, and in the case of David Ma-
carthur they are presented as on the same level. I suggested that, in both cases,
Peirce’s position is not rendered unworkable for the pragmatist. Since both Price
and Macarthur set out their positions in terms of what kind of ‘naturalism’ they
defend, I then considered some ways in which the classical pragmatists do and
don’t count as naturalists. Pragmatists tend to be naturalists in the sense of re-
fusing a dualistic contrast between nature and the supernatural. They need not
be, however, naturalists in either Price or Macarthur’s senses.
In the next chapter we will consider in more detail Peirce’s notion of truth as
the goal of inquiry. This notion of truth can come in various ‘strengths’, which will
allow for more or less ambitious speculations when we turn to metaphysics itself
in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 3
True Propositions and the Aim of
Inquiry
Introduction
In the previous chapter I introduced Peirce’s discussion of truth as the ultimate
aim of theoretical inquiry, and as the proximate aim of practical inquiry. This
discussion did not directly say anything about the truth of this or that particular
proposition. In order to both connect Peirce’s account of truth with that of recent
pragmatists in the analytic tradition and to set the stage for our transition to
Peirce’s metaphysics, it will be necessary to turn to Peirce’s account of the truth
of propositions. In this task, we will be aided by recent work on Peirce’s semeiotic
account of the proposition.
The basic move that connects truth, understood as the aim of inquiry, and
truth, understood as a feature of certain propositions, is taking true propositions
to be an output of successful inquiry. Much more detail is required to flesh this
simple idea out and to ensure that it does not end up as a tautology.1 In this
chapter I offer two related options for fleshing out this idea from Peirce. The first
option takes Peirce to offer a merely ‘contextualist’ story about truth. On this view
we take propositions to be true or false as answers to particular questions, asked
within particular forms of inquiry. I derive this story largely from Cheryl Misak
and Christopher Hookway’s respective work on Peirce. The second option is offered
in addition to the contextualist story. It adds a notion of the ‘absolute truth’ as an
1That is, we’ll need to say something about successful inquiry that doesn’t depend on already
understanding what a true proposition is.
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ideal limit for the project of inquiry in general. I argue that the addition of the ab-
solute notion of truth does not clash with the contextualist account of truth. I will
argue that, on Peirce’s view, only one proposition is absolutely true. To judge of a
particular, finite, proposition, uttered in a context, that it is true does not commit
you to the view that it is absolutely true.
Peirce is notorious for understanding the truth of propositions in terms of their
being accepted at the ‘end of inquiry’. I will begin this chapter by introducing and
attempting to sidestep some classic objections to Peirce’s end of inquiry derived
from Bertrand Russell and, more recently, Crispin Wright (§1). This will motiv-
ate the accounts of Peirce on truth offered by Hookway and Misak. Both accounts
understand Peirce to be offering a ‘pragmatic elucidation’ of the meaning of the
concept truth for our practices, rather than offering necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the truth of a proposition (§2). Moreover, both offer a kind of contextualist
approach, according to which the truth of a proposition is understood in terms of
satisfying various theoretical virtues which can be local to a given form of inquiry.
I then suggest room for a notion of absolute truth by turning to Peirce’s entry
on truth in Baldwin’s Dictionary (§3). This turns on the interpretation of Peirce’s
claim that the truth of a proposition ‘that wemight utter’ essentially depends ‘upon
that proposition’s not professing to be exactly true’ (CP5.565, 1902). I will claim,
then, that any proposition which is true in the contextualist sense, ‘presents itself’
as not being ‘exactly true’. In order to make sense of this it will be necessary to
draw on recent work on Peirce’s semeiotic account of the proposition developed by
Frederick Stjernfelt, Francesco Bellucci, and Richard Atkins (§4). This is done by
showing how the proposition iconically displays its own dependence on experience
and on ‘prescissive abstraction’. The absolute truth is an ideal proposition which
does not have these dependencies (§5).
I conclude by briefly comparing the Peircean accounts on offer with contempor-
ary pragmatist views which refuse the strong link between truth and inquiry that
Peirce insists on (§6). I challenge Price’s attempt to develop a normative account
of truth without any idealised conception of inquiry. I draw out how the method-
ological differences set out in previous chapters result in the differences between
Peirce and Price.
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1 The Truth-Inquiry Link
1.1 The Predestinate Opinion
In some places, Peirce claims that truth is to be understood in terms of the ‘end of
inquiry’. A key source for this claim is found in ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’:
all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation,
if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which
they can be applied.2 [. . . ]3 Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic
views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves
to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried,
not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No
modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural
bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great
law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to
be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth and the
object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.’
(W3:273/EP1:138–139, 1878, emphasis mine)
In this passage the ‘end’ of inquiry appears as the opinion which is ‘predestinate’,
‘foreordained’, or ‘fated to be ultimately agreed to’. Peirce seems to be presenting
the view that there is some opinion that sits at the end of inquiry which can be
identified with the truth.4
The word ‘end’ is equivocal. We have already seen that Peirce thinks of truth
as the aim of inquiry. This is one meaning of ‘end’. But the above passage also
suggests the ‘end’ in the sense of the termination of a process.5 This has led to ob-
jections of the sort most famously entertained by Bertrand Russell, which attempt
to show that the propositions endorsed at the termination of the process of inquiry
are arbitrary (or worse). Russell considers, and eventually rejects, an interpreta-
tion of Peirce according to which whatever is believed by the last human being is
true. On this view truth would be made to
2The editors of Essential Peirce note that Peirce later edited this sentence to change ‘fully per-
suaded’ to ‘animated by the cheerful hope that’, and ‘every question to which they can be applied’
to ‘each question to which they apply it’ (see R422, 1893; EP1:378).
3Peirce offers a long example of convergence here. It will be presented and discussed later in
this chapter (§2).
4This passage also displays the close connection between the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ in
Peirce. We will return to Peirce’s conception of reality ascriptions in the next chapter.
5These meanings are related. Many processes terminate when they successfully achieve their
aim. If I’m looking for lunch, I’ll stop looking once I’ve found it. However, the meanings come apart
since it is possible for a process to terminate unsuccessfully. I might stop looking for lunch because
I’ve run out of time and need to get to work. In this case the looking-for-lunch process has ended,
but it has not achieved its end (c.f. Legg 2014a, p. 206).
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depend upon the opinions of the last man left alive as the earth becomes too cold to
support life. As he will presumably be entirely occupied in keeping warm and getting
nourishment, it is doubtful whether his opinions will be any wiser than ours. (Russell
1951, p. 145; cited in Legg 2014a, p. 206).6
The ‘last man’ that Russell imagines is unlikely to have the time for dispassion-
ate contemplation. Consequently, it would likely be worse than arbitrary for us to
match our beliefs to those of the last person on earth. That is, picking any other
human at random would likely leave us in a better position.
However, this is not either themost obvious reading, or a particularly charitable
reading, of the passage from Peirce just cited.7 To see this, it is important to take
seriously the references to ‘destiny’ and ‘fate’ that Peirce makes in the passage. As
Hookway notes, ‘[h]owever “fate” is explained, it is clear that [Peirce] wanted to
hold that we come to agree on some proposition because it is true; it is not true
simply in virtue of the fact that we come to agree on it’ (Hookway 2000b, p. 47).8
Whatever this notion of fate is, it does not require that the settlement of opinion
actually happens or that there is any supernatural intervention in the world. In
fact, it is compatible with various caveats about inquiry continuing appropriately
(i.e. the claim can be conditional: if inquiry continues, then it will settle on certain
results).9 We do not then need to think, as Russell does, that Peirce’s reference
6Legg suggests that Russell endorsed this as an objection to Peirce. However, Russell deploys
the example to undermine what he takes to be a tempting, but obviously false, interpretation
(Russell 1951, p. 145).
7It is worth noting that Russell is responding, via a quotation from Dewey, to the emphasised
portion of the passage given above from ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ (along with a passage from
Baldwin’s Dictionary that we will consider later, and which introduces the ‘limit metaphor’) (c.f.
Russell 1951, p. 144).
8An immediate objection arises to this idea: How can we get a purchase on the notion of truth
by looking to inquiry, if we explain the development of rightly-ordered inquiry in terms of some
prior notion of truth. I will return to this problem in a moment.
9The full story of Peirce’s attitude to whether the end of inquiry will happen is quite complex.
Peirce does suggest, at the time that he wrote ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’, that the fated settle-
ment will happen. However, even at this point he does not think that it will necessarily be human
beings that do the settling. He seems to think that there is, as a feature of the evolution of the
universe, a tendency to produce inquirers. This thought is expressed in ‘How to Make our Ideas
Clear’ as follows:
Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might even conceiv-
ably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last. Yet
even that would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of investigation carried
sufficiently far; and if, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and disposition
for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they would ultimately come to. (W3:274/EP1:139,
1878)
If the universe, and inquiry into it, are allowed to continue, then the chance of a given question
getting settled approaches certainty. But we need not follow Peirce in this, and Peirce himself
seems to have changed from a ‘will’ reading of the end of inquiry to a ‘would’ reading (c.f. CP1.560,
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to ‘fated’ results is ‘merely rhetorical’ or ‘not intended seriously’ (Russell 1951,
p. 145).
However, even with this clarification a few problems arise. For instance, we
might inquire into whether Bertrand Russell lit an even or odd number of tobacco
pipes in his life. This seems like a perfectly meaningful, if uninteresting, question
and it seems that there should be a fact of thematter about it. However, while there
are surely some things still to be discovered about Russell’s smoking habits, it is
doubtful that inquiry will ever be able to converge on an answer to this particular
question. This is the problem of ‘buried secrets’: truths which are not accessible by
inquiry. Peirce’s explicit response to the problem of buried secrets is a brave one,
but one which most of his readers have been reluctant to follow. Peirce holds that
we must not assume that any fact is forever inaccessible to inquiry. Peirce offers
an example of the failure of attempts to set up certain questions as forever outside
the scope of inquiry:
The history of science affords illustrations enough of the folly of saying that this, that,
or the other can never be found out. Auguste Comte said that it was clearly impossible
forman ever to learn anything of the chemical constitution of the fixed stars, but before
his book had reached its readers the discovery which he announced as impossible had
been made. (CP6.556, 1887)
Peirce’s attitude may be acceptable for claims at the cutting edge of scientific in-
quiry, or for claims that might do important explanatory work for us, but it is a less
obviously satisfactory answer to the question of whether the number of pipes lit by
Russell was even or odd. Some contemporary Peirceans have embraced versions of
this response,10 while others have deflected the problem by means of an appeal to
1905). On the other hand, Almeder has argued that Peirce continued to believe that inquirywill be
fixed for any question (Almeder 1985, p. 88). However, as Almeder acknowledges, Peirce does draw
a distinction between the kind of ‘will be’ associated with the claim that inquiry will converge on a
fated result, and the ‘would be’ modality. Further, he holds that this would-be modality is all that
is needed to get Peirce’s characterisation of truth off the ground (Almeder 1985, pp. 88–89).
10Some, like Legg, have put their emphasis on the notion of hope. On this view we might adopt
the hope that any question we might inquire into has an answer (e.g. Legg 2014a). Others have
defended Peirce by restricting the notion of ‘fact’ (e.g. Atkins 2016).
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the ‘will be’/‘would be’ distinction.11 We will consider buried secrets further, when
more detail about the Peircean proposals on offer have been put forward.12
Russell offers us an additional worry about Peirce’s account of truth:
why does Peirce think that there is an ‘ideal limit towards which endless investig-
ation would tend to bring scientific belief?’ Is this an empirical generalization from
the history of research? Or is it an optimistic belief in the perfectibility of man? Does
it contain any element of prophecy, or is it a merely hypothetical statement of what
would happen if men of science grew continually cleverer? Whatever interpretation
we adopt, we seem committed to some very rash assertion. I do not see how we can
guess either what will be believed, or what would be believed bymenmuch cleverer than
we are. Whether the theory of relativity will be believed twenty years hence depends
mainly upon whether Germany wins the next war. Whether it would be believed by
people cleverer than we are we cannot tell without being cleverer than we are. (Russell
1951, pp. 145-6, emphasis mine)
The core point that Russell makes here does not turn directly on the motivation
for Peirce’s claims about the ‘ideal limit’, but rather on its value as part of an
account of truth.13 Russell notes that we can neither foresee what will be, or guess
what would be, believed by either future investigators or investigators more well
informed and clever than we are. If an account of truth is supposed to inform
someone unfamiliar with the concept how to apply it, then we may be in trouble
here. It doesn’t help someone to say that the property truth can be ascribed to a
proposition if and only if some condition totally opaque to them applies.14 Wewant,
instead, some condition that we have access to now. But, pace Russell, this kind
11For instance, Misak argues that in the case of ‘buried secrets’ it is simply not possible for us to
inquire ‘sufficiently far’, so the conditional claim about what we would discover were we to inquiry
sufficiently far can still come out as true (e.g. Misak 1991, pp. 138–139). For instance, if it is true
that Russell lit an odd number of pipes, then were there sufficient evidence available we would
settle on the belief that Russell lit an odd numbers of pipes. As it happens, however, we cannot
inquiry sufficiently far into this question because the evidence is not available.
12We will also consider Russell’s own example, in which future scientists investigate whether
Russell had eggs and bacon for breakfast on the day in which he wrote his response to Dewey.
Russell’s example is meant to emphasise the difference in authority of our own judgements about
such autobiographical details as opposed to the authority of some hypothetical future scientist.
Even if such future scientists could make some headway with the question of Russell’s breakfast,
and were motivated to do so, it seems that their answer would be far less reliable than Russell’s
own. This example highlights the fact that we seem to have more authority over some of our first-
person beliefs that any future inquirer might be expected to have.
13The issue of Peirce’s motivations will be important for us later, however. We will see that
Russell is right that there is something like an ‘optimistic belief in the perfectibility of man’ here
in the form of various regulative hopes for inquiry.
14The kind of arbitrariness worry that we have seen from Russell earlier also comes up in his
reference to the truth or falsity of the theory of relativity being decided by the Second World War
(the first edition of the book Russell’s article appears in was published in 1939).
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of prophetic ability is not needed to get Peirce’s account of truth off the ground.15
Unlike Russell, Peirce is not attempting to offer an analytic definition of the term
‘truth’. A similar response also applies to a more recent objection from Crispin
Wright.
Crispin Wright offers an objection closely related to Russell’s.16 According to
Wright’s proposal, we should understand the Peircean theory to associate truth
with what would be endorsed in a state of complete information (Wright 2001,
pp. 763–764). That is, the true beliefs are the ones that we would endorse once all
the data is in. This might avoid Russell’s worries about his breakfast. Surely if we
have all the data then we can determine what Russell had for breakfast the day
he decided to set down his worries about Peirce’s account of truth. Perhaps we can
even determine, on the basis of complete data, whether Russell smoked an even
or an odd number of pipes. Wright imagines the completeness of the final state of
information to consist in its providing a truth value for any proposition (Wright
2001, p. 763). We can, with Wright, have serious misgivings about the coherence
of this notion of ‘complete information’. For one thing, contemporary science has
made the claim that there might be a single, unique, sum total of information
hard to endorse (c.f. Wright 2001, pp. 763–764). The point is that if we were in
such a state, then all propositions would be decidable. This would still be true
even if the state is physically impossible (due to, e.g., quantum indeterminacy or
deterministic but chaotic systems).
Russell directs our attention to the difficulty of knowing, from our current po-
sition of incomplete information, what would be judged in a state of complete in-
formation. However, Wright’s worry is more fundamental than this. He notes that
it would be impossible for anyone to know that they were themselves in a state
15It can be argued that the project is not quite as hopeless as Russell lets on. We can see an indic-
ation of what it would look like in Johanna Seibt’s developments of a Sellarsian process ontology.
Seibt develops Sellars’s gestures in the direction of what she calls ‘projective metaphysics’, which
by reflecting on present problems or tensions between the scientific and manifest image imagines,
by analogical reasoning, what kind entity would have to be endorsed in a future scientific world pic-
ture (Seibt 2000). More specifically, the Sellarsian argument directs our attention to the problem of
incorporating the experience of colour, which is essentially continuous, into a world picture made
up of discrete units of one sort or another. The Sellarsian approach argues that the only kind of
object which could bridge this gap would be something analogous to our notion of a ‘process’ (Seibt
1990, pp. 233–270). A similar pattern can be seen in Peirce’s abductive metaphysics, as developed
in the next chapter. However, this does not mean that such activity is necessary for deploying the
concept of truth, as Russell here argues.
16This discussion is indebted to Misak’s pioneering work on the relationship between Peircean
truth and Wright’s superassertabililty theory (e.g. Misak 2007).
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of complete information. As Misak puts it, ‘[w]e might in fact believe all sorts of
truths, but we cannot know when we are in such a position, precisely because we
cannot know when we have a belief which would forever satisfy our aims’ (Misak
2007, p. 83). But if we are unable to ever know that we are in the ‘ideal’ position,
then what we would judge in such a position would not include the truth that we
were in the position. This leads to a problem:
For the idea that what is true is what a subject meeting certain conditions, C, would
be in a position to acknowledge directly requires that a subject who was actually in
conditions C—a subject of whom it was true that she was in conditions C—would be in
a position to acknowledge the fact. If such an acknowledgement would be impossible,
then the antecedents of the subjunctive conditionals which, on a Peircean view, ex-
plicate what it is for a thought to be true, are uniformly false on purely conceptual
grounds. Since the status of subjunctive conditionals with conceptually impossible
antecedents is, by and large, extremely moot, that is bad news for Peircean views of
truth. (Wright 1992, p. 46)
The subjunctives that Wright has in mind here are all of the following form, where
p is any true proposition:
If a subject were in conditions C [‘the end of inquiry’], then they would be in a position
to acknowledge p.
Wight’s claim is that thoughts about what would be the case in a conceptually
impossible state can tell us nothing about what truth is. Someone looking for con-
ceptual clarity about ‘truth’ is not helped by being given a series of entirely unin-
formative conditionals.
1.2 Definitions and Pragmatic Elucidations
Both Wright’s claim that the Peircean ‘end of inquiry’ is conceptually impossible,
and Russell’s claim that adequate judgements about what will be believed by fu-
ture inquirers, or would be believed by cleverer inquirers, gain purchase by virtue
of a similarmisunderstanding of Peirce. Both take Peirce to be offering an ‘analytic
definition’ of truth (c.f. Atkin 2015, pp. 92–93). When Russell challenges Peirce’s
account of truth, he is looking for a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
the application of the concept. Since this definition is supposed to be informative
to one who is not already familiar with the concept, we want to avoid using it in the
definition. That is, we don’t want our definition to be circular. In such a project it
would not be worthwhile to appeal to the beliefs that will be (or would be) held by
future enquirers. Someone who wants to know when to apply the predicate ‘true’
The Truth-Inquiry Link 99
to a proposition is not helped by being told only to apply it when future inquirers
will believe the proposition in question.
Wright, while he thinks of Peirce as offering a traditional analytic definition,
does not himself aim at providing one. Instead of an exhaustive list of necessary
and sufficient conditions, Wright hopes for an ‘analytical theory’ in a broader sense
(Wright 2001, p. 760). Such a theory attempts to assemble
a body of conceptual truths that, without providing any reductive account, neverthe-
less collectively constrain and locate the target concept and sufficiently characterize
some of its relations with other concepts and its role and purposes. (Wright 2001,
p. 759)
Wright goes on to describe the method as follows:
The method here should be initially to compile a list, including anything that chimes
with ordinary a priori thinking about truth—what I shall call a platitude—and later
to scrutinize more rigorously for deductive articulation and for whether candidates
do indeed have the right kind of conceptual plausibility. (Wright 2001, p. 760)
If Peirce’s theory is taken to be ‘analytical’, even in this broad sense, we can
still run in to the problems set out above. Peirce’s ‘end of inquiry’, if cashed out
in terms of ‘complete information’, is not the kind of thing that is apt for a priori
conceptual grasping.17 In the next section we will see Misak arguing that Peirce’s
account of truth can be interpreted as a very similar view to Wright’s. In order to
do this, Misak’s interpretation abandons the notion of complete information.
If we look at the strategy outlined in ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’, we see
that Peirce sets out his account of truth as aiming at the ‘third grade’ of clarity.
He takes the third grade of clarity to come after, first, ‘familiarity with a notion’
and, second, ‘the defining of’ the notion (W3:260/EP1:126, 1878). The ‘grades of
clarity’ are compactly stated in a later text:
Now there are three grades of clearness in our apprehensions of the meanings of
words. The first consists in the connexion of the word with familiar experience. In
that sense, we all have a clear idea of what reality is and what force is—even those
who talk so glibly of mental force being correlated with the physical forces. The second
grade consists in the abstract definition, depending upon an analysis of just what it is
that makes the word applicable. [. . . ]18 The third grade of clearness consists in such
a representation of the idea that fruitful reasoning can be made to turn upon it, and
that it can be applied to the resolution of difficult practical problems. (CP3.457, 1897)
Any characteristically ‘pragmatist’ clarity about a concept like truth is to be found
at the third grade of clarity rather than at the level of necessary and sufficient
17In fact, the arguments just given suggest that the very notion is incoherent.
18Peirce here offers a long example of a defective definition of the physical concept of ‘energy’.
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conditions. Such a pragmatic elucidation is to be found by means of the previously-
quoted, pragmatic maxim:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object. (W3:266/EP1:132, 1878)
It is this kind of clarity that we hope for from a pragmatist account of truth, rather
than that which comes from mere definition. If, then, we are to ask what Peirce
thinks the definition of ‘truth’ is, we will find a remarkably conventional answer:
‘truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object’ (EP2:379–380,
1906). Peirce, moreover, thinks that this is not a particularly informative char-
acterisation. To understand truth we need much more than this.19 So, it seems
that Russell’s (and maybe Wright’s) criticism depends on taking Peirce to be offer-
ing the kind of thing which he is explicitly not offering: an analytic definition of
‘truth’.20
The above shows that Peirce at least agrees with Wright that providing ne-
cessary and sufficient conditions for truth is not the most important philosoph-
ical task. They diverge over what should be offered instead. One difference is that
Peirce’s approach has a historical dimension. This is a result of the fact that the
articulation of the role of some concept ‘for practical purposes’ depends a great
deal on what our ‘practical purposes’ are. These practices change over time. Peirce
thinks that, as the practice of inquiry has developed, the notion of truth has also
developed. We saw some of this in the previous chapter when discussing the ex-
tent to which we can think of the sincere Ptolemaic astronomer as a scientist. But
Peirce is even more explicit about it when reflecting on ‘The Fixation of Belief’
some time around 1906:
My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the agitation of a
question ceases when satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief, and then
only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually develops from that prin-
ciple under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity,
the most degraded of all intellectual conditions; thence rising to the imposition of be-
liefs by the authority of organized society; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion
19Strictly speaking Peirce calls the correspondence notion a ‘nominal’ definition of truth. A nom-
inal definition is, for Peirce, a characterisation of a concept which is merely convenient. A ‘real’
definition, on the other hand, ‘consist[s] of two members, of which the first should declare that any
object to which the definitum, or defined term, should be applicable would possess the characters
involved in the definition; while the second should declare that to any object which should possess
those characters the definitum would be applicable’ (NM4:285, 1904).
20This is not to say that Peirce thought that the provision of a definition of truth was unimport-
ant, or that better definitions might be out there (Heney 2015, pp. 505–506).
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as the result of a fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of truth as over-
whelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality.
(CP5.564, c. 1906)
The concept of truth develops, or perhaps better, ‘evolves’, in the context of a given
social environment.21
An ‘analytic’ approach can be characterised by taking apart something already
given. Wright’s ‘platitudes’ are supposed to be available a priori to pretty much
anyone who can use the concept truth. On the other hand, a ‘synthetic’ approach
would attempt to construct something with given materials. If the distinction is
between analytic and synthetic approaches, then it seems that Peirce’s is one of
the latter. This thought gels well with recent work by Giovanni Maddalena. Mad-
dalena posits an interest in synthetic reasoning as an under-appreciated, and in-
deed central, feature of classical pragmatist thought. Maddalena characterises
a synthetic judgement, or piece of reasoning, as one which ‘recognises identity
through changes’, whereas an analytic judgement, or piece of reasoning, ‘loses
identity through changes’ (Maddalena 2015, p. 43). He, additionally, aligns the
pragmatic maxim with this kind of synthetic reasoning (Maddalena 2015, pp. 81–
83). Maddalena makes out this point by means of his own account of ‘gesture’, but
we already have enough to see something of why the alignment is apt without his
theoretical machinery.
For Peirce, we can trace the development of an idea like truth over time as it has
responded to, in part, changes in the environment in which it functions. That is,
we maintain the identity of the concept of truth across changes in social environ-
ment. This is not true of the strictly analytic conceptual investigations encouraged
in their various ways byWright and Russell. On the synthetic model we can under-
stand Peirce to be, in some places, proposing new conceptions of truth rather than
merely regimenting the ‘platitudes’ which any user of the concept must accept.
All of the views on offer for the rest of this chapter attempt to provide philosoph-
ical clarity about truth of a ‘third grade’ or pragmatist sort. That is, they at least
attempt to avoid merely offering a definition or a set of necessary and sufficient
21Short argues that the deflationism, a close sibling of Wright’s own account of truth, should be
thought of as right about the conceptual meaning or definition of truth, while Peirce’s discussion of
convergence are reflections on a particular social practice, scientific inquiry. In fact, we can think of
some aspects of Peirce’s account of truth as a recommendation of howwe ought to think about truth
given a commitment to scientific inquiry (Short 2007, pp. 332–333). It is worth emphasising that
this proposal is beingmade fromwithin the practice, rather than from the third-person perspective
that we have saw Price adopt in the previous chapter.
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conditions for the truth of some proposition. Instead, we look for clarity about the
concept truth by seeing how it plays out in relation to the practices of theoretical
and practical inquiry.
2 The Contextualist Account of Truth
2.1 Misak and Hookway: Convergence on the Indefeasible
Both Hookway and Misak take Peirce to be offering a pragmatic elucidation of
truth.22 According to Hookway a pragmatic elucidation of a concept ‘provides an
account of just what commitments I incur when I believe or assert a proposition
in which the concept is ascribed to something’ (Hookway 2000b, p. 60). This is not
the same as providing a general definition of a concept which is to apply when the
concept is not playing a role in some belief or assertion (Hookway 2000b, pp. 60–
61). Hookway focuses his attention on commitments that we incur within some
discursive practice (typically some form of inquiry). Rather than looking for ne-
cessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept, we look to its
function in the practices in which it is deployed.
Misak, on the other hand, characterises a pragmatic elucidation of a concept as
drawing our attention to the expectations that we would take on in any situation
in which we applied the concept (Misak 2000, p. 59). She adds, further, that this
is a much more worthwhile task for the philosopher than providing necessary and
sufficient conditions. This is especially true of those concepts which are already
quite familiar and in everyday currency.23 Despite this small variation in their
understanding of a pragmatic elucidation, Hookway and Misak end up with very
similar interpretations of Peirce’s account of truth.
22The earliest use of the phrase ‘pragmatic elucidation’ I can find comes fromMisak’s Truth and
the End of Inquiry (Misak 1991, p. 4).
23Misak attributes this thought to David Wiggins (Misak 2007, pp. 68–69). Wiggins argues that
truth, like many terms of philosophical interest, is ‘indefinable’. For Wiggins, the attempt to gener-
ate ‘non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions’ for the application of terms that are ‘already
fundamental to human thought and long since possessed of an autonomous interest’ is ‘highly prob-
lematic’ (Wiggins 2002, p. 316). I am sceptical that this thought can be neatly attributed to Peirce.
We’ve just seen that a certain amount of familiarity with the use of a concept (the first grade of
clarity) is necessary before a definition (the second grade of clarity) can be attempted can even be
approached. Not only does familiarly not indicate that a definition is not able to be provided, it is
presupposed by the attempt to produce a definition. Peirce’s position is not that truth is undefin-
able, it’s that the philosophically interesting things to say about truth come by considering its role
in the practice of inquiry.
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Hookway has developed a Peircean account of truth over a series of papers.24
The best way in for our purposes is to focus on ‘convergence’. In the long passage
from ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ cited above, we saw Peirce referring to in-
quiry as a process which converges on fated results. On this view, no matter what
perspective the inquirer starts from, they will be drawn to the same end point
as inquirers who start from very different places. Peirce offers a nice illustrative
example of what he has in mind in an earlier text:
All human thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent
on the limitations in circumstances, power, and bent of the individual; an element
of error, in short. But human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite
form, which is the truth. Let any human being have enough information and exert
enough thought upon any question, and the result will be that he will arrive at a
certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will reach under
sufficiently favourable circumstances. Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind.
One hears a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and
hears the victim cry; the other sees the murder done. Their sensations are affected
in the highest degree with their individual peculiarities. The first information that
their sensations will give them, their first inferences, will be more nearly alike, but
still different; the one having, for example, the idea of a man shouting, the other of a
man with a threatening aspect; but their final conclusions, the thought the remotest
from sense, will be identical and free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies.
(W2:468–469/EP1:89, 1871)
According to Peirce, the starting point of inquiry is the most ‘arbitrary’ and ‘indi-
vidual’ feature of the process. Inquiry, when functioning well, tends towards the
development of beliefs that are not arbitrary or individual. We are not to look for
truth (or reality) at the starting point of inquiry. We find it, instead, at the end.
Peirce also offers an example from the history of science:25
One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and
the aberration of the stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of
Jupiter’s satellites; a third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a
fifth by the motions of the curves of Lissajous; a sixth, a seventh, and eighth, and a
ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of statical and
dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different results, but as each perfects
hismethod and his processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined
centre. So with all scientific research. (W3:273/EP1:138, 1878)
In both examples, we see convergence in beliefs despite the inquirers in question
starting from very different positions. So, we can think of the ‘end of inquiry’ as
24These include ‘Truth and the Convergence of Opinion’, ‘Truth and Correspondence’, ‘Truth
and Reference: Peirce versus Royce’ in Hookway 2000b; and ‘Truth, Reality, and Convergence’ in
Hookway 2012d.
25This example was hidden by an ellipsis in the passage from ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’
quoted during the discussion of Russell.
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the point at which our answers to a given question converge. Note that in both
examples a specific question is being asked: ‘what is the velocity of light?’ or ‘what
just happened!?’ in response to given (although distinct) sensations.
Some forms of convergence in belief are not what Peirce has in mind. Examples
of bad convergence are easy to find. In some cases, for instance, inquirers might
converge on a result because they’ve all been paid off by some wealthy inquiry-
distorter. Worries about this kind of distortion in the sciences are not hard to come
by. Recently, for instance, complaints have been made about the Coca-Cola Com-
pany funding researchers who are sceptical that there is any link between diet
and obesity (O’Connor 2016). Other inquirers might converge on results under
the threat of physical violence. Instances of, say, forced religious conversion may
provide examples of this. But these are not the kind of convergence that Peirce has
in mind. Mere agreement is not what we are after. Rather, we are after agreement
as the result of ‘properly conducted’ inquiry.26 Misak draws attention to this by
noting that the pragmatist need not defend a kind of ‘contractarian’ view accord-
ing to which agreement in our beliefs is more important than the quality of those
beliefs (Misak 2000, p. 50).
Hookway characterises Peirce’s connection between truth and convergence as
follows: ‘[i]f it is true that p, then anyone who inquired into the question whether
p long enough and well enough (using good methods of inquiry) would eventually
reach a stable belief that p which would not be disturbed by further evidence or
investigation’ (Hookway 2000b, p. 49). With respect to any particular inquiry that
we are engaged in, we are to adopt the ‘regulative hope’ that such convergence is
possible (Hookway 2000b, p. 61).27
Hookway’s story is close to, but does not quite match, the passages from Peirce
we have just considered. Peirce’s examples do fix a certain question, but inquiry
is not presented as starting from questions of the form ‘is p true?’ and concluding
with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The proposition p, to which inquiry into a given question
converges, may include concepts far beyond those possessed by whoever asks the
26Of course, ‘properly conducted inquiry’ will be a hard notion to specify. In Chapter Two, we saw
something of Peirce’s positive account of well-functioning inquiry. If someone has adopted the ‘spirit
of science’, and has truth as their ultimate aim, then they will be unlikely to have their inquiry
distorted in the ways just mentioned. Peirce also offers a negative characterisation of properly
functioning inquiry. This comes, for instance, in his criticism of the methods of tenacity, authority,
and a priori reasoning in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (EP1:109–123). It is also present in his criticism
of the influence of narrowly instrumental demands on the pure sciences (e.g. CP1:45, c. 1896).
27Hookway credits Misak with this insight (c.f. Misak 1991, p. 140).
The Contextualist Account of Truth 105
question to which it is the eventual answer. That is, we may start by asking a
question using certain concepts, and in the course of investigation find that, in
fact, different concepts are required to capture the phenomenon under investiga-
tion. However, in practice these kind of cases should be easy to incorporate into
Hookway’s account.28
Misak nicely summarises her approach to Peirce on truth as follows:
C. S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that a belief is true if it would be
‘indefeasible’, or would not be improved upon, or would never lead to disappointment,
no matter how far we were to pursue our inquiries. Although he occasionally articu-
lated this view of truth in terms of a belief’s being fated to be believed at the end of
inquiry, on the whole he tried to stay away from unhelpful ideas such as the final end
of inquiry, perfect evidence, and the like. (Misak 2007, p. 68)
The core texts which Misak appeals to are ones in which Peirce emphasises first,
the relativisation of his account of truth to particular questions and, second, the
idea of indefeasibility. These passages, as Misak suggests, tend to avoid ideas like
‘fate’ or the use of the metaphor of a ‘limit’ to inquiry. In so far as the idea of ‘con-
vergence’ is useful for Misak, it is convergence as it appears in Hookway’s account:
a process by which we hit on the same indefeasible result as other inquirers.
Misak further clarifies the notion of ‘best’ involved in the idea of indefeasibility:
The core of the pragmatist conception of truth is that a true belief would be the best
belief, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. We shall see that ‘best’
here amounts to ‘best fits with all experience and argument’, not the kind of ‘best’
that other pragmatists, James and Rorty, for instance, have flirted with—consoling,
best for our lives, or most comfortable. A true belief, rather, is a belief that could not be
improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges of reasons, argument,
and evidence. (Misak 2000, p. 49)
HereMisak emphasises the fact that someways of evaluating beliefs are irrelevant
to whether they are defeasible or not. Convergence on a belief on the basis that it
consoles us all will not count as appropriate convergence. Misak distinguishes this
Peircean position from those of Rorty and James.29
As just mentioned, Misak attaches her interpretation to a few key passages
from Peirce. The idea of indefeasibility is prominent in Peirce’s reflections on ‘How
to Make our Ideas Clear’ at the end of his 1908 article ‘Neglected Argument for the
28We might, for instance, incorporate Maddalena’s pragmatist account of synthetic judgements
here. In this case we are judging questions as in some sense ‘the same’ across changes as an in-
vestigation develops.
29That James thinks of the ‘best’ in the way of belief in this fashion has been challenged in the
recent literature (e.g. Levine 2013). However, whether or not James endorsed this conception of
the satisfactory belief, it persists in the popular philosophical imagination of pragmatism.
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Reality of God’. There Peirce holds that ‘if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot
be any actual satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which would ultimately be
found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue’ (EP2:450,
1907). Misak also points to a passage from Peirce’s entry on truth in Baldwin’s
Dictionary, which holds that:
When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer to the possibility of the proposition being
refuted; and this refutation (roughly speaking) takes place in but one way. Namely, an
interpretant of the proposition would, if believed, produce the expectation of a certain
description of percept on a certain occasion. The occasion arrives: the percept forced
upon us is different. (CP5.569, 1902)
Here, we get an idea of what it is for something to fail to be indefeasible. A be-
lief fails if there is some situation in which we expect one thing on the basis of
a proposition, but another occurs. A belief is indefeasible if there is no possible
situation of that sort. Elsewhere, we get a similar claim in the language of ‘rules’.
Peirce holds that ‘the success for which we hope [in inquiry] is that we shall at-
tain some rule which further experience will not force us to repeal’ (NM4:xii–xiii,
1901). Once we have some ‘rule’, or ‘belief’, that further experience will not ‘force
us to repeal’, then there is nothing more to be asked of inquiry. The aim of inquiry,
truth, has been attained.
We can now see why neither Misak nor Hookway require a notion of complete
information of the sort that Wright criticises. To reach an indefeasible belief in
some proposition in the context of a given form of inquiry does not require us to be
able to provide a truth-value for every proposition. Moreover, the believer need not
know that they have an indefeasible belief for this to work. For the believer, there is
no guarantee that future experience won’t overturn the belief in question.30 This
does not prevent it from being the case that if a belief is true, then it will be
indefeasible in the sense articulated by Misak and Hookway. Misak argues that,
in fact, Wright’s own position is remarkably close to Peirce’s. Wright holds that a
proposition that is true is ‘superassertible’:
A statement is superassertible [. . . ] if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some
warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily
extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information. (Wright
1992, p. 48; cited in Misak 2007, p. 81)
30This is one of the central planks of Peirce’s fallibilism.
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2.2 Convergence in a Context
Both Hookway and Misak offer us ‘contextualist’ approaches to Peirce’s account of
truth. OnMisak’s image there is a general story about truth that draws our atten-
tion to indefeasibility. Indefeasibility, however, depends on different local norms
in different situations. Misak draws this dimension out as part of a comparison
between her version of Peirce and the deflationist about truth:
The deflationist holds (with Peirce) that what there is to say about truth is what there
is to say about local inquiries, and (against Peirce) that it follows that we do not aim
at truth or that there are no general features which true beliefs have in common.
[. . . ] If the naturalist follows Peirce in seeing truth as indefeasible belief, then
it is unproblematic for the naturalist to say that we aim at truth. for ‘truth’ here is
just a catch-all for the particular local aims of inquiry—empirical adequacy, predictive
power, coherence with other beliefs, simplicity, elegance, explanatory power, getting
a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness for other research, greater understanding of
others, increasedmaturity, and the like. There is nothing over and above the fulfilment
of those ends, nothing metaphysical, to which we aspire. The pragmatist steps away
frommetaphysically loaded accounts of truth and steps towards practice. A true belief
is one which would be the upshot of our inquiries. (Misak 2007, p. 70)
The rejection of the ‘metaphysical’ and the alignment of Peirce with ‘naturalism’ in
this passage will need to be dealt with later. For now, we need only note the list of
distinct local aims or ideals that are features of some forms of inquiry but not oth-
ers. While ‘greater understanding of others’ may be a norm within moral/ethical
inquiry, it is not in pure mathematics. Similarly, ‘empirical adequacy’ does not
mean the same thing in ethics and in the physical sciences. Simplicity and eleg-
ance have played important roles in physics, whereas attempts to impose simple
theories in the biological sphere have had less success. Misak’s list could be ex-
panded. In theology, for instance, fidelity to a given religious tradition may be an
important norm, while in other forms of inquiry it is not.
Another way of getting at the importance of context for Misak’s interpretation
of Peirce is to look at what she says about bivalence.Misak notes that Peirce thinks
of bivalence as a regulative hope of inquiry, rather than an unbreakable law of
logic (Misak 2004, p. 165). That is, we assume of any proposition that we could
discover it to be true or false, but there is no guarantee that this is really so.
Misak continues: ‘[i]f it were the case that, no matter how far we were to push
our inquiries, there would be no upshot to the question at hand, then we must
say that there is no truth of the matter at stake’ (Misak 2004, pp. 165–166). As
Misak notes, Peirce explicitly says that philosophical questions regarding free will
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might end up in this situation (c.f. CP5.565, 1901). Misak suggests there might be
a continuum from more to less bivalent subject matters:
We ought to expect bivalence to fail more often in ethics than in physical science, but
moral deliberation nonetheless aims at the truth. We can see that the reality to which
ethical judgements fit is not physical reality, yet ethical deliberation is still guided by
the surprise of experience. Ethics falls somewhere in between the highly subjective
domain of taste and the much more objective domain of the physical sciences. (Misak
2004, p. 169)
Hookwaymakes a similar point about the difference betweenmoral inquiry and
more straight-forwardly factual inquiry.31 He distinguishes between the kind of
explanation that we might offer in cases where agreement on some moral matter
is made on the basis of the influence of some particularly charismatic moralist
and the kind of explanation we might offer when we agree on the basis of natural-
scientific experimentation (Hookway 2000b, p. 76).32
A further dimension in which contextual variation affects the truth of a pro-
position is brought out by Hookway. If we take the proposition whose truth we
are considering to be the answer to a certain question, then the purpose for which
that question is asked becomes important. For instance, suppose we ask howmany
leaves are on a tree at a given time. When we confront the tree we may find
ourselves having to make decisions which are not determined by the question,
but by some additional background purpose or context. Without this background
purpose or context there will be no determinate answer to the question. Hookway
imagines himself in this position and asks:
Should I include a brown, gnarled diseased leaf which no longer has a role in sustain-
ing the tree? Should I include a leaf which is suspended from the tree by a thread,
about to fall off at any moment? What about new growth just escaping from the bud?
In such cases, I must exercise judgement; there is nothing in the semantic content of
the question howmany leaves are on the tree which determines how I should decide. I
cannot be confident that everyone would decide in the same way or even that I would
have made the same judgement on another occasion. I may be influenced by reasons
for undertaking the count: if it is to be used to assess the health of the tree, the brown
gnarled leaf should be excluded; if it is used to assess the shade the tree will produce,
it should be included. (Hookway 2000b, pp. 57–58)
The same will be true in other forms of inquiry. For different purposes, different
things will fall under the same concept (in this case, the concept ‘leaf’). Similar
31Note that this distinction between moral and factual inquiry does not require a hard and fast
fact-value dichotomy of the type rejected by almost all pragmatists. As we’ve just seen Misak say,
we can think of both domains as falling on a continuum.
32Following out the consequences of this difference would lead us straight to the metaphysical
(rather than logical) matters that will be the focus of our attention in the next chapter.
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things are true for other descriptive concepts. For instance, consider the use of the
word ‘flat’. For some purposes it will be true that the table that my laptop currently
sits on is flat, for other purposes it will not. It would not, for instance, be ‘flat’ if
the relevant issue is whether a marble would remain still if placed on it.
2.3 Indefeasibility and the Pragmatic Maxim
Some statements of the pragmatic maxim are friendly to this context sensitive
approach. For instance, in a late attempt to summarise the pragmatist movement,
Peirce characterises the maxim as follows:
themost perfect account of a concept that words can conveywill consist in a description
of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit
be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the
specification of the conditions and of the motive? (EP2:418, 1907)
According to this statement, the kind of clarity about our concepts that the maxim
provides requires the specification of the conditions of application of the concept
and the motive for applying the concept.
We have already seen that Misak and Hookway both understand a pragmatic
elucidation to involve a connection with practice, with Hookway emphasising prac-
tical commitments and Misak emphasising the role of expectation. In addition,
both think that assertion is the central practice for understanding truth. Part
of the motivation for this is the idea that asserting p and asserting that ‘p is
true’ have the same ‘force’ (c.f. Howat 2015, p. 424). That is, the pragmatic ef-
fect or consequences of the respective utterances are the same. This can be true
even though the two assertions have different semantic content (one includes the
concept ‘truth’, while the other doesn’t). One can read this as the traditional defla-
tionist way as revealing the contentlessness of the term ‘truth’, or one can go in a
slightly different direction. If asserting p and asserting ‘p is true’ are force equival-
ent then we can come to grips with the concept of truth by turning our attention
to the practice of assertion and its various norms (Howat 2015, p. 430). Hookway’s
Peircean story of what we commit ourselves to when making an assertion is such
an account. For instance, he takes the following to be a norm of assertion: ‘when
I assert a proposition or accept it as true, then I am committed to thinking that
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it would be a matter on which a fated convergence of opinion would be secured’
(Hookway 2000b, p. 62).33
Before moving on, it is worth facing a possible difficulty in relating Peirce’s
descriptions of the clarity provided by the pragmatic maxim and the interpretive
strategies deployed by Misak and Hookway. We’ve already seen that, according to
Peirce in 1897, a pragmatic elucidation is supposed to provide us with an account
of the concept upon which ‘fruitful reasoning’ can turn and that ‘can be applied to
the resolution of difficult practical problems’. Hookway andMisak both connect the
notion of truth convincingly to the practices of assertion and inquiry. It is less clear
how they enable fruitful reasoning using the concept truth or enable the solution
of ‘difficult practical problems’. However, this difficulty is removed quite easily by
noting that, for Peirce, some of the most significant practical problems concern the
management of the practice of theoretical inquiry itself. So, for instance, if a great
deal of cognitive labour is being wasted on problems about concepts like truth, and
if these problems arise as a result of failing to connect the concept with practice
in the way that Peirce recommends, then a practical problem has been resolved.
A further advantage of the account of truth offered by Peirce is that it limits what
counts as a genuine challenge to the truth of some belief. If truth is aligned with
the indefeasible in practice, then the only relevant challenge to a belief is one that
might be discovered in inquiry. This enables the pragmatist to exclude certain
characteristically Cartesian sceptical hypotheses from consideration. This might,
likewise, free up intellectual energy to be directed in more fruitful directions.
3 Truth in Baldwin’s Dictionary
One way in which pressure can be put on the sufficiency of the contextualist ap-
proach is by turning to Peirce’s ‘definition’ of truth in James Baldwin’s Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology.34 The entry begins as follows:
Truth is a character which attaches to an abstract proposition, such as a person might
utter. It essentially depends upon that proposition’s not professing to be exactly true.
But we hope that in the progress of science its error will indefinitely diminish, just as
33The role of ‘force equivalence’ is slightly more complex in Hookway’s interpretation of Peirce.
We will turn to this in Section Three.
34Much of Peirce’s most creative later philosophical work, while he struggled to publish a mono-
graph, was done in the context of paid contributions to various dictionaries and encyclopedias. This
feature of Peirce’s later philosophical work is brought out in recent work by Shannon Dea (c.f. Dea
2015, pp. 725–726).
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the error of 3.14159, the value given for pi, will indefinitely diminish as the calculation
is carried tomore andmore places of decimals.What we call pi is an ideal limit to which
no numerical expression can be perfectly true. If our hope is vain; if in respect to some
question—say that of the freedom of the will—no matter how long the discussion goes
on, no matter how scientific our methods may become, there never will be a time when
we can fully satisfy ourselves either that the question has no meaning, or that one
answer or the other explains the facts, then in regard to that question there certainly
is no truth. But whether or not there would be perhaps any reality is a question for
the metaphysician, not the logician. (CP5.565, 1901)
Hookway responds to the first two sentences, which seem to paradoxically claim
that the only way to make a true claim is to simultaneously say that it is false, as
follows:
The suggestion seems to be that when an assertion is made by someone who carries
out inquiries in the scientific spirit, this does not involve a firm commitment to the
truth of the proposition. It involves quite a complex propositional attitude, one that
uses the concept of truth to articulate an ideal to which the asserted proposition does
not fully measure up. In that case, asserting a proposition commits me to its ‘approx-
imate truth’, not to its exact truth. If that is correct, a difference opens up between
asserting that p and asserting that it is true that p. Peirce might argue that if I claim
that a proposition is true, I go beyond this commitment to approximate correctness.
(Hookway 2000b, pp. 64–65)
Here, we see Hookway opening up room for a difference between asserting that p
and asserting that ‘p is true’. He suggests that this occurs when someone makes
assertions in the ‘scientific spirit’.
This gap has recently been raised as a problem for Hookway by Andrew Howat.
As noted in the previous section, Howat brings out the importance of force equi-
valence for Hookway and Misak’s accounts of the assertion-truth connection. He
then points to this passage in Hookway as a problem for the pragmatist account of
truth. Once the distinction between those domains of discourse where force equi-
valence applies and those where it doesn’t is admitted, we will need some account
of why the lines between discourses fall where they do (Howat 2015, pp. 434–435).
Hookway suggests that the difference is between the scientific and non-scientific
contexts; Howat doesn’t accept this approach.35
However, if an alternative interpretation is possible this demarcation problem
need not arise.36 I suspect that we have too quickly assumed that we know what
35Howat points to the later section of the Baldwin entry where Peirce claims that ‘[t]he same
definitions hold for the propositions of practical life’ (CP5.568, 1901; cited in Howat 2015, p. 435).
If the same ‘definitions’ hold in both cases, then the force equivalence problem will arise in both
too.
36Howat tentatively offers a solution to the problem in terms of a lexical ambiguity in the word
‘truth’: sometimes it means ‘accuracy’, a matter of degree, and sometimes it means ‘correctness’,
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Peirce means by ‘exact truth’. This move is made by Hookway when he supposes
that Peirce thinks that the assertion of ‘p is true’ is equivalent to the assertion ‘p
is exactly true’. If we can offer an interpretation according to which there are two
notions of truth, one which applies to ‘abstract propositions’ and one which applies
to the ‘ideal limit’, then there will be no problem with force equivalence.37
This alternative attempts to take the first two sentences of Peirce’s definition
literally. According to Peirce, the truth of a proposition ‘essentially depends’ on its
‘not professing to be exactly true’. It is a simple inference from this to the claim
that no proposition that asserts its own ‘exact truth’ can be true. Consequently,
any claim of the form ‘p is exactly true’ is false. This is not a good result if we
want, as Hookway’s interpretation requires, for ‘p is true’ to be equivalent to ‘p is
exactly true’.
Taking Peirce literally, we are left with the need to provide a characterisation
of what he means by ‘exact truth’. We will also need to make sense of the claim
that a proposition might ‘profess’ something about itself. This might allow us to
make sense of the claim that any proposition that ‘a person might utter’ somehow
involves a confession of its own limitations. In the next section I’ll argue that recent
work on Peirce on the proposition can help us with both issues.
Before turning to the attempt to fill in these gaps, let’s look a little more closely
at the mathematical metaphor Peirce deploys. In the metaphor we are to think
of numerical expressions as propositions ‘such as a person might utter’. That is,
in this metaphor the propositions we might utter are co-extensive with the ra-
tional numbers. However, the metaphor embeds these ‘propositions’ within the
real numbers. The propositions we might utter are then able to be part of an in-
finite sequence that converges on a real but not rational number. However, these
sequences cannot include a real but not rational number. In Peirce’s metaphor
then, while pi needs to be acknowledged to make sense of some process whereby
the propositions we utter change over time, it is not a proposition that ‘a person
which is a binary notion. In the former case force equivalence does not apply, in the latter it does
(Howat 2015, pp. 436–437). I will attempt, instead, to offer an interpretation of Peirce that prevents
the force equivalence problem from arising at all.
37We will need additionally to ensure that the assertion ‘p is exactly true’ and the assertion that
p are not force equivalent. This will be obvious once we have cashed out the notion of ‘exact truth’
more thoroughly under the heading ‘absolute truth’. As already intimated, the one proposition
which comes out as ‘absolutely true’ on Peirce’s account will not be one that it is possible to assert.
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might utter’. Peirce’s deployment of this metaphor provides a further motivation
for thinking that, whatever the ‘exact truth’ is, it is not an everyday proposition.38
4 Peirce’s Semeiotic Account of the Proposition
4.1 Propositional Self-Reference and the Liar
Peirce offers an original account of the proposition within his theory of signs, or se-
meiotic. Some of the details of this account will be necessary in order to understand
Peirce’s account of truth. For example, the passage from Baldwin’s Dictionary re-
quires us to make sense of the idea of a proposition ‘professing’ something about
itself. That is, some account of propositional self-reference is required.39
The notion of propositional self-reference develops over time in Peirce’s work.
An important part of the story is that, between 1869 and 1896, Peirce offered a
solution to the liar paradox which turned on the claim that all propositions rep-
resent themselves to be true (Atkins 2011, p. 424). The liar paradox is the problem
of dealing with ‘liar sentences’ of the form ‘this sentence is not true’.40 If a sentence
of this form is true, then it is not true; and if it is not true, then it is true. Atkins
quotes the following passage from Peirce:
A proposition is true only if whatever is said in it is true, but is false if anything said
in it is false
[. . . ] [E]very proposition asserts its own truth.
The proposition in question [i.e. LP], therefore, is true in all other respects but its
implication of its own truth. (EP1:74/W2:262–3, 1869; cited in Atkins 2011, p. 424)
As Atkins interprets the argument, Peirce reasons from the fact that the liar pro-
position is manifestly odd, and that there is no explicit feature of it that is odd (it
has normal propositional form for instance), to the conclusion that the paradox-
generative feature of the proposition is implicit (Atkins 2011, p. 424). The asser-
tion made by each proposition of its own truth is understood to be implicit. If each
proposition implicitly asserts its own truth then the liar sentence both implicitly
asserts its truth while explicitly denying it. That is, the liar proposition is self-
contradictory and therefore false.
38For a much more detailed exploration of Peirce’s ‘limit’ metaphor for truth see Legg 2014a.
39More accurately, it depends on the proposition not professing something about itself. We will
in a moment that Peirce has a broader story to tell about propositional self-reference.
40Atkins calls this sentence ‘LP’.
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However, as Atkins notes, in 1903 we find Peirce going back on this account
of the liar paradox. For one thing, Peirce takes his former argument to beg the
question. His proof that the liar sentence is self-contradictory depends on the claim
that every proposition asserts its own truth, while his proof that every proposition
asserts its own truth relies on the claim that the liar sentence is self-contradictory
(Atkins 2011, p. 425).
In addition, Peirce offers a series of arguments against the claim that a pro-
position can represent itself to be true. If these cannot be side-stepped then the
proposal to understand everyday truth in terms of an acknowledgement of a failure
to be ‘exactly true’ will not get off the ground. Atkins covers three distinct argu-
ments made by Peirce to this conclusion. The first notes that the theory makes the
propositions ‘it rains’ and ‘I assert that it rains’ equivalent. If these were equival-
ent, then their negations should be as well. However, ‘it does not rain’ and ‘I do
not assert that it rains’ are not equivalent (EP2:167, 1903; cited in Atkins 2011,
pp. 425–426).41
The final argument touches more directly on our present concerns. According
to this argument, a proposition indicates its object by means of an indexical re-
lation. Roughly speaking, it must be able to point to its object. But, according to
Peirce, the only things that can be ‘pointed out’ in this fashion are things which
are already ‘real’. To be ‘real’ is to have whatever properties you have independent
of your being represented to have those properties by some person or particular
group of people.42 For a proposition to be able to assert its own truth, it must be
able to relate to itself as an object that is real in this sense. But, Peirce claims,
before a proposition is enunciated, it is not independent of representation in this
sense (Atkins 2011, p. 427). In another text from the same year, ‘Sundry Logical
Conceptions’, Peirce claims that ‘a Symbol cannot even have itself as its Object;
for it is a law governing its Object’ (EP2:276, 1903). On Peirce’s view, a law has
to govern something other than itself (c.f. EP2:345, 1905). In order to make sense
of the claim that a proposition can present itself as ‘not exactly true’ we will need
to look for the possibility of a non-symbolic form of self-reference within Peirce’s
account of the proposition.
41The second argument turns on a court room example in which person A testifies that person
B’s testimony is true, while person B testifies that person A’s testimony is false. ‘Common sense’
declares in this case that nothing has been conveyed (EP2:167, 1903; cited in Atkins 2011, p. 426).
42For instance, Earth has the property ‘orbits the sun’ regardless of whether any group of people
think that it does. Therefore, Earth is real. We will return to Peirce’s account of reality ascriptions
in the next chapter.
Peirce’s Semeiotic Account of the Proposition 115
4.2 Signs and Dicisigns
Peirce provides an account of propositions in the context of his wider theory of
signs.43 Semeiotics, a general account of the varieties of signs and their distinct
roles in cognition, was a preoccupation for Peirce throughout his career.44 The long
period of time over which Peirce worked on signs, along with his isolation from
others working on the same issues, led to a massive proliferation of sometimes-
conflicting terminological choices in different texts.
Peirce characterises signs in the following terms:
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoevermode of being, whichmediates between
an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the
interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise
as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of
this ‘sign’. (EP2:410, 1907)
The key thing to note here, which will be elaborated as we go on, is that the sign
relation has three parts: the object, the sign, and the interpretant. Each is a neces-
sary ingredient in sign use. Note also that the interpretant is, by the action of the
sign, ‘determined by’ the object. If the interpretant is itself a sign, as will usually
be the case,45 it will be subject to further interpretation which will similarly relate
back to the original object.
Peirce’s account of the proposition starts with the idea that propositions are
signs that ‘say something about something’ (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 51). According to
Peirce, the easiest mark of whether something is a proposition or not is that ‘a
[proposition]46 is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its
being so’ (EP2:275, 1903). The proposition is unlike a term, which is neither true
nor false, nor is it like an argument, which presents reasons for the acceptance of
43T. L. Short argues that propositions cannot be equated with any of the kinds of sign that are
provided in Peirce’s semeiotic taxonomies. His worry is that the various semeiotic entities Peirce
aligns with propositions are defined in such a way that they are relative to a particular language,
while he also thinks that a proposition is the kind of abstract entity that can remain the same
while expressed in different languages (Short 2007, p. 245). In the discussions of the proposition
that I lean on in this chapter, Peirce starts with a characterisation of the proposition as the kind
of sign that can be true or false, rather than with the idea that a proposition is an abstract object
held constant across synonymous sentences in different languages. Since it is truth that we are
centrally interested with here, I will leave these issues of synonymity unanswered.
44According to Max Fisch, it was his primary preoccupation (W1:xxii, 1982; cited in Bergman
2009, pp. 1–2).
45Perhaps always, if you accept ‘semiotic idealism’ a la Ransdell (c.f. Ransdell 1997).
46Here Peirce uses the generalised term ‘dicisign’. More detail on this terminological choice will
be given below.
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its conclusion. A ‘proposition is a signwhich separately, or independently, indicates
its object’ (EP2:307, 1904). This is in contrast to a bare index, which merely indic-
ates its object. Instead, a proposition both points out its object and characterises it.
Only in so doing can it make a truth claim. Peirce takes the proposition to include
an iconic part (which characterises the object) and an indexical one (which points
out the object). Stjernfelt cites the following to emphasise the functional character
of Peirce’s account of the proposition: ‘Thus, every proposition is a compound of
two signs, of which one functions significantly, the other denotatively. The former
is intended to create something like a picture in the mind of the interpreter [the
icon], the latter to point to what he is to think of that picture as being a picture of
[the index]’ (R284, p. 43, cited in Stjernfelt 2014, p. 58).
The distinction between icons, indices, and symbols is probably the most well-
known Peircean semiotic triad.47 This trichotomy divides signs according to how
they represent their object. The icon is related to its object by resemblance, or
simply by virtue of possessing the quality that it signifies. For instance, a portrait
represents by virtue of visual similarity between it and its object. An index rep-
resents by virtue of being really connected with its object. Causal examples are
the easiest to highlight. For instance, a hoof-print in a muddy field indexes the
presence of a horse at some point in the near past. A symbol, on the other hand, is
connected with its object simply by virtue of it being taken to be by its interpreter.
For instance, the word ’dog’ signifies by virtue of the conventions of the English
language rather than being directly, even efficient causally, related to dogs or in
some sense resembling a dog.48
It is important to note that the characterisation of a proposition as the kind of
sign compounded of an icon and index of the same object captures a wider range of
signs than is usual. For instance: a weathercock both indexes the direction of the
wind by being causally connected to it, and provides an icon in the form of an arrow
which functions as an icon of the direction of the wind (c.f. EP2:306, 1904). The
weathercock thus makes a truth claim, which, if the weathercock is faulty, may
come out false. The Peircean account of propositions has been applied recently by
Stjernfelt to include animal sign use, certain images, and even video footage (e.g.
2014, pp. 180–187). Given the wide net that his account casts, Peirce sometimes
47Aside from it’s being reasonably well know in its own terms, the distinction is also in the back-
ground of the much more ubiquitous syntax/semantics/pragmatics distinction. This latter distinc-
tion was coined by Charles Morris as an attempt to interpret the former (Cummings 2009).
48For a clear summary of the division see EP2:306–307, 1904 or EP2:4–10, 1894.
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thought a new technical term was in order rather than continuing to use the term
‘proposition’. One term he commonly deploys is ‘dicisign’. In ‘Sundry Logical Con-
ceptions’ we see Peirce using ‘dicisign’ for the general notion and ‘proposition’ to
mean a symbolic (as opposed to indexical, e.g. the weathercock) dicisign (EP2:282,
1903).49
4.3 The Doctrine of the Double Object
A straightforward reading of the claims made so far would be to take the icon and
the index as simply relabellings of the traditional idea of ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’
respectively. Perhaps more sympathetically, we might accept the generalisation
from linguistic subjects and predicates to the wider field of ‘dicisigns’, but still
think that no major advance has been taken. However, there is more to Peirce’s
account. According to Peirce, a proposition must have two distinct objects: the
‘primary object’, which is the object that is indexed by the proposition, and the
‘secondary object’, which is the indexical connection between the proposition and
its object.
Why does Peirce think the proposition has two objects? He offers an answer in a
very dense deduction of the various features of the proposition/dicisign in ‘Sundry
Logical Conceptions’ (EP2:275–277, 1903). Stjernfelt offers a nice statement of the
conclusion we are interested in:
For a first glance, the Dicisign says: ‘Here is an object O, and it has the property P’;
the [‘Sundry Logical Conceptions’] deduction now claims that this is only a shorthand,
made possible by an underlying, more complicated structure which may be given the
following colloquial paraphrase: ‘Here is an object O, really connected to this sign, and
this connection grants the truth of this sign’s further claim that this predicate holds
of that object: P’. (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 72)
The relevant steps in Peirce’s argument are as follows:
• Since a proposition does not provide reasons for its truth, it must be inter-
preted as as a ‘genuine Index’ of its object.
• The interpretant of the proposition ‘represents a real existential relation as
subsisting between the [proposition] and its real Object’.
49Another important extension of the notion of a proposition ismade by Peirce under the heading
‘pheme’. This generalisation attempts to incorporate interrogatives and commands (Bellucci 2014).
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• The interpretant of a sign ‘can represent no other Object than that of the
Sign itself’, so the proposition must also have his ‘existential relation’ as an
object (EP2:276).50
On Peirce’s view, then, the proposition claims itself to be in an indexical relation
to its (primary) object. Further, Peirce claims this relation is iconised by the syn-
tactical link between the predicate-part and the iconic-part of the proposition. In
any token of the proposition the predicate and subject parts, simply by sitting next
to one another, provide an icon of the claimed link between the proposition and its
object (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 69). Consider, for instance, a portrait of the Queen with a
label on the frame saying ‘Queen Elizabeth II’. The primary object of this dicisign
is the Queen herself, while the ‘predicate’ part possesses colours which are claimed
to resemble the Queen. The label ‘Queen Elizabeth II’ on the frame then signifies
by co-location the claim that this portrait is in a real indexical relation with the
Queen.51 A more conventional example would be the proposition ‘Robin Hood was
born in Loxley’. This proposition can be analysed into a name ‘Robin Hood’, which
functions as an index, and an unsaturated predicate ‘-was born in Loxley’, which
functions as an icon.52 Peirce’s claim seems to be that the co-location of the words
‘Robin Hood’ and the predicate ‘-was born in Loxley’ signifies the indexical con-
nection between the proposition ‘Robin Hood was born in Loxley’ and the figure,
whether fictional or not, of Robin Hood.
We need to add two further details before returning to Baldwin’s Dictionary.
The first is to introduce the role of ‘collateral experience’ in indexical reference.53
According to Peirce, no indexical reference is possible absent experience shared
by both utterer and interpreter. Peirce holds that ‘no sign can be understood—or
at least that no proposition can be understood—unless the interpreter has “collat-
eral acquaintance” with every Object of it’ (EP2:496, 1909; cited in Stjernfelt 2014,
50I have substituted ‘proposition’ for ‘dicisign’ here. This is to distort the structure of Sundry
Logical Conceptions, which begins with a derivation of the features of the dicisign and then later
shows that propositions in the narrower sense satisfy the derived description (EP2:279–282, 1903).
51This example is adapted from Stjernfelt 2014, p. 70.
52Peirce did not think that the copula, in this case ‘was’, should be considered an additional part
of the proposition. To think otherwise is, Peirce thinks, to privilege Latin over Greek (EP2:308–
309, 1904). Allowing one’s logical views to be influenced by this kind of linguistic detail is ‘no better
than an unsatisfactory method of ascertaining psychological facts that are of no relevancy to logic’
(EP2:309, 1904).
53More might be said about the role of the icon in Peirce’s account of the proposition. However,
we do not need that level of detail to make out what Peirce means by ‘exact truth’. For more detail
on the issue see Hookway 2012a and Stjernfelt 2014, pp. 61–64.
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p. 80). Peirce variously uses the terms collateral ‘acquaintance’ (e.g. EP2:496,
1909), ‘experience’ (e.g. EP2:480, 1908), and ‘observation’ (e.g. EP2:404, 1907). I
will use these terms interchangeably. ‘Collateral experience’ is not to be thought of
as part of the sign, but as necessary for the sign to function. In Stjernfelt’s words,
the index part of the proposition is ‘simply there in order to activate’ our collateral
knowledge. If it fails in this task, the sign is ‘not able to function as a Dicisign at
all’ (Stjernfelt 2014, p. 83).
In a late attempt to characterise his own pragmatism, and its relations to those
of James and Schiller, Peirce derives his account of signs by abstracting away from
features of everyday communication.54 In everyday communication there is an ut-
terer and an interpreter for any given sign. Peirce then develops a conception of
the object of a sign by finding the ‘ingredient’ of the utterer needed for something
to function as a sign.55 One feature of the utterer which Peirce thinks must be
maintained in the conception of the object is the idea that the utterer is some-
thing distinct from the sign and is needed for the sign to function. Knowledge of
the utterer (or the object), cannot, for Peirce, be derived entirely from a study of
the sign, it must come from some external or ‘collateral’ source. Peirce offers an
example:
Toward the end of a sultry afternoon, three young gentlemen are still lounging to-
gether; one in a long chair, one supine upon a lounge, the third standing by the open
casement that looks down seven stories upon the Piazza di Spagna from its Pincian
side, and seems to be half glancing at the newspaper that has just been brought to
him. His is one of those natures that habitually hold themselves within the limits of
extreme calm, because they too well know the terrible expense of allowing themselves
to be stirred. In a few moments, he breaks the silence with the words, ‘Verily, it is a
terrible fire.’ What does hemean? The other twain are too lazy to ask. The longchaired
one thinks the utterer was looking at the newspaper when he made his exclamation,
and concludes that there has been a conflagration in Tehran, in Sydney, or in some
such place, appalling enough to be flashed round the globe. But the couched man
thinks the utterer was looking out of the window, and that there must be a fire down
in the Corso, or in that direction. Here is another case where the whole burden of the
sign must be ascertained, not by closer examination of the utterance, but by collateral
observation of the utterer. (EP2:405–6, 1907)
Collateral information or observation is that which is external to the sign, and
which is required for us to determine the object of the sign. What the man at
the open window meant by ‘it is a terrible fire’ must be ascertained by attaining
further information about the utterer. If the other two men in the room were less
54This approach to Peirce’s semiotics is favoured by Bergman 2009 and Colapietro 2007.
55Peirce does not think that all signs have utterers. Consider, for instance, medical symptoms
as signs of an underlying disease (EP:404, 1907).
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lazy they might look up to see whether the utterer sets aside his newspaper and
continues staring out the window, or they might simply ask him what he meant.
It is similar in the case of the object of a sign in general. We need some experience
which enables the sign to refer.56
The second detail we need to introduce concerns abstraction. For Peirce, both
the iconic and indexical features of dicisigns are abstractions. Peirce distinguishes
between two varieties of abstraction, both of which play a role in his account of
propositions (and facts):
Abstraction names two wholly different operations. One of them consists in supposing
some feature of the fact to be absent, or at least leaving it out of account. I call that
prescissive abstraction. The other changes ‘This man is shy’ to ‘This man is affected
with shyness’. [. . . ] In non-prosaic language it changes a predicate into a subject (ex-
tending the term subject beyond the subject nominative to the subject accusative and
subject dative,—in short, to what are called the direct and indirect objects of the verb).
‘The rose smells very sweetly’ is by hypostatic abstraction converted into ‘The rose pos-
sesses a delightful perfume.’ So ‘Cain killed Abel’ is changed to ‘Cain caused the death
of Abel.’ Perfume and death are hypostatical abstractions. (R96:9–10, c. 1904–1905;
cited in Bergman and Paavola 2017)
In what remains of this section I will consider the role of prescissive abstraction
in Peirce’s account of the proposition. Hypostatic abstraction will be considered
later.
The dicisign involves prescission in so far as it requires us to attend to a partic-
ular thing to the exclusion of everything else. We are to pick out, via an indexical
relation, the object of the dicisign. The dicisign also requires us to attend to partic-
ular features of the thing picked out by means of the icon. This feature of dicisigns
is brought out most clearly in Peirce’s account of the role of prescission in percep-
tion. The perceptual process involves the conversion of a ‘percept’ into a ‘perceptual
judgement’:57
I maintain that logical criticism cannot go behind perceptual facts, which are the
first judgments which we make concerning percepts. A perceptual fact is therefore an
abstract affair. Each such fact covers only certain features of the percept. I look at an
object and think that it seems white. That is my judgment of the object perceived, my
judgment concerning the percept, but not the percept itself; and it is idle to attempt to
criticize, by any logic, that part of the performance of the intellect which draws that
judgment from the percept, for the excellent reason that it is involuntary and cannot
be prevented or corrected. Such a fact, which represents the percept in a very meagre
way, although it is, in itself, a relatively isolated fact,—as isolated as any fact can
be,—nevertheless does not, in itself, call for any explanation. (EP2:92, 1901)
56Stjernfelt offers the further specification that collateral information determines the universe
of discourse (Stjernfelt 2014, pp. 81–82).
57For a more detailed account of Peirce’s theory of perception see Legg 2014b.
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Our perceptual judgements always leave something in the percept unstated. They
do not take up everything available. That is, in a perceptual judgement we must
focus attention on some aspect of the percept at the expense of others. This is a
clear case of a pattern that applies to dicisignsmore generally. To pick out a subject
we must exclude everything else, and to characterise that subject we must leave
some of its features unstated. Both are cases of prescissive abstraction.
We are thus left with an account of propositions according to which they de-
pend on shared experience of their speakers and hearers in order to establish an
indexical link with their objects. We have also seen that this connection with ex-
periencemeans that all propositions that wemight use are the result of prescissive
abstraction. Moreover, as part of the ‘doctrine of the double object’, this abstractive
relationship with experience is iconically depicted by the colocation of the iconic
and indexical parts of the proposition. This is enough background to turn again
to Peirce’s conception of the truth and falsity of proposition and to the distinction
between ‘exact’ or ‘absolute’ truth on the one hand, and the contextualist notion
on the other.
5 The Truth and the Absolute Truth
5.1 Truth and the Dicisign
Atkins has recently drawn out some of the consequences of the semeiotic concep-
tion of the proposition for our understanding of Peirce’s account of truth. Atkins
holds that, according to Peirce, propositions and facts are isomorphic (Atkins 2016,
p. 1182). Peirce expresses something like this idea in the following passages:
A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a
proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one individual, or completely de-
terminate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively
abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition,
and the term ‘simple,’ here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative
expression. (EP2:378, 1906)
and
Whatwe call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to
be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express ‘fact,’
and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining
an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at
least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP2:304, 1904)
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The notion of the ‘absolute’ or ‘exact’ truth can be made out by focusing on the
notion of ‘the all of reality’ or the ‘absolute Truth’. However, we can first follow
Atkins in his account of the isomorphism between propositions and (prescissively)
abstract facts.
On Atkins’ story, we are to think of facts as including an iconic part and an
indexical part. The iconic part is understood in terms of a notion of structure,
and the indexical by a notion of causation. Atkins introduces the relevant idea of
structure by means of Peirce’s anti-nominalism:
Peirce endorses scholastic realism. He believes that there are real, general features of
the universe. Noun terms like gravity, red, and horse and relative terms like resembles,
causes, and represents to are not mere vocables or creations of reason. They are that,
to be sure, but they also track real, general features of the universe.
[. . . ] This, then, is one point of structural isomorphism between propositions and
facts: the rhemes of true propositions are isomorphic with real features of the uni-
verse.58 (Atkins 2016, pp. 1183–1184)
In a true proposition, then, the iconic part of the dicisign will be isomorphic with
some real, general, feature of reality. In false propositions, they will not. Atkins
offers the example of propositions using predicates involving the concept phlogis-
ton. For example, we might attempt to explain why my bike chain has become
rusty by saying that ‘the chain has lost some of its phlogiston’. However, the be-
haviour of this predicate will not match the behaviour of what is going on in the
chain.59 That is, there is no isomorphism between the proposition and the real
phenomenon. This is, of course, because the proposition is false.
To make sense of the isomorphism between the indexical part of a proposi-
tion and a fact, Atkins turns to the relationship between indexicality and causa-
tion. Atkins notes that ‘on Peirce’s view facts themselves are causally efficacious’
(Atkins 2016, p. 1184). But rather than focusing on efficient causation, Atkins ar-
gues that ‘Facts are causes of and are caused by other facts, in an Aristotelian
sense of “cause” as an explanatory principle’ (Atkins 2016, p. 1185). Atkins con-
tinues, ‘facts are causally efficacious in that they cause other facts, including the
fact that our attention is drawn to some feature of the universe’ (Atkins 2016,
p. 1185).60
58‘Rheme’ is another of Peirce’s terms for the icon-part of the proposition (e.g. EP2:285, 1903).
59This will, presumably, be made manifest when we draw out experiential consequences from
the use of the concept.
60As a result of this analysis of facts and true propositions Atkins offers a distinct response to the
problem of buried facts that we considered above. According to Atkins we should understand there
to be a reality but no ‘fact’ whether Russell lit an even or uneven number of pipes in his lifetime.
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This way of stating things leads us too far in to metaphysics.61 We will see in
the next chapter that this account of facts can be introduced in order to explain the
truth of various propositions, rather than being used as a mark of the truth of pro-
positions. As a result, I think it’s best to try to make out the necessary points here
without introducing a heavy-duty scholastic realism. Nor do we need to introduce
Aristotelian final causes (at this stage at least).
We need, then, to state this account of the truth of propositions using only the
materials available to logic in the hierarchy of the sciences. We are not, in this
task, to appeal to metaphysics or the natural and social sciences for principles. We
can appeal, instead, to mathematics, phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics. Two
strategies suggest themselves here. One would be to work through the ‘pre-logical’
sciences developing the various resources that Peirce himself uses here. One of
the primary things we would have to do here is develop Peirce’s three categories:
firstness, secondness, and thirdness, from scratch.62 To do this properly would re-
quire a lot more detail than I am able to provide. The alternative is to attempt to
align the semeiotic account of the proposition with the account of Peirce on truth
that we took earlier from Misak and Hookway.
Recall that Misak and Hookway’s account of Peirce on truth holds that a true
proposition is the one which, if believed, would be indefeasible. To believe a propos-
ition is, Peirce thinks, to have ‘a controlled and contented habit of acting in ways
that will be productive of desired results only if the proposition is true’ (EP2:312,
1903). The semeiotic account of the proposition adds an account of how the propos-
ition is something which can be acted upon. The proposition has one part which
either is an index or provides the information required to come to be in an index-
ical relationship with relevant objects. It also characterises that object in ways
that enable us to take on expectations regarding either what will happen if we
Atkins also notes the late Peircean distinction between ‘occurrences’ and ‘facts’. An ‘occurrence’ is
a ‘slice’ of reality in complete detail, while a ‘fact’ is something abstracted from the occurrence for
some descriptive or explanatory purpose (Atkins 2016, pp. 1183–1185). No collection of such ‘facts’
could entirely capture an ‘occurrence’.
61Peirce notes his own tendency to express logical views that need not be expressed metaphys-
ically in metaphysical terms:
The logician is not concerned with metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it
is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves
to an acceptance of it that we do when we use substantives such as “humanity,” “variety,” etc., to speak of
them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense.” (EP2:304, 1904)
62The core Peircean texts for this project would be his 1903 Pragmatism Lectures. In this series
Peirce develops the categories phenomenologically, then shows how they play out in esthetics and
ethics, logic, and metaphysics (EP2:133–241, 1903).
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act in a certain way or what we will observe if we get ourselves into the right
circumstances. The true proposition is, we have seen, one which does not lead to
disappointment.
We have also gained an appreciation for the role of abstraction in our use of pro-
positions. Our indexical relations with the world require us to select some particu-
lar object rather than others.We attend to one thing, rather than others. Moreover,
as Atkins says, there will typically be some causal connection involved. If I attempt
to test, for instance, whether ‘there is still tea in the pot’ is true, I put myself into
a position where I can be in the right kind of relation with the tea (say, by taking
the lid off the pot). The answer will then force itself on me. This relies on putting
myself into a relation with a specific part of my experience. It also requires me
to have an understanding of a general concept like ‘tea’, which tells me what to
expect when I take off the lid of the teapot. Insofar as action on the basis of pro-
positions is successful, we can say that the index is connecting us with something
other than ourselves, and that the general concepts we are deploying are successful
abstractions from experience.
This mix of Misak, Hookway, and Atkins is a merely contextualist understand-
ing of Peirce on truth. The means of testing a given abstract proposition will be
dependent on the purposes for which we are attending to one thing rather than
another. The relevant standards can then vary according to context in the way that
we saw Misak and Hookway set out above. However, we already have most of the
resources needed to add the ‘absolute’ conception on top of the contextualist story.
As suggested above, there is room for a ‘two truths’ interpretation of Peirce
something like the one defended by Almeder. Almeder defends a conception of
Peirce on truth according to which:
Peirce defined truth (with a capital T) in terms of correspondence and reckoned such
correspondence the property of the final opinion destined to be agreed upon by the
community of scientific inquirers; and he defined knowledge in terms of this final ir-
reversible opinion. This, I think, will be generally granted. But I submit that there is
a good reason to think that Peirce was also committed to the view that truth is a prop-
erty of propositions warrantedly assertible under the canons of acceptance relative to
one’s current conceptual framework and that knowledge is to be understood in terms
of propositions that are so warrantedly assertible. After all, he frequently urged that
we must consider as true those propositions which are inductively established by the
method of science even though the truth value assigned to the propositions may be
subsequently revised in the light of future evidence. (Almeder 1980, p. 55)
The absolute truth, on Almeder’s view, is truth according to the ‘final’ theory. On
Almeder’s view, only this final theory ‘corresponds’ with reality. The ‘everyday’
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truth, or truth relative to context, is what is warrantedly assertible according to
our current conceptual framework.63
My own proposal does not depend on the notion of correspondence to charac-
terise the final opinion.64 I will work up to a conception of the absolute truth by
following two periods in Peirce’s references to the Absolute.65 Peirce in some places
refers to the ‘Absolute’ as the ‘limit of experience’, and in other places as the ‘final
interpretant’ towards which all sign use tends. I will take each of these themes
in turn. The conception of the Absolute as a ‘limit of experience’ seems to allow
for many propositions to be ‘absolutely true’. Consideration of the absolute truth
as ‘final interpretant’ shows that, ultimately, Peirce thinks only one proposition
can be absolutely true. Both themes reveal some way in which the propositions we
take to be true always leave something more to be said.
5.2 Absolute Truth as the Limit of Experience
5.2.1 The Limit of Experience
We saw above that in so far as a proposition functions as a sign which conveys
information, it must be interpreted as claiming a real connection with its object.
We’ve also seen that this connection depends on collateral experience. In this sec-
tion, I turn to Peirce’s arguments that experience cannot support claims to abso-
lute exactitude. This renders any ordinary proposition we might utter inexact to
some degree. However, in so far as we can make sense of a ‘limit of experience’, we
can begin to make sense of the notion of absolute truth.
That Peirce has something like this in mind can be backed up by another pas-
sage from a few years before the Baldwin’s Dictionary entry:
63Wilfrid Sellars derives something like this conception of absolute truth from Peirce. There
is a notion of assertibility for a given conceptual framework or language, and on top of that an
idealised language called Peirceish which provides adequate ‘pictures’ of the world (c.f. Sellars
1968, pp. 116–123).
64Cooke challenges Almeder’s proposal that correspondence only obtains between the world and
the ‘final opinion’ on the grounds that he misrepresents what ‘p is true’ means for an everyday
proposition. In particular, he fails to see that, as the Baldwin’s Dictionary article makes clear,
such propositions cannot be claims of ‘absolute truth’ (Cooke 2006, p. 103).
65Excluding Peirce’s occasional remarks that his version of pragmatism, unlike some others,
does not deny the reality of the Absolute. In one place he even says that ‘[t]he chief [doctrine asso-
ciated with pragmatism that Peirce does not follow] is the entire denial of the Absolute’ (R284:2,
c. 1905–1906). This suggests that Peirce may have been happy with Royce’s coinage of ‘absolute
pragmatism’ to refer to the views that they both held, in contrast with the pragmatisms of James
and Dewey (c.f. Anderson 2005).
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I carry [synechism] so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole domain
of experience in every element of it. Accordingly, every proposition, except so far as it
relates to an unattainable limit of experience (which I call the Absolute), is to be taken
with an indefinite qualification; for a proposition which has no relation whatever to
experience is devoid of all meaning. (EP2:1, 1893)
Here Peirce does not directly deny the possibility of uttering a true proposition
about ‘the Absolute’. However, he does introduce the idea that, at least most pro-
positions, are ‘taken with’ an indefinite (and unexpressed) qualification. However,
even if we might say something about the Absolute, we acknowledge that it is un-
attainable. That is, if the Absolute is the position one would occupy at the ‘limit of
experience’, then the claim seems to be that we can speak about such a position,
but never from it.66 Peirce goes on to offer some examples of ‘inexact’ truths:
Thoroughgoing synechism will not permit us to say that the sum of the angles of a
triangle exactly equals two right angles, but only that it equals that quantity plus or
minus some quantity which is excessively small for all the triangles we can measure.
We must not accept the proposition that space has three dimensions as strictly accur-
ate; but can only say that any movements of bodies out of the three dimensions are at
most exceedingly minute. We must not say that phenomena are perfectly regular, but
only that the degree of their regularity is very high indeed. (EP2:2, 1893)
Peirce does not use the term ‘true’ in this passage. However, it is not a stretch to
interpret ‘accepting’ a proposition as ‘accepting that the proposition is true’.67 The
three propositions Peirce is considering here are that ‘the sum of the angles of a
triangle equal two right angles’, ‘space has three dimensions’, and ‘phenomena are
regular’.68 It would be easy to read this passage as suggesting that we should not
66Note also the appeal to the pragmatic maxim. This comes when Peirce says that a proposition
that ‘has no relation whatever to experience is devoid of all meaning’.
67We would need to look elsewhere in Peirce for accounts of the various ways one might ‘accept’
a proposition as true. For instance, in some cases, Peirce wants to reserve the word ‘belief’ for a
particularly practically engaged form of ‘holding for true’, in other cases he uses the term ‘belief’
to refer to any kind of ‘holding for true’ (e.g. EP2:56, 1898). One might also look to Peirce’s related
distinction between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ belief (CP5.538, 1902).
68The first example may be puzzling: doesn’t the claim in question follow from the definition of a
triangle and some simple mathematical reasoning? It is best to interpret Peirce as referring to tri-
angles in real space here, rather than to triangles which are by hypothesis embedded in a Euclidean
space. The geometrical nature of real space was one of Peirce’s major concerns in the 1890s. So,
for instance, Peirce characterises geometry as sitting somewhere between philosophy and physics:
‘It is apparent now that geometry, while in its main outlines, it must ever remain within the bor-
ders of philosophy, since it depends and must depend upon the scrutinizing of everyday experience,
yet at certain special points it stretches over into the domain of physics’ (CP1.249, 1902). This is
to place geometry outside of mathematics, which, Peirce thinks, does not depend on scrutinising
everyday experience (e.g. EP2:259, 1903). In fact, it was a very prescient move for Peirce to take
real space to depart from Euclidian geometry (Dipert 2008; Murphey 1993, pp. 219–227).
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make claims like ‘space has three dimensions’ without adding an explicit qualifica-
tion ‘space has (pretty much) three dimensions’, or something of that sort. But this
would be a mistake. If these propositions are such that they can be ‘taken with an
indefinite qualification’ implicitly, then we can make sense of these propositions
as being straightforwardly true, while the corresponding propositions that contain
an explicit claim to exactitude will come out as false. For instance, the proposition
‘space has strictly three dimensions’.
The ‘indefinite qualification’ we are looking for can be found in the dependence
of any proposition on collateral experience.We have seen that the propositionmust
be interpreted as making a truth claim, and that this claim exhibits a connection
to experience. Consequently, we need to turn to Peirce’s account of experience and
of what it can and cannot justify. The basic idea here is that any proposition made
on the basis of experience will be able to be made, for instance, more precise.
5.2.2 What Experience Cannot Justify
Peirce tends to group together a few limitations on experience. He holds, for in-
stance, that ‘experience can never result in absolute certainty, exactitude, neces-
sity, or universality’ (CP1.55, 1896).69 Peirce usually adds the qualification that
this does not apply to propositions about the Absolute (as above) or ‘the A and the
Ω’ (CP6.607, 1893). It is worth distinguishing the properties that Peirce denies of
propositions that are based in experience. While we are interested primarily in
‘exactitude’ for the purpose of interpreting the Baldwin’s Dictionary entry, sim-
ilar arguments will apply to the claim to certainty, necessity, and universality.
This broadening of view will also enable us to transition from the idea of the ‘ex-
act truth’ to the ‘absolute truth’ more broadly construed. The distinction between
exactitude, certainty, necessity, and universality can be understood by looking at
a subject which doesn’t rely on experience in the same way philosophy or the sci-
ences do, namely, mathematics:
Among the minor, yet striking characteristics of mathematics, may be mentioned the
fleshless and skeletal build of its propositions; the peculiar difficulty, complication,
and stress of its reasonings; the perfect exactitude of its results; their broad universal-
ity; their practical infallibility. It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme.
Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain. It is equally easy to be
certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague. It is not so difficult to be pretty precise
69Other examples can be found in Peirce’s writings (e.g. CP1.141, 1897; CP4.237, 1902; EP2:236,
1903).
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and fairly certain at once about a very narrow subject. But to reunite, like mathem-
atics, perfect exactitude and practical infallibility with unrestricted universality, is
remarkable. But it is not hard to see that all these characters of mathematics are
inevitable consequences of its being the study of hypothetical truth. (CP4.237, 1902)
Here ‘exactitude’ is aligned with precision and set against vagueness, ‘certainty’
is aligned with ‘practical infallibility’, and ‘universality’ is set against having ‘a
very narrow subject’. For a proposition to be ‘exact’ is for it not to be vague. Since
vagueness is a matter of degree, we should expect exactness also to be a matter
of degree.70 For Peirce, vagueness is a feature of signs which ‘underdetermine’
their objects—that is, signs which fail to determine whether some property does
or does not apply to their object (EP2:350, 1905). If the further determination of
the sign is not granted to the interpreter, then the sign is vague (EP2:351, 1905).
For instance, if I say ‘a prominent source in the military claims that there are
plans for a coup’, I hold back the right to determine who the ‘prominent source’
is. If, instead, I say that ‘every academic wants more funding for their discipline’,
I leave to the interpreter the possibility of further determining the sign. For in-
stance, by picking out some academic and applying the predicate to them. In so
far as further determination is left to the interpreter the sign is general (EP2:350,
1905).71 The resulting account of the vagueness of signs is then the combination
of indeterminacy along with the denial of the right of further determination to the
interpreter.
Less needs to be said to characterise ‘certainty’ and ‘universality’. The latter
pertains to the range of objects to which some proposition applies. A proposition of
simple arithmetic like ‘2+2=4’ applies to anything with the structure of the natural
numbers. That is, mathematical propositions are particularly universal because
they automatically apply to anything to which the iconic part of the proposition
applies. For Peirce, all we are talking about in mathematics is the ‘hypothetical
state of things’ represented in mathematical diagrams. If we restrict the indexical
part of a proposition we end up with low universality. For instance, the claim ‘to-
morrow it will be cloudy in Sheffield’ has a much more narrow application than
‘2+2=4’. ‘Certainty’, is simply the absolute reliability of some proposition with re-
70This agrees with Peirce’s use of ‘exactitude’ in some places. For instance, Peirce thinks there is
an appropriate ‘standard of certitude and exactitude’ for our various inquiries (CP1.85, 1896). The
impossibility of a high degree of certainty in our results within some subject gives us ‘no reason
for sulkily dismissing the subject’ (CP1.86, 1896). Peirce would presumably say the same about
subjects for which a high degree of precision is impossible as well.
71An account of the ‘game theoretic’ aspects of this account of generality and vagueness can be
found in Pietarinen 2006b.
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spect to future experience. No future experience will be able to shake the pro-
position. Peirce invokes the notion of ‘practical infallibility’ in the quotation given
above, by which he means something like ‘taken as certain for the control of fu-
ture action’. Peirce takes, for instance, the dictates of conscience to be ‘practically
infallible’ (e.g. CP1.248, 1902). The idea that experience cannot justify claims to
certainty being made here is the same as the one that Misak derives from Peirce;
we cannot know that a belief we have is indefeasible because we haven’t had all of
the experience yet!
Given these clarifications, there are two interpretations of the phrase ‘exact
truth’ available. According to the first, an ‘exactly true’ proposition would be one
that is both absolutely exact and absolutely certain. According to this view the
proposition ‘the slime mould is green’ would not be ‘exactly true’ even if the slime
mould is indeed green. One might replace it with the more exact proposition ‘the
slime mould reflects light with a wavelength between 500 and 520nm’, but even
this would not be ‘exactly true’. We still do not know, for instance, exactly what
wavelength the light it reflects is, or how it varies over time. That ‘exact truth’
is unattainable in this sense would follow from the denial of the possibility of ex-
actitude being derived from experience. The second interpretationwould be to take
the ‘exact truth’ to mean that the proposition has, determinately, the property of
being true. Taking true to be a vague predicate, this is not an acceptable inter-
pretation, since we need to be able to say that propositions are ‘true’ without being
‘exactly true’. However, we could take ‘exactly true’ in this sense to be equivalent
to absolute certainty.
We have already seen that Peirce denies the capacity of experience to establish
either absolute exactitude or absolute certainty. Consequently, I think it is best to
avoid picking either of the above interpretations of ‘exact truth’ at the expense of
the other. Rather, we can take ‘exact truth’ to be the conjunction of certainty and
exactitude, and showwhy Peirce thinks neither can be established by experience.72
72This is borne out by the following passage from Peirce:
In the second place, there are those who hold that a theory which has sustained a number of experimental
tests may be expected to sustain a number of other similar tests, and to have a general approximate truth,
the justification of this being that this kind of inference must prove correct in the long run, as I explained in
a previous lecture. But these logicians refuse to admit that we can ever have a right to conclude definitely
that a hypothesis is exactly true, that is that it should be able to sustain experimental tests in endless
series; for, they urge, no hypothesis can be subjected to an endless series of tests. They are willing we
should say that a theory is true, because, all our ideas being more or less vague and approximate, what we
mean by saying that a theory is true can only be that it is very near true. But they will not allow us to say
that anything put forth as an anticipation of experience should assert exactitude, because exactitude in
experience would imply experiences in endless series, which is impossible. (EP2:236, 1903, emphasis mine)
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Peirce takes an experience to be ‘a brutally produced conscious effect that con-
tributes to a habit, self-controlled, yet so satisfying, on deliberation, as to be de-
structible by no positive exercise of internal vigour’ (EP2:437, 1908). Restricting
ourselves to cognitive habits (beliefs), this is just to say that an experience is some-
thing which compels you to think one way rather than another. Experience in gen-
eral ‘means nothing but just that of a cognitive nature which the history of our
lives has forced upon us’ (CP5.539, 1902). In the language of Peirce’s categories,
experience is primarily a matter of ‘secondness’, that is, our being compelled to
think one way rather than another, and secondarily a matter of ‘thirdness’, since
it is the compulsion to think one way rather than another. To say that some belief
is certain, then, is to say that it will stand up to the course of experience come
what may; there is no ‘brutally produced conscious effect’ which could in the long
run destroy the belief in question.
The claim that the indexical reference of propositions depends on collateral
experience should be understood to mean that it depends on the utterer and the
interpreter sharing experience in the above sense. Both have been brought, inde-
pendently of the particular sign the one is uttering and the other interpreting, by
the course of experience to already have some beliefs about the object of the sign.
Or, if not, the sign gives the interpreter enough by way of instructions to gain such
experience. In Peirce’s words:
A proposition, then, has one predicate and any number of subjects. The subjects are
either names of objects well known to the utterer and to the interpreter of the propos-
ition (otherwise he could not interpret it) or they are virtually almost directions how
to proceed to gain acquaintance with what is referred to. (CP5.542, 1902)
Experience cannot guarantee exactitude because the constraint it represents
on our cognition is never enough to completely determine our beliefs about a given
object. Peirce’s argument can be most clearly made out if we start with his account
of measurement and then generalise. One of Peirce’s major scientific contributions
was to the theory of errors in measurement.73 A conclusion he drew from his work
on experimental error is that no measurement is entirely definite; we are always
Here, the application of ‘exact truth’ to a theory is taken to be the non-vague application of the term
‘truth’, which comes to what I have characterised as ‘certainty’ above. Consequently, we should get
everything we need here by merely considering why Peirce thinks experience cannot establish
either exactitude or certainty.
73One of his major preoccupations was determining and correcting the errors that occurred in
pendulum measurements of gravity as a result of the pendulum apparatus flexing (e.g. W4:515–
528, 1881).
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left with some degree of error, which we may or may not be able to quantify.74 If,
for instance, I attempt to measure the length of time it takes for me to walk to
the university using the timer on my watch, then my accuracy is limited to hun-
dredths of a second. Supposing that I’ve measure my walk as taking 28 minutes,
32 seconds, and 83 hundredths of a second, my measurement leaves the number of
thousandths of seconds my walk took indeterminate. While I could solve this prob-
lem by buying a more accurate stop watch, I would be left with a similar problem if
I were to seek further accuracy. This is not the only source of inexactitude here, for
the measurement doesn’t take into account my reaction time when starting and
stopping the watch, nor does it take into account errors which might arise from
defects in my watch. The vagueness of particular measurements, like my timing of
my daily walk to the university, is embedded in the vagueness of experience in gen-
eral. For instance, the measurement assumes that there is a clear criterion for my
having arrived at the university or left my flat. Do I timemyself from the front door
of the apartment, or from the door of the whole building? Similarly, have I arrived
at university when I get onto the campus, into the building, or when I sit down
at my desk? If even the application of our most definite concepts in the context of
measurement is essentially vague, then it is right to say that any concept we ap-
ply in experience, or that is forced on us by experience, will be similarly vague.75
For Peirce, ‘absolute exactitude cannot be revealed by experience, and therefore
every boundary of a figure which is to represent a possible experience ought to be
blurred’ (CP4.118, 1893).
Experience cannot guarantee certainty because the claim to certainty is a claim
about all experience in an, at least potentially, never-ending series of experiences.
We have no guarantee that an experience will not occur which requires us to
upend our beliefs quite radically. The reader familiar with Peirce’s rejection of
both Cartesian radical doubt and Humean inductive scepticism may worry that I
am misrepresenting Peirce here. In the former case, the only doubt that Peirce al-
74Peirce’s claims of this sort are often made in the context of his evolutionary cosmology. For
instance:
Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain
they will be to show irregular departures from the law. We are accustomed to ascribe there, and I do not
say wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such errors in any antecedently
probably way. Trace their causes back far enough, and you will be forced to admit they are always due to
arbitrary determination, or chance. (W8:116–117/EP1:304–305, 1892)
75Recall Hookway’s attempts to count the leaves on his tree earlier in this chapter (§2.2).
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lows is doubt triggered by some particular experience or set of experiences. There
is no justification here for an attempt at complete scepticism.
However, Peirce is not so wedded to common sense that he would not counten-
ance the theoretical possibility of a need for major reform of our beliefs arising.76
Similarly, this is not Humean inductive scepticism because it never leads to an en-
dorsement of the claim that there is no reason to expect that the future resembles
the past in some respect. At most, it allows for the rejection of the claim that the
‘active general principles’ which we take to govern reality are different from the
way we thought them to be before. That there is no a priori guarantee that, say,
the law of gravity will continue to hold as it has in the past is no reason to think
that it won’t continue to hold.
5.2.3 The Indefinite Qualification
Any ‘ordinary proposition’ thus presents itself with a qualification: it presents an
indexical connection with experience that prevents it from being entirely exact or
entirely certain.77 It is an ‘indefinite’ qualification because we cannot even provide
definite limits on the error involved. In the context of certain measurements we
can get a fairly definite idea of the limits on our accuracy, but this is not true of
experience in general, nor is it true of our understanding of our failure to fully live
up to truth as an ideal of inquiry. Peirce makes this distinction while reflecting,
after William James’s death, on James’s ‘love of truth’:
After studying William James on the intellectual side for half a century—for I was
not acquainted with him as a boy—I must testify that I believe him to be, and always
to have been during my acquaintance with him, about as perfect a lover of truth as
it is possible for a man to be; and I do not believe there is any definite limit to man’s
capacity for loving the truth. If you ask me what that ugly word ‘about’ signifies in
my statement of James’s love of truth, as I believe that love to have been, I reply that
I conceive the imperfection of man’s devotion to anything—at any rate to any such
perfect ideal as Truth—to be very different from his incapacity to attain exactitude
in reproducing a metre or a kilo, inasmuch as in these latter cases, what he is liable
to do is to make his copy either too large or too small, with an equal liability—after
making a constant allowance, one way or the other, for his tendency to make it a bit
different from ‘nature’ (as the artists call the real thing they aim to imitate, at least
to a certain difference, près)—I repeat, after [we have made] such allowances [for] an
equal liability, to err in excess and in defect, in such a case we are just as likely, and
76In a related context, Peirce says that ‘it is of the essence of conservatism to refuse to push any
practical principle to its extreme limits—including the principle of conservatism itself. We do not
say that sentiment is never to be influenced by reason, nor that under no circumstances would we
advocate radical reforms’ (EP2:32, 1898).
77Recall the ‘doctrine of the double object’.
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indeed a little likelier, to hit the truth as near as our last place of decimals goes, as we
are to make a small error one way or the other. Indeed we are infinitesimally likelier
to do so. But when it comes to efforts to attain an ideal that it would be an absurdity
to talk of surpassing and an impossibility actually to reach, we ought to measure our
shortcomings by the logarithms of [our] mechanical, blockhead, measures of those
shortcomings. Exactly of what nature these ‘blockhead measures’ would be, it would
be a study to ascertain; but all measurement of the errors that are only known through
those erroneous measurements are pretty rough; and a slight error in the mode of
measuring is very unlikely to be of serious consequence. (CP6.183, 1911)78
Here the kind of approximate certainty and exactitude that attaches to our at-
tempts to measure the value of some quantity is distinguished from our attempts
to live up to truth as an ideal for inquiry. While we can easily deal mathematic-
ally with our tendency to make errors in the case of ‘reproducing a metre or kilo’,
we cannot so easily deal with the approximations we make to the ideal of ‘truth’.
Rather than the fairly definite qualifications available in the case of measurement,
we can only provide an indefinite qualification of the extent to which our propos-
itions are ‘exactly true’. We have only ‘mechanical, blockhead’ measures of such
failings. Peirce does not give any account of these ‘blockhead measures’ in this
passage (or anywhere else that I am aware of), but whatever they are, we can take
them to be quite crude. For instance, we might have some conception of the num-
ber of unsolved problems, or questions left to be studied in some particular field or
hopes for the unification of the available theories. In the case of, say, plant biology
we might have some vague but quantifiable sense of the number of species that
remain unstudied. The kind of measure we might use if we zoom even further out
to natural science in general, or to philosophy, are less clear. Whatever the meas-
ures are, we are to ‘[take] the logarithms’ of them.79 But it seems clear that the
measure of our failure to live up to the ideals of certainty and exactitude are not
definite measures. We cannot give exact bounds on our error in general, nor do the
everyday propositions we utter provide them.
We are now in a position to see that the everyday use of the term ‘true’ is per-
fectly applicable to propositions that are not ‘exactly true’. In so far as a proposition
presents itself with an ‘indefinite qualification’, which it does in so far as it presents
itself as depending on collateral experience, then this lack of both exactitude and
certainty is no bar to its being true. For instance, the proposition ‘all human beings
are mortal’ can be thought of as true without our being in a position to declare it
78The material in square brackets is due to the editors of Collected Papers.
79In the context ofmeasurement, taking the logarithm allows us to compress wide rangingmeas-
ures to a smaller range. This may be what Peirce has in mind.
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either absolutely exact or absolutely certain. On the one hand, the concept of ‘hu-
man being’ does not entirely determinately specify what objects we might pick out
to test the claim. The proposition doesn’t pretend to specify every possible strange
case that might occur. For instance, according to some the prophet Elijah did not
die, ‘ascended in a whirlwind into heaven’ with ‘a chariot of fire and horses of fire’
(2 Kings 2:11, NRSV). On Peirce’s view, this would not falsify the claim that all
human beings are mortal. The claim that all humans are mortal is vague, and in
so far as it is vague, we can be more confident of its truth.80 A truth grounded in
experience cannot be ‘exact’, consequently if it presents itself as exact, it is false.
Note also that while experience can not guarantee certainty, that does not prevent
us from committing ourselves to the truth of a proposition a laHookway’s account.
That is, we can take on a commitment to the continued success of a belief even if
we are not certain that it will hold.
5.2.4 Propositions about the Absolute
Somuch for everyday truth, or the kind of truth attained on the basis of experience.
We now turn to the notion of the absolute as a ‘limit of experience’ and the idea
that the strictures that apply to everyday truth do not apply to propositions ‘about
the Absolute’. Peirce provides at least one explicit example of such a proposition.
This proposition avoids the ‘indefinite qualification’ which must be attached to any
proposition about the ‘object[s] of ordinary knowledge’. In the context of an account
of his evolutionary cosmology, Peirce presents one part of his cosmological project
as follows: ‘. . . I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as consequences
of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, namely, the gen-
eral absence of any determinate law’ (CP6.606, 1893). To this, Peirce attaches the
footnote: ‘Somebody may notice that I here admit a proposition as absolutely true.
Undoubtedly; because it relates to the Absolute’ (CP6.606fn2, 1893). In the same
text, he characterises the Absolute as ‘the A and the Ω’ (CP6.607, 1893). It would
seem that the claim being made here is one about the A: there was a general ab-
sence of determinate law in the beginning of things. The correct question to ask
about this proposition is whether it would be ‘exactly’ or ‘absolutely’ true, were it
80Recall the quote from above: ‘It is [. . . ] easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague’
(CP2.437, 1902).
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true. However, it is not immediately obvious this claim can be exact, certain, or
exactly true.81
A better approach to determining Peirce’s intent here comes by considering his
alignment of the notion of the Absolute in metrical geometry and the notion of the
absolute in philosophy. This also returns us to Peirce’s account of measurement.
Peirce’s use of the term ‘absolute’ in geometry follows Cayley, who developed a way
of introducing a measure on a space using a given conic section, this conic section
was called ‘the absolute’ for that space.82 Cayley’s absolute provides a way of de-
fining a notion of distance on a projective space. One feature of projective spaces is
that parallel lines share a point at infinity (imagine standing on railway tracks on
a flat surface and looking to the horizon: the two tracks seem to merge at a point
on the horizon). A projective space does not, by itself, have a notion of distance
between two points. While there is no privileged measure of the distance between
two points in a projective space, we can determine for any two points, whether they
are on the same line. Picking an ‘absolute’, that is, a privileged line in the space,
allows one to define a metric on the space. In a two dimensional projective space
there are three kinds of ‘absolute’ possible: an ellipse, a parabola, or a hyperbola.
These are distinguished by two points which do not move if the absolute is moved.
If the two points are real and coincide, then the space is elliptical; if the two points
are real and distinct, then the space is parabolic; if the two points are imaginary
and distinct, then the space is hyperbolic (CP6.27, 1898; CP6.582, 1905).
Peirce applies these geometrical ideas to the philosophical ‘absolute’ quite dir-
ectly. On the ‘elliptic’ model the ‘start’ and ‘end’ states are not ideal or ‘imagin-
ary’, rather, the ‘[m]ovement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no
point, has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position’ (CP6.582,
1905). A monistic materialism would answer to this description. The parabolic
philosophy starts with a privileged ideal state and returns back to it. Hyperbolic
philosophy, which Peirce favours, has a distinct ideal beginning and end: ‘[r]eason
marches from premisses to conclusion; nature has ideal end different from its
origin’ (CP6.582, 1905).83 One of the claims that Peirce endorses as ‘absolutely
81Again, this is not an isolated claim. Consider: ‘In short, I object to absolute universality, ab-
solute exactitude, absolute necessity, being attributed to any proposition that does not deal with
the A and the Ω, in the which I do not include any object of ordinary knowledge’ (CP6.607, 1893).
82This terminology is no longer used in mathematics. The ‘absolute’ is now characterised as a
kind of quadric, and the construction in general is called the Cayley-Klein metric.
83ShannonDea offers a clear account of the three forms of the absolute thatmight be entertained
in a Peircean philosophical cosmology (Dea 2015, pp. 725–725).
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true’,—that there was a ‘general absence of determinate law’,—is a claim about
the imaginary ‘beginning point’ of the hyperbolic absolute.
There are problems for the picture that we have been developing here. These
may explain why references to ‘absolutely true’ statements about the absolute
seem to disappear in later Peircean texts. We find Peirce explicitly claiming, for
instance, that the choice of the three possible forms of ‘the Absolute’ is itself to be
made on the basis of experience. For instance:
The Absolute in metaphysics fulfills the same function as the absolute in geometry.
According as we suppose the infinitely distant beginning and end of the universe are
distinct, identical, or nonexistent, we have three kinds of philosophy. What should
determine our choice of these? Observed facts. These are all in favor of the first.
(NM4:377, n. d.)
Moreover, the idea that Peircean cosmological claims could be ‘absolutely true’
seems to run against the idea that metaphysics should be thought of as abductive.
Peirce himself tried to develop various tests by which the truth of his metaphysical
picture could be discerned.
However, we have achieved something here. We can connect what we’ve seen
about the Absolute, understood as the limit of inquiry, to our consideration of the
aim of inquiry from the previous chapter. Just as the geometrical absolute (in a
hyperbolic space) is unattainable, so is truth understood as an aim of inquiry. The
mathematical metaphor inBaldwin’s Dictionary and the comments about James’s
devotion to truth make this clear. In so far as inquiry is a matter of responding to
experience,84 then the results of inquiry can never achieve exactitude or certainty
(or even universality). Yet it is an aim of inquiry to continue to improve the ex-
actitude, certainty, and universality of our beliefs. This is neatly summarised by
Peirce’s claim that inquiry aims at beliefs which give us ‘the maximum of expect-
ation and the minimum of surprise’ (R693, p. 166; cited in Hookway 1985, p. 67).
To increase the universality and exactitude of our claims means our beliefs expose
us more to surprise, while the minimisation of surprise is an increase in certainty.
Peirce’s later discussions of the Absolute tend to fall within a consideration of sign
use in general, rather than ‘experience’ in particular. That is, we move towards a
more general account of the aim of inquiry, understood in semeiotic terms. Accord-
84This is true, whether the inquiry depends on ‘special’ forms of experience enabled by exper-
imental apparatuses or on the kind of experience open to any ‘scientific intelligence’. That is, it
applies to both cenoscopy and idioscopy.
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ing to this semeiotic account, we are to think of the limit of inquiry as a proposition
which is not prescissively abstract.
5.3 The Absolute Truth as the Absence of Abstraction
5.3.1 ‘The “Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but complete . . .
The core texts which can be appealed to to support a notion of the absolute truth in
terms of a lack of abstraction have already been deployed, at least in part (§5.1).We
can now look at both in some additional detail. First, we consider Peirce’s account,
which culminates in a notion of the ‘perfect Truth’, of the three ways in which a
proposition/dicisign can relate to ‘the Truth’:
A sign is connected with the ‘Truth,’ i.e. the entire Universe of being, or, as some say,
the Absolute, in three distinct ways. [. . . ] Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers
to sundry real objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet’s madness,
are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the ‘Truth.’ But so far as the ‘Truth’
is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In
addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies char-
acters, or qualities. We have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential
reaction, whether of Perception or Exertion (the one theoretical, the other practical).
These are directly hic et nunc. But we extend the category, and speak of numberless
real objects with which we are not in direct reaction. We have also direct knowledge
of qualities in feeling, peripheral and visceral. But we extend this category to num-
berless characters of which we have no immediate consciousness. All these characters
are elements of the ‘Truth.’ Every sign signifies the ‘Truth.’ But it is only the Aris-
totelian Form of the universe that it signifies. [. . . ]85 But, in the third place, every
sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification
or meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation
of its, A’s, purpose, that is, in accordance with the ‘Truth,’ even though it, B, denotes
but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A’s, characters,
I call an interpretant of A. What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of
a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose
of every sign is to express ‘fact,’ and by being joined with other signs, to approach as
nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth,
the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the
very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he
never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that
is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as
a sign may have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified
by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that
Universe in its aspect as a sign, the ‘Truth’ of being. The ‘Truth,’ the fact that is not
abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP2:303–304,
1904)
85Peirce here offers a disavowal that he is engaged in metaphysics in his account of the propos-
ition. This was quoted above.
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The three connections between a sign and the Truth presented here are all
included within Atkins’s account of truth, but the third only partially. We see a
connection by a kind of indexical relationship, which Peirce aligns with truth un-
derstood as the ‘Aristotelian “Matter”’ of the sign. We point to something in ex-
perience. That is, the sign must (in however mediated a fashion) connect us with
some external object. This was the upshot of our discussion of ‘collateral observa-
tion’. What distinguishes this kind of link from others is that it is characterised
by a kind of ‘here and now’ compulsion. In another text which develops Peirce’s
interpretation of the Aristotelian form/matter/entelechy distinction, Peirce takes
matter to be something of which ‘we have direct experience in pushing against an
obstacle in the dark, and in many other ways’ (NM4:299, 1904).86 One can come
into a relation with ‘the Truth’ in this way by mere pointing. Such a sign, as we
have seen, conveys no information about the thing pointed out.
The second connection between signs and the Truth is made sense of in terms
of ‘Aristotelian “Form”’. Here the connection is made in terms of some quality that
is picked out in order to characterise an object. This is where real general qualities
of the sort highlighted above by Atkins go.87 We have ‘direct knowledge of qualities
in feeling, peripheral and visceral’, but we are to take there to be many qualities
out there ‘of which we have no immediate consciousness’. In inquiry, we find that
we must appeal to such qualities. They are the ‘Form’ of the ‘Truth’.
The third connection, which Peirce aligns with the ‘entelechy’, is partially cap-
tured in the account of the dicisign that we have developed above. The ‘entelechy’
involves a connection between icon and index, or matter and form. It also involves
connections between dicisigns/propositions. Propositions, like other signs, determ-
ine further signs of the same object. Atkins has this much, and also the connec-
tion between propositions and abstraction. But Peirce goes further and idealises
the notion of the interpretant to imagine the ‘ultimate interpretant’ that sits at
the end of the development of signs. This notion is characterised as the ‘perfect
Truth’, which is, Peirce thinks, free from abstraction and thereby identical with
the universe ‘qua sign’. The connection with abstraction is made clear when Peirce
says, as quoted earlier, that:
A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a
proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one individual, or completely de-
terminate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively
86That is, we are discussing Peirce’s category of Secondness.
87These general qualities are instances of Peirce’s category ‘Firstness’.
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abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and
the term ‘simple’ here has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expres-
sion. (EP2:378, 1906)
Prescissive abstraction, by nature, ignores certain features of things in order to
attend to the others. The view that Peirce is expressing here seems to be that a
complete picture of things would necessarily hold all true (in the everyday sense)
propositions together. There would be nothing left out, and so there would be no
prescissive abstraction. In Peirce’s words, it would be ‘the fact that is not abstrac-
ted, but complete’ (EP2:304,1904). That is, the ‘perfect Truth’ is identical with the
universe qua sign.
Here we can connect Peirce’s conception of the absolute truth with views more
popularly associated with the idealist F. H. Bradley. Bradley also held that the
truth is somehow identical with reality and that truth understood in this way was
marked by an absence of abstraction:
The division of reality from knowledge and of knowledge from truth must in any form
be abandoned. And the only way of exit from the maze is to accept the remaining
alternative. Our one hope lies in taking courage to embrace the result that reality is
not outside truth. The identity of truth knowledge and reality, whatever difficulty that
may bring, must be taken as necessary and fundamental. (Bradley 1914, pp. 112–113)
The difference between Peirce and Bradley on this score is that Peirce adopts two
related conceptions of truth: the contextualist and the absolute.88
Bradley’s version of the ‘identity theory’,89 like Peirce’s, posits a tendency of
thought towards incorporating more and more as it develops:
Truth is the whole Universe realizing itself in one aspect. This way of realization is
one-sided, and it is a way not in the end satisfying even its own demands but felt itself
to be incomplete. On the other hand the completion of truth itself is seen to lead to
an all-inclusive reality, which reality is not outside truth. For it is the whole Universe
which, immanent throughout, realizes and seeks itself in truth. This is the end to
which truth leads and points and without which it is not satisfied. And those aspects
in which truth for itself is defective, are precisely those which make the difference
between truth and reality. Here, I would urge, is the one road of exit from disastrous
circles and from interminable dilemmas. For on the one side we have a difference
88The story of the relationship between Peirce and Bradley on the notion of truth is particu-
larly interesting given the already well discussed relationship between Bradley and James (e.g.
Sprigge 1993). Understanding how Peirce’s and Bradley’s views fit together would add a great deal
to our understanding of both the difference within the pragmatist tradition and of the relationship
between pragmatism and the kind of views characteristic of British idealism. I hope to follow this
path in the future.
89The term ‘identity theory’ was coined by Stewart Candlish (e.g. Candlish 1999). Some con-
temporary analytic philosophers have taken up the label in their work on truth, notably Hornsby
1997 and Dodd 2008.
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between truth and reality, while on the other side this difference only carries out
truth. It consists in no more than that which truth seeks itself internally to be and to
possess. (Bradley 1914, pp. 116–117)
In so far as there is a difference between truth and reality, on Bradley’s view, it is
just thought remains defective.
The question of abstraction is brought out most clearly by turning to the sec-
ondary literature on Bradley. William Mander points out that abstraction is built
in to Bradley’s account of judgement. For Bradley ‘[a]n idea or thought is an ab-
stracted part or aspect of reality considered apart from its concrete existence, and
judgement the act which refers this ideal content to a reality beyond that act’
(Mander 1994, p. 141). Furthermore, on Bradley’s account all judgements have
conditional form in the sense that ‘what they affirm is incomplete. [they] cannot
be attributed to Reality, as such, and before[their] necessary complement is ad-
ded’ (Bradley 1893, p. 361; cited in Mander 1994, p. 141).90 Mander glosses this by
saying that, for Bradley, judgements have the form ‘Reality is such that if C1 . . . Cn
then S is P’, where C1 . . . Cn refers to a series of background conditions, S to the
subject of the judgement and P to the predicate (Mander 1994, p. 141).
The idea, which is the content of a judgement, is abstracted from reality. This
content is general in so far as it can apply in more than one circumstance and to
more than one object. For instance, we take the idea ‘green’ from the experience
of, say, a forest in the summer. It is taken from its particular context, and is then
able to be applied more broadly in other judgements. However, Bradley takes such
abstractive moves to falsify the true situation. As Stewart Candlish puts it: ‘we do
not speak the truth if we say less than the situation we are talking about would
justify our saying, just as we do not speak the truth if we saymore’ (Candlish 1989,
p. 342). Reality, on the other hand, is not abstract.
Mander helpfully summarises the problems that arise for Bradley as a result
of attempting to identify thought and reality with an account of thought as inher-
ently general and abstract and an account of reality as inherently particular and
concrete:
Content [. . . ] is wholly general, a kind or type found in many instances, unlike real-
ity, which is particular. Bradley’s way of putting this is to say that everything real has
both existence and content, or, as he alternatively expresses it, ‘that’ and ‘what’ (Brad-
ley 1893, p. 162). [. . . ] In thinking or using ideas, we take some reality and abstract
90I have changed Mander’s reference changed to match the edition of Appearance and Reality
that I cite elsewhere.
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out its content, which we refer to some other part of reality. The problem is that the
idea is merely an abstracted content, but reality—for instance, as it is given to us in
feeling—is wholly individual and contains no abstractions, so it becomes hard to see
how these abstractions can ever be true of, or identical with, the reality to which they
are referred. As Bradley puts it, ‘Ideas cannot qualify reality as reality is qualified
immediately in feeling’ (Bradley 1914, p. 231). (Mander 1994, pp. 32–33)
5.3.2 . . . is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.’
Bradley’s notion of absolute truth, then, has a problem in its attempt to identify
thought and reality. Peirce’s, on the other hand, does not make abstraction essen-
tial for thought. The identity is between the ‘final interpretant’ which is thought
of as a product of the development of signs, and the universe qua sign. The real,
for Peirce, is understood as rationally structured, while for Bradley the real is ul-
timately unspeakable and grasped most adequately in mute, immediate, sensory
experience. For thought to achieve its end would be, on Bradley’s view, for thought
to cease to be thought. Bradley calls this prospect the ‘happy suicide’ of thought
Bradley 1893, p. 173. Peirce does not have to endorse this prospect.
In the long passage from ‘New Elements’, Peirce characterised the interpretant
as ‘any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its,
A’s, purpose, that is, in accordance with the “Truth,” even though it, B, denotes but
a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A’s, characters’
(EP2:304, 1904). The objects of B are some part (or all of) the objects of A. This
would suggest that we could never, in the process of interpretation, get beyond the
objects of A. This is why Peirce adds that the ‘purpose’ of the signs in question is
‘the Truth’, and that signs must be ‘joined with other signs’ in order to achieve this
purpose. The interpretant of A1 and A2 brought together might have the objects of
either. The hope underlying this seems to be that whenever we have disparate
bodies of knowledge, that we might find some perspective from which they are
unified. It is taken as read, by Peirce, that the objects of (true) signs are all parts
of one big object, ‘the Truth’.
The ‘ultimate interpretant’, unlike the finite propositions that we entertain,
need not be abstract. The form of abstraction that Peirce thinks characterises the
kind of propositions a finite intelligence might utter is prescissive abstraction. Re-
call that this is the form of abstraction which takes some feature of experience and
excludes everything else. We attend to one thing at the expense of others. Like the
limit of experience, considered earlier, the limit of the development of abstracted
propositions in inquiry can be thought of as not subject to the limitations that arise
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from prescissive abstraction. That is, the limit of a series of abstract propositions
need not be itself abstract. Peirce offers an illustration of this picture within the
following passage:
I have not explained, however, why I call the sign the Entelechy, or perfectionment, of
reality. [. . . ] We have seen that a law is a sign. Take away from nature all conformity to
law, all regularity and what have we? A chaos? No matter would possess any property,
nor even an accident for any duration however short. Indeed there would be no time.
Form and Matter would be almost disunited. Properly speaking there would be no
reality at all. The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it might be
truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought carried to its last
perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and further toward the positive side
traversed infinity and appears coming nearer and nearer from the negative side, so
thought passing always from object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches
the absolute reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be
known to be. (NM4:300, c. 1904)
This meets head on the worry that the true understanding of the object (‘the
Truth’) is the interpretant furthest away from the object. Peirce likens the devel-
opment of signs to a ‘perissid curve’. This is Peirce’s own topological terminology.
What he has in mind here is something like a Möbius strip. If travelling along a
Möbius strip you would, going forward, find yourself exactly where you started.
On Peirce’s model the process of interpretation has to ‘[traverse] infinity’, the ab-
solute truth is an ideal point of course, but regardless, the process ends up with
the object that it started with.
The ‘ultimate interpretant’ is said by Peirce to be identical with the ‘Universe
qua fact [. . . ] the Universe in its aspect as a sign’. This end point then, unlike the
Bradleyan absolute, is the same kind of thing as thought. For Peirce, all thought is
in the form of signs, and ‘the Truth’ is no different even if not abstract. This is a key
difference between Peirce and Bradley. For Bradley, thought and reality remain
distinct, since thought is essentially abstract. Peirce does not make this move.
The identity he sets out is between the world as rationally structured and thought.
There may be features of the universe that are not to be understood in terms of
signs, but they are, by hypothesis not something that could be incorporated into
‘the Truth’. Recall Candlish’s maxim that ‘we do not speak the truth if we say less
than the situation we are talking about would justify our saying, just as we do not
speak the truth if we say more’ (Candlish 1989, p. 342). This is not violated by the
thought that the Universe might contain something not of the nature of a ‘sign’.
Those features, since irrational, do not justify us in saying anything.
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5.4 The Resultant View
At the other end of this deep dive in to Peirce’s semeiotics, what have we achieved?
Our aim was to develop an account of Peirce as offering two closely related concep-
tions of truth: one ‘contextualist’ and the other ‘absolutist’. Both can be understood
in terms of Peirce’s account of the ‘dicisign’. The contextualist notion a la Misak,
Hookway, and, more recently, Atkins, can be made sense of in terms of the account
offered earlier in this chapter (§5.1). Within a given context of inquiry or action,
our attention will be determined by various ends. The indefeasibility account of
truth developed by Hookway andMisak works perfectly well in such contexts. This
is our account of the truth of an ‘abstract proposition, such as a person might ut-
ter’, to borrow the terms used in Baldwin’s Dictionary. We’ve added to this the
idea that ‘local truths’, while perfectly fine in a given context, leave unfinished
business. They are not the last word. Were they to declare themselves the last
word, they would fail to be true: ‘[truth] essentially depends on that proposition’s
not professing to be exactly true’. All judgements made on the basis of experience
are such that they can be rendered more precise, more certain. They also leave
unstated their connection with other judgements. This last idea is capture by the
idea of the absolute truth as the limit of the development of signs.
By tracing out Peirce’s account of the absolute as a ‘limit of experience’, the
connection between experience and indexical reference iconically displayed by di-
cisigns, and the idea of the ultimate interpretant, we’ve gained an understanding
of the notion of absolute truth. The absolute truth is not, on Peirce’s view, a pro-
position ‘such as a person might utter’. We saw that even in the Baldwin’s Dic-
tionary article’s mathematical metaphor, the absolute truth ‘pi’ does not appear in
the series of utterable propositions of which it is the limit. As Peirce said when
discussing James’s love of truth, truth is ‘an ideal that it would be an absurdity to
talk of surpassing and an impossibility actually to reach’. We saw, when we turned
to the absolute understood as ultimate interpretant, that we can think of the ab-
solute as the limit of all sign use (or at least, the limit of theoretical inquiry).91
In so doing we see that there is only one absolute truth: the proposition, which
unlike those propositions we utter in various local circumstances, is ‘not abstrac-
91A reason not to restrict our account to theoretical inquiry, or inquiry full stop, is that our
action changes the world - and thus changes what ‘the Absolute’, or ‘entelechy’, is. As Peirce puts
it in ‘New Elements’:
Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets out from a sign of a real object with
which it is acquainted, passing from this, as its matter, to successive interpretants embodying more and
more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct perception of the entelechy; while the latter, setting
out from a sign signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as its form, to successive
interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelechy. (EP2:304, 1904)
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ted but complete’. On Peirce’s view, we should not think that there could be more
than one such truth. To think of there as being two would be to say that inquiry
could develop in two entirely incommensurable ways, while studying the same ob-
ject. This would be to undermine the hope for the possibility of rational agreement
between inquirers on any questions which we might ask. This is, as we saw earlier,
a regulative hope for inquiry.
Before continuing, it is worth pausing over some of the problems raised above
for the notion of the ‘end of inquiry’. One of the core problems, shared by both
Wright and Russell, is that the idea that some proposition would be believed in a
‘complete state of information’ is uninformative for anyone who wants to under-
stand what truth means. However, this misconstrues the function of the notion of
the absolute truth as defended in this chapter. The absolute truth is, in one re-
spect, the perfect theory. But, as a result of Peirce’s identity theory, it is also the
reality that we are inquiring into. So, on the view defended here, the way to de-
termine whether some abstract proposition is true, is to perform exactly the kind
of tests highlighted in Misak’s account of truth as indefeasibility. These tests will
depend on the local norms of the relevant form of inquiry. These will vary as we in-
vestigate the truth of, say, ‘Bertrand Russell had toast for breakfast on the 20th of
March, 1939’, or ‘murder is wrong’, or ‘the gravitational force between two objects
is inversely proportional to the square of their distance’. Since the absolute truth
is reality (in so far as it is intelligible), then there is a respect in which attending,
by abstraction, to some relevant proposition is determining whether it obtains in
the ‘final theory’. Or, in other words, the absolute truth is not just some theory
held by imagined future inquirers, it is also the reality that we interact with in
our present inquiries.
Wright held that the ‘end of inquiry’ is a state of complete information and that
such a state is conceptually incoherent. No one can know that they are in a state of
complete information, so that supposedly complete state in fact leaves out the truth
of the proposition ‘this is a complete state of information’. This does not causemajor
problems for the proposal defended here. For one thing, the main use that Wright
put this idea to was in order to show that the notion of complete information can’t
provide an informative criterion for the truth of abstract propositions. Moreover,
Peirce conceives of the absolute truth as something unobtainable in a way that
defusesWright’s worry. For Peirce, any judgement made on the basis of experience
is subject to further development. For that reason, we cannot imagine a possible
Pragmatism and the Absolute 145
inquirer being in possession of the absolute truth. Any situation in which there
continue to be inquirers, is a situation in which the ‘aim of inquiry’, the absolute
truth, has not been obtained.
Finally, we introduced worries from Russell about both buried secrets and first-
person authority. Russell expressed scepticism that any possible future inquirer
could be in a better position than him to judge what he had for breakfast that
morning. I noted above that propositions about what Russell had for breakfast on
various dates will be studied by whatever local means are appropriate to their
investigation. In this case, the methods of historical research. We can, then, help
ourselves to Misak’s answer to the problem of buried secrets, set out above. If we
were to sufficiently investigate, then we would determine that Russell had toast.
This is not made false by the fact that it seems we cannot investigate sufficiently. If
Russell had been kind enough to tell us what he had for breakfast on the relevant
day, then this would affect whether we could investigate the question sufficiently.
In fact, Russell would, by virtue of a kind of first person authority, be responsible
for setting up an indefeasible belief about the matter (assuming that he was not
himself wrong about what he had for breakfast).92 The only situation in which a
future inquirer could contradict Russell on the matter is if they possessed con-
crete evidence that both explained why Russell’s testimony was to be ignored, and
presented a convincing alternative scenario. This, however, is just as it would be
on any understanding of truth.
6 Pragmatism and the Absolute
The contemporary pragmatist reader of this chapter may be experiencing vertigo.
We have moved very quickly from views broadly within contemporary analytic
philosophy to views in the ballpark of the kind of idealism that both early analytic
philosophy and much of the pragmatist tradition have defined themselves against.
The idealist philosopher Josiah Royce coined the term ‘Absolute Pragmatism’ to
refer to the kind of pragmatism that both he and Peirce endorsed. This chapter
has largely focused on the ‘Absolute’ side of this label, but it is worth considering
92It’s worth emphasising that Russell would be responsible for this belief by virtue of the au-
thority of testimony in this kind of research. However, this authority is grounded in the fact that
testimony is, in many cases, our best access to past events. The fact that we come to have an inde-
feasible belief about Russell’s breakfast is due to Russell’s testimony, but the belief is not indefeas-
ible just because Russell said so. This will become more clear when we discuss Peirce’s account of
reality ascriptions in the next chapter.
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the pragmatist side in a little more detail. As in the previous chapter, it will be
helpful to begin by contrasting Peirce’s pragmatism with Huw Price’s account of
truth. This account of truth is the result of the kind of ‘linguistic anthropology’
outlined in the previous chapter. As such, Peirce will challenge it on the grounds
outlined there. But there are further things to be said about the particular story
Price tells about truth.
6.1 Price on Truth as a Norm of Assertion
Price develops his account of truth in ‘Truth as Convenient Friction’ as a ‘more
realist’ alternative to the views on truth defended by other pragmatists in the
analytic tradition. In particular, Price wants to distinguish his view from the kind
of post-Deweyan account defended most famously by Richard Rorty which eschew
truth in favour of something like ‘warranted assertibility’ (Price 2011, p. 163).
Rorty claimed that there is no practical difference to be discerned between a lin-
guistic community with a norm that asserters justify their assertions and one in
which truth is a norm for assertion over and above justification. According to Price
this is an empirical claim, and that were the experiment to be run we would find
evidence of ‘an important and widespread behavioral pattern that depends on the
fact that speakers do take themselves to be subject to such an additional norm’
(Price 2011, p. 164).93
Price’s conception of ‘linguistic anthropology’ was introduced in the previous
chapter. His account of truth is an instance of this strategy. As Price says, his ac-
count of truth ‘explicates truth in terms of its role in practice’ (Price 2011, p. 167).
It is to do this, moreover, using only the resources of biology and anthropology.94
For Price, truth functions in our practice as ‘a norm which speakers immediately
assume to be breached by someone with whom they disagree, independently of any
diagnosis of the source of the disagreement’ (Price 2011, p. 164). This norm ‘gives
disagreement its immediate normative character’, and thereby enables dialogue
rather than ‘a chatter of disengaged monologues’ (Price 2011, pp. 164; 166).
Price sets out his account of the truth norm in negative terms:
Truth: If Not-P, then it is incorrect to assert that P; if Not-P, there are prima facie
grounds for censure of an assertion that P. (Price 2011, p. 170)
93The centrality of this norm for human behaviour leads Price to say that actually running the
experiment in question would be unethical (Price 2011, p. 164).
94This is not explicit in ‘Truth as Convenient Friction’, but Price cites his account of truth as an
example of his kind of linguistic anthropology in later work (e.g. Price 2013, p. 37).
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Note the normative concept ‘censure’, here. This norm could be added to the prac-
tice of ‘merely opinionated asserters’ (‘Mo’ans’), those who only have the norms of
sincerity and justification in their linguistic practice, in the following terms:
The practice the Mo’ans need to adopt is simply that whenever they are prepared to
assert (in the old MOA sense) that P, they also be prepared to ascribe fault to anyone
who asserts Not-P, independently of any grounds for thinking that that person fails
one of the first two norms of assertibility. Perhaps they also need to be prepared to
commend anyone who asserts that P, or perhaps failure-to-find-fault is motivation
enough in this case. At any rate, what matters is that disagreement itself be treated
as grounds for disapproval, as grounds for thinking that one’s interlocutor has fallen
short of some normative standard. (Price 2011, p. 173)
If justification is the strongest norm of assertion, disagreement doesn’t necessarily
get off the ground. I can easily be justified in believing P, while you are also justified
in believing not-P.
However, this story only works in that there is already reason to be worried
about the disapproval of others. Price notes that we couldn’t add the truth norm
to a language that lacked it merely by adding the predicate ‘true’ to the language.
Rather:
Insofar—so very far, in my view—as terms such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ carry this norm-
ative force in natural languages, they must be giving voice to something more basic:
a fundamental practice of expressions of attitudes of approval and disapproval, in
response to perceptions of agreement and disagreement between expressed commit-
ments. (Price 2011, p. 174)
There is some prior feature of humans that makes disagreements matter, at least
in certain cases. Here we might add some of Price’s later gestures in the direction
of a general account of the function of assertoric language. Price entertains the
thought that the general function of such language is to ‘enable social creatures to
express, revise and align behavioural commitments of various kinds’ (Price 2011,
p. 154). The benefits or costs of such a conceptual technology are revealed to us
by the natural sciences.95 Perhaps an evolutionary story about the need for co-
operation in certain environments, or perhaps a more social scientific explanation.
Regardless, Price takes this disapproval to have a ‘causal, carrot-and-stick role in
encouraging [speakers] to settle their differences, in cases in which initially they
95Price takes it that there are good prospects that the truth norm provides the ‘long-run advant-
ages of pooled cognitive resources, agreement on shared projects, and so on’ (Price 2011, p. 177).
But, he also leaves it open that ‘biologically considered’ the possession of the truth norm and of
dialogue turn out to not be advantageous to us (Price 2011, p. 176).
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disagree’ (Price 2011, p. 175). Ultimately, he takes it to likely depend on ‘a primit-
ive incompatibility between certain behavioral commitments of a single individual,
which turns on the impossibility of both doing and not doing any given action A—
both having and not having a cup of coffee, for example’ (Price 2011, pp. 175–176).
And that ‘[a]ll else—both the public perceived incompatibility of “conflicting" as-
sertions by different speakers, and the private perceived incompatibility essen-
tial to reasoning-is by convention, and depends on the third norm’ (Price 2011,
p. 176).96
In ‘Truth as Convenient Friction’, Price also offers a series of arguments against
what he takes to be the Peircean account of truth. It is worth briefly considering
these before moving on to a Peircean response to Price. The first thing to note is
that Price takes Peirce to be offering a reductive analysis of truth, he is attempting
to ‘identify’ truth with something else (Price 2011, p. 170). Price takes this to be
the (classical) pragmatists ‘ur-urge’ (Price 2011, p. 182). However, we have seen
reason to think that this is not the case for the contextualist pragmatist elucidation
of truth. We are not looking, when attempting to provide a pragmatist elucidation
of truth, to produce a list of necessary and sufficient conditions or a reductive
analysis (c.f. Heney 2015, pp. 510–511). The notion of absolute truth, on the other
hand, is supposed to give voice to a norm of inquiry, and, in any case the truth
of any proposition that we might entertain is not determined by identity with the
absolute truth. We do not identify abstract propositions with the absolute truth
at any part of the story. This means that the truth of abstract propositions is not
given a reductive analysis in terms of the notion of the absolute truth.
Price makes two further objections that are worth considering. He notes that
‘it is very unclear what the notion of the ideal limit might amount to, or even
that it is coherent. For example, couldn’t actual practice be improved or idealized
in several dimensions, not necessarily consistent with one another?’ (Price 2011,
p. 178). Peirce need not deny that this is possible. We saw that Peirce entertains
the thought that there may not be truths to be had concerning each question we
ask. As Peirce provocatively puts it, it may be that the world is not entirely real
96Heney notes that the explanations for our assertoric practices that Price offers all appeal
to features of ourselves, rather than to ‘the forcefulness of experience’ (Heney 2015, p. 512). She
suggests that the Peircean ought to adopt the regulative assumption that our beliefs and assertions
can be appropriately responsive to this ‘forcefulness’. In assertion we are not just answerable to
ourselves or to one another (Heney 2015, pp. 412–413). We will turn to what is required by this
regulative assumption in the next chapter.
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(NM4:343–344, 1898).97 The notion of the absolute truth is an ideal which regu-
lates the practice of inquiry. Moreover, the ideal is not sunk by the thought that
there are many dimensions along which our present practices might improve, and
that some of these might be incompatible. This might be true in some particular
sphere of inquiry, but that does not prevent additional ‘meta-inquiry’ into what
we would have discovered had we taken another path. The results of both could be
encompassed within the absolute truth.
Price, following Putnam, also thinks that there is a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in-
volved in the notion of the ‘end of inquiry’:
Truth is essentially a normative notion. Its role in making disagreements matter de-
pends on its immediate motivational character. Why should ideal warranted assert-
ibility have this character? If someone tells me that my beliefs are not those of our
infinitely refined future inquirers, why should that bother me? My manners are not
those of the palace, but so what? In other words, it is hard to see how such an identi-
fication could generate the immediate normativity of truth. (It seems more plausible
that we begin with truth and define the notion of the ideal limit in terms of it: what
makes the limit ideal is that [it] reaches truth. This doesn’t tell us how and why we
get into this particular normative circle in the first place). (Price 2011, pp. 178–179)
Again, this issue seems to arise from amistaken attitude to Peirce’s strategy.We’re
not attempting to find some non-normative thing (a proposition being accepted at
some particular time) to identify truth with. But, were I to be told what the end
result of some particular practice that I am committed to is, I would not think of
this in the way that Price thinks of the ‘manners of the palace’. Future inquirers
are not simply a different bunch of people, they are fellow-inquirers with whom
I should feel a certain amount of solidarity (even if ‘infinitely refined’). I should
certainly be interested to know what the settled view of future inquirers might be
regarding a given question.
6.2 Pragmatist Naturalism or Pragmatist Idealism?
Peirce’s account of truth, like the rest of his philosophy, does not depend on the idio-
scopic sciences in the same way that Price’s does. Instead, Peirce attempts to think
through the appropriate ideals for practice, and especially the practice of thought,
from the cenoscopic perspective. Granting Price the label ‘naturalist’,98 we can call
Peirce’s account an ‘idealist’ one. Rather than starting with the resources granted
97We’ll consider this claim in the next chapter.
98With the same caveat we gave it earlier: there are many reasonable meanings we can attach
to the word ‘naturalism’ according to which Peirce is a naturalist.
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by biology or anthropology for making sense of our assertoric practices, we can
start with cenoscopy. Recall, in addition, that this is a perspective from within
the practice of inquiry, rather than the third-person perspective of the linguistic
anthropologist. We are especially interested here in Peirce’s ‘normative sciences’,
and what they say about the ideals for conduct and thought. This is a kind of
‘pragmatist idealism’.99
The absolute truth is the notion that we get when we imagine what complete
rational self-control would look like. We should not be satisfied, thinks Peirce, with
merely local stability in our beliefs. If we want to attain rational self-control we
ought to put strain on our present beliefs as much as possible. This is, in part, got
at with the idea of a limit of experience. The drive towards a unified story about
the world is likewise got out of the notion of rational self-control. If we have two
well-functioning theories, or a series of distinct disciplines, we should be driven to
at least attempt to find a story that either makes sense of why we end up with the
various theories or disciplines, or a story which unifies what was previously dis-
parate. That is, the absolute truth is the ideal of an explanation that encompasses
everything.
We can also point to a potential failure of ‘rational self-control’ in Price’s con-
ception of his account of truth. We have seen that Price lets his story about truth
rest on a pre-existing sense of disapproval and approval. Price suggests we might
think of this as a feature of humans as social animals or grounded in the practical
inability of a human to perform an action and its contrary. This is similar to some
features of Peirce’s arguments in ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ and in ‘Fixation
of Belief’. There, Peirce makes his story about truth depend on a desire for stable
habits of action.100 Peirce later rejected this strategy:
The conception of truth according to me was developed out of an original impulse
to act consistently, to have a definite intention. But in the first place, this was not
very clearly made out, and in the second place, I do not think it satisfactory to reduce
such fundamental things to facts of psychology. For man could alter his nature, or
his environment would alter it if he did not voluntarily do so, if the impulse were
not what was advantageous or fitting. Why has evolution made man’s mind to be so
constructed? That is the question we must nowadays ask, and all attempts to ground
99We also need to add the caveat that ‘idealism’ is a term just as hard to pin down as ‘naturalism’.
There will be many senses in which Peirce will not count as an idealist.
100This could be cashed out in terms of Price’s suggestion that his story about truth could be
grounded in the practical inability to perform act A and also to not perform it. A stable habit of
action, for Peirce, is one that does not leave us in a position of not knowing what action to perform.
To be in the situation that Price suggests, of feeling the impossibility of acting in two distinct ways,
is to not have a settled habit in Peirce’s sense.
Pragmatism and the Absolute 151
the fundamentals of logic on psychology are seen to be essentially shallow. (EP2:140,
1903)
We can hope, Peirce thinks, for an explanation of why thought takes the form it
does that does not depend on contingent facts about us. It is in this sense that we
can agree with Russell that Peirce’s story about truth relies on a conception of the
‘perfectibility of man’.
Conclusion
We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter. We began with recent work on
Peirce’s account of truth in the analytic tradition. This discussion presentedMisak
and Hookway as showing that Peirce does not make the truth identical with the
‘end of inquiry’. He is, instead, looking for a pragmatic elucidation of the concept
as it functions in our practices of inquiry and assertion. For both, we end up with
an account of truth in terms of the indefeasibility of beliefs in a given context. We
then turned to Peirce’s discussions of truth as a ‘limit’ in his entry for Baldwin’s
dictionary. I suggested an interpretation of Peirce’s account of truth according to
which there is a distinct, but related, account of truth for ‘propositions such as we
might utter’, and the ‘exact truth’.
In order to develop this account, I turned to recent work on Peirce’s account
of the proposition from Stjernfelt and Atkins. On the conception developed here,
we are to think of the proposition, or ‘dicisign’, as consisting of an icon part and
an index part. We saw that the proposition depends, for its indexical reference, on
collateral experience. This allowed us to consider Peirce’s account of the absolute
as a limit of experience. We then turned to Peirce’s account of the absolute as the
limit of sign use, the ‘ultimate interpretant’. This introduced the idea that the
absolute truth is, unlike other propositions, not abstract. I compared this view to
the slightly more well-known identity theory of F. H. Bradley. There is, on both
Bradley and Peirce’s view, one absolute truth and it is, in some respect, identical
with reality.
Finally, we considered how Peirce’s account of truth differs from that developed
more recently by Price. This provided us with a specific case to see how the dif-
ferences between Price’s naturalism and Peirce’s cenoscopic orientation lead to
differences in their accounts of various concepts of philosophical interest. It also
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highlighted the role of Peirce’s ‘absolute truth’ in articulating the ideals that he
takes to be operative in theoretical inquiry.
Peirce’s accounts of the absolute truth in ‘New Elements’ and in later work
shows that it is very hard to disentangle the metaphysical superstructure of the
notion of absolute truth from the normative-pragmatic account of inquiry that
generates it. We now turn to an account of Peircean metaphysics that will help to
clarify the division of labour between metaphysics and logic.
Chapter 4
Peirce’s Abductive Metaphysics
Introduction
This chapter begins by considering Peirce’s characterisation of metaphysics in
terms of the hierarchy of the sciences. According to Peirce, idioscopy depends on
metaphysics and metaphysics, in turn, depends on the other parts of cenoscopy
and on mathematics. In this chapter, we pay particular attention to the way in
which Peirce takes metaphysics to depend on logic. Emphasis on the relationship
between logic and metaphysics tends to encourage the view that Peirce’s meta-
physics is a kind of a priori study of the necessary structures of reality. This is
often taken to be incompatible with pragmatism. On the other hand, emphasis
on the relationship between idioscopy and metaphysics encourages the view that
metaphysics is simply a very general kind of science. In this chapter I argue that
both orientations can be held together by emphasising the fact that metaphysics
is a kind of cenoscopy (§1). The kind of necessity associated with metaphysics is
the kind that can be generated by cenoscopy. If the arguments made at the end of
Chapter Two hold, then this will be enough to show that Peirce’s metaphysics is
consistent with his pragmatism.
Metaphysics is, like cenoscopy in general, concernedwith the conditions for suc-
cessful abductive reasoning. Metaphysics, as the ‘completing department of ceno-
scopy’ adds to the account of inquiry developed in logic, a conception of the general
structure of any reality that could be the object of successful inquiry. Peircean
metaphysics, then, develops ‘a Weltanschauung, or conception of the universe, as
a basis for the special sciences’ (EP2:146–147, 1903). I argue that this picture of
reality should be understood in terms of the way it structures the hypotheses we
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allow ourselves to consider. On Peirce’s view, all forms of inquiry assume a meta-
physics of this sort; the only question is whether it is conscious and criticised or
unconscious and uncriticised. In this connection, I point to Peirce’s ‘realist concep-
tion of reality ascriptions’ and the role of Peirce’s metaphysics in solving problems
given to it by various forms of idioscopy.
Metaphysics is also associated with abduction in so far as it itself depends on
abductive reasoning. On Peirce’s view all forms of inquiry depend on all three
forms of argument: abduction, induction, and deduction. However, we can still
hold that metaphysics is a primarily abductive discipline. Peirce is explicit that
metaphysics should not be understood as, like mathematics, primarily deductive;
or like the special sciences, primarily inductive. I highlight the first hypothetical
inference in Peirce’s metaphysics: the hypothesis that there is an intelligible real-
ity. This hypothesis is tested, albeit indirectly, by every attempt to inquire into
anything. Other hypotheses in Peircean metaphysics affect first-order idioscopic
inquiry, while being similarly removed from direct test. I argue that what unifies
the hypotheses developed in Peirce’s metaphysics is that they are concerned with
explaining the possibility of successful inquiry (§2).
This basic pattern for moving from logic to metaphysics will take different
forms depending on our conception of what the success of inquiry looks like. In
Chapter Three we considered two variants of the Peircean account of truth. I fol-
low the same approach in this chapter, discussing the kind of Peirceanmetaphysics
that we get if we stick with the contextualist notion of truth, and the kind that we
get when we add the ‘absolutist’ conception of truth as well (§3). My discussion of
the first variety of Peircean metaphysics follows Hookway’s interpretation, accord-
ing to which we offer different explanations for our convergence on certain kinds of
successful belief or practice. This version of Peircean metaphysics depends on our
attitudes concerning the kind of success that is feasible in various local contexts.
Hookway entertains the thought that a Peirceanmight end up with something like
a Blackburn-style quasi-realism, according to which there are different explana-
tions for the truth of, say, moral and scientific beliefs.
If we adopt, in addition, the absolute conception of truth we will attempt to
produce a picture of the world according to which convergence with respect to any
meaningful question is possible. This approach will not be satisfied with merely
contextual explanations of convergence. This has two advantages as an interpret-
ation of Peirce’s position. The ideal of truth that is captured with the notion of
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absolute truth is one which can be adopted by any possible inquirer. That is, it is
the notion of truth that fits naturally with the idea that philosophy is cenoscopy.
Second, it enables us to more fully make sense of the idealist features of Peirce’s
metaphysics by reading features of the process of inquiry, as a hypothesis, on to
reality. I argue this by pointing to the methodological role for Peirce’s realist con-
ception of reality ascriptions.
1 Metaphysics in the Hierarchy of the Sciences
In Chapter One, I introduced Beverley Kent’s claim that the hierarchy of the sci-
ences is a diagram of the pragmatic effects of the various classified sciences on
one another. Pick a science, and the hierarchy should provide a pragmatic clari-
fication of its meaning. Kent follows Peirce in attending primarily to the status
of logic with respect to the other sciences. In this chapter we will use the same
method to understand metaphysics.1
When characterising metaphysics, Peirce often places it with respect to the
other sciences. For instance, he holds that:
Metaphysics is the proper designation for the third and completing department of
cenoscopy, which in places welds itself into idioscopy, or special science. Its business
is to study the most general features of reality and real objects. (EP2:375, 1906)
Metaphysics is, on this characterisation, the bridge between the special sciences
and the rest of philosophy. It completes philosophy and connects it to idioscopy.
To make sense of this, we will need to understand how metaphysics ‘completes’
cenoscopy, what it takes from the other cenoscopic sciences (§1.1), and in what
sense it ‘welds itself into idioscopy’ (§1.2). We must also understand why the sci-
ence that sits at this point in the hierarchy should be characterised as studying
‘the most general features of reality and real objects’. In particular, we will need
to consider what Peirce means by ascribing reality to something and to see what
kind of generality is being aimed at (§1.3).
It is convenient to unpack these features of Peircean metaphysics by first con-
sidering two issues: those which concern the relationship between metaphysics
and the rest of philosophy, and thosewhich concern the relationship betweenmeta-
physics and idioscopy. It turns out that the two directions in which we can read
the hierarchy, ‘up’ from idioscopy to metaphysics, and ‘down’ from mathematics
1A similar strategy has been followed by other commentators (e.g. Parker 1998, pp. 54–55).
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through cenoscopy, result in quite different accounts of metaphysics. Peirce’s read-
ers have often fallen on one side or the other. In this chapter I attempt to provide
an account of Peircean metaphysics that incorporates both orientations. I do this
by focusing on the role of metaphysics is providing an explanation for the possib-
ility of successful inquiry. This is to continue the thought, introduced in Chapter
Two, that cenoscopy is motivated by the need to account for the role of abduction
in inquiry.
It will be helpful to have a sense of the kind of questions that Peirce takes
metaphysics to ask. Thankfully Peirce provides a list of sample questions soon
after the characterisation of metaphysics that I have just quoted:
Whether or no there be any real indefiniteness, or real possibility and impossibility?
Whether or not there is any definite indeterminacy? Whether there be any strictly in-
dividual existence? Whether there is any distinction, other than one of more and less,
between fact and fancy? Or between the external and the internal worlds? What gen-
eral explanation or account can be given of the different qualities of feeling and their
apparent connection with determinations of mass, space, and time? Do all possible
qualities of sensation, including of course a much vaster variety of which we have
no experience than of those which we know, form one continuous system, as colors
seem to do? What external reality do the qualities of sense represent, in general? Is
Time a real thing, and if not, what is the nature of the reality that it represents? How
about Space, in these regards? How far, and in what respects, is Time external, or
does it have immediate contents that are external? Are Time and Space continuous?
What numerically are the Chorisy, Cyclosy, Periphraxy, and Apeiry of Space? Has
Time, or has Space, any limit or node? Is hylozoism an opinion, actual or conceivable,
rather than a senseless vocable; and if so, what is, or would be, that opinion? What is
consciousnesss or mind like; meaning, is it a single continuum like Time and Space,
which is for different purposes variously broken up by that which it contains; or is it
composed of solid atoms, or is it more like a fluid? Has Truth, in Kantian phrase, any
“material” characteristics in general, by which it can with any degree of probability
be recognized? Is there, for example, any general tendency in the course of events, any
progress in one direction on the whole? (EP2:375, 1906)
We will refer back to these questions as we proceed.
1.1 The Completing Department of Cenoscopy
Peirce takes metaphysics to be the ‘completing department’ of cenoscopy. This sug-
gests that there is something still to be done once we are finished with phenomen-
ology and the normative sciences. In this section we consider both what remains
to be done and what metaphysics takes by way of ‘principles’ from cenoscopy.
We have seen already that Peirce takes philosophy to be cenoscopy, the ob-
servational science of the commonly available. The positive argument for taking
philosophy to be cenoscopy, presented in Chapter Two, turns on the necessity of
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abductive inference in inquiry. Abductive inference is understood as a kind of ‘in-
ternal observation’. In order to understand inquiry, then, we need an account of
the inquirer. Moreover, this account of the inquirer must be such that some truth,
understood as independent of any particular group of inquirers, might be attain-
able. An account of the inquirer that satisfied both of these demands would be one
whose results would apply to any possible inquirer.
So far we are only left with the need for an account of the inquirer. However,
such an account would not complete the task of cenoscopy. Cenoscopy is the science
of that which can be derived from the kind of experience that is available to any
possible inquirer. Metaphysics, on Peirce’s story, does not rely on special experi-
ence and so is a form of cenoscopy. However, it is not itself an account of inquiry or
the inquirer. Metaphysics is the discipline which takes the account of inquiry and
the inquirer developed in phenomenology and the normative sciences, and devel-
ops a general picture of the world according to which inquiry might be successful.2
The principles that metaphysics takes from the other departments of cenoscopy
provide an account of the success conditions for inquiry that can be used for this
task. By bridging the gap between the account of the inquirer, and the special
sciences, metaphysics completes cenoscopy.
Just before Peirce offers his characterisation of metaphysics in terms of ‘com-
pleting cenoscopy’, he provides a compact statement of the function of cenoscopy.
According to Peirce ‘[t]he business of cenoscopy is to construct, as best one may,
a true comprehension of the omne,—and if possible, of the totum,—of being and
of nonbeing, and of the principal divisions of this omne’ (EP2:374, 1906). A few
years earlier, in 1903, Peirce takes philosophy (as cenoscopy) ‘to furnish a Weltan-
schauung, or conception of the universe, as a basis for the special sciences’. He
then notes that metaphysics is the discipline ‘whose business it is to work this
out’ on the basis of the results of the prior departments of cenoscopy (EP2:146–
147, 1903). Both of these characterisations highlight what still remains to be done
once Peirce is finished with the normative sciences, and especially logic. We are
looking for an account of the way the world must be if inquiry is to be successful.
Since this discipline appeals to an account of inquiry that applies to any possible
2Hookway offers a similar account of the motivations for Peircean metaphysics (Hookway
2000b, p. 169). However, Hookway does not emphasise the cenoscopic idea that we are interested
in any possible inquirer. This is in part because Hookway is, in the cited paper, largely interested
in developments in Peirce’s philosophy in the late 1880s. The idea that philosophy should be un-
derstood as cenoscopy is a later development.
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inquirer, the resulting metaphysics will be maximally general. It will be a concep-
tion of the omne in so far as it tells us something about any object that could be
inquired into.3 It will be a conception of the totum in so far as it provides a picture
of reality as a unified whole.4
In Chapter Three we considered some core features Peirce’s logic. The most im-
portant step in Peirce’s account of metaphysics is the transition from logic to meta-
physics.5 The dependence of metaphysics on logic is one of themost stable positions
across Peirce’s career.6 Having introduced the characterisation of metaphysics as
‘completing cenoscopy’ and given the above list of metaphysical questions, Peirce
offers two reasons for basing metaphysics on logic:
It would be folly to attack the fastness of the arcana of Metaphysics, with all their
barbed wire entanglements, without having thoroughly considered beforehand the
nature of the reasoning to be employed and the source of its validity. This is the most
obvious reason for making one normative science antecede metaphysics; and also the
most available reason and the one most suited to governing the dispositions of the
elements of the research. It is not the strongest reason by a good deal. The strongest
reason is that most of the metaphysical conceptions, such as Substance, Quality, Re-
lation, Potentiality, Law, Causation, etc., are nothing but logical conceptions applied
to real objects, and can only attain elucidation in logical study. (EP2:376, 1906)
The first reason given here concerns the difficulty of metaphysics. This difficulty
can be avoided, Peirce thinks, by doing some reasoning about reasoning. Meta-
physics can then adopt any principles of proper reasoning developed by logicians.
One reason that metaphysics is difficult is its subject matter. In many domains
we can rely on our pre-theoretical habits of reasoning.7 This is because those habits
have developed in response to more-or-less everyday experience and would not
have survived if they were not sufficiently reliable in that domain. However, in
metaphysics we are not always concerned with ‘everyday experience’. As Peirce
3We will see in a moment that Peirce’s favoured characterisation of reality does not allow for
reality to be ascribed to the absolutely incognisable. On this account, all real objects come within
the domain of metaphysics.
4That is, in so far as it provides a conception of the sum total of objects, rather than a story that
applies to each particular object. This is a distinction between distributive and collective forms of
universality (c.f. CP5.531–533, c. 1905).
5On the view defended here the influence of the other aspects of cenoscopy largely comes to
metaphysics by way of their role in defending views in logic.
6We see it as early as 1867, where Peirce holds that ‘in the opinion of several great thinkers,
the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics’, and
that we ought to follow them in this (CP7.580). Peirce includes amongst there ‘great thinkers’ at
least Aristotle and Kant (e.g. EP2:147, 1903). See also: CP5.4, 1902; NM4:35, 1902; 273, c. 1895.
7That is, our habits of reasoning as they are before the critical work of theoretical logic has
taken place.
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notes, the ‘metaphysician who infers anything about a life beyond the grave can
never find out for certain that his inference is false until he has gone out of the
metaphysical business’ (EP1:30, 1898). This problem applies most directly to ‘spe-
cial metaphysics’, i.e., metaphysics concerned with some special kind of object,
such as God or the soul (c.f. EP260, 1903).8
This reason for basing metaphysics on logic is highlighted by Cornelis de Waal,
who points out that ‘our instinctive logica utens, which is generally such a good
guide in practical affairs, is too far removed [in metaphysics] from its natural en-
vironment to be trustworthy’ (De Waal 2005, p. 296). Rather than the everyday,
instinctive, habits of reasoning that usually guide us (our logica utens), we are to
employ a scientific logic (a logica docens) (c.f. CP2.186–188, 1902). A logica docens
includes, in part, the attempt to uncover and criticise features of our habits of
reasoning, and to note those that should not be taken beyond the domain of every-
day experience.9 The Peircean logica docens also includes various principles that
codify the ‘scientific attitude’. De Waal takes it that one of these is the principle
that we should never ‘settle a priori what can conceivably be settled by experience’
(De Waal 2005, p. 294). He claims, additionally, that this is one of the principles
most commonly ignored by metaphysicians.
However, as de Waal notes, this feature of the dependence of metaphysics on
logic also applies to other sciences that push beyond the bounds of everyday experi-
ence (DeWaal 2005, p. 294). Peirce takes both physics and psychology to be moving
into areas in which we can no longer rely on intellectual instincts developed in the
course of everyday experience (e.g. CP7.508, 1898). Peirce argues, for instance,
that ‘it is extremely dangerous to reason at all about psychology without constant
appeals to the science of logic’ (EP2:386, 1906). This may be an additional reason
for thinking that the difficulty of metaphysics is not the strongest reason for basing
it on logic (c.f. NM4:37, c.1902). Peirce claims that the strongest reason for basing
metaphysics of logic is that ‘metaphysical conceptions’ are applications of ‘logical
conceptions’. This reason does not automatically apply to the other post-logical sci-
8Strictly speaking, Peirce distinguishes here between ‘generalmetaphysics’ and ‘religiousmeta-
physics’. The special/general distinction in metaphysics was most famously made by Christian
Wolff, who aligned general metaphysics with a general study of ‘being’ (‘ontology’), and special
metaphysics with the study of particular kinds of being (Inwagen and Sullivan 2017, §1). That
Peirce has this distinction in mind is suggested by his also aligning the terms ‘general metaphys-
ics’ and ‘ontology’ (EP260, 1903).
9For instance, Peirce notes that there are some instinctively valid argument forms that work
fine when we are dealing with a finite set of objects, but fall apart when applied to infinite collec-
tions. For a contemporary use of this idea from Peirce see Legg 2008.
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ences. The concept of, say, a ‘fast radio burst’, is not a concept derived from logic,
even if it is far removed from everyday experience.10 Peirce lists ‘Substance, Qual-
ity, Relation, Potentiality, Law, [and] Causation’ as logical conceptions ‘applied to
real objects’. Although Peirce is not explicit about exactly what he has in mind
here we can take, say, substance to be a metaphysical correlate of the subject or a
proposition, while quality is the correlate of the idea of a predicate. Potentiality,
law, and causation, would perhaps then be related to certain kinds of arguments
(c.f. CP1.515, c. 1896).11
Some of the questions that Peirce listed above bring out the logic-metaphysics
connection more clearly than others. For instance, the first questions concern whe-
ther there is a metaphysical correlate, and if so of what form, for the (logical)
concepts of vagueness, impossibility, and possibility. Peirce then goes on to ask
whether there can be any strictly individual existence. We can interpret this as
asking whether there is a metaphysical correlate for any singular term.12 The dis-
tinctions between reality and fiction, and between external and internal are both
developed within Peirce’s logic (c.f. EP1:90, 1871).The next two questions concern
what kind of being we should ascribe to those concepts, if any at all. Perhaps, for
instance, there is nothing that answers to our concepts of ‘reality’ and ‘externality’,
perhaps there is a continuum between ‘internality’ and ‘externality’, or perhaps a
Cartesian split between the two is called for (c.f. EP2:151, 1903). In all of these
cases, we start with logic and then turn to metaphysics.13
A few further examples from Peirce’s work will help us to understand the trans-
ition from logic to metaphysics. In 1896 Peirce takes metaphysics to consist ‘in the
results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively
valid, but as truths of being’ (CP1.487, 1896). The text that this comes from is a
complex attempt to derive his three categories by considering what the constraints
on any possible mathematical hypothesis thatmight be entertained are. Reflecting
on the task that he has set for himself, Peirce continues:
10Fast radio bursts are a kind of signal detected by radio telescopes which are, as yet, unex-
plained (Mann 2017).
11A contemporary approach to the idea that inference and law are closely connected will be
presented when we turn to Brandom in the final section of this chapter.
12In fact, Peircean thinks that the answer to this question is no: ‘[g]enerality is, indeed, an in-
dispensable ingredient of reality; for mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity
whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing’ (EP2:343, 1905).
13The other questions in Peirce’s list will be considered when we turn to the relation between
metaphysics and idioscopy.
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This much, however, is indisputable: if there are really any such necessary charac-
teristics of mathematical hypotheses as I have just declared in advance that we shall
find that there [are], this necessity must spring from some truth so broad as to hold
not only for the universe we know but for every world that poet [sic] could create. And
this truth like every truth must come to us by the way of experience. (CP1.417, 1896)
This is an example of the kind of pattern that should be familiar from our discus-
sion of cenoscopy. Peirce is here aiming to come to conclusions that would be agreed
upon by anything that could learn from experience.14 Recall also that Peirce’s term
for anything that could learn from experience is the ‘scientific intelligence’. This
term was used by Peirce at around the same time that he was developing the ac-
count of metaphysics in question (CP2.277, 1897).15
Having moved through the hierarchy from the top,16 Peirce offers an account of
the ‘regulatively valid’ laws of logic. At this stage in his career Peirce takes logic
to establish (regulatively) that, for any existing subject, it is determinate whether
any given predicate applies to it or does not. He also takes logic to establish that
there are three forms of inference, although at this stage of the text he does not
label them abduction, induction, and deduction (CP1.485, 1896). These laws are
‘logically necessary’, by which Peirce means that they ‘must be true if there be any
true answer to every question that has a meaning’ (CP1.485, 1896).
If we take the ‘regulatively valid’ laws of logic to ‘apply to being’, then we end
up, Peirce thinks, with the following metaphysical commitments:
[I]t is to be assumed that the universe has an explanation, the function of which, like
that of every logical explanation, is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the
root of all being is One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they
partake of an identical being [. . . ] Second, drawing a general induction from all ob-
served facts, we find all realization of existence lies in opposition, such as attractions,
repulsions, visibilities, and centres of potentiality generally. [. . . and] as a deduction
from the principle that thought is the mirror of being, the law that the end of being
and highest reality is the living impersonation of the idea that evolution generates.
(CP1.487, 1896)
At this stage all we are concerned with is how these metaphysical claims are de-
rived from logical claims. For instance, in this text a logical claim about explana-
14Recall from Chapter Two that Peirce’s account of experience allows for it to motivate modally
strong claims.
15Eventually, this appeal to experience will be taken up by the discipline Peirce calls ‘phenomen-
ology’ or ‘phaneroscopy’ (c.f. EP2:360–370, 1905).
16Note that this text comes from before Peirce included ethics and esthetics amongst the norm-
ative sciences. This is not a big problem for the present argument since the inclusion of the other
normative sciences affects how Peirce argues for claims in logic, but does not directly affect the
move from logic to metaphysics.
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tion, that it unifies observed variety, is writ large and projected onto reality. From
the fact that explanation unifies variety, we conclude that a reality capable of ex-
planation must be unified.17 The second logical claim is that the idea of a fact is to
be related to the experience of resistance.18 This is extended to ametaphysical doc-
trine that aligns existence with resistance. Finally, Peirce’s claim that thought is
a process that develops towards its end, truth, is likewise read into reality. Peirce
here takes the process of inquiry to match, or give a clue to, the processes that
occur in nature.19
These results are taken by Peirce to be ‘metaphysically necessary’. That is, they
‘must be true provided every form which by logical necessity must be thought of a
given subject is also a form of its real being’ (CP1.483, 1896). Peirce then goes on to
deal withwhat he takes to be contingentmetaphysical laws. Contingentmetaphys-
ical laws are metaphysical laws which, while not enforced by the logic-metaphysics
transition, are not yet the direct concern of idioscopy. These laws include claims
about, say, the structure of space and time (c.f. CP1.488, 1896). We will not follow
Peirce any further along this path here.
Peirce’s transition from logic to metaphysics in 1896 brings a few features to
the fore. For instance, we see the idea that the laws of logic are ‘regulative’. They
are, on Peirce’s view, derived from an account of what it would be for inquiry to be
successful. If inquiry is to be successful, we ought to regulate it by means of the
laws developed in logic. The transition to metaphysics is then understood as, at
least beginning with, the projection of these regulative laws onto reality. The 1896
strategy also reveals the modal strength that Peirce takes at least some logical
17A Parker puts it, Peirce’s position is that ‘we must suppose, on methodological grounds, that
what is now inexplicable is in principle capable of explanation, that irrational facts that defy all
comprehension can eventually be incorporated into our knowledge’ (Parker 1998, p. 205). The unity
postulated here is a unity of explanation. It allows for variety but it does not allow for brute disunity.
18Earlier in the text, Peirce imagines a certain kind of idealist wandering down the street:
‘Whenever we come to know a fact, it is by its resisting us. A man may walk down Wall Street debating
within himself the existence of an external world; but if in his brown study he jostles up against somebody
who angrily draws off and knocks him down, the sceptic is unlikely to carry his scepticism so far as to doubt
whether anything beside the ego was concerned in that phenomenon.’ (CP1.431, 1896)
This kind of experience is taken by Peirce to be the root of the ideas of existence and of facts as
things which exert some compulsive power over us.
19Oneway in which Peirce expresses this idea is by saying that we ‘all think of nature as syllogiz-
ing’. Peirce take it that ‘mechanical philosophers’ think of nature as including processes analogous
to deduction, Peirce wants to recommend that they take it to also behave in ways analogous to
induction and deduction (RLT, p. 161, 1898; c.f. W4:422–423/CP2.713, 1883). The idea of the ‘en-
telechy’, presented in the previous chapter, is also an attempt to articulate this idea. That is, we are
to think of reality as developing towards an end in much the same way that inquiry itself develops
towards the ‘ultimate interpretant’, or absolute truth.
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and metaphysical claims to possess. We see him referring to laws that are either
logically or metaphysically necessary. The kind of necessity that Peirce invoked
here is to be understood in terms of cenoscopy.20 Finally, we get a glimpse of theway
inwhichmetaphysics is supposed to ‘weld into’ idioscopy in Peirce’s transition from
metaphysically necessary laws, towards a ‘metaphysically contingent’ conception
of space and time that might more directly be appealed to in the special sciences.
Further illustration of Peirce’s move from logic to metaphysics can be found in
his 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures and the lectures on pragmatism presen-
ted at Harvard in 1903. In both sets of lectures the move from logic to metaphysics
is cashed out in the language of his categories. The three categories, rather than
the ‘regulative laws of logic’, are then read onto reality.21 We also see that, in ad-
dition to the move from logic to metaphysics consisting merely in the ‘absolute
acceptance’ of the categories as ‘truths of being’, Peirce also offers more direct ar-
guments for the reality of the categories.22
In the 1898 lectures, Peirce presents himself as taking ‘the Kantian step of
transferring the conceptions of logic to metaphysics (RLT, p. 146, 1898). He then
proceeds to consider whether the three categories ought to be endorsed as real by
metaphysics.23 At this stage Peirce offers a version of his ‘reduction thesis’, which
includes the claim that the three categories are irreducible to each other.24 Having
defended this view to his satisfaction, Peirce offers us a metaphysical principle:
I submit for your consideration the following metaphysical principle which is of the
nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable element sui genereis seems to be in
nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, yet must really be [in] nature
20If we can demonstrate that something must be a feature of any scientific intelligence, we have
demonstrated a kind of cenoscopic necessity. In 1896, Peirce takes logical necessity to attach to
anything which must be assumed if we take there to be an answer, discoverable by inquiry, to any
meaningful question. This is the kind of necessity that cenoscopy hopes to establish. We have seen
that metaphysical necessity is then derived from logical necessity.
21This ‘rather than’ is a question of emphasis. Peirce still allows that regulative laws of logic are
read on to reality at this stage. Peirce’s arguments for the reality of thirdness often take the form
of a defence of this move.
22Peirce takes a similar approach in 1903, which includes separate arguments for the reality of
each category (c.f. EP2:179–195).
23In the course of this, Peirce offers a nice, compact, account of what he takes the three categories
to be (RLT, pp. 147–149, 1898). A similar approach, emphasising the experiential basis of the
categories, is taken in 1903 (EP2:149–159, 1903). This is, incidentally a nice illustration of the
gradual development in Peirce’s use of phenomenological arguments.
24The other feature of the thesis is that no further category is needed, since any 4-place or higher
relation can be reduced to a combination of 1, 2, and 3-place relations. This has been discussed in
detail in (Burch 1991).
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somewhere, since nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such
an element sui generis. (RLT, p. 161, 1898)
This retroduction,25 allows us to move from claims about the essential and irredu-
cible role of a concept in cognition to claims about reality.26 It functions as a bridge
between logic and metaphysics. According to this principle, if the categories are ir-
reducible to one another, and thus ‘sui generis’, and if they seem to be in nature,
then we can take them to have some extra-cognitive reality.
Peirce continues, considering the category of ‘secondness’ or ‘reaction’:
For example, I may be in a dream at this moment, and while I think I am talking
and you are trying to listen, I may all the time be snugly tucked up in bed and sound
asleep. Yes, that may be; but still the very semblance of my feeling a reaction against
my will and against my senses, suffices to prove that there really is, though not in this
dream, yet somewhere, a reaction between the inward and the outward worlds of my
life. (RLT, pp. 161–162, 1898)
He goes on to make similar arguments for the categories of firstness and third-
ness.27
In 1903 Peirce supplements this strategy with some more direct arguments for
the reality of each category.28 Peirce’s 1903 argument for the reality of secondness
is addressed to those who accept the reality of firstness and thirdness. An example
25Recall that ‘retroduction’ is another of Peirce’s terms for abduction. This will be important
when we return to the abductive nature of Peirce’s metaphysics.
26Many commentators have discussed the relationship between Peirce’s strategy here and vari-
ous forms of transcendental arguments. Those who oppose this alignment tend to point to Peirce’s
claim that he is ‘not one of those transcendental apothecaries, as I call them—they are so skillful
in making up a bill—who call for a quantity of big admissions, as indispensable Voraussetzungen
of logic’. Peirce goes on to claim indispensability is no guarantee of truth, noting that ‘[i]t may be
indispensable that I should have $500 in the bank—because I have given checks to that amount.
But I have never found that the indispensability directly affected my balance’ (CP2.113, 1902; c.f.
Misak 2016a, p. 90; Hookway 2000b, p. 187). However, Peirce only denies that such presuppositions
deserve the status of belief or certainty. We can adopt them as regulative hopes however. Those
who still want to align Peirce with a transcendental method, tend to agree with Peirce on this. We
read the necessary structures of thought onto reality as regulative hopes rather than as necessary
(c.f. Gava 2011, pp. 234–236; Pihlström 2009, pp. 60–71; Cooke 2006, pp. 125, 135–913). In so far
as the method I am ascribing to Peirce is transcendental, it is transcendental in this latter sense.
27In some ways this form of argument is similar to that deployed in Descartes’ version of the
ontological argument. The idea of God, for Descartes, is an infinite one and, as such, could not have
been generated by finite beings like us. This idea must have been put in us by an infinite being
(Descartes 1984, pp. 27–29). The categories need not be the idea of something infinite. However, in
so far as they are irreducible to one another, it is hard to make sense of how a scientific intelligence
could generate them in a world which didn’t otherwise include them. This is interesting insofar as
anti-Cartesianism is often used as a defining feature of pragmatism (c.f. EP1:28–30, 1868).
28In this connection, Peirce expresses scepticism that the mind could generate the idea of, say,
thirdness, in a world which did not include it (EP2:178, 1903). However, he thinks this scepticism
is not yet an argument.
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of such a view would be a Berkleyan idealism which accepts the reality of qualities
of feeling (firstness) and of archetypal ideas in the mind of God (thirdness). The
defence of secondness then consists in an appeal to the phenomenon of surprise.
To be surprised, we need to expect something, and that expectation needs to be
violated (c.f. Cooke 2011). This violation reveals that the expectation was in fact
a feature of our internal world which, the surprise reveals, is distinct from the
external world:
The old expectation, which is [what she] was familiar with, is his inner world, or ego.
The new phenomenon, the stranger, is from the exterior world or non-ego. (EP2:195,
1903)
There are a few additional turns to this argument, but this is enough to give the
basic idea.29
An emphasis on the logic-metaphysics relation encourages the thought that
Peirce’s metaphysics is both a priori andmodally demanding. By ‘modally demand-
ing’ I mean that the conclusions of metaphysical reasoning, unlike those of the spe-
cial sciences, include claims about whatmust be the case or what couldn’t possibly
be the case in any world in which inquiry could be successful. Such a conception
of metaphysics has been attributed to Peirce by both supporters and detractors
of his metaphysical writings.30 As we have now seen, this is certainly an aspect
of Peirce’s account of metaphysics. However, in so far as it derives from the ceno-
scopic method it remains consonant with a pragmatist approach to metaphysics.31
After looking at the metaphysics-idioscopy relation as well we will be able to see
29Peirce, for instance, offers slightly different arguments depending on whether we take the
claim that we are surprised to be either inferred or directly perceived (EP2:194, 1903).
30For instance, Macarthur takes Peirce to be excluded from his favoured group of pragmat-
ists because Peirce entertains a kind of metaphysical necessity (Macarthur 2008, p. 196). Thomas
Goudge is famous for introducing the ‘two Peirce’s’ interpretation, according to which there are in-
dependent ‘naturalist’ and ‘transcendentalist’ strains in Peirce. On this view, Peirce’s metaphysics
is an example of the latter (Goudge 1947; Goudge 1950, pp. 5–6). Forster offers a long list of the
attitudes of various Peirce scholars on the issue of the a priori (Forster 2011, p. ix n.1).
31That, at least, Peirce thinks of this logic tometaphysics pattern as consistent with pragmatism
is made clear by this passage from his Baldwin’s Dictionary entry for the word ‘pragmatism’:
Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed
by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth
of reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and is
thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmatism in the manner in which C.S.
Peirce applied it, but includes that procedure as a step. (CP5.4, 1902)
In this passage we also see a particular version of the claim that the patterns and processes of
thought are also the processes that occur in nature. Both share the ‘growth of reasonableness’.
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how both the cenoscopic and the ‘scientific’ aspects of Peirce’s metaphysics can be
held together.
1.2 Welding into Idioscopy
The sixth volume of Peirce’s Collected Papers was given the title ‘Scientific Meta-
physics’.32 The use of this title suggests that Peirce’s metaphysical work should
be closely related to his work in the other sciences. The editors divide Peirce’s
metaphysics into the ‘scientific’ material concerned with laws of nature and cos-
mology from his work on ‘religion, or “psychical metaphysics”’, which they take to
be ‘tenuously connected’ with the rest of Peirce’s system and of merely ‘sociolo-
gical or biographical’ interest (CP6.v, 1935). This focus on the connection between
Peirce’s metaphysics and the natural sciences helps us to see certain features of
Peirce’s position even if we do not endorse the claim that his metaphysical work is
not of systematic importance.33
According to the hierarchy of sciences, idioscopy both takes principles from and
provides suggestions to metaphysics. We will consider each of these relations in
turn. On Peirce’s view the influence of metaphysics is oftenmost pronounced when
it is being done poorly. Bad metaphysics blocks paths which idioscopic scientists
should in fact be taking. It does this by prejudicing scientists against hypotheses
that should be tried. An adequatemetaphysics would, instead, leave asmany doors
open as possible. In this connection, Peirce takes one of the lessons of Duns Scotus’s
philosophy to be that ‘real problems cannot be solved by metaphysics, but must be
decided according to the evidence’ (CP4.28, 1893). However, rather than appeal-
ing to the authority of the church (a la the scholastics), Peirce takes the relevant
‘evidence’ to come from the self-correcting methodology of science (CP4.28, 1893).
Metaphysics, then, must not attempt to decide questions which are decidable by
some idioscopic science or other.
This is one aspect of Peirce’s insistence that metaphysics should become sci-
entific. That is, it must be responsive to developments in the special sciences.34
32Peirce proposed a volume with this title in 1893 (CP8, 1893, 5).
33Wehave already used somematerial from the ‘merely biographical’ section ofCollected Papers.
For instance, the account of the role of abduction developed in Peirce’s ‘A Neglected Argument for
the Reality of God’.
34Another sense in which Peirce makes metaphysics ‘scientific’ is by deploying the ‘method of
science’. But this is simply another aspect of the dependence of metaphysics on logic: we must use
the best methods of inquiry that we have to hand, and Peirce takes the superiority of the ‘method
of science’ to be a result in the study of logic.
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This is visible in the hierarchy in terms of the provision of ‘suggestions’ to meta-
physics from the special sciences. A concrete example of Peirce using such a sug-
gestion in hismetaphysical work is the extension of statistical forms of explanation
in thermodynamics to an account of the development of laws of nature.35
Because metaphysics provides principles to idioscopy, bad metaphysics can get
in the way of good science. Peirce offers the example of the reception of Pasteur’s
work on the germ theory of disease. According to Peirce, the popular ‘nominalistic
metaphysics’ of Claude Bernard, especially the claim that a disease must be a
collection of symptoms, rather than an ‘entity’, prevented the uptake of Pasteur’s
discoveries (CP1.109, 1896). According to Peirce, a good metaphysics will leave us
provided with ‘pigeonholes’ for any fact that might be discovered in the special
sciences. A less flexible metaphysics will ‘leave us unprovided with pigeonholes in
which to file important facts so that they have to be thrown in the fire’ (CP1.153,
c. 1897).
The provision of principles from metaphysics to the special sciences happens
whether the inquirer realises it or not. This is why Peirce takes metaphysics to
be unavoidable. Simply, all idioscopy assumes the truth of principles that they
can’t themselves put to the test by idioscopic methods. For instance, Peirce notes
that ‘we find physicists, Kelvin, Maxwell and others, assuming that a body can-
not act where it is not [. . . ] At another time, we find them assuming that the laws
of mechanics [. . . ] hold good for the smallest corpuscles’ (CP1.129, 1905). This re-
quires, as we saw in Chapter Two, substantive assumptions about causation and
mereology that are more general than the subject matter of physics. This discus-
sion just quoted from concludes with one of Peirce’s more well-known claims about
metaphysics:
Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics—not by any
means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of metaphysicians in scorn—
and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and
uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed. (CP1.129, 1905)
There is no way to avoid assuming some general principle or other when engaged
in idioscopic research. The only option Peirce allows for is whether you are aware
of what those principles are or not. Another way of putting the same point about
dependence is to say that metaphysics constrains the hypotheses we consider for
investigation. ‘In the light of one’s metaphysics and general conception of the de-
35We will consider this example in more detail in a moment.
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partment of truth dealt with, one considers what different hypotheses have any
claims to investigation’ (CP7.83, 1902; see also CP8.109, 1900). This is just to note
that fairly general presuppositions will impact both our estimations of the plausib-
ility of various hypotheses, whether some hypothesis is even possibly true, or even
whether the hypothesis is meaningful at all.36
Peirce takes the nomological sciences to be especially dependent on logic and
metaphysics (CP2.121, 1902). An example from Peirce’s own metaphysical work
may help. In his evolutionary cosmology, Peirce takes physics to have been held
back by the metaphysical assumption that all laws must be deterministic and uni-
versal. Part of his work in the Monist series is to argue that this restriction in our
understanding of what a law is, is not justified by experience.37 The result is the
view which Peirce calls ‘tychism’, the view that there is absolute chance in real-
ity. This metaphysical work, Peirce thinks, will enable the physicist to consider a
greater range of possible explanations for phenomena.
Kelly Parker holds that ‘[a]ll of Peirce’s metaphysical questions concern the
operation of laws in the universe of common experience’ (Parker 1998, p. 56). Idio-
scopy also involves laws. This is particularly true of the ‘nomological sciences’,
which attempt to determine the laws that hold of a given range of phenomena.
The concern with law is the point at whichmetaphysics ‘welds into’ idioscopy. How-
ever, metaphysics ‘does not study the laws governing reality, but rather the laws
governing the operation of laws themselves’ (Parker 1998, p. 56).
The importance of the role of laws in Peirce’s metaphysics is drawn out effect-
ively by Hookway. As Hookway presents Peirce, he is motivated by the desire to
explain why there are any laws at all.38 However, this explanatory demand leads to
an infinite regress if we take explanation to take the form of putting the explained
under a law. If we tried that strategy here we would end up with a law of laws,
and then a law of laws of laws, and so on. Peirce’s strategy for getting around this
problem is to introduce an evolutionary hypothesis, according to which laws can
evolve from a less law-governed state of affairs (Hookway 2000b, pp. 172–173).39
36This dependence claim was defended in Chapter Two.
37The arguments in question appear in Peirce’s ‘The Doctrine of Necessity Examined’ (W8:111–
125/EP1:298–311, 1892).
38Reynolds also notes that regularities in general are one of the phenomena that Peirce wants
his cosmology to explain (Reynolds 2002, pp. 13–14).
39This evolutionary hypothesis requires us to take tychism seriously. If laws can evolve from a
state without laws, then we need to allow that some events are not entirely determined by laws.
That is, we need to endorse some form of absolute chance (W8:101/EP1:288, 1890).
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So far, we have primarily been considering the dependence of idioscopy onmeta-
physics. This dependency has been most notable in examples where it goes wrong.
That is, in examples where metaphysical assumptions have stood in the way of
scientific advances. We have not, so far, looked at the ‘suggestions’ that idioscopy
provides to metaphysics. One feature of the above discussion that is worth noting
here is that the stories told by Hookway and Reynolds present metaphysical prob-
lems as being generated by problems in idioscopy. We want an explanation for why
the laws of nature are the way they are, for instance. One of Peirce’s motivations
for telling his evolutionary story about the laws of nature is that he thinks it might
help us to figure out an answer to the more narrowly physical question of why the
various laws of nature have the constants that they in fact do.40 The provision of
problems is one kind of suggestion that can get passed from a subordinate to a
superordinate science.
Two other forms of ‘suggestion’ are important to note: suggestion of methods
and provision of data. For instance, when Peirce inaugurates his Monist meta-
physical project in ‘The Architecture of Theories’, he offers a recommendation:
What I would recommend is that every person who wishes to form an opinion con-
cerning fundamental problems, should first of all make a complete survey of human
knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should
observe in just what respect each has been successful and where it has failed, in order
that in the light of the thorough acquaintance so attained of the available materials
for a philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each, he may proceed
to the study of what the problem of philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of
solving it. (W8:85/EP1:286, 1891)
Later in the paper, Peirce introduces the idea that statistical explanations have
been successful in thermodynamics, and that a similar deployment of the notion
of chance that such explanations involve might be useful in our metaphysics (c.f.
W8:105/EP1:292, 1891).41 That is, a methodology is suggested by a subordinate
science, to a superordinate science. In order for methods to be taken up by a super-
ordinate science, they need to be generalised to apply to a wider range of objects.
Peirce also notes that the results of subordinate sciences can be taken up by a
superordinate science as material to be used either in inductive reasoning or to be
generalised from. This idea is present in one of Peirce’s early presentations of the
hierarchy of sciences as based on the principle that
40This aspect of Peirce’s metaphysics is considered in: Murphey 1993, pp. 236–238 and Reynolds
2002, pp. 17–18.
41This story is developed in detail in Reynolds 2002.
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the sciences may be arranged in a series with reference to the abstractness of their
objects; and that each science draws regulating principles from those superior to it in
abstractness, while drawing data for its inductions from the sciences inferior to it in
abstractness. (CP3.427, 1896)
If we take some metaphysical principle to apply to all objects of subordinate sci-
ences, then any result of a subordinate science is relevant to inductive inferences
in the superordinate science. For instance, if inmetaphysics we hold that all events
are the result of deterministic laws, then the results of quantummechanics will be
a problem.Wemight, then, use indeterministic accounts of quantummechanics as
part of an inductive argument against metaphysical determinism. We’ve already
seen that the methods of idioscopic sciences can be generalised and applied in
philosophy. Peirce also holds that the results of idioscopic sciences can be gener-
alised. For instance, he holds that, despite the cenoscopic nature of philosophy it
can use idioscopic results as the basis for further generalisations:
I would even grant that philosophy, in the strictest sense, confines itself to such obser-
vations as must be open to every intelligence which can learn from experience. Here
and there, however, metaphysics avails itself of one of the grander generalisations of
physics, or more often of psychics, not as a governing principle, but as a mere datum
for a still more sweeping generalisation. (CP3.428, 1896)
Here we also see something of the claim the metaphysics and idioscopy ‘weld into’
one another. At the point at which the data from physics or ‘psychics’ is taken up
by metaphysics it is hard to draw a clean line between cenoscopy and idioscopy.
The questions that appear towards the end of Peirce’s list make more sense
in light of the idioscopy/metaphysics relations that we have just been discussing.
This applies fairly obviously to Peirce’s question about space and time. Peirce asks,
for instance, about whether time and space are real and what their geometrical
structure is. This is particularly clear in his question about the ‘Chorisy’, etc, of
space.42 It even applies to his question about ‘hylozoism’, or the possibility of the
universal applicability of biological forms of explanation. We also see questions
about the nature of mind and teleology that would have important applications in
psychology and the like.
If we emphasise themetaphysics-science relation and themotivations for Peirce
that come from issues in the idioscopic sciences of his day to the exclusion of the
logic-metaphysics relation, then we will be left with a conception of metaphysics
42The strange terminology that Peirce uses here come from his attempts to develop mathemat-
ical topology. For an account of these topological concepts see Havenel 2010.
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according to which it is just a very general kind of natural science. This would
align Peirce with something like the Quinean understanding of philosophy as con-
tinuous with the natural sciences. For Quine there is no important distinction
between natural scientific and philosophical or mathematical statements, the lat-
ter are simply further removed from direct test than the former (e.g. Ullian and
Quine 1978). However, our discussion of the cenoscopic method in Peirce should
already have provided us with enough to understand that this is not Peirce’s view.
In the following section, we will put the cenoscopic and the special-scientific as-
pects of this story together.
1.3 Cenoscopy and the Idea of Reality
1.3.1 Cenoscopic Solutions to Idioscopic Problems
The fact that Peircean metaphysics is responsive to developments in, and current
problems for, the natural sciences, does not undermine the idea that metaphysics
is a form of cenoscopy. We’ve already seen some of the reasons why Peirce takes
idioscopy to depend on cenoscopy for principles.43 We are now in a position to offer a
further reason. Namely, that the kind of problems given by idioscopy to metaphys-
ics are problems which require the kind of reflection characteristic of cenoscopy.
We have seen that metaphysical assumptions can come to the fore at times of
crisis in the special sciences.44 Considering one of the examples from the previous
section in more detail will help here. One of the motivations for Peirce’s cosmology,
emphasised by Reynolds and Murphey, is to overcome what he takes to be a block
in the sciences of his day. Consider the following:
To find out much more about molecules and atoms, we must search out a natural his-
tory of laws of nature, which may fulfill that function which the presumption in favor
of simple laws fulfilled in the early days of dynamics, by showing us what kind of laws
we have to expect and by answering such questions as this: Can we with reasonable
prospect of not wasting time, try the supposition that atoms attract one another in-
versely as the seventh power of their distances, or can we not? To suppose universal
laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and yet having no reason
for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational, is hardly a justifi-
able position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted
for. That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for
43In addition to the arguments presented in this chapter, others were contained in Chapter Two.
44This is reminiscent of Kuhn’s statement that ‘critical discourse recurs only at moments of
crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy [. . . ] [o]nly when they must choose between
competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers’ (Kuhn 1970, pp. 6–7).
172 Peirce’s Abductive Metaphysics
no particular explanation, but if it shows heads every time, we wish to know how this
result has been brought about. Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason.
Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity
in general is to suppose them results of evolution. This supposes them not to be ab-
solute, not to be obeyed precisely. It makes an element of indeterminacy, spontaneity,
or absolute chance in nature. (W8:101/EP1:288, 1891)
Peirce takes there to be some further questions which we might hope to answer,
but seem intractable now.45 It is important to note that the problem Peirce is at-
tempting to answer here is not a problem that is only visible from themetaphysical
perspective. The problems are internal to the physical sciences. In this passage
Peirce cites difficulties in understanding why atoms behave as they do and the
fact that physicists at the time had no obvious means of solving the problem.46
These idioscopic problems result in a standstill. This is where Peirce’s meta-
physics comes in. The attempted solution he offers turns on a kind of cenoscopic
reflection. We see that Peirce’s move towards a solution starts with some general
claims about explanation. Peirce provides a reason to think that a rational ex-
planation is wanted for the ‘special forms’ of the laws of nature. It is, he thinks,
a strange position to take it that there is no explanation available. This is, in
part, a cenoscopic claim – we are to hope there is an answer to any meaningful
question we might ask. This hope is rational, Peirce thinks, for all possible in-
quirers.47 Peirce then turns to some general theses, also cenoscopic, about what
kind of thing demands an explanation. We then get the proposal for an cosmology
briefly discussed above according to which the laws of nature are the result of an
evolutionary process.48
45Peirce’s ambition here is, in fact, greater than understanding atoms, molecules, and the laws
of physics. He wants this story to answer why there is something rather than nothing (W6:208–
209/EP1:277–278, 1888); to explain growth in general (W8:122/EP1:307–308, 1892); and to provide
a satisfactory unification mind and matter (W8:123–124/EP1:309, 1892).
46Murphey highlights the increasingly serious problems with Newtonianism that were arising
at the turn of the century (Murphey 1993, pp. 327–328). Peirce himself also points to the increasing
need to introduce complex auxiliary hypotheses with no clear motivation beyond the fact that we
seem to hit on something that works. He points, in particular, to the difficulties then arising con-
cerning the understanding of light as particle or wave; and explaining thermodynamic phenomena
(W8:101/EP1:288, 1891).
47I say ‘in part’ because Peirce also offers the local point that we already accept that the laws
are apprehendable by minds. It is hard to know exactly what Peirce has in mind here. He seems
to think there is something particularly strange about the idea that we can understand that p,
without there being an available explanation for the fact that p.
48The alternative hypothesis, that the laws of nature are fixed, naturally goes along with the
claim that they are brute facts. Peirce takes an appeal to brute facts to be no explanation at all,
and so to rule out from the armchair, the possibility of answering certain questions that we might
hope are answerable (c.f. CP1.175, c. 1897).
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The key point to take away from this example is not that we should buy into
Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology.49 The particular features of the evolutionary cos-
mology illustrate a pattern which a Peircean metaphysics ought to follow. The
idea is that idioscopic problems, points at which we don’t know how to go on given
present methods or assumptions, can have cenoscopic solutions. The interpreta-
tions of Peirce’s metaphysics as simply very general science misses the specifically
cenoscopic strategy that Peirce’s metaphysics deploys. It’s only by considering the
constraints on explanation in general that Peirce’s metaphysics enables us to cri-
ticise our present assumptions about the relevant range of hypotheses to try. The
practical value of such a project lies in its tendency to produce creative hypotheses
that are then liable to further testing within the special sciences. In so far as it
encourages this kind of creativity, it facilitates the process of inquiry itself.
1.3.2 Realism: Nominalist or Realist?
For this strategy to work, that is, for cenoscopic solutions to be available to this
kind of idioscopic problem, we have to take reality to be explicable. We are faced
with a phenomenon that we struggle to explain, and we ask ourselves a questions
about what might count as an appropriate explanation for the phenomena in ques-
tion. This process, if successful, results in a new range of hypotheses to consider.
That is, the increased control we gain over the hypotheses that we consider is the
result of consideration of ourselves and of the practice of inquiry. It is not gained
by virtue of, say, just paying more attention to the external world.50 This requires
us to take reality to, in some manner, conform to what we find when we consider
ourselves and the project of inquiry. In Peirce’s various attempts to shift from lo-
gic to metaphysics, some such ‘regulative law’ is involved. As a result, it is worth
clarifying the concept of reality that Peirce deploys.
49We need not endorse Peirce’s own conclusions to recognise his project as a worthwhile one
at the time. However, it is worth pointing to a contemporary successor project of Peirce’s cosmo-
logy within physics being worked out by the physicist Lee Smolin (Smolin 2014, e.g.). It is worth
noting that Smolin’s project aims to provide, within the context of a Peirce-inspired evolutionary
cosmology, an account of why the laws of nature involve the particular constants that they do (for
instance, why the stationary mass of an electron is 9.11 × 10−31 and not some other value). As we
have just seen, one of Peirce’s main aims was to provide a general hypothesis that might allow for
an explanation of the these constants.
50Recall that abduction, or explanatory inference, is the result of ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’
observation.
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In the context of a discussion of the medieval problem of universals Peirce dis-
tinguishes between two conceptions of what we mean when we say something is
‘real’. Peirce’s characterisation of the problem of universals is as follows:
The question, therefore, is whether ‘man’, ‘horse’, and other names of natural classes,
correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in common, inde-
pendent of our thought, or whether these classes are constituted simply by a likeness
in the way in which our minds are affected by individual objects which have in them-
selves no resemblance or relationship whatsoever. (W2:467/EP1:88, 1871)
According to Peirce the debate between realists, who affirm the reality of some
commonality ‘independent of our thought’, and the nominalists, who don’t, turns
on a more fundamental difference concerning the meaning of ‘real’. Both camps
agree on the following characterisation of ‘real’, which Peirce ascribes to Duns
Scotus: ‘[t]he real is that which is not whatever we may happen to think it, but is
unaffected by what we may think of it’ (W2:468/EP1:88, 1871).
However, the two sides disagree about how to make sense of this ‘mind inde-
pendence’ criterion.51 According to the ‘nominalist conception’ of reality:
[Our] thoughts [. . . ] have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are con-
strained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind which directly
influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is
independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. (EP1:88, 1871)
The nominalist conception of real, which Peirce thinks is quite natural, ascribes
reality to those things which cause our sensations.
The ‘realist conception’ of reality is characterised in terms of the process of in-
quiry. In the previous chapter we saw that Peirce offers us a conception of truth in
terms of the ‘final opinion’. This conception takes there to be some result which,
if the process is functioning well, all inquirers would converge on despite starting
with distinct methods and biases. On the realist conception of reality ascriptions,
everything ‘which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and noth-
ing else’ (W2:469/ EP1:89, 1871). The final opinion is also mind-independent in
the sense that it is ‘independent of how you or I, or any number of men think’
(W2:469/EP1:88, 1871). If this were not the case then the realist conception would
not even count as a conception of ‘reality’.
51Peirce recognises that a mere appeal to ‘mind independence’ does not do enough to tell us
what we mean by ascribing reality to something. This issue has become a concern in contempor-
ary metaphysics. For instance, see the distinction drawn by Khalidi between mind-dependence as
causal claim vs. as a claim that the item in question is subjective (Khalidi 2013, pp. 147–150).
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Peirce takes it that the ‘final opinion’ will include general concepts like ‘man’
and ‘horse’. As a result, if we adopt the realist conception of reality ascriptions
then there is no difficulty in allowing real generality into our ontology. If we take
on the nominalist conception we will have some difficulties. For one thing, the real
would then be associated with the causes of sensation, which we have no particular
reason to suppose are not mere individuals. Moreover, if we take the understand-
ing of a thing as falling under general concepts as an achievement of thought, then
the nominalist conception of reality puts reality at the wrong end of the process for
us to endorse real generality.52 This thought is taken up by Peirce one year after
the Berkeley review:53
our reasonings begin from the most various premises (otherwise no process to invest-
igation to settle belief would be necessary) and lead ultimately to one conclusion.
The reality must be connected with this chain of reasoning at one or other ex-
tremity. According as we place it at one end of the other, we have realism or nominal-
ism.
The reality must be so connected with our thought that it will determine the con-
clusion of true investigation. But the conclusion depends on the observations. Reality
must then be connected with sensation as its cause (or to use another phrase, as its
possibility) and this is the nominalistic theory of reality.
But reality is independent of the individual accidental element of thought. Now
on the observation end of the chain of reasoning all is accidental and individual. But
at the conclusion end is one result to which alone investigation will ultimately lead.
The personal prejudices or other peculiarities of generations of men may postpone
indefinitely an agreement in this opinion; but no human will or limitation can make
the final result of investigation to be anything else than that which it is destined to
be. The reality, then, must be identified with what is thought in the ultimate true
opinion. This is the realistic view of reality. (W3:55–56, 1872)
The problem with placing reality at the ‘observation end’ of the chain of reasoning
is that the objects we take to be real become intractable for inquiry. The ‘observa-
tion end’ is ‘individual’ and ‘accidental’, inquiry, on the other hand, can only deal
with sufficiently stable regularities: the things that sustained, communal, inquiry
would come to acknowledge.54 In his final attempts to characterise and defend his
pragmatism, Peirce argues that inquiry is directed to ‘experimental phenomena’
rather than single experiments. According to Peirce ‘[w]hen an experimentalist
speaks of a phenomenon, such as “Hall’s phenomenon,” [. . . ] he does not mean any
52Peirce argues that the judgement of similarity between two sensations is the result of some
(fairly basic) reasoning. On this understanding any two sensations do not ‘have in themselves any-
thing in common, and far less is it to be inferred that the external realities have’ (EP1:88, 1871).
53See also: CP7.339, n.d..
54Note that we also get something of Peirce’s identity theory here. The reality is ‘identified with
what is thought in the ultimate true opinion’.
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particular event that did happen to somebody in the dead past, but what surely
will happen to everybody in the living future who shall fulfill certain conditions’
(EP2:340, 1905). Peirce, then, adopts the realist conception of reality ascriptions.
Perhaps surprisingly to themodern ear, this realist conception of reality ascrip-
tions leads to a kind of idealism. This is because it rejects the idea of the radically
incognisable. If something were radically incognisable, then it could not feature
in the final opinion, and consequently would not be real.55 This distinguishes the
Peircean conception of reality ascriptions from the conception that is often operat-
ive in contemporary metaphysics. Some even take the defining feature of realism
about some domain to be that it enables truth to outrun inquiry.56 Peirce would
take this to be an instance of a nominalistic conception of reality.57
Something like the realist conception of reality needs to be endorsed in order
for the Peircean strategy of moving from logic to metaphysics to work.We also need
it if we are to provide metaphysical solutions to idioscopic problems. Reflection on
the way that any possible inquirer must take the world to be would not tell us any-
thing about the way the world actually is unless we adopt something like Peirce’s
understanding of what it is to ascribe reality to something. Without the concep-
tion of the meaning of ‘real’ that Peirce adopts, there would be no reason to think
that reflecting on the structure of our own thought would enable us to produce
informative general hypotheses about the nature of reality. Moreover, there would
be no reason to think that metaphysical reflection could help to solve idioscopic
problems in the way outlined earlier in this section.
55This is to go against Hausman, who takes idealism to require that reality is ‘exhausted by
what is mindlike’, or has an origin in something ‘constituted exclusively as thought’ (Hausman
1993, p. 145). He elsewhere says that we must take there to be some ‘residue-reality’ which is left
over after any attempt to render the world intelligible, and is alignedwith the categories of firstness
and secondness (Hausman 1993, pp. 160–261). That is, on Hausman’s view, one is an idealist if
they accept only the third category. This was indeed Peirce’s charge against the Hegelian idealists.
However, we need not ascribe this view to Hegel (see Stern 2013, pp. 55–59). Nor does the meaning
of ‘idealist’ I am using here require us to think that the other categories can be done without.
56This is how the criterion of mind independence is sometimes taken. For instance, it is taken to
be a commitment of ‘robust’ moral realism that the metaphysics and semantics of moral discourse
are entirely independent (c.f. Ingram 2015; Kahane 2013, p. 152). Or consider the kind of claim
made in Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, where the best model for the purposes of inquiry
might still be false (e.g. Fraassen 1980, p. 12). On these pictures, the real state of affairs could be
entirely distinct even from perfect inquiry.
57One of the problems with the nominalist conception of reality is that opens up space for scep-
tical hypotheses: ‘This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself,—a thing
existing independent of all relation to the mind’s conception of it’ (W2:469/EP1:90, 1871).
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Peirce is explicit in a few places that the claim that there is a reality in the
sense we are discussing here is a hypothesis, albeit a hypothesis built deeply into
the practice of inquiry:
What is reality? Perhaps there isn’t any such thing at all. As I have repeatedly insisted,
it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn
hope of knowing anything. Again it may be, and it would seem very bold to hope for
anything better, that the hypothesis of reality though it answers pretty well, does not
perfectly correspond to what is. But if there is any reality, then, so far as there is
any reality, what that reality consists in is this: that there is in the being of things
something which corresponds to the process of reasoning, that the world lives, and
moves, and has its being, in a logic of events. (RLT, p. 161, 1898)
Elsewhere, Peirce entertains the thought that realitymight come in degrees. Some
things may be ‘more real’ than others, in so far as they are more law-governed than
others.58 Wemight think of the hypothesis that there is something that answers to
the realist conception of reality ascriptions as the first hypothesis of metaphysics.
Having adopted this hypothesis, metaphysics can, on the basis of the normative
sciences, provide its account of ‘the most general features of reality and real ob-
jects’ (EP2:375, 1906).
2 Metaphysics and Abduction
So far in this chapter we have seen something of the functional role that Peirce has
in mind for metaphysics. Metaphysics is that part of cenoscopy which enables the
transition from cenoscopy to idioscopy. Cenoscopy, we’ve seen, studies that which
is available to any possible inquirer, and develops a normative esthetics, ethics,
and logic.59 Metaphysics, on the story that I have derived from Peirce, attempts to
provide an account of the general structure of any world that could be the object
of inquiry. This, along with the realist understanding of ‘real’, allows us to ascribe
58Peirce holds, for instance, that
being is a matter of more or less, so as to merge insensibly into nothing. How this can be appears when
we consider that to say that a thing is is to say that in the upshot of intellectual progress it will attain a
permanent status in the realm of ideas. Now, as no experiential question can be answered with absolute
certainty, so we never can have reason to think that any given idea will either become unshakably estab-
lished or be forever exploded. But to say that neither of these two events will come to pass definitively is to
say that the object has an imperfect and qualified existence. (EP2:2, 1893)
59While this thesis has focused its attention on Peirce’s logic, we have seen something of the
dependence of logic on ethics and esthetics. For instance, we saw that one aspect of Peirce’s account
of truth understands it as a particular kind of ideal for practice, and thus as subject to ethical
criticism.
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to Peirce a conception of metaphysics that is in some ways quite traditional. Meta-
physics is the study of the way reality must be. However, we also saw that Peirce
thinks that the view that there is any reality at all is the result of a fairly deep lying
abductive inference. As a result, it is not something we can be entirely confident
in adopting. The role of this hypothesis, and of metaphysical hypotheses in gen-
eral, is to provide some explanation of the possibility that inquiry might succeed.
Peirce’s metaphysics thus holds on to the traditional understanding of metaphys-
ics as aiming at a certain kind of necessity claim, but rejects the the view that
these claims are certain.60
I now turn to the task of putting together two positive proposals for Peircean
metaphysics. As in the previous chapter, one is a ‘contextualist’ Peircean meta-
physics and the other is an ‘absolutist’ one. This chapter also follows the last in
taking the absolute to be an important addition to the contextualist understand-
ing of Peirce. While both take seriously the explanatory demand that arises from
taking inquiry to have some possibility of attaining the truth, they diverge over
the notion of truth that we should adopt. In so far as the contextualist notion of
truth fails to be sufficiently cenoscopic, the contextualist proposal for Peircean
metaphysics will too. On my view, then, the absolutist proposal is the one that
Peirce himself had in mind. Before setting out these options, it is worth briefly
considering what it means to call metaphysics ‘abductive’.
One sense in which metaphysics is abductive that we do not need to spend
much further time on is just that it is a branch of cenoscopy. We have seen already
how cenoscopy is motivated by an attempt to understand the need for abductive
inferences in inquiry while also maintaining a sufficiently robust conception of
truth. That is, it seeks to show that the necessity of abductive contributions from
inquirers is compatible with the claim that the results of well-functioning inquiry
are not dependent on contingent features of some inquirer or other. Sometaphysics
is ‘abductive’ in the sense that one of its primary interests is the conditions for the
success of abduction. Metaphysics is also abductive in the sense that it depends,
more than some other sciences, on the use of abductive inferences.61 It is worth
pausing briefly over why this is the case.
60Peirce’s approach is thus distinct from Kant’s attempt to treat hypotheses as ‘forbidden com-
modities’ and on that basis to aim at ‘apodictic certainty’ (Kant 1998, Axv).
61We’ve just seen that the ‘hypothesis of reality’, the hypothesis that there is a reality at all, is
the result of one such hypothetical inference.
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Peirce is clear that he does not think of metaphysics as primarily a deductive
discipline:
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be
done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood,in the general line of the
growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
(CP 1.7, c. 1897)
We can take the ‘demonstrations’ that Peirce has in mind here to be deductive
arguments.62 Peirce contrasts this kind of demonstration, which might aim at
both necessity and certainty, with the provision of ‘a hypothesis’. This hypothe-
sis, whatever it is, is such that it might be ‘verified or refuted by future observers’.
This passage highlights hypothetical inference, but by noting the possibility of
testing it also includes deduction and induction. In order to test by observation,
induction is required, and in order to do that certain experiential consequences
must be deduced from the hypothesis.63
One of the enduring features of Peirce’s philosophy is his claim that there are
three fundamental forms of inference: deduction, induction, and abduction. De-
ductive and inductive inferences are, of course, familiar topics of logic.64 Peirce
struggled to articulate his conception of abduction, and it evolved over time.65
Abduction is, throughout this development, associated with the introduction of
hypotheses.66 The second reason that metaphysics is an abductive discipline is
simply that it is one whose dependence on abduction is particularly pronounced.
On Peirce’s view, all sciences involve all three kinds of reasoning. Mathematics is
62One of the themes in Peirce’s account of metaphysics that this thesis does not touch in any
detail is the relationship between mathematics and metaphysics. Peirce often makes the claim
that ‘metaphysics has always been the ape of mathematics’ (CP1.130, 1893; see also CP1.54, 1896;
W6:203–204/EP1:273, 1887–1888;W8:109/EP1:296, 1891; CP8.92, 1892). Peirce then goes on to ar-
gue that since mathematics has abandoned geometrical demonstrations from self-evident axioms,
themetaphysicians will have to too (c.f. Cooke 2006, p. 82). Rather than deduction from unimpeach-
able premises, the metaphysician will have to engage in abductive reasoning. Peirce’s critique of
the use of traditional (Euclidean) geometric form in philosophy and mathematics is considered in
Dea 2006.
63Peirce offers a compact statement of this division of labour between the three forms of inference
at EP2:440–442, 1908. See also: EP2:532n12, 1903.
64Although, as Wim Staat notes, Peirce’s accounts of deduction and induction are themselves
quite idiosyncratic (Staat 1993, p. 225). However, they are not so idiosyncratic that they need to be
considered at any further length.
65Anderson helpfully traces the course of this evolution and situates Peirce’s account of abduc-
tion as rooted in a reading of Aristotle’s ‘apagogue’ (Anderson 1986, p. 147).
66While Peirce’s technical treatments of the distinction between the three forms of reasoning
change over time, he maintains the basic idea that each has its own functional role in inquiry:
abduction introduces hypotheses, deduction derives consequences from them, and induction com-
pares those consequences with experience (e.g. W3:323–338/EP1:186–199, 1878; EP2:33, 1898).
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a science that is characterised by a high dependence on deduction. Peirce follows
his father Benjamin Peirce by using ‘the science which draws necessary conclu-
sions’ as a definition of mathematics (CP3.588, 1898). On the other hand, some
idioscopic sciences are characterised more by induction than abduction or deduc-
tion. For example, if I already have a good, say, classification of possible flags, then
my vexillology might be largely a matter of finding flags and putting them in their
right box. That is, it will be a discipline characterised by its relatively prominent
use of induction. A more serious example of this kind of work is the development
of the periodic law in chemistry by Mendeleev.67
Finally, it is worth briefly distinguishing the proposal for an abductive meta-
physics being made here from current proposals for the use of ‘abduction’ in philo-
sophy. Timothy Williamson has recently argued that philosophy should adopt an
‘abductive’ rather than ‘deductive’ method (Williamson 2016, p. 274).68 However,
Williamson understands abduction to be equivalent to inference to the best ex-
planation (IBE) (Williamson 2016, p. 265). On Williamson’s view, IBE assumes
that we have a series of hypotheses already available and a body of data against
which to evaluate them. We then rank our hypotheses as explanations of the data
in question and adopt the one that ranks highest. There are many possible cri-
teria for ranking hypotheses, and these may vary depending on the investigation
in question.69
Abduction and IBE, though often confused, are distinct forms of inference. For
one thing, abduction produces conclusions with a certain functional role: hypo-
theses or questions to be investigated. While we may attach different degrees of
plausibility to the conclusions of abductive inferences, this is largely independent
of their functional position as the first step in inquiry. We must, Peirce says, think
of the conclusion of an abductive inference as plausible enough to be ‘a question
meriting attention and reply’, but the purpose of abduction is not to establish a be-
lief (EP2:441, 1908).70 This is distinct from IBE, where our aim is to assign some
positive credence to the explanation we pick out as ‘best’. The conclusion to such
67This was discussed in Chapter One.
68A similar proposal is suggested in Andow 2016.
69This discussion closely follows Williamson’s summary of what he takes IBE to be (c.f. Willi-
amson 2016, p. 266). Williamson’s only reference to ‘pragmatism’ in the paper aligns it with anti-
realism (Williamson 2016, pp. 277-8).
70The citations from used from 1908 here are from ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality
of God’, where Peirce uses the term ‘retroduction’ instead of ‘abduction’. The secondary literature
on Peircean abduction often highlights the idea that abduction results in an interrogative (e.g.
Hintikka 2007; Hookway 2012c).
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an inference need not have the functional role that Peirce assigns to abductive
inferences.
Campos suggests that Peter Lipton, the philosopher who coined the term IBE,
mixes together the creation of a new explanatory hypothesis with the evaluation of
the hypothesis. This is, Campos argues, to confuse induction and abduction (Cam-
pos 2011, pp. 440–441).71 This may be true of Lipton, but it is not true of Willi-
amson, who explicitly takes IBE to require us to already have a list of relevant
hypotheses in hand. Williamson’s version of IBE is, in Peirce’s terms, a form of
induction or ‘probable inference’.72 Ironically then, Williamson’s IBE includes de-
ductive and inductive stages, but does not involve abduction at all.
The functional role of abductive inferences is to introduce new ideas to be
tested. This suggests that abduction should be connected with creativity and the
‘context of discovery’.73 We need not deny that the IBE pattern that Williamson
presents is part of Peirce’s methodology for metaphysics and for philosophy in gen-
eral. However, it is less important than the use of abduction to generate new ideas.
Peirce does not draw a hard and fast distinction between the context of jus-
tification and the context of discovery (c.f. Chapter One §2.1). Abduction, while
involving unformalisable creative input, is subject to logical criticism. Just as we
can be more or less diligent observers, we can be more diligent explainers. In both
cases there is something uncontrollable. No matter how diligently I observe the
scene in front of me, I cannot control the fact that what I see is a computer screen.
In abduction, there are equivalently uncontrollable moments of seeing that ‘so one
might conceivably reason’ (EP2:233, 1903).74 In such a situation, some new option
strikes you. You are not compelled to adopt the given hypothesis, but you cannot
‘unsee’ that it is an available option. There is a compulsion here that is at least
analogous to the perceptual case. Nonetheless, some self-control is possible in both
of these processes. We can, for instance, put ourselves in the kind of circumstances
that are conducive to the imaginative work of abduction.75
71A related argument is made in Mcauliffe 2015.
72See also: McKaughan 2008; Staat 1993; Turrisi 1990; Anderson 1986; Frankfurt 1958.
73This connection with creativity can be brought out in various ways. For instance, Mark Ts-
chaepe emphasises the importance of ‘guessing’ as a part of abduction, and draws this out by close
attention to the history of the study of AIDS (Tschaepe 2014).
74In fact, Peirce thinks of abduction and perception as ‘shading’ into one another (EP2:227,
1903).
75Peirce’s account of musement, where we engage in ‘free play’ of the imagination, might answer
to this description (c.f. Anderson 1995, pp. 145–150; Salas 2009).
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3 Two Options for Peircean Metaphysics
3.1 Contextualist Peircean Metaphysics
Peircean metaphysics offers explanations for the possibility of the success of in-
quiry. This section considers how this project might look if our only notion of suc-
cess in inquiry is the context relative account of truth. My presentation of this
option closely follows the work of Hookway, who defends a version of this contex-
tualist approach to metaphysics. We saw previously that a merely contextualist
understanding of Peirce on truth is in tension with the idea that philosophy ought
to be cenoscopy. This tension will carry over when we think of the relationship
between the two proposal for Peircean metaphysics on offer here. In particular,
this option is not able to follow Peirce in methodologically deploying the realistic
conception of reality ascriptions.
We saw in the previous chapter that Hookway’s account of Peirce on truth cent-
rally involves the notion of convergence. Hookway takes the ‘pragmatic elucidation’
of the truth of some proposition p to be that those who inquire into whether or
not p is true, using appropriate methods, would eventually converge on a stable
belief that p. Here stability means that the belief would not be overturned by fur-
ther evidence or inquiry (Hookway 2000b, p. 49). The demand for metaphysics,
on Hookway’s view, comes when we attempt to provide some explanation for our
converging on a given belief or set of beliefs. The contextualist element of this ap-
proach is that it allows distinct kinds of explanation for different areas of inquiry.
The upshot of this is that the form that our metaphysical explanation of conver-
gence takes can appeal more or less to our particular context. For instance, we
might want to explain the convergence seen in the natural sciences with a fairly
robustly mind-independent story; while explaining what convergence we take to
be available in moral matters in a different way. We will not attempt to provide a
story that might apply across all contexts or to provide a standpoint (even as an
unreachable ideal) that allows for a total picture of the relations between contexts.
As so far described, this does not quite match the abductive pattern presented
above. I have presented Hookway’s Peirce as seeking to explain how we have come
to converge on beliefs in certain areas and not in others. Here the two contexts
in question are the rather vaguely characterised contexts of moral discourse and
natural scientific discourse. In the latter context it seems that we have successfully
converged on certain beliefs. In the former we seem to have been less successful.
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This suggests that what Hookway’s Peirce is attempting to explain here is success
(convergence) that inquiry has already obtained. This would not follow the pattern
for Peircean metaphysics set out above. As presented above, Peircean metaphysics
aims to provide us with a story which tells us how reality might be if further
success in inquiry is possible. It does not aim to provide a post hoc explanation
for success already obtained. This would be a misreading. In so far as Hookway’s
Peirce offers a kind of traditional scientific realism (even an ‘object naturalism’) it
is an explanation of both already obtained success in the natural sciences and of
the possibility of further success in that context.
Hookway takes his account of Peirce on truth to be ‘metaphysically neutral’
(Hookway 2000b, p. 80). While convergence in some context may demand an ex-
planation, this demand does not determine what form the explanation must take
(Hookway 2000b, p. 75). In Hookway’s words:
[Peirce’s view of truth] can be held in conjunction with a realist or an anti-realist
metaphysics. The most plausible view may be that some truths can be understood in
a ‘realist’ manner, as dealing with a mind-independent reality, while others deal with
matters whose character bears more marks of our interests, sentiments or construct-
ive activities. (Hookway 2000b, p. 77)
That is, in so far as there is convergence in our various inquiries, we might expect
different kinds of explanation to be appropriate in different cases. Hookway takes
it that there might be room for some robust notion of mind-independent objects
when characterising the convergence of scientific inquiry, while in the case of eth-
ics or mathematics some other explanationmight be appropriate (Hookway 2000b,
p. 76). What kind of explanation will be appropriate will depend on our story about
inquiry into the subject matter in question.76
The ‘realism’/‘anti-realism’ opposition introduced by Hookway here will need
to be slightly modified. This can be done without undermining the metaphysical
neutrality of his position. Later in the same paper, Hookway entertains, but re-
jects, the thought that what he calls ‘basic realism’ can be adopted with respect to
any proposition we take to be true (Hookway 2004, p. 142). Basic realism is real-
ism in the sense that Peirce ascribes to Scotus before he distinguishes between
the nominalist and realist readings. That is, something is real if it is as it is inde-
pendently of what we think of it. Anything that is true, even in the context relative
76We might distinguish the contexts in which different kinds of metaphysical explanation are
appropriate by appealing some something like Misak’s idea that the extent to which bivalence
applies to a subject comes in degrees.
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sense, is real in this ‘basic’ sense. Anyone in the relevant circumstances would con-
verge on the true belief. This does not make the truth of the belief dependent on
what you or I or any number of actual inquirers think (c.f. CP6.237, 1909). This
notion of ‘reality’ is flexible enough to allow reality to be ascribed to something
which ‘persons of a given general description would think under supposable cir-
cumstances’ (CP6.237, 1909). It also allows explanations which make the objects
in question either ‘internal’ or ‘external’.77 That is, it allows for more or less onto-
logically demanding explanations to be given.78
I depart fromHookway by straightforwardly endorsing the claim that the truth
of p implies basic realism about p. Hookway’s argument for drawing the two no-
tions apart turns on the example of the ‘charismatic moralist’. We are to imagine
that a particularly charismatic moralist appears amongst us and by sheer force
of personality establishes a conception of the moral life that is so strong that no
further reflection can shake it. We might imagine some super-charismatic figure
introducing the view that it is always and everywhere wrong to wear blue cloth-
ing. By the sheer power of their rhetoric, no person who hears their message can
think otherwise. In this case, the moral belief that it is always and everywhere
wrong might be stable even though it depends on how some particular person
thought. This is made clear by Hookway’s addition that if some other moralist had
come along, different beliefs would be unshakeable (c.f. Hookway 2004, p. 140).
For instance, if some other charismatic moralist had appeared instead, perhaps
proclaiming that it is always and everywhere wrong to wear red, this belief would
become unshakeable instead . In this case, Hookway thinks, we would have truth
without basic realism .
Hookway’s basis for this argument is a distinction between the concepts of truth
and reality as presented in Baldwin’s Dictionary. We saw there that Peirce aligns
truth with the ‘ideal limit’ of inquiry and reality. Peirce goes on to characterise
reality in much the same way as above. He holds that ‘[r]eality is that mode of
being by virtue of which the real thing is as it is, irrespectively of what any mind
or any definite collection of minds may represent it to be’ (CP5.565, 1902). Peirce
holds that there are distinct ideas, one of which is relevant to the logician, the
77Something is real if its properties do not depend on what any person or group of people thinks
about it. Something is ‘external’ if its properties do not depend on what any person or people think
about anything. Something is ‘internal’ if it is not external, and is a ‘figment’ if it is not real.
(CP6.237-8, 1909).
78These issues are dealt with especially clearly in: De Waal 1996 and Mayorga 2007.
Two Options for Peircean Metaphysics 185
other of which is relevant to themetaphysician. This distinction can bemaintained
even if we hold that there can be no truths without at least basic realism.79 Our
account of the contextualist notion of truth takes the converged-on belief to be
mind-independent in the sense of basic realism. That is, if themoral belief depends
on one particular moralist appearing rather than another, then it is not a true
belief (even on the contextualist understanding of truth developed in the previous
chapter).
Despite entertaining the thought that truth and basic realism might come
apart, Hookway does not think that aligning the two would make truth any less
metaphysically neutral. It will still be the case that taking p to be true does not
demand any particular metaphysical treatment of the objects of p. For instance,
Hookway suggests ‘basic realism’ about numbers can be derived from the claim
that ‘there really are prime numbers between two and ten’, and that this leaves
open most of the metaphysical questions that philosophers of mathematics have
asked about mathematical objects (Hookway 2000b, p. 142).80 This would include
all sorts of questions about the nature of numbers, and what kind of creature
might come to use numbers, and indeed, the extent to which we might think of
mathematical objects as constructed. More generally, wemight go for ‘more robust’
varieties of realism if we take a given subject matter to be open to investigation
by creatures with quite different natures than us. Perhaps we imagine that con-
vergence between ourselves and some alien species on fundamental physics to be
likely, while imagining that they were unable to participate in inquiry into issues
of human phenomenology.
Some examples of metaphysical workmotivated by a desire to explain converge-
nce-in-context will be of use here. We can understand some features of the cosmo-
logical arguments outlined above as following this pattern. We take there to be
fairly robust convergence available in the physical sciences, and want to explain
it. The ‘context’ in question is sufficiently shared that our explanation for conver-
79Peirce goes on to say that if we take the impact of the charismatic moralist to introduce a
moral ideal that no further reflection can shake, the logician can announce the ideal ‘true’. The
metaphysician then ‘may hold that the fact that the ideal thus forces itself upon the mind, so that
minds in their development cannot fail to come to accept it, argues that the ideal is real’ (CP5.566,
1902). I take this claim to be merely highlighting the difference in role of the metaphysician and
the logician rather than seriously entertaining the view that there can be truths that depend on
what you or I or any particular collection of people think about the matter in question.
80The use of this example and appeal to a metaphysically neutral account of ‘real’ suggest af-
finities between basic realism and recent work by Amie Thomasson on ‘easy ontology’ (Thomasson
2015).
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gence should not rely on the inquirer in question being say, amember of the human
species, or enculturated in a particular way. One metaphysical explanation for the
possibility of successful convergence on broad results in the physical sciences is
hard determinism. Peirce took this to be a bad explanation, and offered his own in
its place. For one thing, determinism did not sit entirely well with the new reliance
on statistical explanations in both Darwinian evolution and thermodynamics. For
another, even the success of deterministic laws need not imply that reality itself is
entirely law governed. Rather, we need only think that reality is sufficiently regu-
lar that the measurable features of events are close to those predicted by law.81 On
this alternative conception, we acknowledge the concept of chance as not merely
necessary to cover up areas in which we are ignorant. We shouldn’t, Peirce thinks,
attribute our need to use statistical explanations simply to a lack of knowledge of
an underlying, deterministic, pattern of events. Peirce thus rejects a metaphys-
ical explanation of the possibility of successful scientific inquiry (that the world
is deterministic), in favour of a weaker conception of what explains the possibility
of scientific inquiry converging on certain results (that is, that the world exhibits
certain more-or-less stable statistical regularities that need not stay entirely fixed
over time).82
We might offer a different explanation of convergence in the case of ethics.
Whereas we take the relevant context for inquiry into physical cosmology to be
available to a fairly wide range of possible inquirers, we need not take the same
to be true in ethics. On Peirce’s view of action, it is largely a matter of disposi-
tions to behave in certain ways. In so far as we are in control of the shape of these
dispositions, we are liable to ethical criticism (e.g. EP2:337; CP5.533). The main
questions of ethics are, on this model, questions about the evaluation of certain
dispositions, and their development in the course of ongoing inquiry. We might
then differ about how dependent on contingent features of the human condition
81As Peirce puts it:
Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain
they will be to show irregular departures from the law. We are accustomed to ascribe there, and I do not
say wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such errors in any antecedently
probably way. Trace their causes back far enough, and you will be forced to admit they are always due to
arbitrary determination, or chance. (W8:118/EP1:305, 1892)
The departure of our measurements from those predicted by law can then be attributed to a degree
of absolute chance as well as to errors in our own observations.
82The main text in which Peirce develops these arguments is ‘The Doctrine of Necessity Ex-
amined’ (W8:111–125/EP1:298–311, 1891), but see also ‘A Reply to the Necessitarians’ (CP6.588-
618, 1893). More generally, Peirce’s arguments against the Millian assumption of the uniformity
of nature are also relevant (e.g. W1:420–423/CP7.131–138, 1866).
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the development of these dispositions is. For example, we might take the develop-
ment of these dispositions to be constrained by our nature as rational beings.83 If,
on the other hand, we take these dispositions to be largely constrained by our being
creatures stuck with certain contingent attitudes, then we might offer something
in the ball park of contemporary naturalistic stories about ethics.84
As an interpretation of what Peirce is attempting when he turns to metaphys-
ics, the contextualist proposal runs into some trouble. We have seen that Peirce
hopes for metaphysics to provide an account of both the ‘omni’ and the ‘totum’. A
piecemeal contextualist approach might achieve the first of these aims. That is,
it might provide a distinct account of what it is about the world that enables us
to converge in each area in which we inquire. This would provide an account of
all things (the omni), but it would not give an account of how all of those contexts
fit together in a coherent story (the totum). This, in turn, raises doubts about the
extent to which this approach can achieve the aim of cenoscopy: to provide an ac-
count of project of inquiry that would apply to any possible inquirer. For there to
be an informative story about what any possible inquirer must take to be true,
or of the norms of argumentation that would apply to any possible inquirer; then
we should hope that there is some metaphysical story to be told about the shared
world into which these inquirers are inquiring.
Moreover, this approach does not have much room for the transition from logic
to metaphysics. It does, of course, take on a conception of truth as convergence in
a context. But it doesn’t do anything like projecting a logic onto the world. The
shift from ‘regulative laws of logic’ to ‘laws of being’, or from ‘logical conceptions’
to metaphysical ones does not feature in the method by which we generate meta-
physical hypotheses. Nor do we achieve the kind of modal strength that it seems
that Peirce sometimes wants from his metaphysics. In order to get these things we
will need to add something like the notion of absolute truth. In addition, we will
see in the next chapter that, while the contextualist approach can withstand some
83This would lead us down a Kantian road. Peirce’s own approach is something like this (e.g.
EP2:202–203, 1903).
84This would not make ethical truths any less truthful—any possible inquirer of a given descrip-
tion would converge on the results in question. This would not make the truths in question depend
on what any particular person or group of actual people think. This is realism, although of a sort
that relies on there being a perspective from which we can talk about possible inquirers who do
not fit the given description. Compare Peirce’s account of the reality and externality of colours (e.g.
CP6.327, c. 1893).
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of Price’s recent anti-metaphysical arguments, the absolutist conception is more
successful.
3.2 Absolutist Peircean Metaphysics
If we adopt Peirce’s account of absolute truth in addition to the contextualist no-
tion, we will end up endorsing a different approach to metaphysics. Like the con-
textualist proposal just considered, we will continue to look for an explanation of
the possibility of successful inquiry. However, the relevant notion of success will
change. Recall from the previous chapter that the notion of absolute truth is inten-
ded to push us beyond any particular context towards something more general. At
the very least, we will want some account of how the uses of a concept in various
contexts fit together. This was motivated, in part, by a series of regulative hopes
for inquiry.
If we directly took over the account of Peircean metaphysics that we have just
considered and added the absolutist notion of truth, we would ask how reality
would have to be for the absolute truth to be attainable. This is almost the right
idea. The problem is that, according to Peirce, we should not think of the abso-
lute truth as attainable. Rather, it functions as a limit concept. On this account,
no inquirer, or community of inquiry, could ever possess the absolute truth. Such
inquirers will however, be able to possess all sorts of truths in the everyday sense.
So we instead ask what reality would have to be like in order that inquiry could
successfully approach the absolute truth. This would require us to say, of any par-
ticular lacunae or failure in inquiry, that the problem can be overcome. It would
not, however, require us to think that any particular inquirer or community of
inquiry could possess the absolute truth.
It is worth noting that the idea of an explanation here might seem a little odd.
If I were, say, explaining how I was successful at walking the dog last night, I could
point to all sorts of enabling conditions: the weather, the fact that I got home in
time, the fact that the lead didn’t break, and that I remembered to bring some
plastic bags with me. In this kind of case, the success is already achieved and we
are looking to tell a story about how it came about. In the case of inquiry, at least if
we adopt the absolute truth as an ideal, the success that we are looking to explain
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is never fully achieved. What we are looking to explain, then, is the possibility of
success.85
The ideal introduced by the notion of absolute truth is unitary and embodies
our best present account of what must be admitted by any possible inquirer. The
inquirer adopts, as a norm of their activity, the hope that there is an answer to any
meaningful question they inquire into and a possible resolution of any dispute in
which they are engaged. This requires that there is something to be said about the
success of inquiry over and above success in a context. There must be a perspective
from which a general story can be told. Absolutist Peircean metaphysics attempts
to tell it.
The realist conception of reality ascriptions works naturally with the absolutist
proposal. If we take reality to be cognisable, then we can read features of our lo-
gic onto our metaphysics. This distinguishes the approach from the contextualist
one. Unlike the contextualist approach, the absolutist approach makes methodo-
logical use of the realist conception of reality ascriptions. As Parker glosses the
characterisation of reality that Peirce offers, it is ‘defined as what would be rep-
resented in a perfect argument, at the end of infinite inquiry in to the nature of
the world’ (Parker 1998, p. 185). So, for instance, our conception of reality, as that
which would be discovered at the end of inquiry, becomes the notion of the pro-
position which includes everything. This is the ‘the fact that is not abstracted but
complete’ (EP2:304, 1904). We take the reality we are now interacting with to be
identical (in so far as it is real) with that ideal, unabstracted, proposition. This
is the metaphysical part of the story about absolute truth that was told in the
previous chapter.86
This proposal is not set up in opposition to contextualist stories. Rather, it op-
posesmerely contextualist stories. It may be that different local stories are needed
in different places, but there will still be something global to say. The Peircean
opponent of this story might point to Peirce’s claim that, in inquiry:
We must [. . . ] be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every
philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the con-
clusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the
explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. There is no contradic-
tion here, any more than there is in our holding each one of our opinions, while we
85The claim that metaphysics is unavoidable then becomes the claim that we always have some
such explanation operative, either explicitly or implicitly, when we engage in inquiry.
86Recall that Peirce holds that border between logic and metaphysics to be hard to draw once
we get to thinking about the ideal for inquiry.
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are ready to admit that it is probable that not all are true; or any more than there is
in saying that any future time will sometime be passed, though there never will be a
time when all time is past. (EP1:275–276, 1887–1888)
The picture being defended here does not hold that any given general fact is an
ultimate one. But, more importantly, we do not ‘look forward to’ the explanation
of ‘all things’. This is because Peirce’s conception of the absolute truth is a limit
notion, rather than something ever actually possessed or achieved. However, this
ideal does make sense of the idea that we could hope for the explanation ‘of any
given thing whatever’.
Is this proposal just giving free reign to wishful thinking in metaphysics? This
is a traditional complaint against the pragmatists.87 The case of the adoption of
rational hopes in inquiry is slightly different however, since it is taken up in order
that we can make sense of the practice of thinking. As Parker puts it: ‘[w]ithout
faith in the ideals of Truth and Reality, an honest commitment to rational thought
would not be possible. They are postulates, requisite for any coherent attempt at
inquiry’ (Parker 1998, p. 186). In so far as something like Peircean metaphysics
makes sense of the practice of thought, giving it up would be more like giving up
thinking than giving up merely wishful thinking. Of course, this depends on how
successfully the Peircean shows that the features they put into their metaphysics
are indeed necessary for making coherent sense of the practice of inquiry.
The absolutist conception of Peircean metaphysics then offers an account of
what any world in which inquiry could be successful must be like. Here, success
is understood in terms of the notion of the absolute truth. The notion of the abso-
lute truth is, in turn, adopted as an account of the ideal for inquiry which can be
adopted on the basis of experience available to any possible inquirer.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered Peirce’s conception of the role of metaphysics as
it sits within the hierarchy of the sciences and as a discipline characterised by the
use of abduction. We began with a review of Peirce’s account of metaphysics in its
relation to the other sciences. Peirce takes theoretical philosophy to be cenoscopy,
the study of that which is available to any possible inquirer, and metaphysics to
87A compact summary of criticism of pragmatism on this score can be found in Misak 2016b,
pp. 466–468.
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be the ‘completing department of cenoscopy’. We attempted a reading of Peirce’s
account of metaphysics that remained true to both the relationship between meta-
physics and the idioscopic science and the relationship between metaphysics and
the rest of philosophy. I argued that the two relationships can be held together by
a focus on the abductive character of metaphysics.
Having set out the basic pattern of Peirce’s account of metaphysics and its role
in the sciences, I then offered two proposals for a contemporary Peirceanmethod in
metaphysics. One, corresponding to the contextualist account of Peirce on truth,
was derived from the work of Christopher Hookway. According to this proposal,
the aim of metaphysics is to offer hypotheses that might explain why inquiry is
successful in a given context. The success in question is evidenced by convergence
in belief across difference inquirers in the same context. I suggested that this pro-
posal does not necessarily count as cenoscopy or make as much use as Peirce does
of his realist conception of reality ascriptions. I then presented a conception of
Peircean metaphysics that corresponds to absolutist account of Peirce on truth.
According to this proposal we are to offer hypothetical explanations for the suc-
cess of inquiry on the basis of a fully cenoscopic logic. Such explanations will take
the form of an account of how reality must be if it is to be the object of successful
inquiry.

Chapter 5
Peircean Metaphysics and
Contemporary Pragmatism
Introduction
In the previous chapter I presented two proposals for Peircean metaphysics: the
contextualist and the absolutist. The two proposals share an abductive focus. Both
are interested in offering explanations for success in inquiry. However, the two pro-
posals diverge in both their methods and conclusions. Only the absolutist proposal
fully adopts Peirce’s cenoscopic orientation. As a result, only the absolutist pro-
posal uses the realist conception of reality ascriptions as part of its methodology
or derives necessary conclusions on the basis of claims about any possible inquirer.
In this chapter, I critically compare these two proposals for Peircean metaphysics
with work in contemporary pragmatist philosophy.
I begin by introducing the basic form of Price’s pragmatist rejection of meta-
physics (§1). This rejection of metaphysics turns on a rejection of representation-
alism. This rejection is a result of Price’s subject naturalism. Price holds that
linguistic-anthropological stories can be told about all concepts of philosophical
interest without the introduction of representational notions. Price holds, in ad-
dition, that some kind of globally-applicable representationalist notion would be
necessary in order to motivate either affirmative or negative metaphysical judge-
ments. Price thus endorses a form of metaphysical quietism.
The contextualist proposal for Peircean metaphysics can make some progress
against Price’s anti-metaphysical arguments (§2). Recall that Hookway’s contex-
tualist approach demands an explanation for the possibility of convergence in a
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given context of inquiry. Hookway takes the mere fact of convergence to be ‘meta-
physically neutral’. Various metaphysical stories are then available to explain con-
vergence. Metaphysics is not, on this picture, motivated by deploying a metaphys-
ically loaded (representationalist) conception of truth. However, the Pricean can
respond by claiming that all necessary explanation of convergence can be done by
means of linguistic anthropology, and that, in fact, no context will require either
the affirmation or denial of metaphysical claims. In Price’s recent work, he intro-
duces a merely-local notion of representation (e-representation). Price then claims
that there is no language which is purely e-representational. That is, there is no
form of language which could, absent the adoption of some contingent ‘practical
stance’, be used to make either affirmative or negative reality claims.
In order to more fully challenge Price’s position, I turn to the resources made
available by the absolutist conception of Peircean metaphysics. In particular, I
charge Price with adopting the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions. The
Peircean expects that it will be possible to diagnose uncriticised metaphysics in
anyone who claims to do without it. Price’s adoption of the nominalist concep-
tion is, then, one such case. In addition, I argue that recent exchanges between
Price and Robert Brandom over the status of dispositional/causal modality offer
an open door for the absolutist conception of Peircean metaphysics (§3). In partic-
ular, Brandom seems to be deploying something like Peirce’s realist conception of
reality ascriptions.
1 Price’s Pragmatist Rejection of Metaphysics
David Macarthur and Huw Price characterise pragmatism with an equation:
Pragmatism = linguistic priority without representationalism (Macarthur and Price
2007, p. 97).
They argue that pragmatism, so understood, should lead tometaphysical quietism.
That is, pragmatism should lead us to simply cease askingmetaphysical questions.
Many of the premises for Price and Macarthur’s respective versions of this argu-
ment have been considered in previous chapters.1
1In this section I will focus my attention on the form of the argument that has been developed
by Price in later writings. The account of Macarthur’s differences with Price developed in Chapter
Two should be sufficient for the reader to infer what Macarthur’s version of the argument would
look like.
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Linguistic priority is a claim about the origins of ‘placement problems’. Place-
ment problems arise when we seem to have some commitment that we struggle to
‘place’ with respect to some privileged ontological or epistemological framework.
Price is particularly interested in cases where that background framework is nat-
uralistic. So, for instance, we struggle to place moral facts or the concepts deployed
by folk psychology with respect to (what we take to be) the results of the natural
sciences (e.g. Price 2013, pp. 6–7). This could take the form of either privileging
a particular ‘scientific’ ontology or endorsing an epistemological thesis such that
only the methods of the natural sciences (or some particular natural science) pro-
duce genuine knowledge.2 Price takes it that placement problems are the primary
motivators for contemporary metaphysics.
Price holds that we can either take placement problems to begin with material
or with linguistic data (Price 2013, p. 7). That is, we might take ourselves to be dir-
ectly acquainted with moral facts, or beliefs, or desires and then puzzle over their
naturalistic status. Alternatively, we might take our puzzles to begin with the fact
that we talk and think in terms of moral facts, beliefs, and desires and then won-
der how the referents of these vocabularies (or concepts) could fit within a natural-
istic framework. Linguistic priority is the claim that we should take the linguistic
approach to the origins of placement problems. In Macarthur and Price’s formula-
tion, we begin ‘with linguistic explananda rather than material explananda; with
phenomena concerning the use of certain terms and concepts, rather than with
things or properties of a non-linguistic nature’ (Macarthur and Price 2007, p. 95).
Price takes it that all contemporary analytic philosophers should adopt lin-
guistic priority.3 Price’s pragmatist is differentiated from the metaphysician by re-
jecting representationalism. Price characterises the ‘representationalist assump-
tion’ (about language) as ‘[r]oughly. . . the assumption that the linguistic items
in question [in a placement problem] “stand for” or “represent” something non-
linguistic’ (Price 2013, p. 9). The representationalist deploys ‘substantial semantic
properties or relations’, namely, ones which allow us to turn claims about language
2As argued in Chapter Two, neither of these options would be acceptable to Peirce.
3Price offers a series of arguments based on the current landscape of debates in analytic philo-
sophy. For instance, quasi-realism wouldn’t even be an option within metaethics if philosophers
didn’t, at least implicitly, think that the problems are problems about understanding the language
we use rather than some object which we are already acquainted with (e.g. Price 2013, p. 8). He also
mentions the importance of semantic notions in defending metaphysical theses, including various
forms of naturalism. These would only work, Price thinks, if our problems begin with language
(Price 2011, pp. 265–266; Price 2013, pp. 17–19.
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into claims about the world (c.f. Price 2013, p. 10). Price also characterises sub-
stantial semantic relations as those that play a role in theoretical explanations
(e.g. Price 2013, p. 153). The representationalist, when asked to explain why we
use certain vocabulary, can respond by saying that the vocabulary represents some
set of objects in the world. By invoking representation as an explanatory notion,
the representationalist has moved from ‘words’ to the ‘world’ c.f. Price 2013.4 Two
substantial semantic notions stand out as particularly important for Price: refer-
ence and truth.5
Price offers a metaphor to characterise the representationalist conception of
language. He asks us to imagine a child playing a game with a sticker book. The
child has a collection of stickers on the left page and a collection of outlines which
match the stickers on the right page. The child aims to place the stickers within the
appropriate outlines. In this metaphor the stickers are the statements we take to
be true, and the outlines the states of affairs that make those statements true. The
representationalist takes the function of language to be something like the sticker
game. We aim to make true statements and understand statements to be true by
virtue of ‘matching up’ with the world (Price 2011, pp. 3-4). On this understanding,
we can move from a claim about a piece of language, say ‘p is true’ to a claim about
the world, that there is some state of affairs that corresponds to p in some way or
other.6
The alternative, deflationary, account of semantic properties and relations does
not take them to carry this weight. So, for instance, saying ‘p is true’ does not add
anything to the assertion that p. Likewise, saying that ‘x refers to o’, is simply
another way of talking about o (Price 2013, p. 9). In neither case do we move
from a claim about language to a claim about the world. Such semantic notions
will play no theoretical explanatory role. Price uses the terms ‘deflationism’ and
4Note, as well, that some naturalists take the only legitimate variety of explanation to be causal
explanation. If a naturalist of this sort uses a substantive semantic notion, it will have to play
a causal role linking the language user with some object in the world. In this case, it is quite
obvious how we get from the ‘explanatory’ characterisation of substantiveness to the ‘word-world
connection’ characterisation.
5Strictly speaking, these are two notions that are usually used as substantive relations. Price’s
account of truth, introduced in Chapter Three, is not substantive in this sense. We will see in a
moment that Price’s ‘i-representation’ is intended to be a non-substantive notion of ‘representation’.
6The ‘way’ will depend on the particular variety of representationalism in question.
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‘anti-representationalism’ to refer to the claim that we should reject substantial
semantic relations in our theorising about language.7
Given the explanatory weakness of deflationary notions of truth and reference,
Pricean pragmatistsmust offer accounts of our various vocabularies couched in dif-
ferent terms.8 Price suggests that this can be done under the heading ‘linguistic
anthropology’ (Price 2013, p. 148). As we saw in Chapter Two, the linguistic an-
thropologist accounts for a vocabulary in terms of its function in the lives of lan-
guage users understood as ‘natural creatures in a natural environment’ (e.g. Price
2013, p. 19). Price’s account of truth, considered in the previous chapter, is an ex-
ample of this method. These explanations, will not need, Price thinks, to appeal to
any substantial semantic relations.9
Price does not offer a detailed characterisation of what he takes metaphysics
to be. However, we can infer a lot from the arguments he offers against it. For
instance, Price takes his ‘linguistic anthropology’, couched in the language of the
natural and social sciences, to not bemetaphysical. For instance, to say that ethical
language allows a certain kind of natural creature to cooperate in activities that
they need to carry out to survive may invoke certain objects (the creatures, their
environment). But this would be to offer a bit of biology rather than metaphysics.
So metaphysics must be, for Price, something over and above the sciences that
are involved in linguistic anthropology. Metaphysics must also be concerned with
mind-independent objects, since Price takes the revelation of ways in which some
vocabulary depends on contingent features of ourselves and our environment to
remove the temptation to ask metaphysical questions about that vocabulary (c.f.
7This usage is at odds with some discussions of deflationism, which have a different notion of
‘substantial’ in play. For instance, Misak has argued that Peirce is not a deflationist because he has
a lot to say about the property truth in terms of its connection to notions of inquiry, evidence, etc
(Misak 2007, pp. 70–71). This is to take ‘non-substantial’ to preclude such a connection. Similarly,
Howat has suggested that the Peircean might agree with the deflationist that there is no substant-
ive semantic story to tell about ‘truth’, but argue that there is a substantive story to tell about the
pragmatics of ‘truth’ (c.f. Howat 2014, pp. 373–374, 377). Price would not count as a deflationist
about truth on either Howat or Misak’s approach. It should also be noted that some discussions of
Peirce’s relationship with deflationism are concerned with placing Peirce’s position as a third way
between deflationary and ontological accounts of truth (c.f. Legg 2014a, p. 207).
8Deflationary notions of truth and reference cannot be used in explanations for why we come
to talk in given ways because they make it trivially true that, say, true propositions refer. We are
not then told anything by the claim that, say, declarative language aims to represent the world.
9We will see in a moment that Price slightly weakens this requirement in more recent work
(§2). However, he does not do so in a way that allows for the global use of substantive semantic
relations.
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Price 2013, pp. 62–63). Price is here deploying a certain way of characterising ‘real’
or ‘real object’. We will return to this question later (§3).
We are now in a position to understand the basic form of Price’s argument that
pragmatists should be metaphysical quietists:
1. We can explain our linguistic behaviour, and thus discharge all of our ‘philo-
sophical debts’, without the use of substantial semantic relations (e.g. by
Price’s ‘linguistic anthropology’) (c.f. Price 2013, pp. 19, 181).
2. The use of substantial semantic relations in our philosophical theories leads
to serious problems. At best, we will be left with a long list of intractable
‘placement problems’.10
3. Therefore: we shouldn’t use substantial semantic relations in our philosoph-
ical theorising.
4. Metaphysical questions can only be answered by either asserting or denying
that some substantial semantic relation holds of some linguistic item.
5. Therefore: we should abstain frommetaphysical questions. That is, we should
become metaphysical quietists.
The contextualist approach to Peircean metaphysics can challenge Price by deny-
ing premise (4). That is, explanatory questions about convergence in belief can
be motivated without already adopting some metaphysically loaded conception of
representation. However, we will see that the absolutist proposal enables a more
radical rejection of this form of argument. In particular, by adopting the ceno-
scopic orientation rather than the perspective of the linguistic anthropologist, we
can both diagnose metaphysical assumptions in Price’s argument and defend sub-
stantive metaphysical positions of our own.
2 Contextualist Peircean Metaphysics and
‘Representationalism’
Peirce’s contextualist account of truth, via Hookway, is not ‘substantive’ in the
sense set out by Price. To say something is true, on Peirce’s account, is to say
10There are more serious worries for naturalists though, in so far as naturalism can be argued
to be incompatible with the substantial relations which the representationalist depends on (c.f.
Price 2013, pp. 13–16).
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something about, if not language narrowly construed, then about the practice of
inquiry. It is then a further question how we explain what convergence there is in
those practices. There is no automatic move from claims about the truth of propos-
itions to any particular kind of metaphysical explanation.11 In Price’s language,
‘linguistic anthropology’ might leave room for metaphysical questions cashed out
in terms other than those of substantial semantic relations. In particular, the con-
textualist Peircean story is not one where we have to find a certain kind of object
thatmakes p true for every true p (c.f. Legg 2014a, p. 207). To endorse such a view
would be to prioritise the starting point of inquiry rather than the final opinion,
and thus to adopt the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions.
The move from ‘language narrowly construed’ to ‘the practice of inquiry’ may
raise worries about linguistic priority. It may seem that this is simply to adopt
the material conception of placement problems. I don’t think that Price should be
worried though. We canmaintain the spirit of linguistic priority while abandoning
the letter. The linguistic conception starts with our use of language or concepts,
and this usage occurs within the context of various practices that include non-
linguistic elements. Price thinks, for instance, that the linguistic problems that
he takes to motivate philosophy can equally be raised by asking what role the
term ‘X ’ plays in our lives or asking what function the concept X performs for us
(Price 2013, pp. 7–8). Consideration of some piece of language pushes us directly
to consideration of our practices more broadly construed.
In this connection, we might also consider the role that various concepts play
within the practice of scientific experimentation. At least half the work of any nat-
ural scientific experiment will be preparation. This will involve the application of
more or less sophisticated concepts. Similarly, the results will only be meaningful
in so far as we can interpret them using certain (perhaps distinct) concepts. On
the classical pragmatist story the conceptual phase of the experiment and the act-
ive phase (actually intervening in the world) can not be cleanly divided from one
another. Moreover, to understand a concept is to understand the possible roles it
could play in experimental interaction with the world.12 Instead of starting with
language use narrowly construed, then, we start with our ‘conceptual practices’.
11Recall that this notion of truth is ‘metaphysically neutral’. There is no automatic move from,
say, the capacity of a ‘belief forever to withstand challenge’ and any particular story about the
relationship between beliefs and the world (Bacon 2012, p. 275).
12This is, of course, the pragmatic maxim.
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This is not to adopt the ‘material’ conception of placement problems, since we do
not assume any kind of unmediated acquaintance with the objects of our concern.
The Pricean response to the contextualist Peircean metaphysician would then
be to deny that anything metaphysical is necessary for explaining our conceptual
practices or the successful convergence that sometimes obtains within them. In
other words, Price can hold that his non-metaphysical linguistic anthropology of-
fers all the explanation of convergence one might need. Indeed, if all Price’s stories
about various local vocabularies are successful, he will have discharged the theor-
etical demands that motivate contextualist Peircean metaphysics, without having
to actually engage in metaphysics.
An argument against Price would need to show that there is at least one case
in which success in inquiry cannot be adequately explained without going beyond
linguistic anthropology. The kind of ‘local’ stories that we would look to in order
to find some counterexample to Price’s claim might be, say, descriptive language
including everyday objects like tables and chairs or the language of advanced sci-
entific theories. This would involve the defence of a kind of local representation-
alism.13 In such cases, we we can affirm the mind-independence of at least some
features of the objects in question. Our best explanation for our linguistic practice
won’t have to refer to anything on ‘our side’ of the ledger. The thought would be
something like the following from Blackburn:
How come we go in for descriptions of the world in terms of energies and currents?
Because we have learned to become sensitive to, measure, predict and control, and to
describe and refer to, energies and currents. (Blackburn 2013, p. 79)
Price objects, on the basis of his linguistic anthropology, that there is no vocab-
ulary from which contingent features of our ‘practical stances’ can be completely
removed. However, in order to make sense of this claim we will need to consider
some more recent developments in Price’s anti-representationalism.
In recent work, Price has distinguished between two kinds of representation,
and has diagnosed the problem with ‘capital-R’ representationalism as confus-
ing the two notions. That is, rather than not using any representational notions,
the Pricean pragmatist carefully deploys two (c.f. Price 2013, pp. 62–67). One of
the clearest angles by which to see the distinction is to start with the difference
between ‘local’ and ‘global’ levels of theoretical explanation.14 In line with Price’s
13Something like this move is defended in both Brandom 2013 and Blackburn 2013.
14Price takes this approach in a few places (e.g. Price 2013, p. 153).
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linguistic starting point, we can ask either ‘global’ questions about all assertoric
language, or we can ask ‘local’ questions about some particular vocabulary or set of
concepts. One representational notion appears at the global level. Price calls this
notion ‘i-representation’, where the ‘i’ stands for ‘internal’. I-representation is not
a substantive semantic notion. Rather, it is a notion of representation in so far as
it tells us what it takes for some bit of language to count as claiming or asserting
something.15 Price suggests various stories that could play this role at the global
level. For instance, Brandom’s account of assertions as playing roles in the ‘game
of giving and asking for reasons’ (Price 2013, p. 32).16 The details of this story are
not important for us. All we need to note is that playing a certain kind of role in
a social justification game need not automatically lead us from claims about that
role to claims about ‘the world’.17 If the Pricean arguments developed in in the
previous section work, then i-representation will not get us metaphysics.
However, we can also adopt a ‘local’ approach to the study of language. This
will consist in stories about the function of particular areas of discourse. This will
include, for Price, linguistic-anthropological accounts of the specific functions of
modal, moral, mathematical, scientific, everyday observational vocabularies and
so on. Consider, for example, the following two sentences:
1. ‘The Loxley River is beautiful’
2. ‘There are squirrels in the woods along the Loxley’
At the global level, we can say that both are equally i-representational. For in-
stance, both can be used as reasons in deliberation and so count as propositions
on the sketch of Brandom’s position gestured to above. If someone asks why I am
proposing that we go for a walk along the Loxley, I could offer either (1) or (2)
15Or in other words, it tells us what gives a statement it’s ‘propositional shape’ (c.f. Price 2013,
p. 32).
16Another option for a global story would be to follow Michael Williams’s proposal that ‘if sen-
tences are used in ways that respect the syntactic discipline of assertoric discourse, then they are
used to make assertions and are as “truth-apt’ as sentences get to be’ (Williams 2013, p. 131).
Price’s also offers a ‘uniform story about the defining common characteristics of declarative speech
acts—a common story about what assertion is for, as it were. In the simple version. . . this story will
say that assertions enable social creatures to express, revise and align behavioural commitments
of various kinds’ (Price 2013, p. 153).
17Nor would this notion of representation play any important role in our explanations of why
we go about using certain vocabularies. We wouldn’t start our explanation of why we use language
with i-representation as an explanatory primitive. We, instead, build the notion of i-representation
out of some story about reason giving or aligning behavioural commitments etc.
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as a reason. However, at the local level, different stories will be appropriate for
each. The first sentence includes the concept of beauty, about which we can tell
many philosophical stories. Perhaps, for instance, we could say that the role of the
concept is to enable expression of my appreciation for the river and my insistence
that you appreciate it similarly. This explanation will not apply to sentences like
(2). In attempting to explain (2) we seem drawn to more traditional representa-
tional notions.
Price introduces an environment-tracking representational notion, ‘e-repres-
entation’, which can be used in some local contexts. This would include an explan-
ation of sentences like (2). Part of that story will involve some ability of the speaker
to track the presence of squirrels in their environment. In e-representation ‘some
feature of the representing system either does, or is (in some sense) “intended to”,
vary in parallel with some feature of the represented system’ (Price 2013, p. 36).
Often, this ‘covariation’ will be causal. This is the kind of notion that a theorist
would use in order to explain how I manage to, for instance, token ‘squirrel!’ pretty
much exclusively the presence of squirrels. This kind of co-variation could also be
required in the kind of explanation a biologist might offer for the possibility of a
dog chasing a squirrel, or for a mechanic explaining the relationship between the
fuel gauge on a car and the level of fuel in the tank (c.f. Price 2013, p. 36). This kind
of causal relation need not be intentional in order to count as e-representation.
We might need e-representation in our local stories about scientific vocabulary
or the language of everyday descriptions. If Price is right, then we will not neces-
sarily need it to explain aesthetic language, and we will not need it globally. Price’s
stories about, e.g., morality or truth, do not appeal to any corresponding feature of
the environment tracked by such language. But note that, unlike ‘i-representation’,
‘e-representation’ is a substantive semantic notion (Price 2013, p. 159). It turns
our attention from words or concepts used by some creature, to the world, typic-
ally via some causal relationship. Similarly, it is needed as an explanatory notion.
Part of our explanation about why we come to talk in terms of tables and chairs
will involve an ability to track such objects in our environment.18
Price’s anti-representationalism thus becomes the claim that these two notions
of representation should not be confused with one another. Price characterises the
18Recall that Price offers characterisations of what counts as a ‘substantial’ semantic notion
both in terms of explanatory role and in terms of its enabling a shift in attention from ‘words’ to
the ‘world’.
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distinction between two notions of representation as pulling apart a ‘content’ and
a ‘correspondence’ assumption:
The view I’m challenging can be thought of as a loosely articulated combination of two
fundamental assumptions about language and thought. The first assumption (call
it the content assumption) is that language is a medium for encoding and passing
around sentence-sized packets of factual information—the content of beliefs and as-
sertions. The second assumption (the correspondence assumption) is that these pack-
ets of information are all ‘about’ some aspect of the external world, in much the same
way. For each sentence, and each associated packet of information, there’s an ap-
propriately ‘shaped’ aspect of the way the world is, or could be... The orthodox view
bundles these two assumptions together (not recognising that they are distinct). (Price
2013, p. 40)
Price captures the ‘content’ aspect of thought and language with the notion of i-
representation. The ‘correspondence’ aspect of thought and language is captured
by e-representation.
It is not immediately clear from this why we cannot simply adopt the notion
of e-representation in order to license metaphysics. We might simply claim that
those objects which might be tracked in the environment are real and take an
anti-realist attitude towards those concepts or propositions which are not to be
understood in terms of environment tracking. We might say that there are really
squirrels since they can be tracked in the environment, while there are not really
facts about whether such and such a river is beautiful since we do not understand
beauty in terms of environment tracking.19 It seems that something like this could
be adopted by the contextualist Peircean metaphysician. We could take our con-
vergence in certain domains to be explained by the fact that there are external
objects which we, and anything like us, have some capacity to track. In other con-
texts, say, when attempting to make ethical judgements, we need not invoke this
kind of explanation.20
Price does not think that this kind of picture will work.21 For e-representation
to play this role, there would need to be a form of discourse that was entirely
19This would be perfectly compatible with using the notion of i-representation to license the use
of propositions about, say, aesthetics or morality is a quasi-realist fashion. We can understand why
we talk as though there are moral facts in terms of the need for creatures like us to align their
attitudes about certain behaviours without there being any moral facts to ‘track’.
20This notion of reality would align with ‘basic realism’ if we decided that true convergence is
only available in cases where there is the ‘environment-tracking’ notion of external constraint. It
would be an additional notion of reality if we took there to be other possible explanations that
underwrite convergence without undermining the objectivity of the belief converged on.
21The context of this debate is his understanding of himself as generalising Blackburn’s ‘quasi-
realist’ approach to modal and moral vocabulary to all assertoric vocabularies (see Blackburn
2013).
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e-representational. This would enable us to pick out all the things that could
be tracked in the environment absent any distortion from features of our lan-
guage that are the result of merely contingent features of our situation as nat-
ural creatures. But Price denies that any such language exists. The best candid-
ate for such a language is, Price thinks, natural scientific language. But we cannot
take this to be purely e-representational because there is a non-representational
linguistic anthropology available for core (perhaps irreducible) parts of scientific
vocabulary.22 These include both modal and general terms.
Price makes this argument in very compact form. Price suggests that a Black-
burn-style modal quasi-realism shows how ‘creatures in our situation would be
led to develop a modal physics, even if they inhabited a non-modal world’ (Price
2008, p. 89). Such an account might explain modal language in terms of our situ-
ation as decision making creatures with imperfect information concerning the fu-
ture. On Price’s understanding this would be a contingent ‘practical stance’ (Price
2013, p. 48).23 Price points to similar considerations regarding the use of general
terms. According to Price something like Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem
leads to the conclusion that the use of general terms requires us to adopt ‘contin-
gent, shared dispositions to “go on in the same way” in the same way’ (Price 2013,
p. 62). That is, there is no fact of the matter beyond these dispositions that determ-
ines whether the use of a given general term is correct. To have such a disposition,
or to be able to take on such a disposition, is another practical stance. In so far
as all scientific vocabulary deploys general and modal concepts it requires us to
be able to adopt certain contingent practical stances. This excludes the possibility
of metaphysical questions being formulated using the notion of e-representation.
There is no purely e-representational language that enables us to speak of the
world, even of the world as natural environment, absent the contingencies of our
existence as natural creatures.
There are a few possible responses to this argument. For one thing, we could
challenge the relevant bits of linguistic anthropology that Price relies on. Peirce
has lot of things to say about both modality and the use of general concepts. We
22In the background is a dispute over whether scientific language is necessarily modal. The
basic idea behind this is that at least a large part of science is nomological—it is concerned with
laws. We will consider these issues, and their connection with modality, in more detail when we
turn to Brandom’s exchanges with Price.
23Price defines a ‘practical stance’ as a ‘practical situation or characteristic that a creature must
instantiate, if the language game in question is to play its defining role in her life’ (Price 2013,
p. 48).
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have already discussed Peirce’s opposition to nominalism and acceptance of real-
ism regarding both modal and general concepts. Here it is also worth noting that
there are attempts to develop Peircean responses to rule-following arguments. For
instance, Legg argues, using Peirce’s categories, that we can make sense of a rule
as having a phenomenal quality that can be recognised by its users across distinct
applications of the rule (e.g. Legg 2003). This path could lead to a more tradi-
tional scientific realism. The difficulty with using Peirce’s own metaphysical work
for this project is that much of it is, as the last chapter argued, developed from the
cenoscopic perspective, and with something like the absolutist strategy in mind.
There is room, at least conceptually, for a contextualist Peircean metaphysi-
cian to reject Price’s form of naturalism without adopting the absolutist approach.
While Price restricts his resources for constructing explanations to what is given
by the account of human beings provided by biology and some social sciences, the
Peircean need not be similarly restricted. There is thus room for challenging Price’s
conclusions on the basis of these additional resources.24 For instance, we might
attempt to present agreement across cultures regarding certain ethical principles
as impressive and worthy of explanation. This might be enough to motivate some
non-naturalist local story about ethics.25
Finally, we might adopt the absolutist variant of Peircean metaphysics and,
concomitantly, the realist conception of reality ascriptions. Recall the sketch of a
Peircean argument for the reality of universals: if reality is at the end of inquiry
and all thought involves general concepts, then general concepts are features of
reality. Price claims that the necessity of adopting some ‘practical stance’ for the
concepts involved makes a metaphysical story about those concepts unavailable. I
intimated above that this is a result of Price’s adopting something like the nomin-
alist conception of reality ascriptions and then denying that any such ascriptions
can be either affirmed or denied. However, we’ve seen that a distinct conception
of reality ascriptions is available to the pragmatist. On the realist conception of
reality ascriptions, some concept only being available from the practical stance
that must be adopted by any possible inquirer does not prevent us from adopting a
realist attitude to it. In fact, it encourages metaphysical realism. In order to more
24Price seems to dismiss this option out of hand while responding to Paul Horwich (Price 2013,
185 n.17).
25This story would need to be one such that the non-natural things postulated would be relevant
to the explanation of how we come to converge on moral beliefs.
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fully explore this option, it will be useful to consider a recent exchange between
Price and Brandom on causal and dispositional modality.
3 Peirce, Price, and Brandom on Modality
3.1 Brandom’s Modal Expressivism and Modal Realism
In recent work Robert Brandom has attempted to draw together features of modal
realism and modal expressivism. Brandom’s target vocabulary is variously de-
scribed as physical and causal modality. Under this heading falls:
1. physical/causal necessity and possibility,
2. subjunctive conditionals, and
3. dispositional language.
An example of each may help:
1. ‘It is not possible for a dog to also be a squirrel.’
2. ‘If the culprit had been unknown to the dog, then it would have barked.’
3. ‘Greyhounds are gentle animals.’
As well as the lawlike features of caninity, this form of modality also encompasses
the laws of nature. On Brandom’s view, to understand this vocabulary we need
both a modal expressivism and amodal realism that is not earned by virtue of any-
thing as low-cost as i-representation. If Brandom is right we will have an example
of a practical stance (the modal expressivism) requiring us to also acknowledge a
corresponding feature of reality.
I’ll start with Brandom’s modal expressivism. Brandom takes modal language
to express certain relations of consequence and incompatibility between empirical
descriptions that we take ourselves to be committed to by virtue of deploying de-
scriptive language. For example, correct application of the concept dog26 implies
(defeasibly) correct application of four-legged. We might express this consequence
relation with the sentence ‘dogs tend to develop four legs’. Alternatively, correct
application of dog excludes correct application of squirrel to the same object at the
26I will follow Brandom’s convention of underlining mentioned concepts in this section.
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same time. We might express this relation with the sentence ‘it is not possible for
a dog to be a squirrel’.
On Brandom’s view, the expression of these relations between empirical de-
scriptions allows modal statements to function as ‘inference tickets’. For instance,
the claim that it is not possible for a dog to be a squirrel, licenses the inference
from ‘Murphy is a dog’ to ‘Murphy is not a squirrel’, and the claim that dogs tend to
develop four legs (defeasibly) licenses the conclusion that ‘Murphy has four legs’.
An important further function of modal vocabulary is to help us articulate the
counterfactual or merely possible circumstances in which suchmaterial inferences
fail. So, for instance, I could characterise the circumstances (including some very
unfortunate accidents) which would ruin the inference from ‘Murphy is a dog’ to
‘Murphy has four legs’. Without subjunctive conditionals, and especially counter-
factuals, we could not do this.
Modal vocabulary articulates something about the structure of our language. It
is thus, in a sense, metalinguistic. Brandom takes his modal expressivism to offer
us a ‘pragmatic metavocabulary’ for modal language. A ‘pragmatic metavocabu-
lary’ tells us what we do with a given vocabulary. To repeat, on Brandom’s view,
what we do is express the relations of consequence and incompatibility that hold
between empirical descriptions; and especially the counterfactual robustness of
the material inferences we endorse.
It is worth adding that Brandom takes the structural features of language ar-
ticulated by modal vocabulary to be necessary features of any language that in-
cludes empirical descriptions. They are not optional extras. Brandom calls this
claim the ‘modal Kant-Sellars thesis,’ which he states as follows: ‘in knowing how
to use ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary, one already knows how to do
everything one needs to know how to do in order to be able (in principle) to use
alethic modal vocabulary’ (Brandom 2015a, p. 179).
Defending this thesis, Brandom notes that we do not take someone who cannot
draw out any further consequences from applying a concept in a given situation to
have grasped the relevant concept. If I say that there are lots of squirrels in the
woods by the Loxley, but do not realise that this implies that the Loxley would be a
good place to take my visitor from New Zealand who has never seen a squirrel and
wants to be shown one, then I fail to grasp the concept I am supposedly applying.
In this case, my claim would not describe the woods as ‘full of squirrels’, the phrase
would instead function as a ‘mere label’. OnBrandom’s view, for something to count
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as a description at all, it must be in the kind of relations to other descriptions that
are made explicit by modal vocabulary.
We can now turn to the realist side of Brandom’s position, which aims to provide
a semantic metavocabulary to compliment the pragmatic metavocabulary given by
his expressivism. A semantic metavocabulary aims to tell us what we are talking
about, or what we are responsible to, when using the vocabulary in question. Bran-
dom characterises ‘modal realism’ as any viewwhichmaintains the following three
theses:
1. ‘Some modally qualified claims are true’
2. ‘Those that are state facts’
3. ‘Some of those facts are objective, in the sense that they are independent of
the activities of concept users: they would be facts even if there never were
or never had been concept users’ (Brandom 2015a, p. 195).
Brandom takes (1) and (3) to be true for naturalistic reasons: (1) is instanced by
statements of laws of nature, while (3) is a result of the fact that some of these laws
are time-symmetric. If we denied (3) we’d have to say that the laws of nature came
about at the same time concept-users appeared.27 Brandom takes (2) to be true
by definition, for ‘the facts just are the true thinkables and claimables’ (Brandom
2015a, p. 195).
Brandom’s particular way of implementing modal realism holds that ‘[w]ays
the world can be empirically described as being stand to one another in objective,
modally robust relations of material consequence and incompatibility’ (Brandom
2015a, p. 198). His example of the former is ‘[i]f the sample were (had been) pure
copper, then it would be (would have been) denser than water’. His example of
the latter is that ‘[a] sample’s being pure copper is incompatible with its being an
electrical insulator’ (Brandom 2015a, p. 198). It is really the case that certain ways
the world can be exclude and entail other ways the world might be.
Realism about these modal facts is, Brandom thinks, implicit in realism about
the objects of ordinary empirical descriptions. To make this out he starts from
27Brandom mentions Huw Price here as an example of a philosopher ‘both competent and will-
ing’ to go against the physicists own use of modal vocabulary. This does not greatly affect the
dialectic here for two reasons. First, the Pricean arguments I am interested in do not turn on the
natural scientific details. Second, while Price may be ‘competent’ to go against the physicists, Bran-
dom is clearly not convinced by the actual arguments that Price offers on the basis of his scientific
competence.
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the claim that the world is describable, or determinate. Now, to be determinately
one way is to not be some other way. Brandom endorses, with arguments that we
cannot pause to consider, a ‘Hegelian’ conception of determinateness. According
to this conception, the relevant kind of difference is ‘exclusive’ rather than ‘mere’
difference (Brandom 2015a, p. 200). The difference between two properties is ex-
clusive if they cannot be possessed at the same time by the same object. The prop-
erty of being a dog and the property of being a squirrel are exclusively different:
nothing can be both at once. The property of being a dog and being lovely to be
around are merely different, since while they can be distinguished, possessing one
does not preclude possessing the other; in fact, many objects do. But if we take the
world to be determinate in this exclusive sense, we are automatically committed
to material incompatibilities (and also to material consequence relations). That is,
applying this notion of determinateness to the world commits one to modal real-
ism: ‘[a] world without modal facts would be an indeterminate world’ (Brandom
2015a, p. 202).
3.2 Modality and External Constraint
In order to put Brandom’s views in contact with Price’s it will be helpful to add
one further detail to Price’s position. When drawing the distinction between e-
representation and i-representation, Price presents it as based on an underlying
distinction between two forms of external constraint. The first, ‘in-game’, notion
concerns the norms provided by ‘the game of giving and asking for reasons’ (Price
2013, p. 37). By this, Price means the constraint provided by the norms of our
various assertoric practices. A basic constraint of this sort that will come up again
later is the normative incompatibility of being simultaneously committed to two
contradictory beliefs. The players of a game of chess are bound in a similar way
by the rules of the game, which they must submit to if they are to play at all. This
notion corresponds to i-representation.
The second notion is characterised by, in Price’s words, ‘covariance—and hence
“normal”, “intended” or “proper function” covariance—between a tokening of a rep-
resentation and an element of an external environment’ (Price 2013, p. 37). I’ll call
this the ‘out of game’ notion. To be constrained by the environment, in this sense,
is for the appropriateness of your representational system to be measured by the
presence or absence of some ‘element’ of the external environment. A failure of this
capacity is likely to be more immediately felt than a failure in the ‘in-game’ sense.
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For instance, failing to track the presence of a wall is liable to lead you to walk in
to it. The ‘out-of-game’ notion of externality is aligned with e-representation.
The first thing to note is that the form of modal expressivism we have con-
sidered introduces only ‘in-game’ constraint. It is an ‘in-game’ feature of the game
of giving and asking for reasons that a commitment to ‘Murphy is a dog’ is incom-
patible with a commitment to ‘Murphy is a squirrel’. If I take on those incompatible
commitments, I will not be thought rational by my conversational peers. However,
I am not physically prevented by some feature of my environment from taking
them on. In fact, I am sure that I am in such a state now with respect to some of
my commitments. That is, if I were to follow all of the inferential chains licensed
by my present beliefs, I would end up deriving a contradiction. I do not, however,
know which of my commitments are incompatible. If I did know, I would attempt
to change the commitments in question.
Brandom takes the adopting of this ‘in-game’, expressivist, story to be neces-
sary for even understanding what it is that we are realists about in themodal case.
In Brandom’s terms, modal realism is ‘sense-dependent’ on modal expressivism.
The concepts in which modal realism is cashed out, fact and law, are only able
to be understood if you also understand asserting and inferring. On Brandom’s
view, facts are essentially assertibles, laws are essentially inference supporters
(Brandom 2015a, pp. 208-9).
So far we have not said anything that Price has to disagree with. The difference
comeswhenwe turn to the sense inwhich Brandommakesmodality notmerely ‘in-
game’. Brandom rejects the view that modal realism can be brought by appeal to
what he calls ‘declarativism’, the view that truth-aptness can be brought simply by
means of declarative form. On such a view, as we’ve seen when discussing Price’s
i-representation, a statement of Newton’s second law (F = ma) would be just as
fact-stating as ‘one ought not to be cruel’.28 Brandom wants something stronger
(Brandom 2015a, p. 207).
The realism Brandom wants must satisfy, in his words, the ‘dual requirements
of semantic government of claimings by facts and epistemic tracking of facts by
claimings’ (Brandom 2015a, p. 210). Semantic government captures the thought
that what we are talking about ought to have some authority over what we say
about it. In Brandom’s words ‘[w]hat one is talking about provides a standard for
the assessment of what one says’.
28These are Brandom’s examples (Brandom 2015a, pp. 207-8).
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For instance, if I say that the Loxley River joins with the Rivelin at Malin
Bridge, the standard for assessing the appropriateness of that claimwill depend on
how things are with the Loxley, the Rivelin, and the Malin Bridge. Semantic gov-
ernment can be achieved in the modal case by virtue of the fact that the relations
of material consequence and incompatibility between empirical descriptions and
the relations of material consequence and incompatibility between the contents of
facts (and possible facts) can, and ought to, ‘line up’ with one another (Brandom
2015a, p. 211).
Epistemic tracking, on the other hand, is a matter of subjunctive relations
between possible facts and claimings. Epistemic tracking holds if it is true that
were the facts different then the claimings would be different also (Brandom 2015a,
p. 211). This form of tracking, unlike ‘e-representation’, need not be causal (Bran-
dom 2015a, p. 212).
It seems that Brandom diverges from Price on modality at least in so far as
Brandom adopts the following two theses:
1. The semantic government of modal claimings by modal facts is not merely
an ‘in-game’ feature of modal discourse.
2. The epistemic tracking of modal facts by modal claimings is not ‘e-represent-
ation’ (or ‘out-of-game’ constraint).
Brandom must at least take (1) to be true by virtue of his rejection of declarativ-
ism. An important part of the story about semantic government is that we want to
pattern the normative structure of our claimings on the modal structure that we
take to relate the contents of possible facts. This is not a merely ‘in-game’ concep-
tion of what’s going on. That is, it’s not just that we are subject to certain norms by
virtue of participating in modal discourse, and that we then ‘project’ those norms
onto the world. Even on this view there would be a sense in which there is semantic
government of claimings by facts: we take our claimings to be subject to the rel-
evant norms, and take the facts to be the ‘projection’ of those norms. Even with
only in-game constraint, failing to live up to the norms can easily be presented as
failing to be governed by the appropriate facts. However, Brandom’s rejection of
declarativism explicitly rejects the idea that this notion of semantic government
is sufficient in the modal case.
The truth of claim (2) depends on how narrow the notions of ‘e-representation’
and ‘out-of-game’ constraint are. Both notions point to ‘covariation’ of a partic-
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ular representation with a particular feature of the environment. But, it seems
that Price cannot include features of the environment that are themselves modal.
According to Price, the function of modal language of this sort can be captured
without appealing to ‘e-representation’.29 On this view, then, modal features of the
environment cannot be tracked in the out-of-game, e-representational, sense. The
resulting conception of modal language presents it as representing the modal facts
by means of a structural isomorphism between the normative relations between
claimings and the modal relations between contents of (possible) facts. The modal
facts are not items in the environment in the narrow sense of Price’s out-of-game
constraint. Rather, the modal facts are part of the structure of any determinate
environment.
3.3 Brandom and Price in Light of Peirce
Brandom’s criticism of Price on the issue of modality can be sharpened by applying
three features of the Peircean absolutist approach to metaphysics: the prioritisa-
tion of logic to metaphysics, the cenoscopic characterisation of philosophy, and the
realist conception of reality ascriptions. This will allow Brandom’s account of mod-
ality to provide an example of the kind of case where a certain kind of ‘practical
stance’, namely the practical stance of any possible inquirer, does not preclude the
Peircean pragmatist from taking on metaphysical commitments. In fact, it encour-
ages them.
The cenoscopic approach to philosophy can only function if we have somemeans
of making judgements about what would be true of any possible inquirer. One as-
pect of Peirce’s logic that fills this role is his account of truth as an ideal for inquiry.
It is a normative claim that any possible inquirer ought to adopt something like the
absolute truth as an ideal. Various other features of Peirce’s logic are an attempt
to provide an account of the structures of thought that might enable us to dis-
cover the truth. This includes, for instance, his arguments for the three categories
as necessary and irreducible features of thought. There are various methods for
showing that some concept or practical orientation is necessary for the possibility
of thought.
We quickly passed over the cenoscopic aspect of Brandom’s position in the sum-
mary above. I noted that Brandom endorses the Kant-Sellars thesis about modal-
29Recall that this is an important premise in his argument that the language of natural science
is not entirely e-representational.
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ity according to which any language user in a position to use ordinary empirical
descriptive vocabulary is also in a position to use modal vocabulary. Brandom ex-
pands on this thought as follows:
As I would like to formulate it, the Kant-Sellars thesis begins with the claim that
in using ordinary empirical vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything one
needs to know how to do in order to introduce and deploy modal vocabulary. If that
is right, then one cannot be in the position of the atomist (for instance, empiricist)
critic of modality professes to find himself in: having fully understood and mastered
the use of nonmodal vocabulary, but having thereby afforded himself no grip on the
use of modal vocabulary, and no access to what it expresses. The Humean-Quinean
predicament is accordingly diagnosed as resulting from a failure properly to under-
stand the relation between modal vocabulary and what one must do in order to deploy
nonmodal, empirical, descriptive vocabulary. (Brandom 2015b, p. 152)
Ordinary empirical vocabulary includes, for instance, observational reports like
‘there is a black dog over there’ and ordinary descriptions like ‘there are squirrels
in the woods along the Loxley’. The claim that anyone who can deploy these con-
cepts must also be in a position to be able to ‘introduce and deploy’ modal vocabu-
lary is based on the claim that the use of these concepts requires an ability to dis-
criminate between those counterfactual situations in which material inferences
using the concepts would fail to obtain. Modal vocabulary is the vocabulary that
makes this ability explicit.
Brandom’s argument, if it is successful, holds for anything that deploys de-
scriptive concepts. It seems that anything that is able to engage in inquiry must
be able to make descriptive judgements about the domain that they are inquiring
into. So, put into the cenoscopic key, Brandom is here arguing that any possible
inquirer must have the abilities that are made explicit by the use of modal vocab-
ulary. This is made clear by his claim that the position of the ‘atomist [. . . ] critic
of modality’ is impossible. We have, then, a piece of cenoscopic logic here which we
can attempt to transfer to metaphysics.
The prioritisation of logic over metaphysics in the hierarchy of the sciences in-
dicates that the practical stance of the inquirer is built in to Peirce’s account of
the role of metaphysics. This is particularly clear in the 1896 passage where Peirce
begins with the regulative ‘laws of logic’ and then takes them to be ‘truths of be-
ing’. This is to build the stance of the participant in the practice of inquiry into
your metaphysics. There is no way to make sense of the idea of regulative rules
absent some conception of the practice that those rules regulate. The proposals for
Peircean metaphysics developed in the previous chapter hold that metaphysics is
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either motivated by an explanatory question about the success of our own prac-
tices (the contextualist proposal) or by the attempt to provide an account of the
general structure of any reality that could be the subject of inquiry (the absolutist
proposal). In both cases the practical stance of the inquirer is an input into meta-
physical reflection. In neither case is there license to endorse as real something
that entirely outruns either present inquiry (the contextualist) or possible inquiry
(the absolutist). The possibility of endorsing such a thing seems to be built in to
Price’s claim that metaphysics is impossible unless we have some way of breaking
outside the limits of our practical stances.
The prioritisation of the normative sciences, including logic, is a core plank
of Peirce’s form of pragmatism. Pragmatism starts with practice. For Peirce, it
starts with the practice of theoretical inquiry understood in cenoscopic terms. For
Brandom, it starts with the perspective of the language user who can deploy em-
pirical descriptions. For Price, it starts with the descriptions of practice available
to the biologist or biological anthropologist. Brandom and Peirce’s respective start-
ing points allow for the Peircean shift from logic to metaphysics, whereas Price’s
does not. Price’s approach, like the object naturalism he criticises, starts by priv-
ileging certain results of contemporary science. Price takes philosophy to ‘defer
to’ the sciences, and this leaves their results outside the domain of philosophical
criticism. As Peirce warns, this move often hides an assumed and uncriticised (in
Price’s case uncriticisable) metaphysics. To see this, we return to the issue of real-
ity ascriptions.
Peirce takes it that everyone should at least agree on the definition of the reality
of an object or phenomenon in terms of its independence from the thought or you
or I or any particular collection of people. Price claims that the dependence of our
concepts on practical stances prevents us from being able to either affirm or deny
the independence of thought of anything falling under those concepts. This is to ad-
opt something like the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions rather than the
realist one. Recall that the reason we cannot engage in metaphysical inquiry with
the notion of e-representation is that no language is entirely e-representational.
So, on Price’s view, if we were to engage in metaphysics, we would need something
like an entirely e-representational language. Now e-representations represent by
virtue of tracking some feature of our natural environment. This implies that Price
thinks that if we were to ascribe or deny metaphysical reality to something, then
it would have to be a trackable entity in the environment. This is, to return to
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Peirce’s metaphor, to place reality at the observation end of inquiry. Moreover, it
is to stack the decks in favour of a metaphysics of particular individuals of the
sort that might be tracked. This is a plausible candidate for a metaphysical view
adopted by someone who claims to do without metaphysics.30
The brand of modal realism that Brandom endorses does not take modal fea-
tures of the world to be straightforwardly tracked. We do not simply look into the
world and report the presence of laws in the way we report the presence of cups
and saucers or squirrels and dogs. A law is not a feature of the environment that
is tracked in the same sense that its instances are. I can track the acceleration of
a cup dropped to the floor, but I do not track F = ma as though it were some entity
in the environment. This difference is captured by Brandom’s modal expressivism.
The particular expressive role that Brandom assigns to modal discourse does not
apply to ordinary descriptive vocabulary. Ordinary descriptive vocabulary does not
make explicit the counterfactual robustness of material inferences, for instance.
Brandom is thus a realist about something that does not sit at the ‘observation
end’ of inquiry. This suggests an opening for the realist conception of reality ascrip-
tions. If the realist conception is adopted, then the necessity of modal concepts for
any inquirer will lead to the conclusion that we should adopt some form of modal
realism.
One reason for thinking that Brandom has something like the realist concep-
tion in mind comes in his responses to an earlier version of Price’s challenge to his
treatment of modality. Price introduces the thought that a linguistic-anthropolog-
ical account of modality could explain ‘why creatures in our situation would be led
to develop a modal physics, even if they inhabited a nonmodal world’ (Price 2008,
p. 89). To this, Brandom responds:
I don’t understand what ‘a nonmodal world’ could conceivablymean. That counterfact-
ual—what if we inhabited a nonmodal world—makes no sense if the expressive re-
30Recall that Peirce’s other way of capturing the difference between the nominalist and realist
conceptions of reality ascriptions distinguishes between the observation end and the results end of
inquiry. It is plausible to think that e-representation is an ‘observation end’ notion. The detection
of something in the environment is the trigger for a process of inquiry, rather than its result.
This provides further evidence that Price adopts the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions.
In addition, it suggests why a recent proposal for aligning Peirce and Price developed by Henrik
Rydenfelt. Rydenfelt takes Peircean inquiry to ‘turn’ merely i-representational discourses into e-
representational ones (Rydenfelt 2013, p. 19). On the view defended here this proposal fails to
properly distinguish the observation and result ends of inquiry, and to overestimate the breadth
of the things that can be ‘tracked’ in the environment. In particular, it would not allow us follow
Brandom’s form of modal realism.
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sources recruited by modal vocabulary are really part of the very meanings of the
words that we use to describe the world. (Brandom 2008b, p. 145)
He then goes on to say, in line with the Kant-Sellars thesis, that ‘the very idea
of empirical descriptive and explanatory talk involves [. . . ] modal articulation’.
Brandom is puzzled by ‘the enterprise of trying to assign responsibility for some
of these features [of language] to one side or the other of a word-world divide’. And
finally, he says that ‘if our talk about the world is necessarily modally articulated,
I don’t really understand the point of saying that there is no objective feature of
the world that corresponds to these things’ (Brandom 2008b, p. 145). One way to
abandon the wholesale distinction between the world side and the word side is to
adopt Peirce’s realist conception of reality ascriptions. In so far as Brandom claims
to be puzzled by how to deal with these issues, the Peircean position may provide
a useful conversation partner.31
It would be misleading not to note Brandom’s stated commitment, in the same
paper, to ‘turn [his] back onmetaphysics’ (Brandom 2008b, p. 146). However, Bran-
dom does not go into detail about what he means by metaphysics in this response
to Price. In an appendix to Between Saying and Doing, Brandom suggests that
the aim of metaphysics is to provide a semantic metavocabulary into which state-
ments made in any other vocabulary can be paraphrased without loss (Brandom
2008a, pp. 218–221). That is, metaphysics would provide a master language in
which anything which can (either meaningfully or truly) be said in language at
all can be said. This is not what Peirce is attempting to offer in his metaphysics.
Metaphysics, as we have seen, offers a general conception of things on the basis
of which hypotheses can be generated in the other sciences. It does not attempt to
provide some language into which all other languages can be reduced.
Brandom’s argument for a combination of modal expressivism and modal real-
ism follows something like the Peircean pattern. He holds that a certain practical
stance is necessary for anything that employs empirical descriptive vocabulary,
and that features of that practical stance are made explicit by modal vocabulary.
The features of this stance are articulated from the perspective of the language
user rather than from the third person perspective of the biologist or anthropolo-
gist. From this perspective we (fallibly) draw conclusions about what must be for
anything like us. That is, Brandom follows something like the cenoscopic method.
31Brandom also suggests that Price’s worries about the word side and the world side of the
ledger reveal that he is still engaged in a kind of metaphysics (Brandom 2008b, p. 146). This is
essentially the same charge that Price adopts the nominalistic conception of reality ascriptions.
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Finally, something like Peirce’s realist conception of reality ascriptions offers some
leverage on the problem of diagnosing the metaphysics that Brandom takes to be
implicit in Price’s attitude to modality.
The abductive features of Brandom’s proposal are somewhat obscured. This is
a possible divergence between Brandom and the absolutist Peircean metaphysi-
cian. Recall that the abductive nature of metaphysics was twofold. First, Peircean
metaphysics is concerned with what the inquirer brings to inquiry. Second, meta-
physics is more dependent than most sciences on abductive reasoning. Brandom’s
account of modality certainly has the first feature. His expressivist story is con-
cerned with the kind of conceptual structure that any possible inquirer must be
able to bring to the world in order to even make descriptive claims about it. The
second sense in which Peirceanmetaphysics is abductive is less clear in Brandom’s
case. In order to judge the question it would be necessary to consider the form of
Brandom’s arguments for the Kant-Sellars thesis in more detail than is possible
here. However, we can say that, as the Peircean takes up Brandom’s position, the
hypothesis of reality plays an important role. The Peircean deploys the hypothesis
that there is a reality that answers to the realist conception of reality ascriptions
in order for their reading of the necessary structures of inquiry onto reality to get
off the ground at all. Moreover, this story is motivated by the rational hope that
the ideals that Peirce articulates in his normative sciences are attainable.
The alignment of Peirce with Brandom just defended is by no means perfect.
For one thing, Brandom takes there to be a normative Kant-Sellars thesis. How-
ever, he does not think that this thesis should motivate a parallel form of norm-
ative realism (e.g. Brandom 2015b, pp. 166–172). However, the Peircean strategy
just presented will struggle to make the distinctions that Brandom wants to draw
between the normative and modal cases. However, the aim of this discussion was
not to show that Brandom is a Peirceanwithout knowing it. Rather, it attempted to
show how arguments recently developed by Brandom can be taken up by the con-
temporary Peircean and to show that the position we have developed throughout
this thesis is sufficiently close to contemporary debates to be worthy of considera-
tion by contemporary pragmatists. In addition, the Peircean take up of Brandom’s
combination of modal realism and modal expressivism provides an example of a
way in which the Peircean conception of metaphysics might be carried out today.
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Conclusion
This chapter has critically compared some recent developments in pragmatism
with the two proposals for Peirceanmetaphysics developed in the previous chapter.
We began with an account of the basic form of Huw Price’s pragmatist rejection of
metaphysics. Price argues, on the basis of a kind of anti-representationalism, that
there is no means for a pragmatist to either affirm or deny metaphysical claims.
On this view, pragmatists should be metaphysical quietists. I argued that the con-
textualist approach, since it does not require a uniform metaphysical treatment
of true propositions, does not fall afoul of Price’s original argument against meta-
physics. However, more recent developments in Price’s approach introduce a dis-
tinction between two forms of representation and contain an argument that, while
we can have a notion of externality in our explanations of the function of certain
language, we have no language which will enable us to either affirm or deny real-
ity. This is because Price takes the adoption of some practical stance or other to be
a necessary feature of human language use. I argued that this shows that Price
adopts the nominalist conception of reality ascriptions and that this metaphysical
thesis is assumed by Price.
We then turned to recent exchanges between Price and Brandom on the topic of
causal/dispositional modality. I argued that, Brandom’s combination of modal ex-
pressivism andmodal realism reflects something interestingly close to the absolut-
ist proposal for Peircean metaphysics. In particular, the realist side of Brandom’s
account of modality seems to adopt something like the realist conception of reality
ascriptions, and to argue for it on the basis of a cenoscopic claim about any possible
inquirer. That is, we can adopt a kind of realism about dispositional modality on
the basis that it comes along with the conception of the world as determinate. Any
world that could be inquired into must be, on Brandom’s view, modally structured.
Conclusion
This thesis has derived a pragmatist account of the role of metaphysics from the
late 19th and early 20th century work of Charles Peirce. According to Peirce we are
to understandmetaphysics as the final part of cenoscopy, the observational science
of that which is available to any inquirer simply by virtue of being an inquirer. Hav-
ing developed an account of the ideals that should be adopted by any inquirer, and
especially of truth, the Peircean metaphysician asks what any world that could be
successfully inquirer into would have to look like. In this, it conceives of itself as
offering hypotheses whose success will be determined by the extent to which they
enable successful inquiry in other domains. On the Peircean view, defended in this
thesis, all such inquiry either explicitly or implicitly depends on metaphysical and
logical hypotheses concerning the quality of explanations and of the kind of reality
that could support them. This position was critically compared with recent work in
the pragmatist tradition. I argued that Price’s arguments to the conclusion that
pragmatists ought to be metaphysical quietists can be rejected by the Peircean.
In addition, recent pressure placed on Price’s position by Brandom’s modal real-
ism suggested that there is space for a more full-throated Peircean strategy to be
deployed by contemporary pragmatists.
In order to defend these views, we began Chapter One with an account of
Peirce’s hierarchical classification of the sciences. According to Peirce’s classifica-
tion, philosophy is foundational for the other sciences, and metaphysics is, in turn,
grounded in the other subdisciplines of philosophy. We considered what Peirce
means by a theoretical science andwhat distinguishes philosophy from other forms
of theoretical inquiry. While both share the same ‘spirit’, defined in terms of a sin-
cere desire for the truth, they are based on different kinds of observation.
In Chapter Two, we considered the distinction between cenoscopy and idioscopy
in more detail and offered some Peircean arguments for the claim that idioscopy
depends on cenoscopy for principles. I argued that cenoscopy should be thought of
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in terms of what is available to any possible inquirer, rather than in terms of what
is simply available ‘from the armchair’. The dependence of idioscopy on cenoscopy
was made out in terms of the necessity for abductive inferences in all forms of in-
quiry and in terms of the possibility that alternative arrangements would under-
mine the ideal of rational self-control articulated by Peirce’s normative sciences.
This position was distinguished from recent pragmatist forms of philosophical nat-
uralism. We saw that pragmatism need not imply either the total abandonment of
‘first philosophy’ or deference to the results of the natural sciences.
Chapter Three developed Peirce’s core logical doctrines concerning truth. I ar-
gued that, in addition to the contextualist understandings of truth developed by
Misak and Hookway, there is further room for a notion of absolute truth in Peirce.
I argued, in addition, that this notion is an important feature of Peirce’s ceno-
scopic logic. That is, the absolute truth functions as an ‘ideal limit’ which could be
agreed upon by any possible inquirer, whereas particular local norms of inquiry
of the sort considered by the contextualist might be unavailable to some possible
inquirers. The notion of the absolute truth was articulated by means of Peirce’s
semeiotic account of the proposition. Unlike the abstract propositions considered
by the contextualist, propositions which by nature have to attend to some partic-
ular properties of some particular subject to the exclusion of others, the absolute
truth is not abstract. As a result, there is only one proposition which is ‘absolutely
true’. Moreover, this proposition is identical with reality in so far as it is intelli-
gible. I compared this view this the identity theory more famously defended by F.
H. Bradley.
In Chapter Four, the Peirce’s conception of metaphysics was developed. This
was done by considering Peirce’s various accounts of the shift from logic to meta-
physics. We also saw in more detail the role of metaphysics in helping to solve idio-
scopic problems. A central aspect of this account was Peirce’s defence of the realist
conception of reality ascriptions. The absolutist Peircean metaphysical strategy
outlined in this thesis relies on this conception of reality ascriptions in order to
make themove from logic to metaphysics. We also saw the extent to which amerely
contextualist approach to Peirceanmetaphysics, of the sort developed byHookway,
can follow the same pattern.
Finally, Chapter Five put Peirce’s conception of metaphysics into critical con-
tact with recent anti-metaphysical work by Price.We saw that even the contextual-
ist approach to Peircean metaphysics can challenge Price’s pragmatist rejection of
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metaphysics. Contextualist Peircean metaphysicians can motivate metaphysics by
asking explanatory questions about our success in various forms of inquiry. This
need not rely on a metaphysically loaded conception of representation. However,
we also saw that a more radical challenge to the Pricean position is available from
the absolutist approach developed in Chapter Four. We saw that Price’s position
relies on the adoption of a nominalist conception of reality ascriptions. This was
presented as an example of a metaphysical commitment which undermines Price’s
claim to do without any such commitments. In addition, we saw that the cenoscopic
approach to metaphysics has some resonances with recent developments in Bran-
dom’s account of dispositional modality.
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